Social and Labour Plans as Companies’ Prevailing Social Sustainability Institution
Mining companies operate in a complex legal environment in SA. Within this environment, interviewees regarded SLPs as the prevailing social sustainability institution, interconnected to the BBBEE/Mining Charter (supplementary material). The mining company’s contribution to the host community via collaborative development projects—among other labour-related topics—must be disclosed in the respective SLP, which should be aligned with the local development plans. Moreover, SLPs are necessary for companies to be awarded as well as subsequently retain a mining license and mitigate negative social mining impacts (CALS
2016,
2017). Thus, the institution gives meaning to what is perceived as mining companies’ ethically correct actions.
The coding revealed a strong interface between SLPs as well as the deductively derived
social performance sub-categories. The SLPs cover and even exceed all these sub-categories. On top of those, companies must conduct
enterprise development2 by capacitating existing local businesses or establishing new ones. Furthermore, for the
financial provision of the respective SLP, mining companies set up trusts and dedicate a share of their profit to communities via these (compare CALS
2016,
2017). Without enough upliftment measures available to communities through SLPs, it is not possible to mine in SA (ID12,11,8,7,2).
3 Thus, “(…) there is always a social angle to mining” (ID11), and an SLP “pretty much dictates all social responsibility of the mine” (C4/GO2). In fact, all companies are obliged to conduct the outlined
social performance measures (Table
5), and company respondents are aware that the government is not able to fulfil its full mandate for these services (ID9/GO4-3): “So, there is that dynamic as well in SA where something that would be traditionally considered as a government service is actually provided by the private sector” (ID9).
Table 5
Matching external social performance and its sub-categories to SLP guidelines
This finding confirms the prominent role of GOs in understanding how SA’s mining sector functions—that is, the researched institutional field. SA’s legal requirements in mining are perceived as beyond or at the level of international best practices (ID9/ID2/C6/C1). All interviewees essentially reported the existence of state actors’ institutional enforcement (ID11-8, 5,2/C6,5,2,1/FS6B,4,2/G4-1/MU2-1/NGO4-2). The interviewed key officials of the Department of Environmental Affairs (GO4), Department of Water & Sanitation (GO3), Department of Mineral Resources (GO2) in the leading role and Department of Trade and Industry (GO1) were considered throughout the entire data sample as the most relevant GOs in the sector. Hence, the institutional void concept is not applicable to SA. However, it is necessary to dive deeper into the institution’s enforcement to understand the related institutional uncertainty. State actors’ institutional pressure was reported to be weakened by certain factors that are outlined in the following section.
State Actors’ Weakening Factors as Drivers of Institutional Uncertainty
The national regulation and its coercive pressure along regulative institutions appear powerful. However, four weakening factors of GOs were reported to weaken the SLPs’ institutionalisation and enforcement. The inductively identified weakening factors thus form drivers for the institutional uncertainty in the institutional field.
On a macro level, political (in-)
certitude—see exploratory quotes in Table
6—was reported across the actor groups. Policy arbitrariness related to mining regulation in general as well as SLPs was evident (ID11-8,2/FS4,3,1/C5/GO2/NGO4,1b).
Table 6
Weakening factors of state actors: sample quotes
The lacking certitude is paired with regulatory compatibility—i.e. not well-suited regulation—in different forms. First, the regulation is characterised by generic conditions that are vague and therefore partially unenforceable (ID8/GO4,2/NGO2). Furthermore, an ill-defined financial provision—an undefined amount of spending and investments’ expected impact—as a key indicator for social performance does not guarantee meaningful social contributions (ID12,9/C4/FS6B/GO2/MU2). In addition, complex power distributions in communities due to traditional tribal structures are difficult to incorporate into the regulation. Traditional leaders of communities with whom the mining company initially felt obliged to deal might be rejected by the community later, and local GOs might not sufficiently fill this governance vacuum (ID8/GO2/NGO4).
GOs’ overall capacity regarding mining permits, SLPs’ compliance checks and local development planning is questioned (ID8,7/C4,2/GO4/GO2/MU2). Since SLPs go hand in hand with underdeveloped local development plans, tailoring an appropriate SLP is difficult (MU1). Furthermore, municipalities do not deliver infrastructural components of SLPs and do not follow-up on components already delivered by mining companies to ensure their full implementation (ID12,5/GO3/NGO1A).
Corruption reflects another interrelated weakening factor. The current mining regulation is perceived to benefit a politically connected elite, thus potentially causing a conflict of interests (ID9/FS4/C4,1/MU2,1/NGO5,1A&C). The local GOs’ money from SLPs might drain away and fail to benefit the local population due to their lack of monitoring mechanisms (C5,4/MU2/NGO5,1A&B). Furthermore, according to some interviewees, GO2 as a state actor is too powerful and centralised and may consequently lead to nepotism (C5/NGO1B). In addition, communities are incorporated to meet black ownership requirements (BBBEE); however, the mentioned tribal leader structures can cause problems because the wealth might not be adequately shared with the entire community or shares might be sold without consultation (ID8/NGO2).
