The Euro-Crisis, EMU and the Perils of Centralisation

Since the outburst of the Euro-crisis, legal measures adopted by the Member States and the institutions of the EU have produced a major centralisation of powers in the field of economic governance. Recent proposals to achieve a deeper and more genuine European Economic and Monetary Union—and especially the June 2015 Five Presidents Report on “Completing Europe’s EMU”, and the October 2015 European Commission communication “On Steps towards Completing EMU”—have called for further centralisation of powers in the Eurozone. In particular, both documents have proposed the establishment of so-called independent competitiveness councils which would advise State Governments on what structural reforms to undertake nationally as a way to boost growth. The purpose of this contribution is to shed a critical light on these recent proposals discussing the perils that centralisation poses on the balance of power between the EU and the Member States. The chapter, in particular, questions whether the objective of a full centralisation and control of national economic policy can be effective and legitimate. As an alternative, it considers what advantages would be connected to the creation of a genuine EU fiscal capacity: to this end, the chapter explains how an EU fiscal capacity could support the functioning of EMU without bringing about a full centralisation of national economic policies.