Introduction and background
Protected areas have long been widely recognized as a cornerstone for biodiversity conservation (Dudley, 2008; Vimal et al., 2021). Tanzania, with over 30% of its land area under protection (WPA, 2021), contributes more than most countries in the world towards achieving the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KM-GBF) targets specifying the minimum proportion of land for biodiversity conservation (CBD, 2022; Protected Planet, 2020). These protected areas also substantially support the state economy by contributing approximately 21% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 25% of foreign exchange through tourism activities (URT, 2023). However, establishment of most of the protected areas in Tanzania, involved removal of resident people from their traditional lands, with little or no consultation or compensation (Songorwa, 1999). The adverse impacts of their establishment are continuing to affect local people, particularly where they and their livelihoods are directly exposed to wildlife threats (Kideghesho et al., 2007). Consequently, the benefits received by people living close to protected areas tend to be much smaller than the costs they incur from living with wildlife (Mwakaje et al., 2013).
One of the largest protected area networks in Tanzania is the Greater Serengeti Ecosystem (GSE) which covers 25,000 km2 in the northern part of the country and straddles the border with Kenya. The GSE comprises nine protected areas managed by different conservation institutions in Tanzania and one in Kenya, the neighboring country (Kisingo et al., 2016). In Tanzania, two protected areas, Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area, are World Heritage Sites. They constitute Tanzania’s leading tourism destinations, making them a major source of revenue for the country (URT, 2023). However, the removal of traditional communities from the GSE continues, with ongoing relocation of Maasai pastoralists whose growing population is perceived as a threat to the quality of Ngorongoro Conservation Area (Al Jazeera, 2022; Mittal, 2022). Where local communities perceive that they are being denied their traditional rights and their livelihood options are threatened, their attitudes towards conservation tend to be negative (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012; Kiwango et al., 2018).
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Some conflicts between conservation institutions managing the protected areas in the GSE and neighboring communities have remained unresolved for several decades (Bonner, 1993; Neumann, 1996; Kideghesho et al., 2020). The rights to access natural resources or benefits from the protected areas by local people are largely denied through the conventional “fence and fine” approach to conservation policy (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012). Local people have been severely punished by the courts either by confiscation of livestock found grazing in the protected areas (i.e. game reserves, Serengeti National Park and Wildlife Management Areas) or incarceration; there is a minimum sentence of 20 years in prison for possession of bushmeat, even though bushmeat hunting is an important livelihood strategy and culture for some communities around the GSE (Kideghesho et al., 2005; Mwakaje et al., 2013). However, while people are not allowed to use park resources, damage by wildlife to human livelihoods through crop damage, livestock depredation and loss of life or injury to people is common (Mwakatobe et al., 2014; Eustace et al., 2018, 2022; Snyder et al., 2021). There have also been conflicts between local communities and protected areas’ management in the GSE over boundaries (Matata et al., 2022).
Consequently, the protected area management authority in the GSE uses a large proportion of its total budget to protect wildlife from illegal use by local communities living around the parks (Knapp, 2012; Holden et al., 2019; Rija and Kideghesho, 2020). The approach is not working well. Most local people living in and around the GSE protected areas have negative attitudes toward conservation (Kideghesho et al., 2007; Mfunda et al., 2012; Kegamba et al., 2022) and, notwithstanding the potential punishment, subsistence hunting by local people for bushmeat consumption is so widespread that it is recognized as a leading threat to biodiversity in the GSE, contributing to a substantial decline in wildlife populations of the area (Loibooki et al., 2002; Rentsch and Packer, 2015; Rija and Kideghesho, 2020). Other forms of illegal harvest of resources in the GSE include felling trees for charcoal production, mining and livestock grazing in the park (Fyumagwa et al., 2013; Kihwele et al., 2021). Retaliatory and pre-emptive killing of wild animals that damage crops or attack livestock is also common (Holmern et al., 2007; Mbise, 2021; Kideghesho et al., 2020).
The existing conflicts in the GSE have been attributed to wildlife-centered policies and strategies that fail to incorporate or consider the views of community members (Denninger-Snyder et al., 2019). The situation is further complicated by the diversity of cultures and livelihood strategies that exist among the communities living in and around the GSE (Kaltenborn et al., 2008; Kideghesho and Mtoni, 2008; Estes et al., 2012; Sekar et al., 2014; Kegamba et al., 2023). For example, agro-pastoralists base their livelihoods on both livestock and cropping, pastoralists focus on raising livestock, and hunter and gatherer communities neither raise livestock nor cultivate crops but rely on resources based on their knowledge of the landscape away from cultivated areas (Kegamba et al., 2023). The demands of specific livelihood types and the associated impact experienced from conservation management are therefore likely to vary greatly among communities.
Conservation institutions in the GSE and the Tanzanian Government have been responding to these pressing and complicated conservation issues in several ways, particularly through a variety of community-based conservation and benefit-sharing approaches. For example, in 1988 the Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (the two leading sources of tourism revenue in the ecosystem) established the Community Conservation Services (CCS) program in the GSE that built schools, health centers and water wells in villages (Kaaya and Chapman, 2017). In 2006, two protected areas, the Ikona and Makao Wildlife Management Areas, were gazetted to be managed by the local people outside the core types of protected area - game reserves and national parks (Schmitt, 2010). Likewise, conservation authorities in the GSE have been attempting to reduce livelihood losses by inhibiting wildlife access to communities (Eustace et al., 2018), or have compensated local people for their losses under the Wildlife Conservation (Dangerous Animals Damage Consolation) Regulation which was introduced in 2011(GN, 2011). However, the compensation provided is far smaller than the costs incurred by local people having to live with wildlife, many of whom are trapped in a perpetual cycle of severe poverty (Mwakatobe et al., 2014; Kegamba et al., 2024). To find a solution for the complex trade-offs needed between conservation goals and the costs to local communities, we analysed key current wildlife policies, conservation legislation, regulations and strategic plans in the GSE. Specifically, we reviewed; (1) how conservation benefit-sharing mechanisms are represented in Tanzanian conservation policies; and (2) how the management of human-wildlife conflict is addressed in the policies related to wildlife conservation. We integrate this analysis with community perspectives on the types of community benefits provided and their effectiveness, and the wildlife-related losses to livestock, crops and human life in the GSE.
