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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

15. Weapons of Mass Protection? Rogue Asteroids, Nuclear Explosions in Space, and the Norms of Global Nuclear Order

Author : Michal Smetana

Published in: Planetary Defense

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Planetary defense scientists frequently consider nuclear explosive devices (NED) among the suitable tools for deflection of near-Earth objects. Despite the convenient physical characteristics of nuclear explosions, this chapter sketches the negative implications of developing any options in this direction for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the global nuclear order as such. Moreover, the author critically unpacks the seemingly objective scientific rationality of these proposals and discusses how support for the NED development de-stigmatizes technology that, similarly to the impact of large asteroids, also carries the risk of destroying human civilization with a non-zero probability. The chapter concludes with a pragmatic attempt to find the middle ground between the NED advocates and critics.

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previous chapter Conceptualizing the Asteroid Threat and Searching for a Balanced Answer Between Effectiveness and Desirability

next chapter Dilemmas for Planetary Defense Posed by the Current International Law Framework

See Chap. 7 for a comprehensive discussion of NEO-deflection methods.

For most relevant countries, the employment of such nuclear explosions would be prohibited under the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which was signed by 183 countries but has not yet entered into force). In addition, the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (usually referred to as ‘Nuclear Ban Treaty’) explicitly prohibits those looking to ‘develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’ (UNGA 2017). However, all the current nuclear-armed countries refused to sign the document and expressed their unwillingness to abide by its terms.

See Chap. 14.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that many US–Russian R&D initiatives have been suspended after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (see Stone 2016).

For different academic perspectives on the global nuclear order and its dynamics, see for example Walker (2000, 2004, 2007b, 2012), Krause (2007), Biswas (2014), Jasper (2016), or Tannenwald (2018)

Besides the economic argumentation, some scholars and experts (Rislove 2006) also highlight the importance of the global diffusion of nuclear industry in the context of global climate change.

The NPT established two categories of states with different rights and obligations according to the treaty: nuclear weapon states, defined as the ones that tested nuclear weapons before 1967, i.e. the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China; and non-nuclear weapon states, i.e. all the other signatories.

The two superpowers also adopted a 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty that would specify the rules of appropriate conduct of PNEs on both sides.

Indian behavior was widely interpreted as a breach of the non-proliferation norm among the NPT members, particularly on the side of the United States and Canada, who supplied India with heavy water and a research reactor, respectively, and saw the test as ‘cheating on the basic bargain of the nuclear regime’ (Epstein 1975, 1976; Nye 1981). On the consequences of India’s 1974 nuclear explosion, see Wan (2014).

The meaning of this article has been subject to numerous interpretations over the course of the last few decades. There were also many attempts to make the normative prescriptions and proscriptions more specific, most prominently in the ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’ adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the ‘Thirteen Steps’ in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the 2010 NPT Review Conference ‘Action Plan.’ Nuclear disarmament, as the fundamental norm of the global nuclear order, was also formally validated in the 1996 ruling of the International Court of Justice and in numerous resolutions of the UNGA and other international bodies. On July 7th, 2017, the UNGA adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as the first international agreement banning nuclear weapons and providing framework for their elimination.

Admittedly, this US practice of restraint may now be reevaluated in the light of the President Trump’s forthcoming 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

On the 1960s negotiations leading up to the signature of the NPT, see for example Burns (Burns 1969), Epstein (1976), Unger (1976), Shaker (1980), Nye (1981), Müller et al. (1994), Bourantonis (1997), Paul (2003), Krause (2007), Bunn and Rhinelander (2008), Walker (2012), and Popp et al. (2016).

On ‘indefinite nuclearism’ and its incompatibility with the culture of human rights, see Booth (1999a, 1999b); on the perils of nuclear status quo, see also Hanson (2002) and Thakur (2000).

For an alternative interpretation of the logic underpinning the nuclear non-use norm, see Paul (2009, 2010), Press et al. (2013), or Sagan & Valentino (2017a, 2017b).

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Title: Weapons of Mass Protection? Rogue Asteroids, Nuclear Explosions in Space, and the Norms of Global Nuclear Order
Author: Michal Smetana
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Planetary Defense
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-00999-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-01000-3

Copyright Year: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01000-3_15