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About this book

These transactions publish research in computer-based methods of computational collective intelligence (CCI) and their applications in a wide range of fields such as performance optimization in IoT, big data, reliability, privacy, security, service selection, QoS and machine learning. This thirty-fourth issue contains 12 selected papers which present new findings and innovative methodologies as well as discuss issues and challenges in the field of collective intelligence in group decision making with special emphasize given to voting theory, power indices and graphs while addressing elections, social choices, IoT and allocation algorithms.

Table of Contents


A Probabilistic Model for Detecting Gerrymandering in Partially-Contested Multiparty Elections

Classic methods for detecting gerrymandering fail in multiparty partially-contested elections, such as the Polish local election of 2014. A new method for detecting electoral bias, based on the assumption that voting is a stochastic process described by Pólya’s urn model, is devised to overcome these difficulties. Since the partially-contested character of the election makes it difficult to estimate parameters of the urn model, an ad-hoc procedure for estimating those parameters in a manner untainted by potential gerrymandering is proposed.
Dariusz Stolicki, Wojciech Słomczyński, Jarosław Flis

Power in Networks: A PGI Analysis of Krackhardt’s Kite Network

This paper applies power index analysis to the well-known Krackhardt’s kite social network by imposing a weighted voting game on the given network structure. It compares the results of this analysis, derived by applying the Public Good Index and the Public Value, with the outcome of employing the centrality concepts - degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality - that we find in Krackhardt (1990), and eigenvector centrality. The conclusion is that traditional centrality measures are rather a first approximation for evaluating the power in a network as they considerably abstract from decision making and thereby of possible coalitions and actions. Power index analysis takes care of decision making, however, in the rather abstract (a priori) form of the potential of forming coalitions.
Manfred J. Holler, Florian Rupp

Orders of Criticality in Graph Connection Games

The order of criticality of a player in a simple game and two indices inspired by the reasoning à la Shapley and à la Banzhaf were introduced in two previous papers [3] and [4], respectively, mainly having in mind voting situations. Here, we devote our attention to graph connection games, and to the computation of the order of criticality of a player. The indices introduced in [4] may be used as centrality measures of the edges in preserving the connection of a graph.
Marco Dall’Aglio, Vito Fragnelli, Stefano Moretti

The Capacity of Companies to Create an Early Warning System for Unexpected Events – An Explorative Study

This paper presents a discussion of determinants of the capacity of companies to deal with unexpected events and an approach to the creation of a company’s Early Warning System. Capacity determinants discussed include: lack of functional stupidity, paradigms, general trust and awareness of fragility indicators. The results of research based on an explorative questionnaire are presented for two small Swiss and German companies. The working hypothesis for the research is that flatter organizational structures possess higher capacity to create an Early Warning System than more hierarchical organizational structures. There is some weak evidence confirming this hypothesis.
Johannes (Joost) Platje

Electoral Reform and Social Choice Theory: Piecemeal Engineering and Selective Memory

Most electoral reforms are dictated by recognized problems discovered in the existing procedures or - perhaps more often - by an attempt to consolidate power distributions. Very rarely, if ever, is the motivation derived from the social choice theory even though it deals with issues pertaining to what is possible and what is impossible to achieve by using given procedures in general. We discuss some reforms focusing particularly on a relatively recent one proposed by Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen. It differs from many of its predecessors in invoking social choice considerations in proposing a new system of electing representatives. At the same time it exemplifies the tradeoffs involved in abandoning existing systems and adopting new ones.
Hannu Nurmi

Repeated Trust Game – Statistical Results Concerning Time of Reaction

The paper presents basic results regarding probability distributions together with the parameters related to the decision-making time in the repeated trust game. The results obtained are of a general nature, related to the waiting time for a reaction in computer-aided systems, as well as a special one related to the characteristics of the decision-makers participating in the experiment.
Anna Motylska-Kuźma, Jacek Mercik, Aleksander Buczek

Labeled Network Allocation Problems. An Application to Transport Systems

We deal with networks in which there are more than one arc connecting two nodes. These multiple arcs connecting two nodes are labeled in order to differentiate each other. Likewise, there is traffic or flow among the nodes of the network. The links can have different meanings as such roads, wire connections or social relationships; and the traffic can be for example passengers, information or commodities. When we consider that labels of a network are controlled or owned by different agents then we can analyze how the worth (cost, profit, revenues, power...) associated with the network can be allocated to the agents. The Shapley quota allocation mechanism is proposed and characterized by using reasonable properties. Finally, in order to illustrate the advantages of this approach and the Shapley quota allocation mechanism, an application to the case of the Metropolitan Consortium of Seville is outlined.
Encarnación Algaba, Vito Fragnelli, Natividad Llorca, Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano

Seat Apportionment by Population and Contribution in European Parliament After Brexit

The problem of apportioning seats to member countries of the European Parliament after Brexit and in view of new accessions/exits is delicate, as countries with strong economies (and their consequent large contributions to the European Union) require that they have greater representative weight in the European Parliament. In this paper, we propose a model for seat apportionment in the European Parliament, which assigns seats taking into account both the percentages of the populations and the percentages of the contributions by each member state to the European Union budget by means of a linear combination of these two quantities. The proposed model is a modification of the approach given by Bertini, Gambarelli, and Stach in 2005. Using the new model, we studied the power position of each European Union member state before and after the exit of the United Kingdom using the Banzhaf power index. A short latest-literature review on this topic is given.
Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Izabella Stach, Giuliana Zibetti

The Use of Group Decision-Making to Improve the Monitoring of Air Quality

The aim of this paper is to present the use of methods supporting group decision making for the construction of air quality measurement networks. The article presents a a case study of making group decisions related to the construction of a hybrid network for measuring air quality in Gdańsk. Two different methods of data processing were used in the decision making process. The first one is using fuzzy modeling for quantitative data processing to assess the quality of PM10 measurement data. The other is using trust metrics for the IoT nodes of four different measurement networks. The presented example shows the complexity of the decision making process itself as well as the choice of the method. The authors deliberately used both the quantitative and qualitative methods in the decision making process to show the need to search for the right method by decision-makers.
Cezary Orłowski, Piotr Cofta, Mariusz Wąsik, Piotr Welfler, Józef Pastuszka

Bi-proportional Apportionments

An apportionment method is proposed that generalises Hamilton’s method for matrices, optimising proportionality in both directions, both for rows and columns. The resulting matrix respects fixed totals for rows and columns even when such totals do not satisfy standard criteria (monotonicity, maximum or minimum Hare), for example following the allocation of majority prizes to parties or coalitions.
Optionally, if required, the result can also respect the minimum Hare quotae for rows and columns. The algorithm may easily be expressed on the basis of rules.
Mirko Bezzi, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Giuliana Angela Zibetti

A Probabilistic Unified Approach for Power Indices in Simple Games

Many power indices on simple games have been defined trying to measure, under different points of view, the “a priori” importance of a voter in a collective binary voting scenario. A unified probabilistic way to define some of these power indices is considered in this paper. We show that six well-known power indices are obtained under such a probabilistic approach. Moreover, some new power indices can naturally be obtained in this way.
Josep Freixas, Montserrat Pons

The Story of the Poor Public Good Index

The paper starts from the hypothesis that the public good index (PGI) could be much more successful if it were introduced by a more prominent game theorist. It argues that the violation of local monotonicity, inherent to this measure of a priori voting power, can be an asset – especially if the public good interpretation is taken into consideration and the PGI is (re-)assigned to I-power, instead of P-power.
Manfred J. Holler


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