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Materials and methods
Study area description
The GSE, our case study site, covers an area of 25,000 km2 in northern-western Tanzania (Fig. 1). The ecosystem, most of which comprises protected areas, is one of the most valuable tourist destinations in Africa because of its rich and spectacular wildlife (Gadd, 2015). The dominant wild mammals in the ecosystem are the migratory wildebeest (Connochaetes spp.) that migrate across the border between the two countries (Larsen et al., 2020) along with zebra (Equus burchelli) and Thomson’s gazelle (Gazella thomsoni) (Mduma et al., 1999). However, it is the less abundant species that cause most damage to neighbouring local communities. Elephants (Loxodonta africana) frequently damage crops and attack people (Eustace et al., 2018, 2022; Snyder et al., 2021) while spotted hyena (Crocuta crocuta), lions (Panthera leo) and leopard (Panthera pardus) cause livestock losses (Lyamuya et al., 2014, 2016).
Fig. 1
Distribution and size of local communities in and around the Greater Serengeti Ecosystem (population size based on Tanzania’s NBS census 2022) (NBS, 2022)
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In Tanzania, the protected areas of the GSE are managed by conservation institutions operating under a variety of legal frameworks (Kisingo et al., 2016). Serengeti National Park (14,763 km2), located at the core of the GSE, is managed by Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) and prohibits any form of consumptive use of resources (Nyahongo et al., 2009). Ngorongoro Conservation Area (8,094 km2) in the southeast of the GSE permits photographic tourism along with pastoralism among the resident tribes including Maasai, Hadzabe and Datoga. Five game reserves i.e., Maswa (2,764 km2), Kijereshi (66 km2), Ikorongo (602 km2), Grumeti (411 km2) and Pololeti (1,500 km2, not shown on the map) allow tourist hunting and photographic tourism but prohibit livestock grazing and other human activities. Two Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), Ikona (242 km2) and Makao (769 km2), which were established to motivate local people to support and participate actively in wildlife conservation (Benjaminsen et al., 2013) are managed by a body comprised of elected village representatives. These areas also allow hunting by tourists and photographic safaris but no other human activities, with the exception of those related to conservation activities and livestock grazing during extreme drought in some places under specific conditions.
Local community context
Local people who were displaced during the establishment of protected areas in the GSE, both before and after Tanzania gained independence, live around the border as mixed smallholder farmers and pastoralists (Kideghesho et al., 2007; Veldhuis et al., 2019). Poverty is pervasive; households in villages close to the protected areas are more likely to rely on the environment for their income (e.g., charcoal burning, non-timber forest products; 45% households) than those in villages further away (23%) with over half the communities (51%) living below the poverty line (national average of 36%) (Mwakaje et al., 2013; Kyando et al., 2019). Communities close to protected areas are also subject to substantial crop and livestock losses, and suffer more wildlife-related injuries and mortality than those living far away (Snyder et al., 2021. The human population is dense (Fig. 1) and its growth is rapid: 3.5% per year in areas near the park with 30 people/km2 and 2.5% per year near Lake Victoria where the density is 160 people/km2 (Estes et al., 2012; URT, December, 2022). In the eastern part of the GSE, restrictions on the movement of pastoralists and their cattle in Ngorongoro Conservation Area (IUCN, 2017) have forced people to become sedentary, reducing milk and meat production, resulting in malnutrition (Johnsen, 2000; McCabe, 2003). With no farming allowed, food must be purchased from outside (Melubo and Lovelock, 2019).
Policies and laws for wildlife management in GSE
Wildlife conservation in Tanzania, and the GSE in particular, is governed by several national policies and legislations. In 1998, Tanzania’s first wildlife policy governing wildlife resources in the country i.e. the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania, was formulated after several years without one. This was revised in 2007 (URT, 2007). The Tanzanian Tourism Policy is used to govern tourism activities in the country, most of which occur in protected areas (URT, 1999) that are largely managed by the government. For the small percentage of area managed by local people under the WMAs, the government plays a critical role in terms of legislation and operational supervision (Moyo et al., 2017; Kicheleri et al., 2018a, 2018b). This paper considers policy as the proposed course of action aiming to guide and determine present and future decisions and actions (FAO, 2010). In Tanzania particularly, a policy provides a set of goals and broad direction, and leads to the drafting of legislation and regulatory instruments. Legislation, and the associated regulations, establish the rules, rights and responsibilities needed to implement the direction stated in a policy. In addition to this, the respective government agencies may prepare strategies or plans to operationalize the implementation of policy goals in general, which may not directly be linked to a specific policy. An example of this is the National Human-Wildlife Conflict Management Strategy 2020–2024 (URT, 2021b) which provides a plan and actions for reducing human-wildlife conflict across the country.
Analytical approach
This paper analyses how conservation benefit-sharing mechanisms are represented in Tanzanian conservation policies, legislation, regulations and strategic plans (hereafter referred to as “conservation policies”). To do so, we drew on the findings of three studies conducted during 2021 and 2022 that have documented community members’ interactions with wildlife, and with the parks nearby or within which they live. These interactions are based on: (i) the types of benefits local people living around protected areas in Tanzania (Kegamba et al., 2022); (ii) the effectiveness of benefit-sharing mechanisms in securing communities support to conservation of wildlife (Kegamba et al., 2023); and (iii) the losses incurred by communities (Kegamba et al., 2024). In particular, we assess how benefit-sharing and human-wildlife conflict management are addressed in the policies related to wildlife conservation, using GSE as a case study.
