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2024 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

The EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation: Why, What and How?

Author : Lena Hornkohl

Published in: Weaponising Investments

Publisher: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

With the new Regulation on Foreign Subsidies distorting the Internal Market (FSR), the EU wants to close several gaps in its current toolbox, foster its new industrial strategy and create a level-playing field on its internal market, thereby increasing competition on the merits. Contrary to FDI control, at least at the outset, security concerns play a minor role in the discussions around regulating foreign subsidies on the EU internal market. The focus lies on economic concerns: the level playing field in the EU internal market. Specifically, the EU fears far-reaching involvement of non-EU State-owned enterprises in its internal market to the detriment of EU competitors.
This article will first give an overview of the new FSR and, second, explore the alignment and interdependencies of the new instrument with existing EU screening instruments, with a focus on merger and FDI control tools. The article supports foreign subsidy control in general but takes a sceptical view towards the new regulation in regard to coordination and alignment with existing policies. It concludes by placing the proposal in the context of other recent developments and a general increased governmental involvement and control of economic activities in the EU.

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Footnotes
1
See, hereto, Hornkohl (2020).
 
2
Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L 330/1 (FSR).
 
3
European Commission (2020) Making Europe’s businesses future-ready: A new Industrial Strategy for a globally competitive, green and digital Europe (IP/20/416). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​commission/​presscorner/​detail/​en/​ip_​20_​416.
 
4
See on purpose Article 1(1) FSR; see, on the legal basis Smela Wolski (2022), pp. 153 et seq.
 
5
See Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, OJ L 1791/1 (FDI-Screening Regulation); see on the interplay also Dackö et al. (2022), pp. 505 et seq.
 
6
See on the notion of level playing field Erdmann and Reinhold (2022), pp. 145 et seq.
 
7
Recitals 2, 5 FSR.
 
8
Neumann (2019), p. 77; Guilliard (2020), p. 306; Kühling et al. (2022), p. 7; critically Brauneck (2021), p. 2322.
 
9
Article 69(4) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94/65, and Art. 84(4) Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L 94/243.
 
10
It is true that under EU procurement law a tender can otherwise be rejected if it is abnormally low. However, this is only part of an overall consideration and requires proof that only the third State subsidy made such a low bid possible, see, Article 69 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC and Art. 84 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC.
 
11
The following statements on EU trade defence instruments apply mutatis mutandis also to WTO subsidy law see Trapp (2020), pp. 969 and 970.
 
12
Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union, OJ L 176/55 (Anti-Subsidy Regulation).
 
13
Müller-Ibold (2020), pp. 246–251.
 
14
Ibid 257–263.
 
15
European Commission, Decision of June 2, 2019, Case M.8677—Siemens v Alstom.
 
16
Bundeskartellamt, Decision of April 27, 2020, Case B4-115/19—CRRC v Vossloh.
 
17
Trapp (2020) pp. 339–341, see hereto below at Sect. 3.
 
18
Crochet and Gustafsson (2021), pp. 343 et seq.
 
19
European Council (2019) Conclusions European Council meeting, 21 and 22 Mar 2019. https://​data.​consilium.​europa.​eu/​doc/​document/​ST-1-2019-INIT/​en/​pdf.
 
20
European Parliament (2020) Report on competition policy—annual report 2019. https://​www.​europarl.​europa.​eu/​doceo/​document/​A-9-2020-0022_​EN.​pdf.
 
21
European Commission (2020) White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies (COM(2020) 253 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​international/​overview/​foreign_​subsidies_​white_​paper.​pdf (White Paper).
 
22
European Commission (2021) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (COM(2021) 223 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​international/​overview/​proposal_​for_​regulation.​pdf (Draft Regulation).
 
23
European Council (2022) Foreign subsidies distorting the internal market: provisional political agreement between the Council and the European Parliament. https://​www.​consilium.​europa.​eu/​en/​press/​press-releases/​2022/​06/​30/​foreign-subsidies-regulation-political-agreement/​.
 
24
See European Parliament (2022) Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 10 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, P9_TC1-COD(2021)0114, https://​www.​europarl.​europa.​eu/​doceo/​document/​TA-9-2022-0379_​EN.​html.
 
