Top

Published in:

2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. Washington’s Perceptions and Misperceptions of China’s Anti-access Area Denial ‘Strategy’

Author : James Johnson

Published in: The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config

AI-assisted search

Off

Abstract

Chapter 3, the first of four case study chapters, builds on the current (albeit limited) literature that elucidates the key driving forces behind U.S. analysts’ interpretations of the Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge in East Asia. The Obama administration became increasingly concerned that China’s A2/AD capabilities would put at risk U.S. military assets operating in the Western Pacific, which could allow China to deter, delay, and deny U.S. intervention in future regional conflicts and crises. This case study demonstrates how U.S. perceptions of Chinese A2/AD-influenced U.S. decision-making and defense planning in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, it focuses on the strategic ambiguities associated with A2/AD which provided fertile ground for U.S. misperceptions of Chinese strategic intentions to grow. This chapter concludes that the analytical baselines (or framing assumptions) used by U.S. analysts to interpret Chinese A2/AD were overly reliant on pure material risk assessments to determine Beijing’s strategic intentions that overlooked the evolution of Chinese operational and doctrinal preferences. Specifically, U.S. defense analysts frequently and often erroneously conflated a Chinese operational capability with an underlying strategic intention, which conceptualized the United States as its primary (if not sole) target. This chapter demonstrates that the strategic ambiguities and opacity associated with China’s A2/AD capabilities reinforced Washington’s reliance upon capacity-based assessments, which in turn exacerbated misperceptions, confounded by the cognitive bias of Beijing’s strategic intentions.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

previous chapter Conceptualizing the United States–China Security Dilemma

next chapter China’s Vision of the Future Networked Battlefield: Emerging Military-Technological Challenges to the United States

Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategic concepts that were first used by the U.S. DoD in their 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In recent years, a number of countries have increased their investments in A2/AD capabilities (especially antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, and aircraft carriers) including China, Russia, and Iran. In addition to the A2/AD potential threats posed by China, the DoD in its QDR report stated that Iran has also deployed a variety of A2/AD capabilities that could overwhelm U.S. layered naval defenses operating in the Persian Gulf. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2010). Quadrennial defense review report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 31–33.

As described in Chap. 2, the use of cognitive and psychology concepts and methods by IR scholars has added intellectual depth to the security dilemma concept. See Boulding, K.E. (1959). National images and international systems. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3(2), 120–131; Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Garthoff, R.L. (1994). Detente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. For United States–China relations, see Friedberg, A. (2005). The future of U.S.-China relations. International Security, 30(2), 7–45; Godwin, P. (2010). Asia’s dangerous security dilemma. Current History, 109(728), 264–266; Scobell, A. (2012). Learning to rise peacefully? China and the security dilemma. Journal of Contemporary China, 21(76), 713–721; Johnston, A.I. (2013). How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security, 37(4), 7–48; Mearsheimer, J.J. (2014). The tragedy of great power politics. New York; London: Norton & Company; Liff, A., & Ikenberry, J. (2014). Racing toward tragedy?: China’s rise, military competition in the Asia Pacific, and the security dilemma. International Security, 39(2), 52–91.

Cliff, R., Burles, M., Chase, S.M., Eaton, D., & Pollpeter, K. (2007). Entering the dragon’s lair: Chinese anti access strategies and their implications for the United States. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation; Montgomery, E.B. (2014). Contested primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s rise and the future of U.S. power projection. International Security, 38(4), 115–149; Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

Posen, B.R. (2003). Command of the commons: The military foundation of U.S. hegemony. International Security, 28(1), 5–46.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214; Christensen, T.J. (1999). China, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia. International Security, 23(4), 49–80.

The ASB concept is one component of the overarching 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and was renamed as part of a ‘major rethink’ by the DoD as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) in 2015. Goldfein, D. (2015). Document: Air Sea Battle name change memo. USNI, 8 January 2015. Available at: http://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/document-air-sea-battle-name-change-memo (Accessed: 8 June 2015). Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel originally articulated the Pentagon’s ‘Third’ Offset Strategy in late 2014. In a speech in January 2015, more details were offered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work. Work, R. (2015). The third offset strategy and its implications for partners and allies, remarks as delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work. Washington, DC. U.S. Department of Defense, 28 January 2015. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies (Accessed: 29 January 2015). Although this new concept appeared to have been formulated to replace the often-criticized ASB, it has not been officially stated to date. Rather, the Third Offset Strategy—together with the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII)—can be best viewed as a strategy that can enable the technologies that underpin ASB: leveraging U.S. advantages in new and emerging military technologies to counter the perception of weakening U.S. dominance in several more ‘traditional’ conventional military domains.