To analyse the policy documents we followed the three steps of Bouwma et al. (2018) and Ahammad et al. (2021). From January to April 2021, the first author conducted key informant interviews with the communities’ representatives and the wildlife managers in the GSE, whose daily activities are guided by these documents. In total, 18 people were interviewed; two each from Serengeti National Park, game reserves, Ngorongoro Conservation Area, and three from the Wildlife Management Areas, one each from Game Controlled area and Serengeti District Council and seven from the communities. The managers were asked to list the conservation policies which are applicable to the conservation in their respective areas. To locate these documents, we first searched for the wildlife-related policies on Google using the following terms: “wildlife policy Tanzania”, “wildlife conservation policy Tanzania”, “wildlife conservation regulation Tanzania”, “tourism policy Tanzania”, “wildlife strategic plan Tanzania” and “tourism policy regulation Tanzania”. After having these documents, we checked for their validity and currency with the key informants to ascertain if we had the most up to date version. This was necessary because there was no central database of policy documents. Secondly, within each document, we reviewed the aims, objectives, description, general statements and proposed programs, strategies or actions, and documented any reference to benefit-sharing with communities or to human-wildlife conflict management. From the analysis we excluded statements related to conservation benefit-sharing between protected areas organisations and the Tanzanian government that did not mention communities (e.g. regulations pertaining to government and tourist hotel owners). We also excluded documents that have expired such as the General Management Plan (GMPs). We noted the presence of each representation or mention of “benefit-sharing” and “human-wildlife conflict management” and used six ordinal criteria to judge the quality of each mention (Table 1). Our focus was to assess the coherence between existing policies and the concepts of community benefit-sharing and human-wildlife management conflict.
Criteria used |
|---|
• No mention of benefit-sharing |
• Benefit-sharing with the communities broadly mentioned, with no details on implementation |
• Benefit-sharing with the communities considered in detail |
• No mention of human-wildlife conflict management |
• Human-wildlife conflict management broadly mentioned, with no details on implementation |
• Human wildlife conflict management considered in detail |
Results
We analysed the current conservation policies below in relation to the various types of benefit-sharing mechanisms, community perceptions of the benefits, and the losses incurred by the community due to wildlife, to offer a holistic perspective of conservation.
Current benefit-sharing mechanisms, community perceptions, and conservation-related costs incurred by the communities
Current benefit-sharing mechanisms in GSE
Generally in Tanzania, conservation institutions do provide benefits to local communities residing in proximity to protected areas. Based on Kegamba et al. (2022), we categorised them into social services, livelihood support and employment. Social services included investment in schools (in the form of classrooms, student desks, scholarships, school fees or books), health centers, and village office buildings. Livelihood benefits included all living-related benefits such as food, water, cash, training (in, for example, materials for crafts and production opportunities such as beekeeping), or access to non-timber forest products (NTFP). Employment offered for the local people was either permanent (with pensionable terms) or temporary (without pensionable terms). The types of benefits received within these categories varied significantly among wildlife institutions in terms of magnitude and acceptance by the communities (Kegamba et al., 2023; Table 2). The variations in the types of benefits provided were found to be caused by differences among institutional policies and legislation governing the organisations.
Table 2
Types of benefits provided by conservation institutions in the GSE, their magnitude and the extent to which the type of benefit is accepted by local people.
(adapted from Kegamba et al. (2023)
Institution | Policy | Source of the document | Type of benefits | Magnitude | Acceptance level by the communities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TANAPA | National Policies for Tanzania National Parks | (TANAPA, 1994) | Social services | Low | Accept |
The National Park Act Chap. 282 revised in 2002 | (TANAPA, 2002) | Livelihood support | Not provided | Strongly reject | |
Employment | Low | Reject | |||
TAWA | Wildlife Conservation Act Chap. 283 Revised Edition 2022 | (URT, 2022) | Social services | Low | Reject |
Wildlife Conservation (Special Wildlife Investment Concession Areas) Regulations, 2021 | (URT, 2021c) | Livelihood support | Not provided | Strongly reject | |
The Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations, 2016 | (GN, 2015) | Employment | Low | Reject | |
NCAA | The Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority Act No. 14 of 1975 Revised Edition, 2002 | (NCA, 2002) | Social services | High | Strongly accept |
Livelihood support | High | Accept | |||
Employment | Low | Reject | |||
WMA | The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2018 | (GN, 2018) | Social services | High | Strongly accept |
Livelihood support | Low | Neither accept nor reject | |||
Employment | Low | Reject |
The community perceptions on benefit-sharing at GSE
Respondents to an earlier survey of benefit-sharing mechanisms in the GSE (Kegamba et al., 2023) were aware that the benefits they received aimed to encourage them to support the nearby protected areas, and agreed that the benefits helped to reduce illegal activities in the protected areas. However, only 22% were willing to support the existence of a protected area without benefits. The study also found that the greater the benefit community members received from conservation, the more they were aware of conservation activities and the more likely they were to have a positive perception of the protected areas. Respondents from villages receiving little benefits expressed little support the adjacent protected areas, explaining that the benefits were too small, were provided too inconsistently, and did not meet the immediate needs of individuals or households.
Losses incurred by the local people to wildlife at GSE
In another study (Kegamba et al., 2024), we assessed the losses incurred by local people and the compensation by the Tanzanian government. We used a historical dataset maintained by the Tanzanian government on crop damage, livestock losses and attacks on humans, allowing the calculation of the annual losses of crops and livestock, and of attacks on people among communities residing beside or within the protected area. Elephants were found to have caused most crop damage and were most dangerous to people, with hyenas and lions killing most livestock (details in Kegamba et al., 2024; Table 3). Based on the agency data, 76% of local Indigenous people who experienced attacks on their livestock from wildlife lived within Ngorongoro. The government compensated for only < 20% of the total financial losses (Table 4), with small amounts provided for wildlife-related injury or death of a person in the community.