26
Article 54(1) FSR, the FSR was published in the Official Journal on 22 December 2022.
 
27
Article 54(2) FSR.
 
28
Article 54(4) FSR, see also below at Sects. 2.4.2 and 2.4.3.
 
29
See hereto also Ritzek-Seidl (2022a), pp. 29 et seq.; Ritzek-Seidl (2022b), pp. 423 et seq.
 
30
See, for example, Recital 6 FSR; European Commission (2021) Commission Staff Working Document—Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (SWD(2021) 99 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition-policy/​system/​files/​2021-06/​foreign_​subsidies_​impact_​assessment_​report.​pdf, pp. 7, 37, 46, 47, 63; for further analysis of the comparison between foreign subsidy and State aid law see, Hornkohl (2023); also Zöttl and Werner (2022), pp. 475 et seq.; Weiß (2022), pp. 467 et seq.; Blazek and Hegener (2022), pp. 453 et seq.
 
31
Furthermore, according to Recital 9 FSR, the FSR should be ‘applied and interpreted in light of the relevant Union legislation, including those relating to State aid, mergers and public procurement’; see also Soltész (2022), p. 425; Laprévote and Lin (2022), pp. 443 et seq.
 
32
Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 475.
 
33
For example, Regulation (EU) 2019/712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on safeguarding competition in air transport, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 868/2004, OJ L 123/4.
 
34
Article 2(1) FSR.
 
35
See the fundamental case of CJEU, C-41/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161—Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, para 21.
 
36
See, for example, CJEU, C-155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40—Giuseppe Sacchi.
 
37
See also Recital 2 FSR; hereto Scholke et al. (2022), p. 624.
 
38
See, for example, European Court of Auditors (2020) The EU’s response to China’s State-driven investment strategy, Review 3/2020. https://​www.​eca.​europa.​eu/​Lists/​ECADocuments/​RW20_​03/​RW_​EU_​response_​to_​China_​EN.​pdf; Bardt and Matthes (2021), pp. 300 et seq.
 
39
Müller-Ibold (2020), pp. 246–251.
 
40
Recital 11 FSR.
 
41
See Article 3(1)(a) Anti-Subsidy Regulation; Article 9(10) Regulation (EU) 2019/712 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on safeguarding competition in air transport, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 868/2004, OJ L 123/4.
 
42
See also Article 39 FSR.
 
43
See Soltész (2022), p. 426, listing examples of possible financial contributions.
 
44
See also Zöttl and Werner (2022), pp. 476 and 477; Bauermeister (2022), p. 483.
 
45
See on the legal test in detail Schonberg (2022), pp. 143 et seq.
 
46
Recital 17 FSR.
 
47
See CJEU, C-730/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:209—Philip Morris para 11.
 
48
Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 481.
 
49
See, for example, Article 19 FSR, limiting the assessment to the concentration concerned and all foreign subsidies provided in the 3 years prior to the conclusion.
 
50
Article 46(1)(a) FSR.
 
51
See on the question of the relevant theory of harm and whether the analysis requires a determination of the relevant market also Zöttl and Werner (2022), pp. 481 et seq. and 483.
 
52
See also Article 7 and Recital 7 FSR.
 
53
See already White Paper, 15.
 
54
Article 3(2) FSR referring to Article 3(2), first subparagraph Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 352/1.
 
55
Similar distinction Dackö et al. (2022), p. 513.
 
56
Similar wording Ritzek-Seidl (2022b), p. 425.
 
57
See also Modrall (2022); European Commission, Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 91I as amended by ere subsequent versions published in OJ C 112I (2020), OJ C 164 (2020), OJ C 218 (2020), OJ C 3401 (2020), OJ C 34 (2021) and OJ C 473 (2021), informal consolidated version of the Temporary Framework of 18 November 2021. https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition-policy/​system/​files/​2021-11/​TF_​consolidated_​version_​amended_​18_​nov_​2021_​en_​2.​pdf.
 
58
Article 5(2) FSR.
 
59
See also Recital 20 FSR for details.
 
60
See, for unlimited guarantees, for example CJEU, C-438/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2018:737—European Commission v France.
 
