Skip to main content
Top

2022 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

2. Theoretical Background of AI and Governance

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

AI is a portfolio of methods facilitating advances in the precision, speed, or scale of machine performance across complex and large data substituting human performance in diverse specific duties such as decision-making, pattern-recognition, and prediction. AI systems must lead to efficiency improvement and opacity could provide certain benefits. AI applications in fact play an increasingly important role in organizing society at large, in the regulation of a wide variety of social systems and infrastructures, and even in shaping human interactions and preferences. The use of AI to govern numerous aspects of human activities has been generated concerns linked to matters of privacy and surveillance, bias and inequality, transparency and procedure, and freedom and autonomy.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Footnotes
1
Alexandra Chouldechova et al., A Case Study of Algorithm-Assisted Decision Making in Child Maltreatment Hotline Screening Decisions, PROC. OF THE 2018 Conf. On Fairness, Accountability, And Transparency (2018) (discussing an algorithmic system deployed to evaluate child abuse and neglect risk in Allegheny County). Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 148 (2017).
 
2
Cao S, Jiang W, Wang J, Yang B (2021) From Man vs. Machine to Man + Machine: The Art and AI of Stock Analyses (Cambridge, MA).
 
3
Wu L, Hitt L, Lou B (2020) Data Analytics, Innovation, and Firm Productivity. Manage. Sci. 66 (5):2017–2039.
 
4
Sukwoong Choia, Namil Kimb, Junsik Kimc & Hyo Kang, How Does AI Improve Human Decision-Making? Evidence from the AI-Powered Go Program at: https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3893835 P19.
 
5
Arielle Pardes, AI Can Run Your Meetings Now, WIRED (Nov. 24, 2020), https://​www.​wired.​com/​story/​aican-run-work-meetings-now-headroom-clockwise/​ (“Headroom’s software uses emotion recognition to take the temperature of the room periodically, and to gauge how much attention participants are paying to whoever’s speaking. Those metrics are displayed in a window on-screen, designed mostly to give the speaker real-time feedback that can sometimes disappear in the virtual context.”).
 
6
The Toronto Declaration: Protecting the right to equality and non-discrimination in machine learning systems, https://​www.​accessnow.​org/​cms/​assets/​uploads/​2018/​05/​Toronto-Declaration-D0V2.​pdf
 
7
G Zekos, Cyber Versus Conventional Personal Jurisdiction, 2015 Journal of Internet Law, Volume 18 Number 10, April 2015 3–35 Wolters Kluwer. www.​wrightsmedia.​com https://​lrus.​wolterskluwer.​com/​store/​product/​journal-of-internet-law/​ G Zekos, Demolishing State’s sole power over Sovereignty & Territory via Electronic Technology & Cyberspace, 2013 Journal of Internet Law, Volume 17 Number 5 November 2013 27–41 Aspen Publications-Wolters Kluwer.
 
8
Robotic Process Automation (RPA) is defined as “tools [which] perform statements on structured data, typically using a combination of user interface interactions, or by connecting to APIs to drive client servers, mainframes or HTML code.”
 
9
Tzafestas, S. 2018. Ethics in robotics and automation: A general view. International Robotics & Automation Journal, 4, 229–234. Van Der Aalst, W. M., Bichler, M. & Heinzl, A. 2018. Robotic process automation. Springer.
 
10
Dirk Beerbaum, Artificial Intelligence Ethics Taxonomy—Robotic Process Automation (RPA) as business case, https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3834361 p17.
 
11
Jeffrey Hirsch, Worker-Protection Laws Aren’t Ready for An Automated Future, Conversation (Aug. 28, 2019).
 
12
Hannah Sloan, Human Rights and IoT: The Right to Fair and Decent Work, IOT FOR ALL (Oct. 23, 2018) (“[T]he efficiencies produced by automation will result in widespread job loss. It’s entirely possible that the continued growth of constantly-improving and self-maintaining machines could eliminate 99% of all jobs today.”).
 