Table 3
List of animals causing the damage, listed according to the extent of damage they cause in each case, starting with the high to the least damaging species.
(source: adapted from Kegamba et al., 2024)
Animal causing crop damage | Animal killing livestock | Animal dangerous to people |
|---|---|---|
Elephant (Loxodonta africana) | Hyena (Crocuta crocuta) | Elephant (Loxodonta africana) |
Baboon (Papio anubis) | Lion (Panthera leo) | Hyena (Crocuta crocuta) |
Velvelt monkey (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) | Leopard (Panthera pardus) | Buffalo (Syncerus caffer) |
Wild pig (Sus scrofa) | Elephant (Loxodonta africana) | Lion (Panthera leo) |
Wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus) | Wild dog (Lycaon pictus) | Leopard (Panthera pardus) |
Warthog (Phacochoerus africanus) | Buffalo (Syncerus caffer) | Nile crocodile (Crocodylus niloticus) |
Porcupine (Hystrix cristata) | Hippopotamus (Hippopotamus amphibius) | |
Hippopotamus (Hippopotamus amphibius) | Black barked jackal (Canis mesomelas) | |
Cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus) |
Table 4
Financial losses and compensation by the government for Serengeti District only in the west of the GSE.
(source: adapted from Kegamba et al. 2024)
Financial losses (crops) (USD/yr) | Financial losses (livestock) (USD/yr) | Compensation (crops) (USD/yr) | Compensation (Livestock) (USD/yr) |
|---|---|---|---|
489,000 | 17,600 | 85,000 | 3,000 |
Review of conservation policies
In total, 14 conservation policies were identified and reviewed (Fig. 2; Table 5). The documents reviewed included three policies, four pieces of legislation, six regulations and one strategic plan. To operationalise the policies, these documents complement each other usually in a linear arrangement (Fig. 2). The policies lay out the main goals and programs/actions required to be achieved by responsible authorities, followed by the legislation (statutes) which lay down the enforcement mechanisms and compliance to achieve the stated goals in a policy. In some cases, legislation may delegate power to the ministerial departments or respective organisations to formulate the subordinate legislation i.e. the regulations which provide the procedures and technical arrangements to help implement the legislation. Occasionally, some departments may have strategic plans which are useful practical tools to explain how, by whom, and when the actions will be performed. All the studied documents reviewed apply to protected areas across the country, including those forming the GSE.
Fig. 2
Complementary arrangement of various conservation-related policies, legislation, regulations and strategic plans in Tanzania. NCAA: Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority; TANAPA: Tanzania National Parks; TAWA: Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority; WMA: Wildlife Management Area
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Table 5
Policies, legislation, regulations, strategic plans and relevant agencies of the Tanzanian government determine the consideration of benefit-sharing between protected areas and adjacent communities and the provision of compensation for wildlife losses
Document type | Name of the document | Year of enactment | Acronym | Responsible agency | Source of the document |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Policy | 1) The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania | 2007 | WP | TANAPA, NCAA, TAWA | (URT, 2007) |
2) National Tourism Policy | 1999 | TP | Tourism Department | (URT, 1999) | |
3) National Policies for Tanzania National Parks | 1994 | NPNP | TANAPA | (TANAPA, 1994) | |
Legislation | 4) Wildlife Conservation Act Chap. 283 Revised Edition 2022 | 2022 | WCA | Wildlife Division, TAWA | (URT, 2022) |
5) The Tourism Act | 2009 | TA | Tourism Department | (URT, 2008) | |
6) The National Park Act Chap. 282 revised in 2002 | 2002 | NPA | TANAPA | (TANAPA, 2002) | |
7) The Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority Act No. 14 of 1975 Revised Edition, 2002 | 2002 | NCA | NCAA | (NCA, 2002) | |
Regulation | 8) Wildlife Conservation (Special Wildlife Investment Concession Areas) Regulations, 2021 | 2021 | WCSR | TAWA | (URT, 2021c) |
9) The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2018 | 2018 | WCWMA | TAWA, WMAs | (GN, 2018) | |
10) The Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations, 2016 | 2016 | WCTH | TAWA | (GN, 2015) | |
11) The Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulations, 2016 | 2016 | WCNC | TANAPA, NCAA, TAWA, WMAs | (GN, 2016) | |
12) Tourism (Tourism Development Levy) Regulations, 2013 | 2013 | TDR | Tourism Department | (GN, 2013) | |
13) Wildlife Conservation (Dangerous Animals Damage Consolation) Regulations, 2011 | 2011 | WCDAC | Wildlife Division | (GN, 2011) | |
Strategic plan | 14) National Human-Wildlife Conflict Management Strategy 2020–2024 | 2020 | NHWCM | Wildlife Department | (URT, 2021b) |
Benefit-sharing was mentioned in all but three of the 14 policies reviewed (Table 6), with five mentioning the concept only in broad terms and six including detailed measures for its implementation. Four policies considered human-wildlife conflict management for implementation in detail, and one did so in broad terms with nine not mentioning or addressing human-wildlife conflict at any level (Table 6).