61
See Chapters 3 and 4 FSR.
 
62
White Paper, 15.
 
63
Article 6(2) FSR.
 
64
Recital 21 FSR.
 
65
Soltész (2022), p. 426; Gau and Gutmann (2022), p. 42.
 
66
See also Dackö et al. (2022), p. 507.
 
67
White Paper, 17; see hereto in detail Gau and Gutmann (2022), pp. 42 et seq.
 
68
See, for example, Article 31 Anti-Subsidy Regulation.
 
69
See, on the EU interest test in general Wellhausen (2001), pp. 1027 et seq.; Horváthy (2014), pp. 261 et seq.
 
70
See on the discussion Horváthy (2014), p. 267.
 
71
See Article VI and XIX of GATT, the Article VI Agreement, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the Agreement on Safeguards.
 
72
Article 3(1) WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
 
73
Article 9(1) Anti-Dumping Agreement.
 
74
White Paper, p. 17.
 
75
See Article 5 Draft Regulation.
 
76
Commission Staff Working Document—Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (SWD(2021) 99 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition-policy/​system/​files/​2021-06/​foreign_​subsidies_​impact_​assessment_​report.​pdf, p. 48; see also Gau and Gutmann (2022), p. 45.
 
77
Trapp (2020), p. 968.
 
78
See for competition law, for example, Hildebrand (2017), p. 1.
 
79
On similar examples and using primary law foundations Gau and Gutmann (2022), pp. 56 et seq.
 
80
See in more detail also Gau and Gutmann (2022), pp. 50 and 53.
 
81
Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 483.
 
82
Article 7(1) FSR.
 
83
Article 7(2) FSR.
 
84
Recital 23 FSR.
 
85
Article 7(3) FSR.
 
86
Article 7(3) FSR, see Recital 22 FSR on the topic of proportionality.
 
87
Article 7(5) FSR.
 
88
Article 17(5) FSR, see Recital 32 FSR.
 
89
See hereto Laprévote and Lin (2022), p. 448.
 
90
Article 7(4)(h) FSR refers to Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC)No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules on the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 140/01.
 
91
European Commission (2021) Commission Staff Working Document—Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (SWD(2021) 99 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition-policy/​system/​files/​2021-06/​foreign_​subsidies_​impact_​assessment_​report.​pdf, p. 21.
 
92
See, for example, the exemption from the concentration requirement for insolvency acquisitions in Article 20 (4)(b) FSR.
 
93
Article 28(3) FSR and Recital 41 FSR. In contrast, Article 2(3)(c) FSR excludes defence and security contracts falling under Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council which are exempted by Member States on the basis of Article 346 TFEU completely from the scope of the FSR, see also Recital 10 FSR.
 
94
See hereto Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 479.
 
95
Article 28(4) FSR.
 
96
Those must fulfil the concentration requirements set out in Article 20(1), (2), (4)–(6) FSR.
 
97
See also Recital 36 FSR.
 
98
European Commission (2021) Communication from the Commission—Commission Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases (C(2021) 1959 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​consultations/​2021_​merger_​control/​guidance_​Article_​22_​referrals.​pdf.
 
99
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24/1 (EUMR).
 
100
See also Modrall (2022).
 
101
Article 46(1)(c) FSR.
 
102
Recital 36 FSR.
 
103
Scholke et al. (2022), p. 626.
 
104
See Recital 36 FSR, see also the explicit wording of Article 29(8) FSR ‘without prejudice’.
 
105
See Recital 57 FSR.
 
106
Article 34(1) FSR, Recital 57 FSR.
 
107
See also Recital 57 FSR.
 
108
See Draft Regulation, 61, see also Soltész (2022), p. 425.
 
109
European Commission (2021) Commission Staff Working Document—Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (SWD(2021) 99 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition-policy/​system/​files/​2021-06/​foreign_​subsidies_​impact_​assessment_​report.​pdf, p. 86.
 
110
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1/1 (Regulation 1/2003).
 
111
Article 28(5) FSR.
 
112
According to Article 28(5) FSR such information is not a notification in the sense of Chapter 4 and should not be investigated under this Article but the ex officio procedure.
 
113
See in detail below at Sect. 2.4.3.
 
114
See below at Sect. 2.4.2.1.
 
115
Article 36 FSR.
 
116
Articles 9(1), 35(2) FSR.
 
117
See, for example, Article 10 Anti-Subsidy Regulation.
 
118
See, for example, Article 7(2) Regulation 1/2003.
 
119
See, for example, Article 12(1) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248/9.
 
120
According to Article 35(2) FSR, natural and legal persons are encouraged to communicate to the Commission information on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market.
 