13
Peter Dizikez, MIT Report Examines How to Make Technology Work for Society, MIT: NEWS (Sept. 4, 2019).
 
14
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
 
15
James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 Calif. L. Rev. Online. 164, 170 (2017).
 
16
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
 
17
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 16–18 (2014) Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085, 1100–05 (2018).
 
18
Harry Surden, “The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Law: Basic Questions” in M Dubber and F Pasquale (eds), The Oxford Handbook of AI Ethics (Oxford University Press 2019).
 
19
Hin-Yan Liu, “The Power Structure of Artificial Intelligence” (2018) 10 Law, Innovation and Technology 197. Jamie Susskind, Future Politics: Living Together in a World Transformed by Tech (Oxford University Press 2018).
 
20
Robert Cover et al. Narrative, Violence, and the Law, The Essays of Robert Cover (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995). Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’, Cardozo Law Review 11 (1990): 920–1045.
 
21
M Hildebrandt, “The Force of Law and the Force of Technology,” in The Routledge International Handbook of Technology, Crime and Justice, ed. M.R.P. McGuire and Holt (Routledge, 2017), 579–608.
 
22
Christopher Markou and Simon Deakin, Ex Machina Lex: The Limits of Legal Computability at: https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3407856
 
23
“Legal Tech Market Map: 50 Startups Disrupting The Legal Industry,” CB Insights - Blog, 13 July 2016, https://​www.​cbinsights.​com/​blog/​legal-tech-market-map-company-list/​. A. Ramanathan et al., “Integrating Symbolic and Statistical Methods for Testing Intelligent Systems: Applications to Machine Learning and Computer Vision,” in 2016 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), 2016, 786–91.
 
24
Federico Cabitza, “The Unintended Consequences of Chasing Electric Zebras” (IEEE SMC Interdisciplinary Workshop HUML 2016, The Human Use of Machine Learning, 12/16/ 2016, Venice, Italy, 2016), https://​www.​researchgate.​net/​publication/​311702431_​The_​Unintended_​Consequences_​of_​Chasing_​Electric_​Zebras
 
25
B.C. Brosnahan, “The Law and Computers” (1970) 1 (3) Auckland U. L. Rev. 1 at 2: “no matter how many contingencies the program may be designed to cope with, a computer can never outdo humans and perform activities that cannot be analysed into logical patterns.” JC Smith, “Machine Intelligence and Legal Reasoning” (1998) 73 ChicagoKent Law Review 277.
 
26
Bob Ambrogi, The 20 Most Important Legal Technology Developments of 2018, LAWSITES (Dec. 26, 2018).
 
27
Alarie, Benjamin, The Path of the Law: Toward Legal Singularity (May 27, 2016). https://​doi.​org/​10.​2139/​ssrn.​2767835
 
28
Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014).
 
29
Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (2d ed. 2017). Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (2019).
 
30
Michael Culpan, “This Algorithm Can Create an Imitation Van Gogh in 60 Minutes,” Wired, September 1, 2015, https://​www.​wired.​co.​uk/​article/​art-algorithm-recreates-paintings
 
31
Mark Coeckelbergh, “Can Machines Create Art?,” Philosophy & Technology 30 (2017): 285–6. George E. Lewis, “From Network Band to Ubiquitous Computing: Rich Gold and the Social Aesthetics of Interactivity,” in Improvisation and Social Aesthetics eds. Georgina Born, Eric Lewis and Will Straw (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017).
 
32
Dana Remus and Frank Levy, “Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law,” The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 30 (2017): 501–58.
 
33
Gunter Lösel, “Can Robots Improvise?,” Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies 14, no. 1 (2018).
 
34
Roger Dean, Hyperimprovisation: Computer-Interactive Sound Improvisation (Wisconsin: A-R Editions, Inc., 2003), xiii.
 
35
George E. Lewis, “(Machine) Listening as Improvisation,” Technosphere Magazine, December 23, 2018), https://​www.​technosphere-magazine.​hkw.​de/​p/​5-Rainbow-Family-5Aj9nAxzG6zFRAAd​9icEvH. George E. Lewis, “Listening for Freedom with Arnold Davidson,” Critical Inquiry 45, no. 2 (Winter 2019): 434.
 