Table 6
The 14 identified Tanzanian wildlife policy documents, analysis of content relating to benefit-sharing with local people and addressing human-wildlife conflict and the identified policy gaps
Name of the document | Benefit-sharing | Human-wildlife conflict | Policy gap | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Sections of the policy document related to benefit-sharing | No mention of benefit-sharing | Benefit-sharing with the communities broadly mentioned, with no details on implementation | Benefit-sharing with the communities considered in detail | Sections of the policy document related to human wildlife conflict | No mention of human wildlife conflict management | Human wildlife conflict management broadly mentioned, with no details on implementation | Human wildlife conflict management considered in detail | ||
The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania of 2007 | 3.1.4, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 & 3.2.4 | × | ✓ | × | 3.2.3 | × | ✓ | × | Omits compensation for animal damage |
National Tourism Policy of 1999 | 3.0, 5.1.1, 5.6 & 5.9 | × | ✓ | × | ns | ✓ | × | × | Lacks detail on the share of benefit with local communities by the conservation authorities |
National Policies for National Parks of 1994 | 7.0, 7.1.2 & 7.2.3 | × | × | ✓ | ns | ✓ | × | × | Lacks detail on the share of benefit with local communities by the conservation authorities; human wildlife conflict described only in terms of the effects of humans on wildlife, not vice versa |
Wildlife Conservation Act Chap. 283 Revised Edition 2022 | 5(1)(h, J), 31, 31(2, 5), 71(1, 2) & 91(2d) | × | × | ✓ | 69–73 | × | ✓ | × | Lacks details on implementation of benefit-sharing or both |
The National Park Act Chap. 282 revised in 2002 | ns | ✓ | × | × | ns | ✓ | × | × | Lacks detail on the share of benefit with the local people and no mention of human wildlife conflict |
The Ngorongoro Conservation Area Act No. 14 of 1975 Revised Edition, 2002 | 6(c) | ✓ | × | × | ns | ✓ | × | × | Protects the interests of Indigenous Maasai communities but includes neither benefit-sharing provisions nor any mention of human wildlife conflict |
The Tourism Act of 2009 | 58(1) | × | ✓ | × | ns | ✓ | × | × | Minimal benefit-sharing with local people |
The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2018 | 2.0, 17e, 18(J), 66(1), 66 (1b) & 3.2(ix) | × | × | ✓ | 53 (1)–(5) | × | × | ✓ | Reduced the share of benefit to the communities |
The Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations 2016 | 16(1c) | × | × | ✓ | ns | ✓ | × | × | The fixed benefit amount to the communities (USD 5000) is outdated, now even less than the hunting fees for single elephant. |
The Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulation, 2016 | 16(3), 19(a)(iii) (b)(ii) and (c)(iii) | × | × | ✓ | ns | ✓ | × | × | Limiting power of the communities to manage wildlife. Collection of revenues in WMA’s centralised to the Director of wildlife. Small percentages of revenue given to local people. No benefit-sharing formula has been specified by this regulation on the revenue collected from game reserves, national parks and Ngorongoro Conservation Area. |
Tourism (Tourism Development Levy) Regulation, 2013 | ns | ✓ | × | × | ns | ✓ | × | × | Lacks detail on the share of benefit to the communities by the conservation authorities |
Wildlife conservation (special wildlife investment concession areas) regulations, 2021 | 5e, 36 (1), 36(1), & 36 (2c) | × | ✓ | × | ns | ✓ | × | × | Minimal benefits allocated to local people |
Wildlife Conservation (Dangerous Animals Damage Consolation) Regulations of 2011 | 71(1, 2 & 3) | × | × | ✓ | The entire document | × | × | ✓ | The rates of consolation are far less compared to the actual loss |
National Human - Wildlife Conflict Management Strategy 2020–2024 | 5.4 | × | ✓ | × | The entire document | × | × | ✓ | This document lacks implementation strategies. No institution has been tasked to implement this strategy and will expire in the next one year, i.e. 2024 |
The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania, 2007 (URT, 2007), which is the primary instrument from which most of the legislation and regulations in wildlife conservation have been drawn, does not explicitly mention benefit-sharing with the local people in either of its objectives. While the policy refers to equitable sharing of benefits arising from wildlife utilization, it does not specify with whom the benefits should be shared (URT, 2007, section 3.2.2, p. 28). However, the Wildlife Policy recognises that local communities living on village lands with viable wildlife populations have a role in protecting and benefiting from wildlife, and indicates that the establishment of WMAs is the only mechanism for implementation of this vision (URT, 2007, section 3.2.3-4, p. 34 & 37). In addition, Sections 31 and 32 in the Wildlife Conservation Act (URT, 2022) provide binding clauses for the establishment of a local protected area managed by local people (WMA) with its primary objective being to provide benefits to the communities (URT, 2022, sections 31 & 32, p. 34 & 35). Therefore, a wildlife conservation regulation was formulated to provide an implementation mechanism via WMAs (i.e. GN, 2018). Furthermore, the National Tourism Policy provides a general statement that local communities will benefit from conservation by being involved in tourism activities. This policy indicates that a priority for tourism-related investments on land (such as hotels), will be given to tourist projects that benefit local communities (URT, 1999, section 5.6, p.13). The three conservation policies, WP, TP and NPNP (Table 3), set out a general vision for outcomes, but omit mention of mechanisms or instruments to be brought into effect. For example, benefit-sharing is mentioned in Wildilfe Policy (URT, 2007), but in very general terms, and “benefits” do not seem to be described at all other than in terms of the ecosystem services provided to everyone by nature.
3.2.1 The Ngorongoro Conservation Area Act specifies that one of its core functions is “to safeguard and promote the interests of Maasai citizens of the United Republic engaged in cattle ranching and the dairy industry within the Conservation Area” (NCA, 2002, Section 6(c)). This has provided significant opportunities to the Indigenous Maasai people living inside Ngorongoro by enabling them to become the key stakeholders in the management of the Area for several decades. However, the Act does not specify the level of community involvement nor the benefits to be provided.
The Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations 2015, indicate how a trophy hunting company should contribute to the villages within and adjacent to their approved hunting block, specifying that an annual amount of not less than USD 5,000 be provided for each hunting block as a contribution to the implementation of various community development projects (GN, 2015, section 16 (1c), P. 10). According to the key-informant interviews, this money is collected by TAWA and latter presented to respective communities through the village government. The TAWA officials visit the respective village and convene a meeting to explain to the villagers the source of the money and leave the Village Council to decide what development project the money should be used for.