121
Soltész (2022), p. 426.
 
122
See Chapter V Regulation 1/2003.
 
123
Similar Laprévote and Lin (2022), p. 446; Scholke et al. (2022), pp. 625 and 626.
 
124
Article 16(4) FSR.
 
125
See, for example, Article 28 Anti-Subsidy Regulation or Article 18 Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union, OJ L 176/21 (Anti-Dumping Regulation), see hereto Laprévote and Lin (2022), p. 445.
 
126
Article 40 FSR.
 
127
Article 41, 42 FSR.
 
128
Article 43 FSR.
 
129
Article 43 FSR.
 
130
See hereto Laprévote and Lin (2022), p. 449.
 
131
Article 42(1) and (3) FSR.
 
132
Article 42(4) FSR.
 
133
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145/43 (Transparency Regulation).
 
134
Article 11(2) FSR.
 
135
Article 11(3) FSR.
 
136
Article 11(4) FSR.
 
137
See above at Sect. 2.3.
 
138
The same is true for the special notification proceedings according to Article 8 FSR.
 
139
Article 8 FSR.
 
140
See on revocability of decisions Schroeder (2018), Article 288, para. 126.
 
141
See, Article 8(6) EUMR.
 
142
See, in detail below Sect. 3.
 
143
See Recital 9 FSR; Bauermeister (2022), p. 482; Scholke et al. (2022), p. 623.
 
144
White Paper, p. 23.
 
145
White Paper, 23 footnote 37.
 
146
See above at Sect. 2.4.1.1.
 
147
For the calculation of turnover, see Article 22 FSR; on the calculation of turnover of public undertakings Scholke et al. (2022), p. 625.
 
148
For the calculation of the financial contributions, see Article 23 FSR.
 
149
See also Ritzek-Seidl (2022b), p. 427.
 
150
See on the notion of establishment in the Union Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 479.
 
151
Article 18(4) Draft Regulation.
 
152
Article 20(3)(a) FSR.
 
153
See also Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 480; Bauermeister (2022), p. 483.
 
154
Critical specifically with regard to the acquired undertaking Scholke et al. (2022), p. 626.
 
155
Article 23 FSR.
 
156
See above at Sect. 2.1.
 
157
See above at Sect. 2.4.1.1.
 
158
See above at Sect. 2.4.1.2.
 
159
White Paper, p. 23.
 
160
Article 1(2) EUMR; see on the differences to the EUMR Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 479; Bauermeister (2022), pp. 482 and 483; Scholke et al. (2022), p. 623.
 
161
European Commission (2021) Commission Staff Working Document—Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (SWD(2021) 99 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition-policy/​system/​files/​2021-06/​foreign_​subsidies_​impact_​assessment_​report.​pdf, p. 85.
 
162
See above at Sect. 2.4.1.1.
 
163
European Commission (2021) Commission Staff Working Document—Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (SWD(2021) 99 final). https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition-policy/​system/​files/​2021-06/​foreign_​subsidies_​impact_​assessment_​report.​pdf, p. 85.
 
164
See, in detail below at Sect. 3.
 
165
White Paper, p. 23.
 
166
See above at Sect. 2.4.1.1.
 
167
See above at Sect. 1.
 
168
Article 54(4) FSR.
 
169
See also Ritzek-Seidl (2022b), pp. 429 and 430.
 
170
See on the procedural steps also Bauermeister (2022), pp. 481 and 482.
 
171
Recital 38 FSR.
 
172
Article 47(1)(a), (4) FSR.
 
173
European Commission (2023), Draft Implementing Regulation on detailed arrangements for the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market. https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​info/​law/​better-regulation/​have-your-say/​initiatives/​13602-Distortive-foreign-subsidies-procedural-rules-for-assessing-them_​en.
 
174
Article 7(1) EUMR.
 
175
Article 14 EUMR.
 
176
See above at Sect. 2.4.1.1.
 
177
Recital 34 FSR.
 
178
See below at Sect. 3.2.
 
179
Article 24(1)(a) FSR.
 
180
Actually, EU merger control law often uses the terms ‘remedies’ and ‘commitments’ as synonyms, see for example, Article 20(1a) Consolidated Version Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 133/1. Essentially, merger control only allows commitments, an obligation voluntarily taken up by the merging companies in order to avoid a prohibition decision, see hereto van de Walle (2021), pp. 12 et seq.
 
