Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXVII

The study proposed here builds up a game model (with associated algorithms) in a specific non-linear interfering scenario, with n possible interacting elements. Our examination provides optimal Kalai-Smorodinsky compromise solution n-tuples, for the game, whose components indicate active principle quantity percentages. We solve the problem by using the Carfì’s payoff analysis method for differentiable payoff functions. Moreover we implement Matlab algorithms for the construction and representation of the payoff spaces and for the finding of Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. The software for the determination of graphs are adopted, but not presented here explicitly. The core section of the paper, completely studies the game in the n-dimensional case, by finding the critical zone of the game in its Cartesian form. At this aim, we need to prove a theorem and a lemma about the Jacobian determinant of the n-game. In the same section, we write down the intersection of the critical zone and the Kalai-Smorodinsky straight-line. In the Appendix 1 we solve the problem in closed form for the 2 dimensional case and numerically for \(n > 2\). Our methods works also for games with non-convex payoff space. Finally, in a particular highly symmetrical case, we solve analytically the Kalai-Smorodinsky compromise problem in all cases. We provide some applications of the obtained results, particularly to economic problems.

The standard assumption in decision theory, microeconomics and social choice is that individuals (consumers, voters) are endowed with preferences that can be expressed as complete and transitive binary relations over alternatives (bundles of goods, policies, candidates). While this may often be the case, we show by way of toy examples that incomplete and intransitive preference relations are not only conceivable, but make intuitive sense. We then suggest that fuzzy preference relations and solution concepts based on them are plausible in accommodating those features that give rise to intransitive and incomplete preferences. Tracing the history of those solutions leads to the works of Zermelo in 1920’s.

A multicameral simple game is an intersection of a number of simple games played by the same set of players: a coalition is winning in the multicameral game if and only if it is winning in all the individual games played. Examples include decision rules in multicameral parliaments where a bill must be passed in all the houses of the parliament, and voting rules in the European Union Council where a winning coalition of countries must satisfy two or three independent criteria. This paper is a preliminary study of relations between the positions and power indices of players in the “chamber” games and in the multicameral game obtained as the intersection. We demonstrate that for any power index satisfying a number of standard properties, the index of a player in the multicameral game can be smaller (or greater) than in all the chamber games; this can occur even when the players are ordered the same way by desirability relations in all the chamber games. We also observe some counterintuitive effects when comparing the positions and decisiveness of players. However, as expected, introducing an additional chamber with all the players equal (a one man - one vote majority game) to a complete simple game reduces all the differences between the Shapley-Shubik indices of players.

The most important problem in a practical implementation of degressive proportionality is its ambiguity. Therefore, we introduce an order relation on a set of degressively proportional allocations. Its main idea is to define greater allocations such that emerge from other after transferring a certain quantity of goods from smaller to greater entities contending in distribution. Thus, maximal elements in this ordering are indicated as the sought-after solution sanctioning boundary conditions as the only reason of moving away from the fundamental principle of proportionality. In case of several maximal elements the choice of one allocation remains an open issue, but the cardinality of the set from which we make a choice can be reduced significantly. In the best-known example of application of degressive proportionality, which is the apportionment of seats in the European Parliament, the considered set contains a maximal element. Thereby, there exits an allocation that is nearest to the proportional distribution with respect to transfer relation.

Any power index defines a total preorder in a simple game and, thus, induces a hierarchy among its players. The desirability relation, which is also a preorder, induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on linear games, i.e., games in which the desirability relation is total. The desirability relation is a sub–preorder of another preorder, the weak desirability relation, and the class of weakly linear games, i.e., games for which the weak desirability relation is total, is larger than the class of linear games. The weak desirability relation induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on weakly linear games. In this paper, we define a chain of preorders between the desirability and the weak desirability preorders. From them we obtain new classes of totally preordered games between linear and weakly linear games.

The behavioral models of classical values (like the Shapley and Banzhaf values) consider the contributions to coalition S as contributions delivered by the players individually joining such a coalition as it is being formed; i.e., v(S) – v(S \ {i}). In this paper, we propose another approach to values where these contributions are considered as given by sets of players: (v(S) – v(S \ R)), where S, R are subsets of the set of all players involved in cooperative game v. Based on this new approach, several sub-coalitional values are proposed, and some properties of these values are shown.

