3. Understanding the Resilience to Hybrid Threats in the Baltics
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- 2026
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Abstract
3.1 Introduction
In today’s security landscape, hybrid threats have become a persistent and evolving challenge, particularly for states in geopolitically sensitive regions like the Baltics. These threats represent a multifaceted approach that combines traditional military operations with a range of unconventional tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and energy pressure—all designed to exploit vulnerabilities, disrupt political stability, and weaken national cohesion without triggering full-scale conflict. In the Baltic States, where historical and geopolitical tensions with Russia remain high, the ability to understand and counter hybrid threats is essential for ensuring long-term security and stability.
To address these threats effectively, nations must develop resilience—a competence that allows societies, governments, institutions, and international organizations to anticipate, withstand, and recover from hybrid tactics without compromising core democratic values. Resilience, with its all-government and all-societal components, involves strengthening critical infrastructure, enhancing cybersecurity, promoting media literacy, and fostering public trust in democratic institutions. It also requires coordinated strategies at multiple levels: national, regional, and trans-Atlantic.
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This type of resilience is particularly crucial for pluralist democracies like the Baltics. The very openness and diversity that define democratic societies can be targeted by adversaries seeking to create division and instability. Disinformation campaigns, for example, can be used to fuel polarization, erode trust in institutions, and undermine elections. However, by building resilience, democratic states can safeguard their core principles while promoting social unity and institutional integrity. Resilient societies are not only capable of withstanding attacks but also of deterring future hybrid threats by reducing the effectiveness of such tactics.
In the context of the Baltics, this article will explore key cases illustrating hybrid threats, outline their main characteristics, and discuss the dilemmas democratic states face when developing resilience. The stakes are particularly high as hybrid tactics continue to evolve in tandem with Russia’s broader strategic objectives, both within Ukraine and across the wider region. Understanding how to build and maintain resilience in this environment is critical to safeguarding democratic institutions and ensuring national security in the face of ongoing hybrid pressures.
The concept of “hybrid” (as in “hybrid warfare” or “hybrid threats”) attracts attention from both practitioners and political analysts. A growing consensus identifies hybrid threats as a coordinated offensive against democracies, targeting their institutions, human rights, diversity, market-based economies, freedom of speech, and the rule of law.1
In essence, penetrators want to create chaos and to cause confusion, they seek to wage war by other means, below the “war thresholds” so that the Alliance cannot say that Russia started a war and are prevented from activating Article 5. According to Cederberg and Eronen, “hybrid warfare intentionally blurs the distinction between the times of peace and war making it hard for the targeted countries to devise policy responses in a proper and timely manner” (Cederberg & Eronen, 2015).
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In addition to its conventional war against Ukraine, Russia continues to pursue an aggressive strategy aimed at destabilizing the West. This involves spreading disinformation, interfering in elections, attempting to poison and intimidate political opponents, and supporting radical and anti-Western political parties. The Baltic States are frequently alluded to—correctly or mistakenly—as primary targets of Russia’s hybrid operations. For them, the concept of “hybrid” is not just an abstract term but a reality they must contend with.
Russia’s malignant actions not only strike at the core of the democratic way of life of the Baltic States but also pose a direct threat to their sovereignty. Hybrid tactics align with Russia’s broader strategic (military) goals—to alter the global balance of power, challenge democratic systems, undermine the post-WWII security architecture, enhance its military posture, divide the trans-Atlantic alliance, dominate its perceived sphere of influence (including the Baltic Sea Region), and create ambiguity by exploiting vulnerabilities.
Why are Russia’s hybrid actions so alarming for the Baltic States? Historically, Russia has consistently regarded the Baltic States as part of its exclusive sphere of influence. It has long employed political, economic, energy, propaganda, cyber, informational, and other coercive, overt, and covert methods to weaken and destabilize these countries. In recent years, these efforts have intensified alongside the employment of Russia’s military capabilities.