36
Daniel Martin Katz, “The MIT School of Law? A Perspective on Legal Education in the 21st Century,” University of Illinois Law Review, no. 5 (2014). On the lack of methodological integrity of the use of statistics in social science e.g. https://​errorstatistics.​com/​2016/​11/​08/​gigerenzer-at-the-psa-how-fisherneyman-pearson-bayes-were-transformed-into-the-null-ritual-comments-and-queries-i/​, adversarial statistics: https://​jasp-stats.​org
 
38
Nicholas Carr, The Glass Cage: Automation and Us, 1 edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014). John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 517–57.
 
39
UN Press Release, World Stumbling Zombie-Like into a Digital Welfare Dystopia, Warns UN Human Rights Expert (Oct. 17, 2019). Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/74/48037, §8 (Oct. 11, 2019).
 
40
Bersoff, David M., Sarah Adkins, Cody Armstrong, Joshua Wu, Nick Maxwell, Giuseppe Bovenzi, Abbey Fox, and John Zamites. “2019 Edelman Trust Barometer.” Edelman, March 2019. https://​www.​edelman.​com/​trust-barometer
 
41
Kevin Kelly Alec Ross, Understanding the 12 Technological Forces that Will Shape Our Future (Penguin 2017).
 
43
Regulation Of Artificial Intelligence In Selected Jurisdictions, 138 (2019), https://​www.​loc.​gov/​law/​help/​artificial-intelligence/​regulation-artificial-intelligence.​pdf
 
44
Thorsten Jelinek, Wendell Wallach & Danil Kerimi, Coordinating Committee for the Governance of Artificial Intelligence (2020), https://​www.​g20-insights.​org/​policy_​briefs/​coordinating-committee-for-thegovernance-of-artificial-intelligence/​
 
45
N. Notat and J.-D. Senard, “L’entreprise, objet d’intérêt collectif – Rapport aux Ministres de la Transition écologique et solidaire, de la Justice, de l’Economie et des Finances, et du Travail”, 9 March 2018.
 
46
B. Dondero, “La raison d’être des entreprises (rapport Notat-Senard)”, 10 March 2018: https://​brunodondero.​com/​2018/​03/​10/​la-raison-detre-des-entreprises-rapport-notat-senard/​
 
47
Conger, K. (2020). Uber and Lyft Drivers in California Will Remain Contractors. The New York Times. https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2020/​11/​04/​technology/​california-uber-lyft-prop-22.​html
 
48
M. Fenwick and E. Vermeulen, “Technology and Corporate Governance: Blockchain, Crypto and Artificial Intelligence,” ECGI Working Paper No. 424/2018, November 2018.
 
49
M. Field, “Decentralized Governance Matters”, Medium, 5 February 2018.D. Zetzsche, R. Buckley and D. Arner, “The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain,” EBI Working Paper Series 2017–007, No. 14, 15 August 2017; P. Paech, “The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks,” LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 16/2017, 16 December 2016.
 
50
D. Guégan and C. Hénot, “A Probative Value for Authentication Use Case Blockchain,” Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, 2018. F. G’Sell, “The challenge of algorithmic governance,” Interdisciplinary workshop on blockchains, Ecole Normale Supérieure, 2 July 2018.
 
51
C. Perreau, “L’interactive initial offering, l’alternativetransparente à l’ICO”, LeJournalDuNet.​com, 26 October 2018; W. George, “Kleros’ IICO Analysis,” 26 July 2018; J. Teutsch, V. Buterin and C. Brown, “Interactive coin offerings,” 11 December 2017. J. Halfon, “The DAICO: ICO savior or wolf in sheep’s clothing?”, Forbes, 24 May 2018. C. Pauw, “What is a DAICO, Explained,” CoinTelegraph, 13 February 2018.
 
52
D. Yermack, “Corporate Governance and Blockchains,” Oxford Review of Finance, Volume 21, March 2017. A. Glidden, “Should Smart Contracts Be Legally Enforceable?”, Blockchain at Berkeley, 27 February 2018.
 
