The Military and Counter-insurgency

It is popular in 1990 to say that counter-insurgency is not a military problem. It is widely believed that poor social and economic conditions and ineffective, corrupt governments are the causes of insurgencies, and if these conditions are remedied, the insurgencies will go away. However, people, not situations, make insurgencies, though poor conditions provide a fertile environment for dissatisfied people to launch insurgencies. Insurgents want political power and are willing to fight long and hard for it. Because of their small and simple beginnings, they must grow, and therefore tend to wage protracted struggles. The founders need to recruit, train and indoctrinate cadres as the backbone of their growing insurgency. They have added violence to peaceful means to achieve their political objectives of overthrowing a government or of gaining independence from it. They wage a total war, though on a low but increasingly intense level of violence, using not only the military but also political, psychological and economic tools to win. As the insurgents increase in numbers and capabilities, they create insecurity in the countryside and make the maintenance of law and order, as well as the provision of government services, difficult and dangerous if not impossible. To counter such an assault, most if not all government agencies, including the military, must be mobilised. Security becomes a primary concern, as the government must assure it in order to function effectively and provide needed services to its people. The military is the only institution able to effect security once insurgency has broken out.