This article begins by exploring the foundational aspects of Russia’s hybrid strategy and its origins. Without a clear understanding of Russia’s intentions, identifying the specific hybrid tactics used in the Baltic States is challenging. The article then presents cases of Russian influence in the Baltic region and conclusions on the main hybrid challenges facing the Baltic States and on resilience to cope with them.
3.2 Origin of Russia’s Hybrid Threats Strategy and Why Hybrid Threats Matters in the Case of the Baltic States
How could we describe hybrid threats and is this new type of aggression significant?
Experts agree that hybrid methods are neither new nor being applied for the first time. We can recall Soviet-developed means of influence, such as ideological struggle, propaganda, agitation, deception, “reflexive control”, and “active measures” (Rus. активные меры), advanced primarily by the NKVD/KGB and now, at least partially, adopted by contemporary Russia. However, over the last decades, we have witnessed a clear shift in Russia’s strategic thinking, where alongside conventional methods (a stark reminder of this is Russia’s war in Ukraine), there has been a growing emphasis on the active use of non-military and asymmetric tactics, below the Article 5 “thresholds”. This shift towards non-military methods is evident in Russia’s foreign policy concept (United States Institute of Peace, 2023), which emphasizes “soft power”, such as the protection of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad as well as Russia’s information security concept (Security Council of the Russian Federation, 2016).
Given that Russia’s hybrid influence tactics are often considered “old methods”, why has this term become so relevant now? Several characteristics of what we now conceptualize as Russia’s hybrid threats enable us to speak of the “novelty” of this form of threats.
First, unlike Western strategic culture, Russia’s strategic thinking does not sharply differentiate between peace and war; instead, it views them as points on a continuous spectrum of competition and conflict (Steven Nolan, 2022, https://www.thestrategybridge.org/thebridge/2022/9/8/escaping-the-cave-an-analysis-of-russian-and-american-strategic-cultures-influence-on-war-peace-and-the-realmin-between). Then, in executing hybrid activities, Russia skilfully exploits openness and freedom of speech granted by democratic systems in Western states (there was a period when Russian representatives could freely operate and invest in Western countries; this is still possible, though with some restrictions). Moreover, Russia takes advantage of globalization and modern information technologies—using tools like social media to exert influence that is low-cost but has a global impact. Only now is the world beginning to grasp the full implications of nearly unrestricted access to vast amounts of data and the ability to use them by both undemocratic governmental and non-governmental actors.
By employing hybrid strategies, Russia exploits vulnerabilities in Western societies. For example, the spread of propaganda has been facilitated by the erosion of trust in democratic institutions and mass media (and Russian covert activities have facilitated this distrust and erosion). Both in neighbouring regions and in Western countries, the Kremlin takes advantage of the core principles of liberal democracy, positioning lies and propaganda as legitimate alternative viewpoints. Supporting extremist groups and radical forces—financially and in other ways—regardless of their ideological orientation, destabilizes societies from within. Additionally, Russia engages in cyber activities, uses “proxy groups” (like pseudo-NGOs, youth organizations, think tanks, and motorcycle clubs), and promotes cultural diplomacy abroad (an effort for which the organization “Rossotrudnichestvo” was created).
Another important aspect is the fact that in the case of Russia, we see a great level of coordination. Already some time ago, evidence was discovered of the establishment of the National Defence Management Center, which controls and coordinates the entire military and non-military spectrum of activities concerning the use of force in Russia’s region and abroad (Gavrilov, 2014). This is particularly important in analysing hybrid threats and the employment of all aspects—military, intelligence, economic energy-related, and others.
Indeed, a variety of Russian state entities and pseudo-non-governmental organizations are involved in organizing, coordinating, and executing influence operations. These include Russian intelligence and security agencies, state-run institutions, government-controlled media outlets, and supposedly independent NGOs, think tanks, and activist groups. While overarching strategies for influence campaigns are generally pre-planned and approved, Russia maintains the flexibility to quickly adapt to emerging opportunities, such as exploiting situations where incomplete or unreliable information follows unexpected events.