53
Assaf Hamdani, Niron Hashai, Eugene Kandel & Yishay Yafeh, Technological Progress and the Future of the Corporation, 6 J. British Acad. 215, 225 (2018) (arguing that, because DLTs reduce fraud and enhance trust, they have the potential to displace “powerful intermediaries”).
 
54
Jordan Danielle, Broadridge Patents Blockchain Solution For Proxy Voting And Repurchase Agreements (May 10, 2018), https://​www.​ethnews.​com/​broadridge-patentsblockchai​n-solution-for-proxy-voting-and-repurchase-agreements. Christine Kim, Northern Trust Wins Patent for Storing Meeting Minutes on a Blockchain (Jun. 6, 2018), https://​www.​coindesk.​com/​northern-trust-wins-patent-storingmeeting-minutes-blockchain
 
55
See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 Rev. Fin. 1, 9 (2017). Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 853, 858–864 (2008) (describing three forms of secret option backdating, including the backdating of executives’ option grants; the backdating of nonexecutive employees’ option grants; and the backdating of executives’ option exercises).
 
56
Jenny Chu, Jonathan Faasse & P. Raghavendra Rau, Do Compensation Consultants Enable Higher CEO Pay? A Disclosure Rule Change As a Separating Device, 64 MGMT. SC. 2845 (2017) (arguing in favor of a more nuanced view on consultants after concluding that “not all multiservice consultants are conflicted while not all specialist consultants are guardians of shareholder value”). Christopher S. Armstrong, Christopher D. Ittner & David F. Larcker, Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels, 17 REV. ACC’T STUD. 322–351 (2012) Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and “Independent” Compensation Consultants, 49 J. ACC’T & ECON. 247–262 (2010).
 
57
T. Santiago, AI Bias: How Does AI Influence The Executive Function Of Business Leaders? January 2019 Muma Business Review 3:181–192.
 
58
J. Danaher, The threat of algocracy: reality, resistance and accommodation, Philosophy & Technology 29 (3) (2016) 245–268.
 
59
NCAA v. Board of Regents 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
 
60
G Zekos, ECONOMICS AND LAW ON COMPETITION IN 21st CENTURY GLOBALIZATION 2014 Nova Science Publications New York USA. www.​novapublishers.​com G Zekos, Economics and Law on Competition in US and EU 2008 Nova Science Publications New York USA.
 
61
Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1849–50 (2020) (highlighting how Chicago school’s call to use economics in antitrust analysis yielded less enforcement and increased consumer welfare and efficiency).
 
62
Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 35, 47. Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis Of Antitrust Principles And Their Application §§ 260–62 (5th ed. 2020).
 
63
FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Microsof Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 453 (7th Cir. 2020).
 
64
Jon Fingas, Tesla May Open ‘Centers’ to Get Around Pro-Dealership Laws, ENGADGET (Oct. 12, 2019), https://​www.​engadget.​com/​2019-10-12-tesla-centers-leak.​html
 
65
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018). Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 715, 722–24 (2019).
 
66
Daniel A. Hanley, A Topology of Multisided Digital Platforms, 19 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 289–91 (2020); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 B.U. L. REV. 489 (2021).
 
67
Jignesh Padhiyar, iPhone vs Android: A Look at Competitive Past and Future, GEEKSBLOG (July 21, 2020), https://​www.​igeeksblog.​com/​iphone-vs-android
 
68
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018) (“Only other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided platform for transactions.”). Texas v. Google, LLC, No. 4:20cv957 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2020) (alleging an agreement between Google and Facebook to restrain “header bidding,” which was a system intended to make ad pricing more competitive by facilitating bidding among multiple ad exchanges).
 
69
United States v. Google LLC, No.1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020).
 
70
C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Nascent Competitors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (2020) (discussing the importance of protecting nascent competitors).
 
