Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Social Choice and Welfare
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 4/2015

01-04-2015

Voting power apportionments

Author: Paul H. Edelman

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 4/2015

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

I propose apportioning the United States House of Representatives so as to equalize, to the extent possible, the voting power of the individual voter. Surprisingly such an apportionment falls squarely within the traditional apportionment paradigm and is, in a very precise sense, midway between the Hill method and the Webster method of apportionment.
previous article On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
next article Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Literature
Balinski M, Young HP (2001) Fair representation, 2nd edn. Brookings Institution Press, Washington
Banzhaf JF III (1965) Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev 19:317–343
Banzhaf JF III (1966) Multi-member electoral districts-do they violate the “One man, one vote” principle. Yale Law J 75:1309–1338CrossRef
Banzhaf JF III (1968) One man, 3.312 votes: a mathematical analysis of the Electoral College. Villanova Law Rev 13:304–332
Board of Estimate of City of New York, et al. v. Morris et. al., (1989), 489 US 688
Burt OR, Harris CC (1963) Apportionment of the US house of representatives: a minimum range, integer solution, allocation problem. Oper Res 11:648–652CrossRef
Edelman PH (2006) Getting the math right: why California has too many seats in the house of representatives. Vand Law Rev 59:297–346
Edelman PH (2006) Minimum total deviation apportionments. In: Simeone B, Pukelsheim F (eds) Mathematics and democracy. Springer, Berlin
Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1998) The measurement of voting power: theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamCrossRef
Gilbert EJ, Schatz JA (1964) An ill-conceived proposal for apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives. Oper Res 12:768–773CrossRef
Ianucci v. Board of Supervisors of Washington County, NY (1967), 282 NYS 2d 502
Marshall AW, Olkin I, Pukelsheim F (2002) A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation. Soc Choice Welf 19:885–900
Penrose LS (1946) The elementary statistics of majority voting. J R Stat Soc 109:53–57CrossRef
Pukelsheim F (2014) Proportional representation: apportionment methods and their applications. Springer, BerlinCrossRef
Słomzyński W, Życzkowski K (2006) Penrose voting system and optimal quota. Acta Phys Pol 63:3133–3143
US Department of Commerce v. Montana (1992), 503 US 442
Metadata
Title
Voting power apportionments
Author
Paul H. Edelman
Publication date
01-04-2015
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 4/2015
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0869-4

Other articles of this Issue 4/2015

Social Choice and Welfare 4/2015 Go to the issue

OriginalPaper

Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

OriginalPaper

The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities

OriginalPaper

On the measurement of plutonomy

OriginalPaper

A note on the Sobolev consistency of linear symmetric values

OriginalPaper

Multidimensional welfare rankings under weight imprecision: a social choice perspective

OriginalPaper

Extremism drives out moderation