Furthermore, the concept of hybrid threats aligns with Russia’s broader strategy of unconventional and asymmetric warfare, often associated with the name of General Valery Gerasimov, serving as the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Although there is debate over whether the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” exists, Gerasimov’s widely cited article nonetheless reflects the core principles of hybrid operations that Russia values (Gerasimov, 2013): “The ‘rules of war’ themselves have greatly changed. The role of non-military methods in seeking political and strategic objectives has increased and in certain cases has even well surpassed, due to their efficiency, an armed force. The essence of the employed confrontation methods is the broad application of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures implemented by employing the potential of population protest. These measures supplement military means of covert nature including the implementation of the informational confrontation activity and actions of special operations forces”.
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many observers anticipated that Russia’s pressure on Ukraine would resemble a form of Russian-led hybrid warfare, like that seen in 2014, combining “little green men”, cyber weapons, influence operations, and military force to quickly overwhelm Ukrainian defences.
Of course, after February 2022, Western attention shifted to the conventional aspects of the war—supporting Ukraine with ammunition, weapons, and military training, strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and increasing national defence efforts. However, as the Russian-Ukrainian frontline remains largely stagnant, with Russia’s progress severely limited despite heavy casualties and widespread destruction, and with the conflict likely to become protracted, Russia’s reliance on hybrid strategies has become increasingly apparent—both in Ukraine and in the West.
One example of Russia’s ongoing influence operations is a coordinated disinformation campaign some time ago uncovered by the German government. This campaign distributed over a million messages via fake social media accounts, pushing false or misleading narratives, such as the claim that aid to war-torn Ukraine was neglecting local citizens (Echtermann & Jonas, 2022).
A notable shift in the concept of asymmetric methods is Russia’s current trend of moving from “classical” hybrid threats to more “kinetic” methods (i.e. not just propaganda and cyber activities but also physical actions on the ground). Some refer to this as sabotage or even state-sponsored terrorism.
Here are some examples of recent Russian sabotage acts. On May 15, 2024, a fire broke out at an IKEA storage facility in Lithuania (Lyberytė, 2024). It is part of a broader strategy that combines physical sabotage with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. Disinformation campaigns also emerged, spreading false narratives about the safety and reliability of foreign investments in Lithuania. In June 2024, a series of cyberattacks targeted critical infrastructure in the Baltic states—power grids, water supply systems, and communication networks. Russia has also been using GPS jamming as part of its hybrid warfare tactics in the Baltic States, particularly since the start of its war in Ukraine. In March 2024, Riga city authorities experienced a notable surge in reports of vandalism, particularly targeting pro-Ukraine posters. A Maltese-registered cargo ship, carrying 20,000 tons of explosive ammonium nitrate, triggered alarm bells in Lithuania and some other countries when the vessel sustained damage and began to seek permission to unload its lethal cargo (Bajarūnas, 2024).
The timing, targets, and methods of these sabotage acts reveal a clear pattern. They often coincide with significant political events, such as elections or international summits, aiming to maximize psychological and political impact. The choice of targets—economic assets, critical infrastructure, and refugees—reflects a strategy to destabilize and exert pressure on governments opposing Russian interests. These actions fit into a broader geopolitical strategy to reassert influence over Russia’s neighbours and counter Western alliances. They also exemplify a multifaceted approach to hybrid threats, blending physical, cyber, and psychological operations to achieve strategic objectives.
How does Russia specifically employ hybrid, asymmetric, or non-military methods in the case of the Baltic States?
In the Baltic States, the conventional military dimension is a dominating factor. As defined by Murphy and Schaub (2017), the security of the Baltic Sea region is determined by Russia’s determination to recreate its zone of influence in the region and its desire to probe the weakness of the West. Russia is less interested in the territory than in the effect itself. In the military area, Russia carries out the most intensive modernization in the Western military district, creating “hard” security challenges for the Baltic States.
Why do Russia’s actions cause concern for the Baltic States? It has already been mentioned that Russia never stopped treating these countries as being within its exceptional influence area and has long been using political, economic, energy resources, propaganda, cyber, informational, and other coercive, overt, and covert means to make countries vulnerable and weak. Those measures, even comparing them to the increase of Russia’s military potential, only kept growing during the recent years.
