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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

5. The United Nations Security Council and Power Politics

Author : Deepak Mawar

Published in: States Undermining International Law

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Abstract

The United Nations is analysed in order to better understand the influences of utopianism on the international organisation and also how States have at times blocked the UN’s capacity to maintain international peace and security. Initially, the founding years of the UN are analysed to highlight the influence of utopianism on the development of international law. The second part of the chapter focuses on the UN Security Council. Here, the sufficient tools it has to deal with threats to international peace and security are highlighted, which raises questions as to why the Security Council and its Member-States have failed to adequately exercise such powers in order to effectively deal with a host of conflicts. Such failures justify the argument made by emancipatory idealist that the primary position States enjoy in international law is problematic if the central aim is to protect all individuals and groups from modes of oppression.

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previous chapter The Life and Death of the League of Nations

next chapter Conclusion: Utopianism and State Primacy in International Law

M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, (2008), 14.

L. Goodrich, ‘From the League of Nations to the United Nations’, (Feb. 1947) 1.1 International Organisations 3, at 4.

J.S Rofe, ‘Prewar and Wartime Postwar Planning: Anecdotes to the UN moment in San Francisco’ in D. Plesch & T.G. Weiss(eds.), Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations, 17 at 20.

Goodrich, supra note 2 at 7.

M. Koskenniemi. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, (2004), 330.

H. Kelsen, Völkerrechstslehre, (1995), at 278–283.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 39.

Mazower, supra note 1, at 28.

Ibid, at 28.

R. Wolfrum, ‘International Law of Cooperation’, (1995) 2 Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 1242, 1242–1247.

M. Lachs, ‘Legal Framework of an International Community,’ (1992) 6 Emory International Law Review 329, at 332.

Ibid. See also R. L. Bindschedler, ‘Illusion und Wirklichkeit: Gegenwart und Zukunft des Volkerrechts’, (1958) 8 Jahrbuch Int’l Recht 1.

Ibid., 335.

P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, (1997), at 30–31. See also G. Jaenicke, ‘International Public Order’, (1995) 2 Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 1348, 1348–1351.

Trial of the major war Criminals before the International Criminal before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946 531 (1947).

Ibid., 126.

P. Akhavan, ‘Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilisation’, (1995) 8.1 Harvard Human Rights Journal 229, at 230.

Ibid., at 230.

UN Charter (1945) Article 24.1.

UN Charter (1945) Chapter VII.

L. Goodrich, ‘From the League of Nations to the United Nations’, (1947) 1.1 International Organization 3, at 10.

P. Nadin, UN Security Council Reform (2016), 7.

M. Glennon, ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, (2003) 82.3 Foreign Affairs 16, at 16.

D. Bourantonis, The History and Politics of the UN Security Council Reform, (2005), 3.

Nadin, supra note 23, at 10.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 39.

G.H. Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council Is Unbound by Law’, (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549; & I. Österdahl, Threat to the Peace (1998), at 98.

H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950), at 730; B. Conforti,’ The Legal Effect of Non-Compliance with Rules of Procedure in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council’, (1969) 63 American Journal of International Law 479.

T.D. Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’, (1995) 26 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 33, at 60.

B. Martenczuk. ‘The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?’ (1999) 10 EJIL 517, at 538.

E. De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, (2004), at 133–134.

M. Selkirk, ‘Judge, Jury and Executioner? Analysing the Nature of the Security Council’s Authority under Article 39 of the UN Charter’, (2003) 9 Auckland University Law Review 1101, at 1102.

De Wet, supra note 32, at 135.

Ibid., at 136.

Ibid., at 135.

J. Frowein, ‘Article 39’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of United Nations, (1994), at 607.

De Wet, supra note 32, at 136. See also Barbara Lorinser, Bindende Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates 39 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1996) and Andreas Stein, Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und die Rule of Law 27 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999).

GA Resolution 3314.

Selkirk, supra note 33, at 1104.

UN Charter, (1945), 24.2.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 40.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 41.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 42.

De Wet, supra note 32, at 182 and D. Akande, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?’ (1997) 46.2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 309, at 320.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 103.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1969), Article 53.

De Wet, supra note 32, at 190.

A. Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council- Countermeasures Against Wrongful Sanctions, (2010), at 71.

Ibid., at 70.

Ibid.

UN Security Council Resolution 713, UN Doc/S/RES/713, (25 September 1991).

Application of the Convention on Prevention of Genocide and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia), Provisional Measures, Judgement of 20 March 1993, [1993] ICJ Rep. 407, at 441 (Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, Separate Opinion).

Ibid.

Tzanakopolous, supra note 49, at 71. See also Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Commentary (2001), at 122(4).

De Wet, supra note 32, at 191.

UN Charter (1945) Article 24.2.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 1.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 2.

R.B. Lillich, ‘The Role of Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World’, (1995) 3 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, at 3.

D. Whittle, ‘The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action’, (2015) 26.3 EJIL 671, at 673.

De Wet, supra note 32, at 194.

