The Role of BRICS in Large-Scale Armed Conflict

This introductory chapter discusses the role of BRICS in the changing global order. BRICS is primarily understood as a foreign policy grouping with an ambitious reform agenda on global order issues with the aim to seek a more equitable recognition considering recent changes in the global power balance. BRICS favor a multi-polar order based on a conservative conceptualization of state sovereign emphasizing non-interference and uncompromised sovereignty. It is argued that how BRICS respond to armed conflict is constitutive for how the global security order is forming especially as institutional reforms in global governance institutions have been minimal until today. The chapter systematically explores summit declarations with regard to peace and security and presents an analysis of individual foreign policy positions and power capabilities of BRICS countries. It is providing the necessary background information for the following conceptual chapter. The two guiding research questions are: How do BRICS countries respond to large-scale armed conflict and how can we explain the choice for a particular response type?

This chapter forms the conceptual core of the book following the main research questions which aim at exploring how BRICS respond to large-scale armed conflict and how we can explain preferences for particular types of action. This chapter provides the reader with a detailed typology. Six ideal type responses are presented ranging from cooperative and multilateralism to neo-imperial and unilateral action. Furthermore, the chapter discusses a number of explanatory variables which have been chosen to explain the choice of response. These are: proximity to conflict, availability of power resources in relation to strategic interests, the type of conflict in terms of its relevance for global order questions, economic consequences of the conflict on BRICS members, the extent to which conflict engagement can resonate with the normative BRICS agenda and lastly responding to conflict in order to act upon global humanitarian norms. The following empirical chapters apply the conceptual framework to four case studies which are Libya, Syria, Ukraine and South Sudan.

The Libyan case is constitutive for BRICS as a foreign policy grouping. The Western-led intervention to remove Gaddafi was commonly seen as unacceptable, favoring geostrategic calculations and a regime change approach but not in the first place humanitarian motivations. To the crisis BRICS responded passive cooperatively voicing their concern but not having any significant influence on the course of civil war. While all BRICS countries were serving on the UN Security Council in 2011, there was no visible coordination or group engagement toward the crisis. However, the anger over the intervention was essential for BRICS in confirming their belief in the need to counter Western hegemony and insisting on the strict adherence to state sovereignty.

In the case of Syria BRICS countries were determined to prevent the repeated application of the ‘Libyan model’. BRICS countries this time got actively engaged in the conflict. Any Security Council resolution hinting at a forceful removal of Assad was vetoed by Russia and China. IBSA countries started a short-lived mediation initiative. Lastly Russian military support for Assad turned the fortune in favor of the government. While BRICS agreed on the opposition to forceful regime change, there is a visible difference between IBSA and Russia and China. In particular Russia became a warring party to the conflict and played the role of a regional hegemon. IBSA countries favored non-coercive means of conflict mediation.

The war in the Ukraine put the BRICS grouping in a delicate situation as one of its members is directly involved in armed conflict. While BRICS countries are known for favoring uncompromised sovereignty and non-intervention, the Russian occupation of Crimea and tacit support for armed groups in Eastern Ukraine are hardly compatible with the group’s main principles. BRICS displayed group solidarity by not opposing Russian action in the Ukraine but also by not endorsing it. With regard to the Ukrainian crisis BRICS treated the issue as being of vital interest to one of its members against which no criticism was expected to be voiced. BRICS provided declaratory support for multilateral conflict resolution by supporting the Minsk protocols.

The conflict in South Sudan, unlike the other conflicts, does not touch upon issues of state sovereignty or regime change. It is predominately a civil war with a regional dimension. The BRICS response to this crisis is mostly cooperative and multilateral aiming to seek a negotiated peace agreement. Of the BRICS group China has been the most pro-active actor facilitating peace talks and sending peacekeepers to the country. This follows directly from its multibillion-dollar investments in the oil sector and experience of asset loss during the war in Libya. Other BRICS countries are also engaged. India deploys the largest contingent of troops to the UN mission and South Africa supported peace talks through regional organizations. Russia and Brazil remained mostly passive bystanders.

Through analyzing the four conflict case studies (Libya, Syria, Ukraine and South Sudan) and the BRICS response to them, it is apparent that the grouping is actively shaping the current security order. Western-preferred outcomes (removal of Assad, isolation of Russia) have been actively prevented by BRICS. This concluding chapter provides a cross-case overview of response types combined with an analysis of input variables explaining the choice for particular responses. In total the study consists of 20 observable responses to four conflicts. In most cases BRICS countries responded cooperatively within existing multilateral structures. Only in three instances can we observe hegemonic or neo-imperial behavior. IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) countries in all cases are responding cooperatively to conflicts. Only Russia and China also resort to more coercive means of foreign policy. On average the response to armed conflict becomes the stronger the closer countries are to conflict and the more power capabilities are readily available. Economic interests or normative concerns do not lead with certainty to a particular outcome.