Henrik Praks provides additional arguments for the importance of the Baltic States to Russia in the case of hybrid threats (although the author writes about five countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland—it could be specified in the case of the three Baltic States discussed here) (Praks, 2024). Physical proximity is one. All the countries are nations that have been under Russian or Soviet rule at various stages in their history and Russian propaganda likes to speak about “the historical borders of Russia”. The Baltic States are repeatedly mentioned as possible subsequent targets after Ukraine, because they are located on the Baltic Sea, which is a strategically important region for Russia. Estonia and Latvia have the largest number of ethnic Russians and Russian citizens in the EU as a proportion of their populations. Also, these countries have been at the forefront of international support for Ukraine.
There is an even stronger argument for the relevance of the hybrid threats to the Baltic States. The Baltic States are NATO members, meaning an outright military attack would likely trigger Article 5. However, hybrid threats are designed to operate below this threshold, avoiding confrontation and allowing Russia to disrupt these countries without triggering a military response from NATO (Radin, 2017). Indeed, Article 5 requires a clear act of armed aggression, and hybrid activities like cyberattacks, propaganda, or the use of proxy forces may not constitute sufficient aggression. This allows Russia to engage in a “grey zone” conflict where the response from NATO is uncertain. Hybrid tactics also escalate slowly, often giving the perception of isolated incidents rather than coordinated attacks, which prevents a full-scale military response.2
3.3 Russia’s Hybrid Actions Towards the Baltic States
How does Russia specifically employ hybrid, asymmetric, or non-military methods against the Baltic States? Several major elements define the hybrid security environment in Lithuania, which can be described as the biggest “building blocks” of Russia’s hybrid threats in the Baltics. In 2019, together with my colleague Vytautas Keršanskas, we attempted to comprehensively analyse the hybrid threats facing Lithuania (Bajarūnas & Keršanskas, 2018). These included:
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Informational threats (particularly operating through Russian-speaking citizens)
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Threats to cyberspace
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Influencing elections and the political system
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Threats through the potentially poorly guarded state borders (in the case of Ukraine, the “little green men” did not emerge from nowhere—they had to cross the state border physically)
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Negative impact on critical infrastructure (this would comprise energy—assurance of supply and diversification; transport—the significance of the Klaipėda seaport for the Lithuanian supply, and in general the importance of the Baltic Sea for the Lithuanian economy; communications—the only Lithuanian fibre line to the West, lying on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, leads to Sweden which provides great possibilities to disrupt it)
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Traditional military measures supported by subversive activity, and escalation of fear by coordinating known measures with new ones
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Covert violent actions
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Actions aimed at vulnerable areas of society, non-violent subversive activity by employing wider military, political, economic, civilian, and informational methods
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The Astravets nuclear power station in Belarus next to Vilnius and the possibility of using it for hybrid actions could also be treated as a threat in the hybrid context
The Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of National Defence (AOTD, 2024) and the State Security Department (VSD) of Lithuania, in their joint National Threat Assessment, provided a comprehensive list of threats to Lithuania, including many of the items noted above (AOTD, 2024).
Not all threats can be associated with hybrid threats concepts. Furthermore, conventional military components remain crucial to Baltic security. Despite the growing prevalence of hybrid threats, in the case of the Baltic States, the dominant factor shaping the geopolitical landscape is the conventional military dimension. It is the combination of conventional and hybrid threats that forms the foundation of the Baltic States’ security challenges.
More generally, hybrid threats in the Baltic States can be understood by categorizing them into several areas.
Disinformation/Propaganda. The National Threat Assessment identifies (AOTD, 2024) a significant increase in the intensity of information attacks against Lithuania and its neighbouring countries. These aggressive information operations aim to spread fear among the public and disrupt the functioning of state institutions. Russia’s information policy is expected to intensify further, with new disinformation campaigns targeting elections, regional conflicts, and support for Ukraine. In 2023, compared to 2022, the quality and frequency of information attacks increased significantly. In response to restrictions on its TV channels and websites, Russia has ramped up its propaganda efforts on social media platforms like Telegram and TikTok.