181
Article 8(3) EUMR.
 
182
See Recitals 53 and 54 FSR.
 
183
Article 54(4) FSR.
 
184
Article 53(4) FSR, see also Ritzek-Seidl (2022b), p. 430.
 
185
For framework agreements, see Recital 42 FSR.
 
186
Article 28(1)(a) FSR.
 
187
Article 28(2) FSR.
 
188
Article 28(1)(b) FSR.
 
189
See above at Sect. 2.4.1.1.
 
190
Article 29(3) FSR.
 
191
Article 32(1) FSR.
 
192
See hereto already above at Sect. 2.4.2.1.
 
193
See hereto also Blockx (2021); on the parallelism, for example with merger control, FDI, and trade law see Laprévote and Lin (2022), pp. 444 et seq.
 
194
See also Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 478; Scholke et al. (2022), pp. 627 and 628.
 
195
Hereto Bauermeister (2022), p. 484.
 
196
See also Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 479.
 
197
See also Dackö et al. (2022), pp. 507 and 515 et seq., providing for practical examples.
 
198
White Paper, 40.
 
199
See Trapp (2020), p. 969, for a similar conclusions.
 
200
Bundeskartellamt, Decision of April 27, 2020, Case B4-115/19—CRRC v Vossloh.
 
201
Ibid paras. 334 et seq.
 
202
Ibid paras. 350 et seq.
 
203
Ibid paras. 361, 362.
 
204
European Commission (2017) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions of the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations (SWD(2017) 483 final/2). https://​trade.​ec.​europa.​eu/​doclib/​docs/​2017/​December/​tradoc_​156474.​pdf; see Bundeskartellamt, Decision of April 27, 2020, Case B4-115/19—CRRC v Vossloh para. 387.
 
205
See hereto Monopolkommission 2020 = Wettbewerb 2020, XXIII. Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GWB. https://​monopolkommissio​n.​de/​images/​HG23/​HGXXIII_​Gesamt.​pdf, p. 241 et seq.
 
206
See hereto Hornkohl (2023).
 
207
Müller-Ibold (2022), p. 435.
 
208
See above Sect. 2.2.2.
 
209
Equally hinting at the fact that Article 6 FSR could be used for political considerations Soltész (2022), p. 426.
 
210
See also Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 478; Scholke et al. (2022), p. 627.
 
211
Hereto Bauermeister (2022), pp. 483–485.
 
212
See also Dackö et al. (2022), pp. 507 and 515 et seq., providing for practical examples.
 
213
See on these relationships in general Müller-Ibold (2022), pp. 431 et seq.; Laprévote and Lin (2022), pp. 444 et seq.
 
214
White Paper, p. 40.
 
215
Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 483.
 
216
See already above at Sect. 2.4.2.1.
 
217
See Ritzek-Seidl (2022b), p. 427; Bauermeister (2022), p. 482; Scholke et al. (2022), p. 623.
 
218
Blockx (2021); Laprévote and Lin (2022), p. 448; Bauermeister (2022), p. 482; Scholke et al. (2022), p. 627.
 
219
Zöttl and Werner (2022), p. 485.
 
220
Recital 39 FSR.
 
221
Recital 67 FSR.
 
222
See also Ritzek-Seidl (2022b), p. 429.
 
223
Article 10(2) FSR, recital 27 FSR; see also Scholke et al. (2022), p. 627.
 
224
Article 10(3)(c) FSR.
 
225
Article 14(4)–(6) FSR.
 
226
See hereto Dackö et al. (2022), pp. 508 and 509.
 
227
Recitals 39 and 58 FSR.
 
228
See hereto also Soltész (2022), pp. 425 et seq.; Zöttl and Werner (2022), pp. 475 et seq., Bauermeister (2022), pp. 477 et seq.; Scholke et al. (2022), pp. 622 et seq.
 
229
See hereto also Recital 9 FSR.
 
230
See also Recital 7 FSR; see also Dackö et al. (2022), p. 506.
 
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Metadata
Title
The EU Foreign Subsidy Regulation: Why, What and How?
Author
Lena Hornkohl
Copyright Year
2024
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/17280_2023_15

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