Before the establishment of WMAs in Tanzania, villages that had abundant wildlife on their land were free to enter individual agreements with safari companies and collected all the revenues by themselves without state interference (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; Kicheleri et al., 2018a). However, during the growth of the tourism business and revenues in these areas, there were some conflicts among the communities themselves due to internal politics and elite capture (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). Although a village retains land rights according to the Village Land Act of 2001, wildlife on it remains the property of the state. After the establishment of the WMAs across the country and the publication of Wildlife Conservation Act No. 5, 2009, all activities associated with wildlife in the village land were centralised and controlled by the state. There followed a series of government regulations’ amendments which severely constrained the share of the benefits provided to local people residing in villages forming the WMAs. The benefit-sharing formula provided in section 19(a-c) of the Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulation, 2016 indicates that all the revenue generating activities conducted in the WMA should follow (i) 70% share to the Authorised Association managing the WMA, (ii) 25% to the Director (i.e. TAWA) and (iii) 5% to the district council as a levy (GN, 2015, P. 14).
A subsequent amendment of the Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2018, under section 48 (3) further reduced the community share by 5% and increased the district council share to 10%. In January 2020 (Government Notice No. 27), another 5% of the WMA community share was directed to the so called “consortium” of authorized associations— which aims to serve as an apex body for all authorized associations, leaving communities with 60% of the total share (GN, 2018, Section 29 (2e), P. 23).
Moreover, not all 60% of the total gross revenue from the WMAs provided to the Authorised Association reaches local people. The Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2018 (Section 72 (2a-c) specifies that 15% of the Association’s funds be re-invested in resource development, 25% be used to strengthen the Authorized Association, 10% be retained by the Authorised Association for any emergency case leaving 50% for the villages forming the Wildlife Management Area (GN, 2018, P. 40). This 50% community share actually comprises only 30% of the total gross revenue collected by the WMA.
The reasons why 25% of the gross revenues from each WMA is directed to TAWA are explained as follows: under section 8 of the Wildlife Conservation Act Chap. 283 Revised Edition 2022, TAWA has been given the mandate of protection, management and administration of all wildlife resources outside the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and national parks in Tanzania. Therefore, TAWA represents the central government directly in these areas. They set hunting quotas, supervise hunting activities, manage trophy exports and control poaching. It should also be noted that the WMA rangers are not allowed to use the firearms but TAWA rangers can, and are therefore the people most likely to deal with armed poachers.
Regarding human-wildlife conflict management, the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania, 2007 in its policy statement (page 33) clearly states that “the government does not intend to introduce a compensation scheme for the damage caused by wildlife” (URT, 2007). However, Section 71 of the Wildlife Conservation Act (Chapter 283, Revised Edition 2022) describes how the Minister, after consultation with the Minister responsible for finance, can make regulations specifying the amount of money to be paid as “consolation” to a person or group of persons who have suffered loss of life, livestock, crops or injury caused by dangerous animals. This was implemented by formulating the Wildlife Conservation (Dangerous Animals Damage Consolation) Regulation (GN, 2011). The consolation regulation was made specifically to console those affected by the loss of livelihood and suffered attacks by wild animals (GN, 2011). Section 2 of the Wildlife Conservation (Dangerous Animals Damage Consolation; Regulations of 2011) defines consolation as “the alleviation of misery, distress of mind or grief in either pecuniary or non-pecuniary terms with a view to providing support, comfort and relief from damage” (GN, 2011, P. 97). This regulation specifies clearly what damage should be consoled at given rates and the procedures to be followed (GN, 2011). In addition, the regulation specifies the wildlife species to be considered in the consolation which currently excludes some of the animals causing the damage, as reported in Table 3.
Discussion
Our analysis of the current conservation policies identifies several limitations depending on the type of document reviewed, the time when the policy/legislation was formulated and where it was intended to be implemented. The major limitations identified were: the low level of benefit, if any, delivered to communities; the lack of clear benefit provisioning mechanisms from the central government, and a lack of details on implementation and therefore a lack of capacity to judge on-ground performance.
Benefit-sharing in the conservation policies
Benefit-sharing in conservation is a relatively new approach which has been introduced in policies to reinforce the concept of community engagement in natural resource management (Snyman and Bricker, 2021). This has meant that benefit-sharing provisions have had to be retrofitted to the policy and regulations relating to many of the protected areas forming the GSE, especially the giant Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area, which came into existence over 30 years before the community engagement ideology was introduced the early 1990s (Emerton and Mfunda, 1999; Kaltenborn et al., 2008). Early policies and legislation governing the existence of these protected areas were drafted in a manner that assumed the local people were a threat to the survival of natural resources found in and outside conserved areas. As a result, community engagement and benefit-sharing was not the main target. The concept of engaging the communities in conservation was introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s during policy reviews. Most of these reviews were implemented by the conservation institutions as a condition for continued collaboration or funding by international organisations (Sutherland et al., 2009; Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; Sayer et al., 2015). However, while benefit-sharing is now incorporated into many documents, compliance has been slower with institutions sometimes still reluctant to shift to the new paradigm even 25 years after the concept was first introduced.
In fact the older conservation policies reviewed include far less on benefit-sharing or community involvement in wildlife conservation than recent documents. Some of these policies omit any reference to benefit-sharing at all. Examples are the National Park ordinance and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area ordinance which were first formulated in 1959 before Tanzania became independent. The Acts were aiming to protect Serengeti National Park, which was the first national park in the country, with Ngorongoro Conservation Area created to keep local pastoralists away from the SNP. At that time, the protection of wildlife resources from commercial and subsistence utilization was deemed to be critical (Sinclair and Norton-Griffiths, 1979; Galvin et al., 2008). Benefit-sharing or community engagement was first introduced as a concept in the general Wildlife Policy of Tanzania in the late 1990s and soon every conservation organisation started implementing the idea of community involvement in conservation by supporting communities in whatever form they thought would work. For example, even though the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Act does not mention benefit-sharing with Indigenous people living inside the conservation area, the Ngorongoro’s management established a share of some percentages of collected revenue to be distributed to the communities through the community representative body, the Ngorongoro Pastoral Council (Melubo and Lovelock, 2019).
