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Published in:
2010 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Truthful Fair Division
Authors : Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space (“cake”) and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that there exists a truthful “mechanism” which ensures that each of the
k
players gets at least 1/
k
of the cake. This mechanism also minimizes risk for truthful players. Furthermore, in the case where there exist at least two different measures we present a different truthful mechanism which ensures that each of the players gets more than 1/
k
of the cake.
We then turn our attention to partitions of indivisible goods with bounded utilities and a large number of goods. Here we provide similar mechanisms, but with slightly weaker guarantees. These guarantees converge to those obtained in the non-atomic case as the number of goods goes to infinity.