2009 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
The Norm Game - How a Norm Fails
Authors : Antoni Dydejczyk, Krzysztof Kułakowski, Marcin Rybak
Published in: Computational Science – ICCS 2009
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We discuss the simulations of the norm game between players at nodes of a directed random network. The final boldness, i.e. the probability of norm breaking by the players, can vary sharply with the initial boldness, jumping from zero to one at some critical value. One of the conditions of this behaviour is that the player who does not punish automatically becomes a defector. The threshold value of the initial boldness can be interpreted as a norm strength. It increases with the punishment and decreases with its cost. Surprisingly, it also decreases with the number of potential punishers. The numerical results are discussed in the context of the statistical data on crimes in Northern Ireland and New Zealand, on divorces in USA, and on the alcohol consumption in Poland.