71
Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7–8, 55–57, 101 (2021) at 24–55 (documenting venture capital markets’ heavy orientation toward new entrants’ selloff possibilities); Staff Of H. Subcomm. On Antitrust, Commercial And Administrative Law Of The Comm. On The Judiciary, 116th Cong., Investigation Of Competition In Digital Markets 23 (Comm. Rep. 2020) (canvassing Amazon’s major acquisitions); at 25, 150 (noting Facebook’s acquisitions of at least 63 companies since 2004); at 175 (“In a span of 20 years, Google purchased well over 260 companies—a figure that likely understates the full breadth of Google’s acquisitions, given that many of the firm’s purchases have gone unreported.”) Kevin A. Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334–38 (2020).
 
72
Case AT.40099, Google Android, C(2018) 4761, §§ 1214, 1401 (July 18, 2018), https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​antitrust/​cases/​dec_​docs/​40099/​40099_​9993_​3.​pdf (pre-installation of competing search engines would have created more competition in search traffic, that Google was willing to pay large sums to be the default search engine on some devices, and that installing a single search engine as a default increased that search engine’s traffic by a factor of two to three); Katie Collins, Google Won’t Be Default Search Engine for Android Users in EU Next Year, CNET (Aug. 2, 2019, 3:35 AM PT), https://​www.​cnet.​com/​news/​google-to-prompt-eu-android-users-to-choose-a-search-engine-within-chrome
 
73
STIGLER COMM. ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS, FINAL REPORT, CHICAGO BOOTH: STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE 16 (2019), https://​research.​chicagobooth.​edu/​-/​media/​research/​stigler/​pdfs/​digital-platforms-committee-report-stigler-center.​pdf
 
74
Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1683, 1703, 1716 (2020).
 
75
Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust Litigation 4 (USC CLASS Research Papers Series, No. CLASS20–12, 2020), https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3563843
 
76
Mark Fenwick and Erik P. M. Vermeulen “The Digital Future of Corporate Governance” International Corporate Governance Network Yearbook 2018, p. 11; Mark Fenwick and Erik P. M. Vermeulen, “Technology & Corporate Governance” 48 (1) The Texas Journal of Business Law, 1 (2019); Mark Fenwick and Erik P. M. Vermeulen, “The Unmediated and Technology-Driven Corporate Governance of Today’s Winning Companies” New York University Journal of Law and Business (2020).
 
77
Venture Capital Ass’n, 2017 Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n Y.B. 9 https://​nvca.​org/​blog/​nvca-2017-yearbook-go-resource-venture-ecosystem/​. Henry Hansmann, The Ownership Of Enterprise 40–44 (1996) (observing the “nearly complete absence of large firms in which ownership is shared among two or more different types of patrons, such as customers and suppliers or investors and workers” and theorizing the high cost of collective decision making that would result from having different types of owners).
 
78
Alfred Lee, Delayed IPOs Undercut Startup Employee Options, THE INFORMATION (July 13, 2018), https://​www.​theinformation.​com/​articles/​delayed-ipos-undercut-startup-employee-options (noting 52 unicorns hit the 10-year mark in 2018 and more will follow in 2019).
 
79
Begum Erdogan et al., Grow Fast or Die Slow: Why Unicorns Are Staying Private, MCKINSEY (May 2016), https://​www.​mckinsey.​com/​industries/​high-tech/​our-insights/​grow-fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-arestaying-private
 
80
Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), https://​techcrunch.​com/​2013/​11/​02/​welcome -to-theunicorn-club/; The Global Unicorn Club, CB INSIGHTS, https://​www.​cbinsights.​com/​research-unicorn-companies
 
81
Robert P. Bartlett & Eric Talley, Law and Corporate Governance, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 8 (Hermalin & Weisbach eds., forthcoming), https://​papers.​ssrn.​com/​sol3/​papers.​cfm?​abstract_​id=​3009451
 
82
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 769 (2017).
 
83
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271 (2017).
 
84
Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 583 (2016). Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 169 (2017).
 
85
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 37 (2006).
 
86
Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold, Equity Compensation & The Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613 (2017). Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60 (2011).
 
87
In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 21.
 
88
Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 315 (2013) (noting that venture-backed startups “are growing exponentially in importance in the U.S. economy”).
 