More generally, in Lithuania (applicable to Estonia and Latvia as well), Russia’s disinformation efforts aim to influence society by casting doubt on historical memory, EU and NATO membership, undermining confidence in the current socioeconomic situation, drawing specific groups into narratives favourable to Russia, escalating Soviet nostalgia, and creating a sense of insecurity. Propaganda is always strategically constructed, with specific messages targeting specific community groups that are most susceptible. These efforts seek to divide society, pitting one part against the other by using deliberately false and fabricated information, while rendering another group into a passive “grey mass” that becomes indifferent to sociopolitical matters (e.g. “why resist at all if Russia is so powerful?”). Russia’s disinformation campaigns also focus on sensitive issues such as relations between Lithuania and Poland and Lithuania’s involvement in the Holocaust.
The groups most vulnerable to Russian disinformation—and thus the primary focus of these efforts—include ethnic minorities, those who remain nostalgic for Soviet times, individuals from lower social strata, and more conservative segments of society. The Kremlin tailors its propaganda to these groups by blending entertainment content tinged with Soviet-era sentiment with informational messages designed to appeal to a specific audience.
An investigation conducted by the Lithuanian Public TV and Radio Broadcaster portal LRT.lt, along with its partners, revealed a brainwashing scheme for Lithuania, as examined in leaked Kremlin documents (Makaraitytė & Aušra, 2024). For instance, narratives suggest that the USA will abandon the Baltic States at the first opportunity, that Lithuania is allegedly preparing for an invasion of Belarus, and that the Baltic States are responsible for worsening the West’s position with Russia. Last year, a special campaign focused on the Orthodox Church’s schism was prepared for Lithuania, receiving numerous views per day. These findings reconfirm the earlier results of the same LRT.lt investigation in 2023, which reported that strategy documents prepared by the Russian Presidential Office revealed Moscow’s plans for maintaining influence in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. These plans include, among others, funding pro-Russian NGOs (Makaraitytė et al., 2023).
Similar trends are evident in Estonia and Latvia. Latvia’s Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) (2023) has stated that, despite limited access to foreign audiences, Russian media continues to carry out specific disinformation campaigns against Latvia and its top officials. Numerous Russian organizations and individuals are engaged in disseminating the Kremlin’s messages, using modern technologies such as machine translation, artificial intelligence, and deepfakes. Russia’s disinformation efforts target reducing support for Ukraine, as well as influencing Latvian domestic policy and historical narratives. The SAB has also highlighted an increasingly aggressive and provocative tone emanating from the Russian Embassy in Riga.
Estonian experts emphasize that, alongside domestic propaganda efforts, the Kremlin continues to use nuclear rhetoric to intimidate the Western public and spread harmful false narratives, despite facing increasing limitations (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 2024).
Societal weaknesses. With its malign operations, Russia is striking at the heart of our democratic way of life, targeting our civil societies. Military forces, especially deployed troops in times of war, depend on the civilian sector for transport, communications, and basic supplies such as food and water to fulfil their missions. Therefore, military efforts to defend Alliance territory and populations need to be complemented by robust civil preparedness. Yet, civil assets can be vulnerable to external attacks and internal disruption in times of peace and war.
However, that’s only one aspect. As a rule, hybrid strategies focus on societal vulnerabilities—weak or failed states, internal conflicts, divided societies, lack of political consensus about the future of the society, corruption, inefficient law enforcement, lack of natural resources, and dependency on foreign countries. None of the states mentioned in this article, including the Baltics, are immune from these problems, and Russia could easily exploit them. Indeed, Russia’s hybrid threats here specifically target societal resilience by exploiting vulnerabilities in civil infrastructure, governance, and public trust. These operations include cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and attempts to undermine political cohesion. They can be summarized as follows:
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Russia uses disinformation to target Lithuania’s democratic fabric, attempting to destabilize society by sowing divisions and eroding trust in government institutions. These disinformation campaigns focus on various sectors, including ethnic divisions, social unrest, and political discord, intending to weaken the state’s social contract (Bajarūnas, 2016).