The United States also faced advanced A2/AD threats from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This experience has arguably made it easier for U.S. analysts to use similar (and familiar) strategic frames of reference to assess China’s military capabilities. In contrast to the contemporary United States–China security relationship, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union broadly agreed that they were engaged in a competitive bilateral security relationship—even if disagreement existed as to the nature and outcome of this rivalry. Much debate and contention, however, surrounds the nature and trajectory of contemporary United States–China strategic relations. See Rosen, S.P. (2002). War and human nature. New York, NY: Hill & Wang; Mahnken, T.G. (Ed.). (2012). Competitive strategies for the 21st century—Theory, history, practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future of warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti access, area denial, U.S. air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia. International Security, 41(1), 7–48.

For example, Krepinevich, A.J. (2010). Why Air-Sea Battle? Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC; Krepinevich, A.J. (2015). How to deter China: The case for archipelagic defense. Foreign Affairs, 94(2), 1–10; Cliff, R. (2011). Anti-access measures in Chinese defense strategy—Testimony before the U.S. China economic and security review commission. Washington, DC: The RAND Corporation; McDevitt, M. (2011). The PLA navy’s anti access role in a Taiwan contingency. In P. Saunders, C. Yung, M. Swaine & A. En-Dzu Yang (Eds.), The Chinese navy: Expanding capabilities, evolving roles (pp. 191–214). Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2012). Joint operational access concept (JOAC). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 6–7.

Blumenthal, D. (2012). The U.S. response to China’s modernization. In A. Tellis, & T. Tanner (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s military challenge (pp. 309–340). Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR); Dutton, P., Erickson, A.S., & Martinson, R. (2014). China’s near sea combat capabilities. Naval War College: China Maritime Studies Institute, 11 (February).

According to the U.S. DoD, China is developing conventional ballistic weapons capable of reaching as far as Guam, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). Annual report to congress: Military power of the people’s republic of China. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 40. In 2015, China officially revealed the DF-26 intercontinental range ballistic missile (IRBM); a dual-payload missile system officially described by China as ‘capable of targeting large- and medium-sized targets on water’; Erickson, A.S. (2015). Showtime: China reveals two ‘carrier-killer’ missiles, The National Interest, 3 September 2015. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/showtime-china-reveals-two-carrier-killer-missiles-13769 (Accessed: 3 July 2015).

Ibid.

Christensen, T.J. (2001). Posing problems without catching up. International Security, 25(4), 5–40.

The first chain refers to the chain of major archipelagos from the East Asia continental mainland coast composed of the Kuril Islands, Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Northern Philippines, and Borneo. The second chain refers to the chain of archipelagos out from the East Asian continental coast and beyond the first chain—composed of the Bonin Islands, Marianas Islands, and Caroline Islands—from Honshu to New Guinea. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2010). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 22–23. For a recent discussion on how Chinese analysts conceptualize the ‘Island Chains’ in Asia see, Erickson, A.S., & Wuthnow, J. (2016). ‘Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains”, The China Quarterly, 225, 3–4.

Peng Guangqian, & Yao Youzhi (Eds.). (2005). The science of military strategy (English Edition ed.). Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 454–459. This chapter has primarily used officially ‘authorized’ Chinese materials from the following sources listed in order of their authoritativeness: China’s official National Defense White Papers (published since 1998, and renamed China’s ‘Military Strategy’ in 2015); officially sanctioned military doctrinal texts (especially the Science of Military Strategy); articles from China’s official military PLA press; and commentary and opinions from Chinese analysts and strategists affiliated with China’s premier military teaching and research institutes. See Godwin, P.H., & Miller, A.L. (2013). China’s forbearance has limits: Chinese threat and retaliation signaling and its implications for a Sino-American military confrontation. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 6(71), 1–120; Fravel, T.M. (2016). China’s changing approach to military strategy: The science of military strategy from 2001 and 2013. (No. 2016-15). Cambridge, MA: MIT, Political Science Department. For a recent comparative study on the relative ‘authoritativeness’ of Chinese military empirical sources, see McReynolds, J. (Ed.). (2016). China’s evolving military strategy. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation. China does not have a concept of ‘military doctrine’ that is directly comparable to U.S. military equivalents. Instead, the PLA’s official ‘doctrine’ (i.e. documents containing details relating to specific campaigns and current operational procedure) remains classified.

Rinehart, I., & Gitter, D. (2015). The Chinese military: Overview and issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 7.

Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China. (2008). China’s national defense in 2008. Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council.

Peng Guangqian, & Yao Youzhi (Eds.). (2005). The science of military strategy (English Edition ed.). Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 104.