89
A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2013). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 l(a) & 78o(d); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 343 (2013); Usha Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529.
 
90
Jill E. Fisch, Leave It To Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 752–54 (2013).
 
91
Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, 2018 Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n Y.B. 29–31 (providing historic data on U.S. venture-backed exit activity, including 2017 data indicating 750 acquisitions versus 59 IPOs).
 
92
Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 190–91 (2012).
 
93
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance In Theory And Practice 74 (2008). In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996): “Directors legally are only required to authorize the most significant corporate acts or transactions: mergers, changes in capital structure, fundamental changes in business, appointment and compensation of the CEO, etc.” Marc Moore & Martin Petrin, Corporate Governance: Law, Regulation and Theory 174–177 (2017).
 
94
Mckinsey & Company, The Board Perspective: A Collection Of Mckinsey Insights Focusing On Boards Of Directors, Number 2 (Mar. 2018), at 49, https://​www.​mckinsey.​com/​featured-insights/​leadership/​the-board-perspective
 
95
Ajay Agrawal et al., What to Expect From Artificial Intelligence, 58 MITSLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW (2017), at 26, http://​ilp.​mit.​edu/​media/​news_​articles/​smr/​2017/​58311.​pdf.
 
96
Fenwick M et al., The End of “Corporate” Governance (Hello “Platform” Governance), ECGI Law Working Paper, n. 430/2018, <https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3232663>. Yermack D, Corporate Governance and Blockchain, Review of Finance, vol. 21, Issue 1, March 2017, pp. 7 ff., <www.academic.oup.com>; Lafarre A & Van der Elst C, Blockchain Technology for Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism, ECGI Law Working Paper n. 39/2018, 2018, <https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3135209>. OECD, Blockchain Technology and Corporate Governance. Technology, Markets, Regulation and Corporate Governance, 2018.
 
97
Carpenter M & Poon SH, Lesson Learned from AI Prototype Designed for Corporate AGM (2018), https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3244160.
 
98
Van Rijmenam M, Will AI Board Members Run the Companies of the Future? (2018), <www.​brinknews.​com>. Pugh W, Why not Appoint an Algorithm to Your Corporate Board? (2019), Future Tense, <www.​slate.​com>. Enriques L & Zetzsche D, Corporate Technologies and the Tech Nirvana Fallacy (ECGI Law Working Paper n. 457/2019) (2019), http://​ssrn.​com/​abstract_​id=​3392321
 
99
Vegard Kolbjørnsrud et al., How Artificial Intelligence Will Redefine Management, Harvard Business Review Online (Nov. 2, 2016), https://​hbr.​org/​2016/​11/​howartificial-intelligence-will-redefine-management
 
100
E. M. Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932).
 
101
Singapore Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev. Ed).
 
102
Lennard’s Carrying Company Ltd. v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd. [1915] AC 705.
 
103
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500 Ben Chester Cheong, “Context is the most Important Factor: One-man Companies and Corporate Attribution in Singapore” Oxford Business Law Blog (12 June 2020) https://​www.​law.​ox.​ac.​uk/​business-law-blog/​blog/​2020/​06/​context-mostimportant-factor-one-man-companies-and-corporate
 
104
Alexander Sarch and Ryan Abbott, “Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction or Science Fiction” (2019) 53 UC Davis Law Review 323, 325–326; Martin Petrin, “Corporate Management in the Age of AI” (4 March 2019) UCL Working Paper Series (No. 3/2019).
 
105
https://​www.​technologyreview​.​com/​2018/​03/​12/​144746/​when-an-ai-finally-kills-someone-who-will-beresponsible/​ Gabriel Hallevy, “The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities—from Science Fiction to Legal Social Control” (2010) 4 Akron Intellectual Property Journal 171, 171–172.
 
106
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COL. L. REV. 767, 769 (2017). Lynn Stout, Corporate Entities: Their Ownership, Control, and Purpose, in Oxford Handbook Of Law And Economics (2017).
 
107
Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON PERSPECTIVES 171, 191 (2002).
 