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Russia frequently launches cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, targeting energy, financial, and communication sectors. These attacks are often used to test Lithuania’s resilience, especially when coordinated with disinformation and other hybrid activities (Delfi, 2020).
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Hybrid strategies often exploit Lithuania’s internal divisions, such as ethnic tensions and political disagreements. By amplifying these issues through media manipulation and direct interventions (e.g. issuing Russian passports to ethnic Russians), Russia seeks to create social fragmentation, weakening national unity and resilience (Fraszka, 2020).
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Russia’s instrumentalization of diasporas and Russia-linked institutions, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, has been a key tactic in its hybrid threats strategy aimed at destabilizing the Baltic region. In Estonia and Latvia, where large Russian-speaking minorities remain from the Soviet era, Russia leverages its cultural influence and media control to shape narratives within these communities. Additionally, Russia has used diasporic connections to recruit agents of influence, particularly from Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic States (Brauß & Rácz, 2021).
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Russia has also been exploiting Ukrainian refugees in the Baltic States, using them as a tool for hybrid weapon. The arrival of tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees has introduced new challenges to the region, including logistical pressures, while also creating opportunities for Russia to stoke ethnic and political tensions (Hadden, 2022).
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Finally, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has played a critical role in advancing the Kremlin’s geopolitical objectives in the Baltic States by aligning closely with Russia’s political and strategic interests. In these countries, the ROC serves as a conduit through which Moscow exerts influence, particularly among Russian-speaking minorities.3
Influencing elections. In their report, the AOTD and VSD of Lithuania also addressed the issue of elections (AOTD, 2024). The report identified that Chinese intelligence services will likely seek information on Lithuania’s national elections, including the presidential, parliamentary, and European Parliament elections. Additionally, it is expected that cyberattacks planned by Russia-linked actors will coincide with the upcoming Lithuanian elections.
Marius Laurinavičius delved deeper into Russia’s influence on elections, using a “stock-taking” approach to examine Russia’s interference in Western elections, referendums, and politics in general (Laurinavičius, 2018). He created a list of the tools and techniques employed by the Kremlin in various cases and analysed the possible implications of Russian meddling in recent Western political processes. Most importantly, numerous specific examples from Lithuania and the Baltic States (such as Russia’s significant role in the 2003 election of impeached Lithuanian President Rolandas Paksas, the 2018 case of former Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mindaugas Bastys, which exposed Russia’s influence through connections to the Russian nuclear giant Rosatom and ties to former Russian security officers, and cases of money being transferred to Latvian banks for potential political manipulation) confirm the importance of this tool in Russia’s influence operations.
Cyber activity. The National Threat Assessment notes that a significant portion of hostile cyber activity originates from Russia (AOTD, 2024). It also reports that the list of groups coordinated by intelligence services from hostile countries has expanded to include new actors, particularly a group controlled by the GRU. This group is known for conducting aggressive and destructive attacks. These perpetrators have targeted private sector IT companies that provide services to Lithuania’s critical infrastructure and state institutions. Private sector companies are likely to be more attractive targets because it is easier for attackers to access information systems that store their customers’ data. The 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius was also targeted by pro-Russian cyber groups and actors linked to Russian intelligence. However, most attempts to disrupt the event were limited and short-lived. For example, DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks were used to disrupt systems, and disinformation was spread through malicious emails.
In a broader sense, cyberattacks have become more frequent, complex, and increasingly intertwined with disinformation efforts as part of wider hybrid threats strategies. Russian state-backed groups have frequently launched cyberattacks against Lithuania. These attacks include attempts to hack government databases, disrupt public services, and undermine democratic processes.
Chinese intelligence services have also ramped up cyber espionage against Lithuania. Cyber actors affiliated with China regularly conduct vulnerability scans of Lithuanian government networks, aiming to infiltrate and exfiltrate sensitive data.