In some of the recent conservation policies, such as the Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2018 and Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulation, 2016 the concept of benefit-sharing and community engagement in the conservation of wildlife is firmly embedded (Kicheleri, 2018b). However, they lack details on how these concepts are to be implemented. In contrast, some of the conservation policies (e.g. National Human-Wildlife Conflict Management Strategy 2020–2024) suggest that conflicts could be minimised where there is a clear implementation plan on the ground. A good example is the Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2012 based on the Wildlife Conservation Act (No. 5 of 2009) which states in its objective that the aim of the WMA is to transfer the management responsibility of wildlife to local people and to ensure that local communities obtain substantial tangible benefits from wildlife conservation (URT, 2022, section 5 (1 h), p.19). However, in reality, the current management responsibility of WMAs in GSE and other parts of the country has not been transferred to the local people (Bluwstein et al., 2016). The central government still plays a critical role in the daily management of these WMAs from planning resource utilization to the collection of revenue from activities conducted in these WMAs. For example, section 16 (3) of the Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulation, 2016 grants authority to the Director of Wildlife to collect all revenues listed for all activities conducted in some of these protected areas, including the WMAs. The regulation, under section 17(2), explicitly denies local people any right to charge extra fees apart from those stipulated in the 2016 Wildlife Conservation (non-consumptive wildlife utilization) Regulations. Privileging the central government for utilizing natural resources on community land has been described as “land grabbing” (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012).
According to the key informant interviews conducted as part of this study (Kegamba et al., 2023), the local authorities are unaware of how much money is collected annually by the Director of Wildlife from their WMAs, and no community representative is involved in the division of funds that should be distributed applying the specified formula described in the Act or to determine the amount that the Director returns to the Authorised Association. Furthermore, the funds may take a long time to reach the communities due to bureaucratic procedures. For example, according to a key informant interview, in 2020 the Tanzanian Government reformed its revenue collection for all government-based institutions across the country, requiring all the revenue to be sent to the central treasury. This administrative change has brought a lot of trouble in getting the funds back to the WMAs as it takes up to six months for funds to be released by the Director of TAWA to the WMAs. This combination of administrative hegemony and opacity, as well as typical delays exacerbates conflicts between the central government and the communities over revenue shares (Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Nelson, 2010) to the extent that some villages have threatened to withdraw from their WMA associations (Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Kicheleri et al., 2018a).
A major reason for this discontent is that, under section 19 of the Wildlife Conservation (Non-Consumptive Wildlife Utilization) Regulation, 2016, communities receive a much lesser share compared to the government. For example, the formula indicates that for the game-controlled areas only 20% of total revenue goes to the communities, and for the WMAs, 30% goes to the community. Further, there are only two WMAs that cover just 4% of the total area of the GSE. Hence, for the vast majority of communities bordering the four game reserves, Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation Area, there is no benefit-sharing formula specified by any policy relevant to these large protected areas despite their large contribution to revenue collection in the GSE. A fixed benefit (USD 5,000) is provided for wildlife hunting annually by an investor to a local community under section 16(1c) of the Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations, 2015. However, this sum is now outdated, as a single trophy elephant earns USD 10,000 (GN, 2015, P. 21).
Section 73(1) of the Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations, 2018, has provided the mandate to the community’s Authorised Association to manage any generated fund on behalf of local people. However, there is no accountability. For example, the budget for re-investments in resource development includes payment for the Village Game Scouts’ salaries, uniforms, equipment, maintenance of patrol vehicles and fuel. The budget for strengthening the Authorized Association is typically spent on travel, organising meetings and per diems. According to one of the key informant interviews, there have been many allegations on the misuse of funds by personnel of the Authorised Associations. One key informant said “They spend a lot of money for travelling, paying each other per diems and many allowances, that is why they use a lot of money to be elected in the Authorised Association as they know how it pays”. Similar observations on the misuse of Authorised Associations funds were found at Burunge WMA (Kicheleri, 2018b). According to another informant, the expenditure by Authorised Associations varies greatly among WMAs because there are no guidelines for expenditure and typically each WMA’s Authorised Association decides how much and where they want to spend the money, without consulting the wider community.
Reducing the percentage share of revenues flowing from the WMAs to the communities is undermining the initial objective of helping local people living beside protected areas via the community engagement model. In addition, reducing the community share weakens Authorised Associations’ capacity to manage the WMAs. For example, the community-based WMAs do not receive any subsidy from the central government. However, game reserves managed by TAWA, a government based authority, receive subsidies in the form of empoyees’ salaries, and also takes 25% of the gross revenue from the WMA. One key informant questioned why this percentage of their gross revenue is taken by TAWA. The same key informant questioned why each WMA should contribute 5% of gross revenue to the consortium. As it is, the 5% taken by the consortium from 22 WMAs across the country seems to be far larger than might be expected for a small board with 13 personnel in an office who have no on-ground operations.
In contrast to the Tanzanian situation, in Zimbabwe a Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) receives a commercial hunting quota directly from the government through the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM). Communities have the freedom to negotiate deals with safari hunting companies themselves (Murindagomo, 1992; Fischer et al., 2011). The CAMPFIRE association, which is similar to Tanzanian consortium, receives 4% and the communities receive 50% of the gross revenue. The households in the villages forming CAMPFIRE receive a cash dividend (Taylor, 2009; Tchakatumba et al., 2019). Similary, communal conservancies in Namibia have the right to negotiate and collect revenues themselves from hunting and tourism operators which then flows to the community households directly (Naidoo et al., 2016). In Tanzania, none of the WMAs provide a dividend at a household level.