108
Megan Beck & Barry Libert, The Rise of AI Makes Emotional Intelligence More Important, Harvard Business Review Online (Feb. 15, 2017), https://​hbr.​org/​2017/​02/​the-rise-of-ai-makes-emotional-intelligence-more-important. Ajay Agrawal et al., What to Expect From Artificial Intelligence, 58 Mitsloan Management Review (2017), at 26, http://​ilp.​mit.​edu/​media/​news_​articles/​smr/​2017/​58311.​pdf.
 
109
FATF Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on So-Called Stablecoins (The Financial Action Task Force, 2020).
 
110
Joseph Lee, Law and Regulation for a Crypto-Market: Perpetuation or Innovation? In Chiu Iris and Deipenbrock Gudula (eds) Routledge Handbook on FinTech and Law—Regulatory, Supervisory, Policy and other Legal Challenges (Routledge, 1st edn, 2021).
 
111
Peter Van Valkenburgh, “The Differences between Bitcoin and Libra Should Matter to Policymakers” (2019) https://​www.​coincenter.​org/​the-differences-between-bitcoin-and-libra-should-matter-to-policymakers/​
 
112
G. Zekos, Economics and Legal Understanding of Virtual Currencies, Banking & Financial Services Policy Report, Volume 38 Number 8 August 2019 Wolters Kluwer. G. Zekos, Euro Zone: The Basis for the Materialization of The United States of Europe. Banking & Financial Services Policy Report, Volume 39 • Number 2 • February 2020 Wolters Kluwer.
 
113
Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 12, 2015) http://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​2580664
 
114
Twining, W,. Globalisation and Legal Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
 
115
Mises, L. v. (1996): Human Action: a Treatise on Economics. San Francisco, CA: Foundation for Economic Education, Inc.
 
116
Monika Zalnieriute et al., The Rule of Law and Automation of Government Decision-Making, 82 The Modern Law Review 425 (2019).
 
117
Hazlet Th., K. and Sullivan, S.D. (1994), “Professional organizations and healthcare industry support: ethical conflict?”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 236–56.
 
118
Doreen Lustig and Eyal Benvenisti, The Multinational Corporation as “the Good Despot”: The Democratic Costs of Privatization in Global Settings, in Theoretical Inquiries in Law · April 2014 Vol. 15:125 P156.
 
119
Corruption and Economic Development, World Bank (May 4, 2019), http://​www1.​worldbank.​org/​publicsector/​anticorrupt/​corruptn/​cor02.​htm#note1 What Is Corruption?, Transparency International (May 4, 2019), https://​www.​transparency.​org/​what-is-corruption/​
 
120
Hanne Fjelde & Håvard Hegre, Political Corruption and Institutional Stability, 49 (3) Studies in Comparative International Development 267 (2014).
 
121
OECD, Financing Democracy: Supporting Better Public Policies and Preventing Policy Capture (2014) (May 4, 2019), https://​www.​unodc.​org/​documents/​treaties/​UNCAC/​WorkingGroups/​workinggroup4/​2014-September-8-10/​Responses_​NV/​OECD_​EN.​pdf
 
122
Alexander James Hamilton & Craig Hammer, Can We Measure the Power of the Grabbing Hand?: A Comparative Analysis of Different Indicators of Corruption (The World Bank, 2018), http://​documents.​worldbank.​org/​curated/​en/​1132815155168287​46/​Can-wemeasure-the-power-of-the-grabbing-hand-a-comparative-analysis-of-differentindicat​ors-of-corruption
 
123
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
 
124
Randall v. Sorrell 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) and Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC. 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006).
 
125
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“The Government has a strong interest, no less critical to our democratic system, in combatting corruption and its appearance. We have, however, held that this interest must be limited to a specific kind of corruption—quid pro quo corruption ...”.
 
126
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
 
127
Libertarian National Committee, Inc. v. FEC 924 F.3d 533, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
 
128
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (the government “may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”).
 