In effect, the analysis of coercive sustainability pressure exerted by GOs reveals contradictory findings. On the one hand, the sound national regulation and its enforcement are respected among various actors of the institutional field, while on the other hand, GOs underlie the reported C4 weakening factors, which are certitude, compatibility, capacity and corruption. This leads us to our first proposition set (P):
These delicate constraints together weaken GOs’ regulative institution itself and GOs’ coercive pressure to enforce ethically perceived actions and thus drive institutional uncertainty; a topic that is discussed further in the next section.
Institutional Uncertainty and Decoupling
Referring to the conceptual section, the presented strive for legitimacy and resulting isomorphism cause conflicts of interest, and a decoupling from incorporated institutions might occur. Considering GOs’ weakening factors—conceptualised as drivers for institutional uncertainty—there seems to exist a gap between mining companies’ reported sustainability measures and what social performance mining-affected actors monitor (C4/NGO2,1A). This is also manifested in the accusation that some mining companies hide their SLPs and do not make them publicly available or only do so after legal measures are taken (FS6A,5/NGO5,3,2,1B): “There is a disconnect between what the mines and the banks are telling their shareholders and investors and what is experienced in reality” (NGO2); “there’s a difference between what the mines say and what’s actually happening on the ground” (FS1). C4 elaborates on SLPs, asserting that “if you had to take exactly what’s in the SLP and go look on the ground, would it match? 80–90% no” (C2).
Referring again to the GOs’ weakening factors, reported SLPs’ decoupling is assigned to the related compatibility, capacity and corruption to more thoroughly understand the consequences of institutional uncertainty in the institutional field. The vague political certitude remained largely implicit in the interviews, although it basically affects all actions in the field because the certitude missing from regulation questions the future value of companies’ capital-intensive investments and long-term social performance projects (ID11-8/FS4, 1/C5/GO2/NGO4).
Regulatory
compatibility as a driver of mining companies’
institutional uncertainty and
decoupling/non-compliance are intertwined. The findings reveal that regulative ambitions can diverge from reality and lead to
regulation-
decoupling. Furthermore, mining companies often struggle to fully comply with vaguely regulative requirements. This vagueness leaves room for differing interpretations of companies’ compliance in the SLP projects and thus allows for a certain level of
decoupling (ID12,9,8,3,2/C5,4,2/FS6B,4,1/GO2/NGO2,1). Tables
7,
8 and
9 provide examples for the aggregated findings of each
weakening factor and
decoupling.
Table 7
Evidences and samples of regulation-decoupling caused by the institutional uncertainty driver compatibility
Table 8
Evidences and samples of opportunistic-decoupling caused by the institutional uncertainty driver capacity
Table 9
Evidences and samples of bribe-decoupling caused by the institutional uncertainty driver corruption
GOs’
capacities to monitor and coerce compliance as another driver of
institutional uncertainty and
decoupling are interwoven. Due to GOs’
capacity shortages regarding enforcement, as all details of the SLP’s full implementation simply cannot be investigated, and lacking GOs’ SLP delivery due to budgetary limitations, further
opportunistic-
decoupling leeway is provided (Table
8), and
social performance implementation is reduced (ID9,8,5,3/C5/GO3,1/NGO4,3,1A&B/MU1).
Corruption and mining companies’ relations with GOs or the community’s accepted representatives might reduce the sanctions of lacking compliance and thus increase the freedom for
bribe-
decoupling (Table
9) in the sense that investigations and compliance enforcements are not conducted at all or not fully (ID3/C5/GO3/NGO5,1A&B). In addition, the company size and likelihood to
decouple are related; smaller mining companies face greater difficulty in complying due to resources and might be more prone to small-scale
corruption (ID8,6/C4).
The above findings lead to the next proposition set:
The findings of reported decoupling demonstrate that these occurrences are not merely the result of mining companies’ actions in response to outside pressure that causes a conflict of interest. Weakened GOs with reduced coercive pressure and existing institutional uncertainty play their part in creating SLP non-compliance leeway in the institutional field, as both are intertwined and might be mutually dependent. This results in companies failing to provide the full social performance that is expected of them. However, companies with their “false sense of legitimacy” nevertheless face a “crisis of legitimacy” because they are hindered by unethically perceived actions and officially reported isomorphism (NGO5,1A). We label these impeding interactions as the complementing pressures that are presented in the next section.
Complementing Pressures as Barriers to Institutional Uncertainty
All actors referenced the SLPs as their main institution for scrutinising and consequently pressuring mining companies for more social sustainability in the field. The interviewed actors reported a wide variety of interactions that pressured companies to meet ethical expectations and debilitate the identified state actors’
weakening factors and
decoupling thereof. The analysis revealed 23 individual interactions both within and among the actor groups, and propositions lists the interactions by the individual actor groups leading to aggregated
coercive,
mimetic and
normative pressures. These pressures complement the weakened GOs, and according to Tracey and Phillips (
2011), they can be perceived as barriers to
institutional uncertainty in the field because they raise the legitimacy cost of not implementing certain institutions. Thus, these pressures are necessary to obtain a full understanding of how social sustainability is established.