This article anlayses the change in the balance of power in the European Union Council due to the United Kingdom leaving (referred to as Brexit). This analysis is based on the concept of power indices in voting games where natural coalitions, called pre-coalitions, occur between various players (or parties). The pre-coalitions in these games are assumed to be formed around the six largest member states (after Brexit, the five largest), where each of the remaining member states joins the pre-coalition based around the large member state which is the most similar according to the subject of the vote. This is illustrated by an example. We consider adaptations of three classical indices: the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf-Penrose and Johnston indices based on the concept of a consistent share function (also called quotient index). This approach can be interpreted as a two-level process of distributing power. At the upper level, power is distributed amongst pre-coalitions. At the lower level, power is distributed amongst the members of each pre-coalition. One of the conclusions of the research is that removing the UK from the voting game means that the power indices of small countries actually decrease. This seems somewhat surprising as the voting procedure in the EU council was designed to be robust to changes in the number and size of member states. This conclusion does not correspond to a general result, but does indicate the difficulty of defining voting rules which are robust to changes in the set of players.

A comparison of the rules of voting in the last two main Polish classical music competitions: the XVIIth Chopin Piano Competition and the XVth Wieniawski Violin Competition. Weak and strong points of rules are analyzed. The rules are also compared to rules used in the previous editions of the competitions. We conclude that the changes resulted in the simplification of rules.

Contemporary strategic management has accepted the category of opportunity, although it cannot be reflected in the organization’s plans and strategies. Alertness, proactivity, social networks and knowledge resources are the categories that come up most often when discussing opportunity perception as one of the determinants of entrepreneurial activity. In reality, they are the result of both behavioral and cognitive processes. The purpose of the article is to identify the primary factors that predetermine the idiosyncrasy of how opportunity is perceived by various persons, such as creativity, intuition, and divergent thinking. The article presents opportunity value chain, paraphrases the order of M.E. Porter’s value chain and the A. Koestler’s concept of ‘bisociation’. The article also discusses the process of group decision making in terms of opportunity.

The article has been based on a study of the subject’s literature, but the conclusions provide important directions that are utilitarian in nature.

We deal with the free-riding situations that may arise from sharing maintenance cost of a facility among its potential users. The non-users may ask for a check to assess who the users are, but they have to pay the related cost; consequently, a non-user may not ask for the check, with the hope that the other non-users ask and pay for it. In this paper, we provide incentives for asking for the check, without suffering a higher cost

In this research, the effects of culture, cognitions, and emotions on crisis management and prevention are analysed. An agent-based crowd evacuation simulation model was created, named IMPACT, to study the evacuation process from a transport hub. To extend previous research, various socio-cultural, cognitive, and emotional factors were modelled, including: language, gender, familiarity with the environment, emotional contagion, prosocial behaviour, falls, group decision making, and compliance. The IMPACT model was validated against data from an evacuation drill using the existing EXODUS evacuation model. Results show that on all measures, the IMPACT model is within or close to the prescribed boundaries, thereby establishing its validity. Structured simulations with the validated model revealed important findings, including: the effect of doors as bottlenecks, social contagion speeding up evacuation time, falling behaviour not affecting evacuation time significantly, and travelling in groups being more beneficial for evacuation time than travelling alone. This research has important practical applications for crowd management professionals, including transport hub operators, first responders, and risk assessors.

Expansion of modern IT technologies, which took place last years, caused a significant increase in software projects. Those projects are quite often complex venture burdened with high risk. Nowadays, a large number of software projects is managed using Scrum framework. In Scrum, where people form self-organizing team, group decisions became an essential element of the project, which plays an important role to create time approximation or to manage potential risks. This paper focuses on group decisions, temporal aspects of estimation and risk management in Scrum project. In article we present conceptual model of extension Scrum framework by risk management process in aspect of project time estimation. Proposed model contains time buffers based on mixture probability distribution, which improve Scrum framework in terms of group estimation. We also depict case study which presents time approximation process which took place in one of a Scrum project.

In the paper several extensions of a successful EDA-type algorithm, namely \(COMMA_{op}\), inspired by the paradigm of agent-based computing (EMAS) are presented. The proposed algorithms leveraging notions connected with EMAS, such as reproduction and death, or even the population decomposition, turn out to be better than the original algorithm. The evidence for this is presented in the end of the paper, utilizing QAP problems by Éric Taillard as benchmarks.