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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Understanding Takeover Law in the Global Context

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the political economy of global takeover laws in light of the current power restructuring in the global economy brought about by events such as Brexit and the US-China trade war. It discusses how such changes may give rise to economic nationalism, and analyses how China will react in the global takeover market, in its M&A activities in the US and EU markets, in its regulatory responses to domestic takeover laws, and in its approaches to foreign financial intermediaries providing services in the Chinese market. Neoliberalism has provided the theoretical basis for the development of the takeover market and takeover governance but we may now begin to see more policy-based interventions. Digital economy, tech giants’ governance, and climate change initiatives are areas where policy considerations will shape the market and its governance. The US and EU have been influencing global takeover market and its governance. China will start to be a player—not only as a rule-taker in the global takeover market, but a rule-maker in its governance.
Footnotes
1
Basedow (2019).
 
2
Meltzer and Shenai (2019).
 
3
Gee et al. (2016).
 
4
‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative has been regarded as a ‘twenty-first century silk road’, and it was made up of a ‘belt’ of overland corridors and a maritime ‘road’ of shipping lanes. This initiative includes 71 countries from south-east Asia to Eastern Europe and Africa. For detailed introduction, see Kuo and Kommenda (2018).
 
5
Weber (2020).
 
6
Weber (2020).
 
7
Wong and Koty (2020a).
 
8
Financial Times (2020).
 
9
Petsinger et al. (2019).
 
10
Li and Alon (2019).
 
11
See chapter “Disclosure Rules in Takeovers: Making Sense of Fragmentation in German Law”.
 
12
Millward (2020).
 
13
Moon (2018).
 
14
Cainey and Nouwens (2020).
 
15
Eurostat (2020).
 
16
Eurostat (2020).
 
17
Giles (2020).
 
18
Li (2018).
 
19
See chapter “On the Supply Side of Western Hostile Takeover Law and its Implications for China”.
 
20
Ford and Hughes (2020).
 
21
He (2020).
 
22
He (2020).
 
23
WIRED (2019).
 
24
Wong and Koty (2020b).
 
25
Graaff et al. (2020) and Meltzer and Shenai (2020).
 
26
Payne (2020) and Boland (2020).
 
27
Lippert and Perthes (2020).
 
28
London Stock Exchange (2019).
 
29
Payne (2020).
 
30
European Movement International (2016).
 
31
Herrero and Xu (2016) and Winders (2016).
 
32
European Commission (2020).
 
33
HM Government (2018).
 
34
European Parliament (2020).
 
35
See chapter “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China”.
 
36
Ibid.
 
37
Milhaupt and Zheng (2015).
 
38
See chapter “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China.
 
39
Ibid.
 
40
Bradsher (2017).
 
41
Aberdeen Standard Investments (2019).
 
42
Xu et al. (2019).
 
43
OECD (2011).
 
44
Bughin et al. (2019).
 
45
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2009).
 
46
Lin (2017).
 
47
Cai (2011).
 
48
See chapter “The Role and Future of Self-Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: A Comparative Narrative of the Two Models in the UK and China”.
 
49
See chapter “On the Supply Side of Western Hostile Takeover Law and its Implications for China”.
 
50
See chapters “On the Supply Side of Western Hostile Takeover Law and its Implications for China” & “The Role and Future of Self-Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: A Comparative Narrative of the Two Models in the UK and China”.
 
51
See chapter “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China.
 
52
See chapters “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China”, “On the Supply Side of Western Hostile Takeover Law and its Implications for China” & “The Role and Future of Self-Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: A Comparative Narrative of the Two Models in the UK and China”.
 
53
Meltzer and Shenai (2019).
 
54
Beuerle et al. (2011).
 
55
Mukwiri (2020).
 
56
Habersack (2017).
 
57
See chapter “The Role and Future of Self-Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: A Comparative Narrative of the Two Models in the UK and China”.
 
58
Economy (2020).
 
59
Lee (2017).
 
60
Zhou and Xiao (2018).
 
61
See chapter “Evaluating the Mandatory Bid Rule for Takeover Law in China: An Empirical and Comparative Analysis”.
 
62
See chapter “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China.
 
63
Xinhua Net (2020).
 
64
Kharpal (2020).
 
65
See chapter “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China.
 
66
See chapter “Disclosure Rules in Takeovers: Making Sense of Fragmentation in German Law”.
 
67
See chapter ““The Takeover Mirror”: On the EU Side of the Looking Glass, Most Regulatory Checks Are Ex Post, Not Ex Ante”.
 
68
See chapter “The Role and Future of Self-Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: A Comparative Narrative of the Two Models in the UK and China”.
 
69
Orsmond (2019).
 
70
European Commission (2018).
 
71
Gabriela (2013).
 
72
Lee (2017).
 
73
See chapters “Mergers and Competition in Digital Markets: Learning from our mistakes” & “The Amendment of Anti-monopoly Law of Merger Remedies: Based on the Empirical Analysis in China”.
 
74
Buthe (2014).
 
75
See chapters “Mergers and Competition in Digital Markets: Learning from our mistakes”.
 
76
See chapter “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China.
 
77
See chapters ““The Takeover Mirror”: On the EU Side of the Looking Glass, Most Regulatory Checks Are Ex Post, Not Ex Ante”, “Mergers and Competition in Digital Markets: Learning from our mistakes” & “The Amendment of Anti-monopoly Law of Merger Remedies: Based on the Empirical Analysis in China”.
 
78
Hobbs (2020).
 
79
Leplay (2020).
 
80
OECD (2017) and Atanassov (2012).
 
81
Wang (2018).
 
82
Morrison (2019).
 
83
Jiang and Kim (2020).
 
84
Knight and Ding (2009).
 
85
Hong (2020) and Lim (2013).
 
86
Ellyatt (2018).
 
87
Shevlin (2018).
 
88
ASIFMA (2018).
 
89
See chapter “On the Supply Side of Western Hostile Takeover Law and its Implications for China”.
 
90
See chapter “Conflict of Goals in Takeover Law: The Impossible Regulatory Alignment Between UK and China”.
 
91
See chapter “Disclosure Rules in Takeovers: Making Sense of Fragmentation in German Law”.
 
92
See chapter ““The Takeover Mirror”: On the EU Side of the Looking Glass, Most Regulatory Checks Are Ex Post, Not Ex Ante”.
 
93
See chapter “Evaluating the Mandatory Bid Rule for Takeover Law in China: An Empirical and Comparative Analysis”.
 
94
See chapter “The Role and Future of Self-Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: A Comparative Narrative of the Two Models in the UK and China”.
 
95
See chapters “Mergers and Competition in Digital Markets: Learning from our mistakes” & “The Amendment of Anti-monopoly Law of Merger Remedies: Based on the Empirical Analysis in China”.
 
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Metadata
Title
Understanding Takeover Law in the Global Context
Author
Joseph Lee
Copyright Year
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72345-3_1

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