Energy. Lithuania faces significant hybrid threats, primarily originating from Russia, to its energy system. These threats include cyberattacks, disinformation, and energy “weaponization”, all of which are aimed at undermining Lithuania’s energy security and broader geopolitical stability.
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Lithuania’s energy infrastructure has been targeted by cyberattacks, particularly from Russian-linked groups like the already-mentioned Killnet. These attacks, such as the one on the energy company Ignitis Group, have disrupted energy services and exposed vulnerabilities within Lithuania’s energy sector (Štitilis et al., 2024).
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Lithuania also challenges Russian disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust in its energy security, particularly regarding the reliability of alternative energy sources like LNG. This broader strategy includes false narratives about energy shortages and renewable energy failures (Sytas, 2023).
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Historically, Lithuania was heavily reliant on Russian energy. However, with projects like the Klaipėda LNG terminal, Lithuania has drastically reduced its dependence on Russian gas, becoming a model for energy diversification in the region. This shift away from Russian energy supplies is a critical element of Lithuania’s strategy to counter hybrid threats because it diminishes Russia’s leverage.
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The proximity of the Astravets Nuclear Plant in Belarus is another significant hybrid threat. Lithuania views the plant not only as a safety risk but also as a geopolitical tool that could be used by Belarus and Russia to exert influence over the region (Pillai, 2023).
There are many additional links between energy security and hybrid threats: possible disruptions of energy supply from safe and reliable sources, dependence on dominant energy suppliers, lack of diversification and competition among energy sources, political pressure, and corruption associated with “grey” energy schemes, among others. The national security concept (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 2017) enumerates these energy vulnerabilities, such as the operation of the Baltic States’ electricity system within the synchronous transmission grid of the IPS/UPS, which hinders the management of Lithuania’s electrical system and affects electricity flows through connectors with Russia and Belarus. Additionally, the monopolization of energy imports remains a significant concern.
By the time of writing this article, the situation concerning Baltic energy security has dramatically improved. As of February 2025, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania successfully disconnected from the Soviet-era BRELL grid and synchronised their electricity networks with Continental European grid, fully aligning with Western standards and finally ending Russia’s direct influence (Andrius Sytas, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/balticcountries-leave-joint-power-grid-with-russia-belarus-2024-07-16/).
Subversion, covert violent action, and conventional aggression. In a study on Russia’s hybrid warfare, Andrew Radin (Radin, 2017, Radin, A. (2017). Hybrid warfare in the Baltics: Threats and potential responses. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf ) highlighted three main types of activities that Russia could use against the Baltic States: non-violent subversion; covert violent action, and conventional aggression supported by political subversion. According to Radin, in the cases of non-violent subversion and covert violent actions, Russia’s chances of destabilizing the Baltic States are relatively low. Nevertheless, Russia employs a range of tactics, from subversion to covert violent actions and conventional military threats, aiming to destabilize the region and exert influence. Russia also employs covert violent tactics that remain below the threshold of outright war. These actions include sabotage, targeted assassinations, and support for extremist groups, all designed to destabilize governments and create internal chaos.
As part of its covert activities, Russia’s intelligence efforts, led by the FSB, GRU, and SVR, focus on espionage, disinformation, and influence operations with the broader goal of weakening NATO and EU influence in the region. Russian intelligence services have increasingly targeted military and energy infrastructure in the Baltic States.
China has also intensified intelligence activities against Lithuania from its territory. Its intelligence services increasingly use social networks to establish and maintain contact with potential targets, as well as conduct cyber espionage against Lithuania.
Finally, Russia is using Belarus to exert pressure on neighbouring countries, including Latvia and Lithuania. This strategy became more pronounced following the failed mutiny by the Wagner Group’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023. After the mutiny, Wagner’s core fighters were transferred to Belarus as part of an agreement with the Kremlin, allowing Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko to use them in his influence activities against neighbouring countries (Lukiv, 2023).