D. Hovell, The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security Council Sanctions Decision-Making, (2016), 11.

Ibid. See also R. Geiss, ‘Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-up Assessment of Long-Term Effects’ (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 167 & M. Reisman, ‘Assessing the Lawfulness of Nonmilitary Enforcement: The Case of Economic Sanctions’, (1995) 89 American Society of International Law Proceedings 350, at 351.

UN Security Council resolution 1127, UN Doc S/RES/1127, (28 August 1997); UN Security Council resolution 1173, UN Doc S/RES/1173, (12 June 1998). At the height of the UNITA sanctions regime, 157 individuals were subject to asset freezes and travel bans.

Hovell, supra note 64, at 12.

International Commission of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, (2009), at 117.

Hovell, supra note 64, at 14.

Ibid., at 15.

Joined Cases T-306/01 and T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-0000, at 276.

T. Biersteker & S. Eckert, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures, (2006), at 7.

‘Ninth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 1822 (2008) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities’ (13 May 2009) UN Doc S/2009/245, para 47.

E. Rosand, ‘Panel Discussion on UN Terrorist Designations and Sanctions: A Fair Process and Effective Regime?’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 5 June 2008).

UN Security Council resolution 1617 (29 July 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1617, para 4.

A. Ciampi, ‘Security Council Targeted Sanctions and Human Rights’ in B. Fassbender (ed), Securing Human Rights?: Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council, (2011), at 107.

Hovell, supra note 64, at 20.

Ibid., at 24. See also ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’ (15 December 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/16/50, para 21; & ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’ (2 August 2010) UN Doc A/65/258, paras 56–57.

UN Security Council resolution 1904 (17 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904.

Hovell, supra note 64, at 29.

European Commission v Kadi (2013) EU ECJ, at 133.

Case T-85/09 Kadi v European Commission (2010) EUECJ, at 28. See also Nada v Switzerland (2012) ECHR 169, at 209–214; Al-Dulimi and Montana v Switzerland (App No 580/08), ECHR, 26 November 2013, at 119; Case T-85/09 Kadi v European Commission (2010) EU ECJ, at 128.

Hovell, supra note 64, at 25. See also Rapport de la Commission de Politique Extérieure du Parlement Suisse, ‘Les Fondements de Notre Ordre Juridique Court-Circuités par l’ONU’ (2010), translated in Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Compatibility of UN Security Council and EU [terrorist] Black Lists with European Convention on Human Rights requirements’ (7 December 2010), at 6.

Lillich, supra note 61, at 5.

Ibid., at 4–5.

I. Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, (2002) Global Governance 35, at 35.

E. Grove, ‘UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee: A Look Back’, (1993) 17.4 International Security 172, at 177.

UN Charter (1945) Article 43.1.

See E. Grove, supra note 87, for details on the discussions amongst the Permanent Members in regard to the contributing forces to the Security Council, highlighting the obstacles that arose from such a setup.

D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security- The Delegation of the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers, (2000), 142–143. See also F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces (1966), 32.

Ibid., at 142. See also ‘Report of the Military Staff Committee to the Security Council’, S/336, SCOR Special Supplement (1947), No.1., Article 36–40.

Ibid., at 159.

Ibid., at 142–143.

Ibid. at 149.

Ibid. at Pg 148. See also F. Kirgis, ‘The Security Council’s First Fifty Years’ (1995) 89 AJIL 506, at 521.

Ibid. at 160.

UN Charter, (1945), Article 54.

Sarooshi, supra note 90, at 191.

D. Grieg, ‘Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 336, at 391.

100

V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility,’ (1994) 43.1 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55, at 63.

101

Glennon, supra note 24, at 25.

102

M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’, (1996) 17.2 Michigan Journal of International Law 455, at 460.

103

Article 27(3) of the UN Charter: ‘Decisions of the Security Council on all matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

104

Nadin, supra note 23, at 9.

105

Selkirk, supra note 33, at 1103.

106

Malanczuk, supra note 15, at 376.

107

S. Tharoor, ‘Security Council Reform: Past, Present and Future’, (2011) 25.4 Ethics & International Affairs 397, at 397–400.

108

J. Quigley, ‘The “Privatisation” of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism’ (1996) 17.2 Michigan Journal of International Law 249, at 283.

109

Bourantonis, supra note 25, at 5.

110

M. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, (2011) at 85.

111

Y.Z. Blum, ‘Proposals for UN Security Council Reform’, (2005) 99 AJIL 632, at 632.

112

Bourantonis, supra note 25, at 6.

113

E. Stamnes, ‘Critical Security Studies and the United Nations Preventative Deployment in Macedonia’, (2007) 11 International Peacekeeping 161, at 169.

114

UN doc. S/1999/201; UN doc. SC/6648. See also https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s1999201.php accessed 19 June 2019.

115

UN SC press release on China’s veto on Macedonia: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm accessed 25 November 2017.

116

UNPREDEP report:http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm accessed 25 November 2017.

117

C. Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’ in C. Reus-Smit (ed.) in The Politics of International Law, (2004) at 15–16.