Scobell, A. (2003). China’s use of military force: Beyond the great wall and the long march. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Blasko, D.J. (2014). The evolution of core concepts: People’s war, active defense, and offshore defense. In R. Kamphausen, D. Lai, & T. Tanner (Eds.), Assessing the people’s liberation army in the Hu Jintao era (pp. 81–128). Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College Press.

Peng Guangqian, & Yao Youzhi (Eds.). (2005). The science of military strategy (English Edition ed.). Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 135–136.

Ibid., 459–546.

Ibid.

Wishik, A.L. (2011). An anti-access approximation: The PLA’s active counterattacks on exterior lines. China Security, World Security Institute, 1(19), 39.

Ibid., 44–45.

Goldstein, A. (2013). First things first: The pressing danger of crisis instability in U.S.-China relations. International Security, 37(4), 49–89; Medcalf, R., & Thomas-Noone, B. (2015). Nuclear-armed submarines in Indo-Pacific Asia: Stabilizer or menace? Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy.

McVadon, E.A. (2012). China’s navy today: Looking toward blue water. In A.S. Erickson, & L.J. Goldstein (Eds.), China goes to sea: Maritime transformation in comparative historical perspective (pp. 373–400). Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press, 387; Twomey, C.P. (2014). What’s in a name: Building anti-access, area denial capabilities without anti-access, area denial doctrine. In R. Kamphausen, D. Lai, & T. Tanner (Eds.), Assessing the people’s liberation army in the Hu Jintao era (pp. 129–170). Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College Press.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 58–59.

Biddle, S. (2005). Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

George, A.L. (1980). Presidential decision-making in foreign policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 66–67; Payne, K.B. (2001). The fallacies of cold war deterrence and a new doctrine. Kentucky, KY: Lexington, University Press of Kentucky; Twomey, C.P. (2010). Military lens: Doctrinal difference and deterrence failure in Sino-American relations. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

For a classic study published on the inherent conceptual problems in estimating another state’s military power, and the analytical challenges associated with estimating the trajectory of a state’s military capabilities—especially the analytical dangers associated with the false assumption that states are ‘rational-decision’ makers, which produce consistent and well-defined strategic objectives, see Marshall, A.W. (1966). Problems of estimating military power. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. For a discussion on the challenges inherent in linking assessments of the military balance to predictions of the use of force for coercion, see Betts, R.K. (1985). Conventional deterrence: Predictive uncertainty and policy confidence. World Politics, 37(2), 153–170. And, on the board literature that covers the role of strategic culture, civil–military culture, organizational structure, intelligence bureaucracies, and implications of military technological change in international security relations, see Cohen, E.A. (1988). Toward better net assessment: Rethinking the European conventional balance. International Security, 13(1), 50–89; Mahnken, T.G. (Ed.). (2012). Competitive strategies for the 21st century—Theory, history, practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Finkelstein, D.M. (2007). China’s national military strategy: An overview of the “military strategic guidelines”. In R. Kamphausen, & A. Scobell (Eds.), Right sizing the people’s liberation army: Exploring the contours of China’s military. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press (pp. 69–140); Finkelstein, D.M. (2016). Initial thoughts on the reorganization and reform of the PLA. Washington, DC: CNA China Studies, 76.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2016. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 57.

Willard, R. (2011). Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. navy commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the house armed services committee on U.S. Pacific command posture. Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee.

Van Tol, J. (2010). Air Sea battle: A point-of-departure operational concept. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 3–4.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.

Dobbins, J.C., Gompert, D., Shlapak, D., & Scobell, A. (2011). Conflict with China—Prospects, consequences and strategies for deterrence. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 141–146.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2014). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2014. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, i.

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214; Glaser, C. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 174.

Johnson-Freese, J. (2015). US-China: Civil space dialogue. The Diplomat, 7 August 2015. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/us-china-a-civil-space-dialogue/ (Accessed: 10 August 2015).

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 58–117.

Morrow, J.D. (1989). Capabilities uncertainties, and resolve: A limited information model of crisis bargaining. American Journal of Political Science, 33(November), 941–972; Fearon, J.D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.

Wu, X. (2008) Managing crisis and sustaining peace between China and the United States, Peaceworks no. 61. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace; Twomey, C.P. (2010) Military lens: Doctrinal difference and deterrence failure in Sino-American relations. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Betts, R.K. (1985). Conventional deterrence: Predictive uncertainty and policy confidence. World Politics, 37(2), 153–170. Lieber, K. (2000). Grasping the technological peace: The offense-defense balance and international security. International Security, 25(1), 71–104.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 172–203.