Despite its use of hybrid warfare, Russia still poses a significant conventional military threat to the Baltics. Russia’s local military superiority, particularly in the Kaliningrad and Pskov regions, allows it to project power and intimidate NATO forces. Any large-scale aggression would likely be supported by political subversion, potentially weakening internal defences before an invasion. This remains a primary concern for Baltic governments and NATO.
In this context, nuclear intimidation as part of Russia’s influence operations should be noted (even though this is not a Baltic-specific threat). Russia seeks to influence Western decision-makers and populations by threatening escalation and employing nuclear intimidation.
Illegal migration. In 2021, Belarus initiated a hybrid operation against Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland by exploiting migrants from third countries (mainly—Iraq) and facilitating illegal border crossings. This operation involved several strategic actions designed to destabilize these neighbouring countries and exert political pressure on the EU. The illegal scheme included recruitment and transportation efforts. Belarusian authorities actively recruited migrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, promising them easy access to the EU. These migrants were transported to Belarus and escorted to the borders with Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (Kleczkowska, 2021). Belarusian border guards were reported as guiding migrants to specific border points, providing tools to cut through fences and instructions on how to evade detection by EU border patrols (Golubeva, 2021). The influx of migrants was intended to overwhelm the border security and asylum systems of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, creating a humanitarian crisis.
3.4 Conclusions
As part of a broader publication on democratic resilience in the Baltics, this article aimed to provide a framework for understanding the hybrid threats that the Baltic States are facing. Although the Baltic efforts to counter Russian, Chinese, and Belarusian hybrid strategies remained outside the scope of this article, some conclusions will address these aspects as well.
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The key issue in understanding the threats posed by Russia to the Baltic States is that Russia still views the Baltic region, particularly the three Baltic States, as a potential theatre of operations in a global conflict between the US/NATO and Russia. This view has been further strengthened by the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
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Russia presents a significant conventional military threat to the Baltics since its local military superiority, particularly in the Kaliningrad, Leningradand Pskov regions, allows it to project power and intimidate NATO forces. If the USA shifts its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region, Russia may see an opportunity to act more aggressively in Europe, particularly in the Baltics.
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Russia has long used political, economic, energy resources, propaganda, cyber operations, and other coercive, overt, and covert means to weaken the Baltic States. These measures, even when compared to the growth of Russia’s military potential, have only intensified in recent years. Therefore, the security challenges of the Baltic States arise from the intricate interplay between conventional and hybrid threats.
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Many international experts agree that hybrid threat methods have become a more prominent feature of Russia’s strategic thinking over the last decade.
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Despite hybrid efforts, Russia has had limited success due to strong Baltic societal resilience, awareness of Russian influence, and a unified stance against Russian aggression. The Baltic States have successfully demonstrated decisiveness, internal coherence, great intelligence gathering, and coordination.
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Contrary to expectations, the Baltic States not only withstood Russian hybrid pressure but also provided an example to other Western democracies on how to resist foreign influence by becoming more resilient.
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However, resilience is not static. It requires constant adaptation to evolving and emerging hybrid security threats. As hybrid tactics continue to grow in sophistication—particularly through cyberattacks, information manipulation, sabotage and economic coercion—Baltic States have remained agile in their responses, enhancing early detection systems, public awareness, and cross-border cooperation.
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Lessons from the Baltic States highlight the importance of building strong societal resilience. This includes fostering trust in institutions, promoting media literacy, securing critical infrastructure, and strengthening collaboration between governments and the private sector. These strategies are highly applicable to other democracies, especially those in regions vulnerable to hybrid influence.
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While some aspects of resilience in the Baltics—such as their historical experiences with Russian influence and geographic proximity to Russia—are unique, the core principles of resilience can be generalized to other states. However, resilience-building measures must be tailored to the specific political, social, and economic contexts of each country.
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Finally, while all three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—face similar hybrid threats, there are important distinctions in their approaches to resilience. For example, Estonia has prioritized digital and cybersecurity measures, while Lithuania has focused more on countering energy dependency and disinformation. These differences highlight the importance of customized strategies while maintaining unity in countering common threats.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
Eitvydas Bajarūnas,
Ambassador, MFA of Lithuania/Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC, USA