118

Grove, supra note 87, at 172.

119

R. Higgins, ‘Peace, Security, Achievements and Failures’, (1995) 6 EJIL 445, at 449.

120

Malanczuk, supra note 15, at 426.

121

J. Boulden, ‘Double Standards, Distance and Disengagement: Collective Legitimization in the Post-Cold War Security Council’ (2006) 37.3 Security Dialogue 409, at 412.

122

Lillich, supra note 61, at 5.

123

Bourantonis, supra note 25, at 27.

124

The operation in Somalia would be the exception to this proposition. The humanitarian intervention in Somalia though had the support of the United States, who led the military operation to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief, was a failure but not because of a lack of commitment from Member-States. First of all, as there was no working government it was difficult to establish any semblance of control once the crisis had been neutralised. Instead, this meant that the political climate of Somalia would prove to be more unstable. Secondly, the reactionary expansion of the UN mandate from providing humanitarian relief to use force in order to establish a secure environment in Somalia and ‘assist in rebuilding the economy and social and political institutions of the country’ was problematic. Several other States criticised such an expansion of the UN mandate as the presence of heavy military forces was seemingly worsening the situation. Ultimately, the Security Council had entered into this humanitarian crisis with a lack of effective planning.

125

G. Nolte, ‘The Different Functions of the Security Council with respect to Humanitarian Law’ in V. Lowe, A. Roberts, J. Welsh & D. Zaum (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and the Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, (2010), at 538.

126

G. Marston, ‘UK Materials on International Law’, (1992) 63 BYIL 615, at 624.

127

UN Security Council Resolution 918 (17th May 1994) UN Doc/S/RES/918).

128

N. Kuhrt, ‘Russia, The Responsibility to Protect and Intervention’ in D. Fiott, & J. Koops (eds.), The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar, (2015), 97 at 99.

129

P. Wang, ‘China and the Third Pillar’ in D. Fiott, & J. Koops (eds.), The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar (2015), 78 at 89.

130

Ibid., at 79.

131

R. Falk, ‘Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law’, (1999) 93.4 AJIL 847–857.

132

Ibid, at 849.

133

A. Hehir, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Past, Present and Future’, (2006) 6 Political Studies Review 327, at 328.

134

Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on the United Nations action in Sri Lanka, (November 2012), at 14, para 34. https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf accessed 15 May 2019.

135

Ibid., at 9, para18.

136

R. Thakur, ‘Law, Legitimacy and the United Nations’ in R. Falk, M. Juergensmeyer, & V. Popovski (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs, (2011), at 45–71.

137

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, [2004], ICJ Rep. 136, 69 at para163.

138

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/19, (29 November 2012) UN Doc A/Res/67/19.

139

Ibid.

140

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria accessed 25 November 2017.

141

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2016/09/failed-syria-160923192457782.html accessed 25 November 2017.

142

H. Koh. The Trump Administration and International Law, (2018), at 5.

143

Ibid. See also S. Von Einsiedal & D. Malone, ‘Security Council’ in T.G. Weiss & S. Daws (eds.), Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, (2018), 149.

144

Ibid., at 129.

145

Jen Kirby, Read Trump’s Statement on Syria Strike: “They Are Crimes of a Monster,” Vox, Apr. 13, 2018, https://www.vox.com/2018/4/13/17236862/syria-strike-donald-trump-chemical-attack-statement: Trump restated his objective as ‘doing what is necessary to protect American people.’.

146

Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Obama Doctrine,’ The Atlantic, April 2016.

147

A.J. Bellamy & P.D. Williams, ‘Libya,’ in S. Von Einsiedel, D.M. Malone & B.S. Ugarte (eds.), The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, (2016), 699–716.

148

S. Von Einsiedal & D. Malone, ‘Security Council’ in T.G. Weiss & S. Daws (eds.), Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, (2018), 149.

149

Ibid., at 141.

150

Boulden, supra note 121, at 412.

151

Reus-Smit, supra note 116, at 17–18.

152

N. Krisch, ‘The Security Council and the Great Powers’ in V. Lowe, A. Roberts, J. Welsh & D. Zaum (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and the Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, (2010), at 152.

153

M. Foucault Society Must be Defended, (2003), at 241.

154

Ibid.

155

C. Schmitt, Concept of the Political (2007) at 27.

156

J. Goldsmith & E. Posner, The Limits of International Law, (2005), at 169.

157

M.N. Barnett, ‘The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda’, (1997) 12.4 Cultural Anthropology 551, at 558.

158

‘Attorney General’s Advice on the Iraq War Iraq: Resolution 1441’ (2005) 54.3 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 767.

159

M. Koskenniemi, supra note 110, at 460–461.

160

Krisch, supra note 152, at 152.

161

Ibid.

162

Nadin, supra note 23, at 66.

Title: The United Nations Security Council and Power Politics
Author: Deepak Mawar
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: States Undermining International Law
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-64788-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-64789-6

Copyright Year: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64789-6_5

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