McDevitt, M. (2011). The PLA navy’s anti access role in a Taiwan contingency. In P. Saunders, C. Yung, M. Swaine, & A. En-Dzu Yang (Eds.), The Chinese navy: Expanding capabilities, evolving roles (pp. 191–214). Washington, DC: National Defense University Press; Willard, R. (2011). Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. navy commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the house armed services committee on U.S. Pacific command posture. Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee; Cliff, R. (2011). Anti-access measures in Chinese defense strategy—Testimony before the U.S. China economic and security review commission. Washington, DC: The RAND Corporation; Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 46–60.

Erickson, A.S., & Wuthnow, J. (2016). Barriers, springboards and benchmarks: China conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains’. The China Quarterly, 225, 3–4.

Montgomery, E.B. (2014). Contested primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s rise and the future of U.S. power projection. International Security, 38(4), 115–149; Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2016. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 71–72; Erickson, A.S., & Wuthnow, J. (2016). Barriers, springboards and benchmarks: China conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains’. The China Quarterly, 225, 3–4.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2012). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2012. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 8.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 58–117.

Goldstein, A. (2013). First things first: The pressing danger of crisis instability in U.S.-China relations. International Security, 37(4), 70.

Gompert, D.C., & Kelly, T. (2013). Escalation cause: How the Pentagon’s new strategy could trigger war with China. Foreign Policy 2 August 2013. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/03/escalation-cause/ (Accessed: 5 May 2014).

Goldstein, A. (2013). First things first: The pressing danger of crisis instability in U.S.-China relations. International Security, 37(4), 67.

Bitzinger, R., & Raska, M. (2013). The Air-Sea battle debate and the future of conflict in East Asia (February). S. Rajarathnam School of International Studies: RSIS Policy Brief, 4.

The expanding range and scope of Chinese A2/AD capabilities during this period can be in large part attributed to Beijing’s suspicions of U.S. intentions and capabilities in the Western Pacific.

Sayers, E., & Fan, G. (17 March 2011). Air-Sea battle: An exchange (No. 17). Honolulu, Hawaii: PacNet, 1–2.

People’s Daily Online. (2011). Air-Sea battle plan renews old hostility. People’s Daily, 14 November 2011. Available at: http://en.people.cn/90780/7643679.html (Accessed: 26 June 2015).

Cunningham, F.S., & Fravel, M.T. (2015). Assuring assured retaliation: China’s nuclear posture and U.S.-China strategic stability. 40(2), 42.

Glaser, C. (2015). A U.S.-China grand bargain? The hard choice between military competition and accommodation. International Security, 39(4), 49–90.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 58–110.

Snyder, G. (1965). The balance of power and the balance of terror. In P. Seabury (Ed.), The balance of power (pp. 184–201). San Francisco, CA: Chandler.

Morgan, F.E., Mueller, K.P., Medeiros, E.S., Pollpeter, K.L., & Cliff, R. (2008). Dangerous thresholds: Managing escalation in the 21st Century. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation; Christensen, T.J. (2012). The meaning of the nuclear evolution: China’s strategic modernization and US-China security relations. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(4), 447–487; Goldstein, A. (2013). China’s real and present danger: Now is the time for Washington to worry. NY: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Recently, several Chinese analysts have implied that ‘no-first-use’ is more of a guideline than an unwavering commitment. See, Christensen, T.J. (2012). The meaning of the nuclear evolution: China’s strategic modernization and US-China security relations. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(4), 447–487; Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 31–32.

For example, Beijing’s 2015 Victory Day Parade was a very public vehicle for displaying several of the PLA’s advanced strategic missile systems. During peacetime, such displays of military strength serve to bolster Chinese strategic deterrence, and signal to the United States (and to China’s regional neighbors) Beijing’s ambitions and coercive capacity. On offense–defense theory and military signaling, see Lynn-Jones, S.M. (1995). Offense-defense theory and its critics. Security Studies, 4(4), 660–691; Lieber, K. (2000). Grasping the technological peace: The offense-defense balance and international security. International Security, 25(1), 71–104; Morgan, F.E., Mueller, K.P., Medeiros, E.S., Pollpeter, K.L., & Cliff, R. (2008). Dangerous thresholds: Managing escalation in the 21st Century. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 47–83.

See Johnston, A.I. (2016). The evolution of interstate security crisis-management theory and practice in China. Naval War College Review, 69(1), 29–31; Chase, M.S., Engstorm, J., Cheung, T.M., Gunness, K.A., Harold, S.W., Puska, S., & Berkowitz, S.K. (February 2015). China’s incomplete military transformation—Assessing the weaknesses of the people’s liberation army (PLA). Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1–33.

Schelling, T.C. (1966). Arms and influence. London; New Haven: Yale University Press; Jervis, R. (1970). The logic of images in international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Title: Washington’s Perceptions and Misperceptions of China’s Anti-access Area Denial ‘Strategy’
Author: James Johnson
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75837-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-75838-1

Copyright Year: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75838-1_3