Table 10
Sustainability interactions leading to complementing institutional pressures that are barriers to institutional uncertainty
The interviewees in this study described a vibrant actor scene. As shown in Table
5, SA’s mining regulation adds weight to the communities that interact among one another and with both NGOs and unions to join forces. Mine workers represented by MUs often live in surrounding communities, and Table
10 illustrates that communities collaborate with NGOs via capacity building to convey their rights and to monitor mining companies (interaction 5 of Table
10). MUs and communities are the main rights bearers under the SLPs for obtaining developmental benefits from mining (ID3,1/C5/NGO2/MU2). Aside from the fact that NGOs, with their affiliated communities and MUs, reach out to buyers globally by, for instance, visiting shareholder conferences and confronting downstream buyers (interactions 1, 16, 18), they are also contacted by FSs that seek sustainability information (interaction 13). Furthermore, the financial sector (interaction 14) considers the risks of communities’ (interactions 6, 7) and MUs’ (interaction 11) upheavals, and both are considered powerful pressure-exerting actors with legislative scope. In effect, actors interact with one another and share their expertise, media attention and legal voices to achieve enhanced conditions for the local population. Specifically, NGOs and MUs aim to support the communities through SLPs’ implementation and enforcement by contributing their expertise and insights.
Moreover, and as indicated above, the interviewees reported that FSs and private sector buyers at the downstream SC create a sustainability leverage effect due to their demand. They enforce compliance with either the regulations from both SA and mineral importing countries or international standards and guidelines (e.g. ISO Standards, UN Global Compact and IFC Performance Standards) (interactions 13, 14, 17, 18). However, the mentioned buyers are not necessarily located abroad; SA possesses local beneficiation facilities and a market where buyers also demand sustainability compliance (ID9, 6, 5).
With reference to the identified weakening factors/institutional uncertainty and the associated consequences regarding social performance, the evident coercive pressure can be regarded as limiting regulatory compatibility, the weak capacity and corruption vulnerability. The variety of interactions and their interrelations regarded together constitute a barrier to institutional uncertainty.
After outlining the
coercive pressure in the
institutional field, sustainability leaders in the mining sector, such as ID12, ID9, ID4 and ID6, are a source of inspiration regarding their best practices, leading to
mimetic pressure (interaction 19). Isomorphic responses of frontrunners that exceed institutional rules are identified. They range from an adopted system perspective post-mining operation to stimulate socio-economic development, over voluntary
financial provisions beyond SLPs, to the measured impact against the integrated reports’ six capitals and an appointed position for sustainability in SCs (ID12/ID9/ID6) (compare Jain et al.
2017—similar mimetic pressure). Furthermore, the interviewees underlined that past wrongdoings in the sustainability domain helped them evolve toward greater sustainability (interaction 20). This finding reveals that the institutional pressure reflects a barrier to
institutional uncertainty by directing its force against regulatory
compatibility with companies that elaborate upon the prescribed
social performance beyond ethical expectations.
In order to address
normative pressure’s verification difficulty (DiMaggio and Powell
1983), this case study includes a representative body of mining companies. It presents common and shared beliefs about conditions as well as work methods for greater legitimacy; all nine interviewed mining companies are members of this association (ID12,9-6,3/C4,1/FS3/GO4-1/MU2,1/NGO4,1A&B). First,
normative pressure stems from the fact that mining companies’ sustainability managers interact with one another and GOs on a regular basis to share experiences (interaction 21). Second, the representative body incentivises its members to adopt their own developed and international standards to support GOs’ regulations (interaction 22). Third, the change in professionals among the organisations in the field spread
normative convictions (interaction 23). Taken together, this pressure is a barrier to
institutional uncertainty because it targets regulatory
compatibility through additional standards that increase legitimacy. The exchange of sustainability practices among companies and
normative convictions among companies is helpful for this process and simultaneously limits weak
capacity.
Another finding of this case study is that the pressures are interlinked; related to the previously mentioned normative pressure and the associations’ members (interactions 21, 22), interrelations can be named among the coercive pressure created by the financial sector as well as buyers. These complementing interactions (14, 17, 18) can be namely perceived as a motivation for mining companies to adopt sustainability standards. Moreover, the interactions among communities, MUs, NGOs, buyers and FSs constitute further evidence for interlinkages. As another interlink, the mentioned sustainability frontrunners exerting mimetic pressure are naturally exposed to all identified pressure sources.
These findings demonstrate that it is vital for social sustainability in SCs to understand state and non-state actors that constitute the institutional field and play a vital role in ensuring social sustainability. The interactions and interrelations that build up to interlinked coercive, mimetic and normative pressures are grounded in the national context and enforce ethical practices, which leads us to the third set of propositions.