Human-wildlife conflict management in the conservation policies
Human-wildlife conflict management features less in the policies than benefit-sharing, although this might be because the challenge is relatively recent (Estes et al., 2012; Eustace et al., 2018; Snyder et al., 2021). According to the wildlife policies, only a single conservation institution (i.e. TAWA), has been tasked with tackling human-wildlife conflict around the country. This means that any wild animal causing damage outside any protected area, including national parks, Ngorongoro Conservation Area, game reserves or the WMAs, should be dealt with by TAWA. This is a huge responsibility for TAWA given that it must also conserve wildlife and manage tourism enterprises like TANAPA and Ngorongoro. The National Human-Wildlife Conflict Management Strategy for 2020–2024 attempted to tackle the issue but that strategy is about to expire with only few projects being implemented on the ground by the support of a Non-Governmental Organisation i.e., Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). This is largely because this strategy lacks details on strategic actions, funds, and is without any explicit responsibility to an organisation for implementing this strategy. Lack of policy implementation is a common phenomenon in conservation in Tanzania, which further impacts local communities as also evident in various parts of the world (Makinde, 2005; Moyo et al., 2017).
Most governments in sub-Saharan Africa pay little or nothing to compensate people affected by wildlife damage (Anthony et al., 2010; Dunham et al., 2010). Consequently, the consolation (compensation) scheme introduced for crop and livestock loss is far less than the cost incurred (Kegamba et al., 2024). For example, consolation for a cow killed by a wild animal is USD 21.5 in Tanzania (GN, 2011) compared to a five times higher (i.e. USD 100) in Namibia (Shilongo et al., 2018), and estimated by applying prevailing market prices in Kenya (WCMA, 2013; Manoa et al., 2020).
Wildlife attacks on people also receive little government support. The Wildlife Conservation (Dangerous Animals Damage Consolation), Regulations of 2011 state that the family will receive TZS 1,000,000 (USD 430) if someone is killed, TZS 500,000 (USD 215) if they suffer a permanent disability or TZS 200,000 (USD 86) for a temporary injury (GN, 2011). In contrast, the amount paid in neighbouring Kenya following a death is ten times higher (USD 4,705; WCMA, 2013; Manoa et al., 2020). As in Tanzania, the Namibian compensation policy also aims to provide a relief for human death or injury, such as payment for funeral expenses when someone is killed by a wild animal, rather than paying the compensation cost for a human life (Shilongo et al., 2018). This contrasts with the compensation paid to the government staff killed or injured by wildlife. According to the Tanzanian Workers’ Compensation Act (revised edition, 2015, Sects. 48 and 52) and Government Notice 668 of 2021 (amendments Sects. 5 and 6), which include protected areas’ management staff, a person 100% disabled in the course of duties is paid a lump sum up to a maximum of TZS 8.4 million (USD 3,360) and continues to be paid 70% of their monthly salary as a pension (GN, 2021a). When an employee dies during the course of their duties, the spouse or dependant is paid a lump sum of up to TZS 16.4 million (USD 6,560), along with receiving 40% of their monthly salary as a pension (GN, 2021a).
Policy recommendations
This conservation policies review in Tanzania suggests that the good intention to involve the communities in the conservation of protected areas has stalled. There are two main recommendations arising from our analysis. First update all policies, legislation and regulations to ensure that they not only make explicit reference to community benefit-sharing but also include details of how such benefit-sharing will occur. Such a review should be conducted in consultation with communities, building on work that explores exactly what communities seek in terms of benefits. Research in some communities, for example, revealed that scholarships for children are given more importance (Kegamba et al., 2023) but any review will need to consult widely with communities across the country as there are likely to be regional differences. The discussions should also cover how benefits are to be divided among communities and how the disbursement of funds will occur in ways that are transparent, equitable and timely.
Secondly, the strategy on human-wildlife conflict should be reviewed and appropriately funded with an explicit pathway for implementation. If necessary, this should include legislation, regulations and strategic plans. As part of the review, the adequacy of consolation amounts should be of prime consideration. Currently, the amount paid by a trophy hunter to the government to kill a single elephant is over 22 times the amount that would be paid to the family should that elephant kill a villager living next to the GSE. A review should consider whether that ratio properly reflects Tanzanian standards of justice and ethics.
Conclusion
Most conservation policies in Tanzania are visionary and lack a clear mechanism and plan for implementing that vision. The benefit-sharing mechanisms are more firmly embedded in the recent conservation policies than older documents developed pre-independence when conservation regimes construed local people to be a threat to conservation. This is a legacy of the colonial era that still prevails in public institutions. Benefit-sharing is also considered more frequently and in great depth in policies relating to protected areas with strong ties to the communities than in those that are under the direct control of the central government.
Our review of benefits allocated to communities under regulations highlights disparities in the system. Mostly the amounts are small and their distribution is erratic and subject to the vagaries of local interpretation or is held up by bureacratic processes. Most benefits derived from wildlife conservation are increasingly controlled by the state. Existing models merit review to ensure they meet the purpose of improving the livelihoods of communities suffering the negative impacts of conservation activities in their area.
Human-wildlife conflict is rarely featured in the reviewed conservation policies. Although the government formulated a National Human-Wildlife Conflict Management Strategy for 2020–2024, it lacks the administrative tools to implement it, and nor does it appear to have had a budget allocated that will bring it to fruition. The consolation payments to communities that suffer losses of crops, livestock and human life are low compared to other countries in southern Africa. Also, given the complexity of dealing with human-wildlife conflicts across the country, management by a single conservation institution with multiple other responsibilities (i.e. TAWA) is likely to be challenging without dedicated resources. Both the amounts provided for those affected by wildlife and the manner in which that compensation is delivered need to be reviewed, and probably replaced with a more transparent, equitable and just system of codified payments.
Declarations
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
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