Literature
1.
go back to reference Pasquale, F. (2019). A rule of persons, not machines: The limits of legal automation. The George Washington Law Review, 87 Pasquale, F. (2019). A rule of persons, not machines: The limits of legal automation. The George Washington Law Review, 87
2.
go back to reference Zekos, G. (2015). Cyber versus conventional personal jurisdiction. Journal of Internet Law, 18(10), 3–35. Zekos, G. (2015). Cyber versus conventional personal jurisdiction. Journal of Internet Law, 18(10), 3–35.
3.
go back to reference Zekos, G. (2013). Demolishing state’s sole power over sovereignty and territory via electronic technology and cyberspace. Journal of Internet Law, 17(5), 27–41. Zekos, G. (2013). Demolishing state’s sole power over sovereignty and territory via electronic technology and cyberspace. Journal of Internet Law, 17(5), 27–41.
4.
go back to reference Zekos, G. (2019). Economics and legal understanding of virtual currencies. Banking and Financial Services Policy Report, Vol 38(8). Wolters Kluwer. Zekos, G. (2019). Economics and legal understanding of virtual currencies. Banking and Financial Services Policy Report, Vol 38(8). Wolters Kluwer.
5.
go back to reference Zekos, G. (2020). Euro Zone: The basis for the materialization of The United States of Europe. Banking and Financial Services Policy Report, 39(2). Wolters Kluwer. Zekos, G. (2020). Euro Zone: The basis for the materialization of The United States of Europe. Banking and Financial Services Policy Report, 39(2). Wolters Kluwer.
7.
go back to reference Lösel, G. (2018). Can robots improvise? Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies 14(1). Lösel, G. (2018). Can robots improvise? Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies 14(1).
8.
go back to reference Liu, H.-Y. (2018). The power structure of artificial intelligence. Law, Innovation and Technology, 10, 197.CrossRef Liu, H.-Y. (2018). The power structure of artificial intelligence. Law, Innovation and Technology, 10, 197.CrossRef
9.
go back to reference Derrida, J. (1990). Force of law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”. Cardozo Law Review, 11, 920–1045. Derrida, J. (1990). Force of law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”. Cardozo Law Review, 11, 920–1045.
10.
go back to reference Susskind, J. (2018). Future politics: Living together in a world transformed by tech. Oxford University Press. Susskind, J. (2018). Future politics: Living together in a world transformed by tech. Oxford University Press.
11.
go back to reference Ross, K. K. A. (2017). Understanding the 12 technological forces that will shape our future. Penguin. Ross, K. K. A. (2017). Understanding the 12 technological forces that will shape our future. Penguin.
12.
go back to reference Fenwick, M., & Vermeulen, E. (November 2018). Technology and corporate governance: Blockchain, crypto and artificial intelligence. ECGI Working Paper No. 424/2018. Fenwick, M., & Vermeulen, E. (November 2018). Technology and corporate governance: Blockchain, crypto and artificial intelligence. ECGI Working Paper No. 424/2018.
13.
go back to reference Petrin, M. Corporate management in the age of AI (4 March 2019) UCL Working Paper Series (No. 3/2019). Petrin, M. Corporate management in the age of AI (4 March 2019) UCL Working Paper Series (No. 3/2019).
14.
go back to reference Hurley, M., & Adebayo, J. (2017). Credit scoring in the era of big data. Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 18, 148. Hurley, M., & Adebayo, J. (2017). Credit scoring in the era of big data. Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 18, 148.
15.
go back to reference Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies. Oxford University Press. Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies. Oxford University Press.
16.
go back to reference Susskind, R. (2017). Tomorrow’s lawyers: An introduction to your future (2d ed.). Susskind, R. (2017). Tomorrow’s lawyers: An introduction to your future (2d ed.).
17.
go back to reference Van Der Aalst, W. M., Bichler, M., & Heinzl, A. (2018). Robotic process automation. Springer. Van Der Aalst, W. M., Bichler, M., & Heinzl, A. (2018). Robotic process automation. Springer.
Metadata
Title
Theoretical Background of AI and Governance
Author
Georgios I. Zekos
Copyright Year
2022
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94736-1_2

Premium Partner