Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Published in:
Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems Given Candidate Positions Read chapter Read first chapter

2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets

Authors : Meena Jagadeesan, Alexander Wei

Published in: Web and Internet Economics

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

In large matching markets between job candidates and organizations, organizations may be unable to effectively identify interested candidates due to a large volume of applications. The resulting congestion makes it unlikely for candidates to receive offers from their most preferred organizations, leading to significant mismatch. We study how signaling mechanisms can be used as a market design tool to reduce the congestion in such markets. Specifically, we look at how the number of signals available to market participants affects welfare and the number of matches using a large market model. We show that for sufficiently many signals, candidate welfare and the number of matches decrease as a function of the number of signals, while the behavior of organization welfare depends on the extent to which organizations value top candidates. Furthermore, we describe a class of firm utility functions for which these limiting effects start to hold at realistic numbers of signals S.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
previous chapter Combinatorial Assortment Optimization
next chapter Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations
Footnotes
1
While Coles et al. [5] also study the case of multiple blocks of firms, some of their welfare trends become indeterminate for more than one block of firms in their model. For this reason, we focus on the case of one block in our paper.
 
2
In Coles et al. [5], each firm is only allowed to make an offer to at most one worker, and each worker is allowed to accept at most one offer from at most one firm. In our model, we maintain that each worker can accept at most one offer. However, we instead set the maximum measure of offers that a firm is permitted to send to \(\gamma \). While this offer structure does not precisely model the dating market (where candidates can “accept” multiple dates) or college admissions (where colleges can select the number of students to accept based on yield rates), the simplicity of the game, in both the setting of Coles et al. [5] and in our setting, enables the analysis to be tractable.
 
3
One difference between the dynamics of our model and the dynamics of the model of Coles et al. [5] is whether \(c = 1- \gamma \) is an equilibrium if worker signal truthfully, while in our model, for any \(S < F\), the cutoff \(c = 1 - \gamma \) is never an equilibrium. On the other hand, in [5], the cutoff \(c = 1 - \gamma \) is always an equilibrium in the game with signals. The difference arises because in our model, firms send offers to more than one candidate, and the margin now matters. One consequence is that in our model, shifts to strategies based on signaling are more likely to endogenously occur given the existence of a signaling mechanism.
 
Literature
1.
Arnosti, N., Johari, R., Kanoria, Y.: Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets. In: Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2014, pp. 451. ACM, New York (2014)
2.
3.
Azevedo, E.M., Leshno, J.D.: A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets. J. Polit. Econ. 124(5), 1235–1268 (2016)CrossRef
4.
Coles, P., Cawley, J., Levine, P.B., Niederle, M., Roth, A.E., Siegfried, J.J.: The job market for new economists: a market design perspective. J. Econ. Perspect. 24(4), 187–206 (2010)CrossRef
5.
Coles, P., Kushnir, A., Niederle, M.: Preference signaling in matching markets. Am. Econ. J.: Microecon. 5(2), 99–134 (2013)
6.
7.
He, Y., Magnac, T.: A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets. TSE Working Papers 17–870, Toulouse School of Economics, December 2017
8.
9.
Lee, S., Niederle, M.: Propose with a rose? Signaling in internet dating markets. Exp. Econ. 18(4), 731–755 (2015)CrossRef
10.
Sun, Y., Zhang, Y.: Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty. J. Econ. Theor. 144(1), 432–443 (2009)MathSciNetCrossRef
Metadata
Title
Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets
Authors
Meena Jagadeesan
Alexander Wei
Copyright Year
2018
Book
Web and Internet Economics

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-04611-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-04612-5

Copyright Year: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_16

Premium Partner

    Image Credits