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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

6. Why Would Bond Referenda Ever Fail? Do They?

Author : William S. Peirce

Published in: Explorations in Public Sector Economics

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Local bond referenda provide the best available information to test whether agenda setters prefer higher levels of public investment than do the voters. This study examines the entire population of local bond referenda in Ohio from 1963 through 1987. The results do tend to support the hypothesis that agenda setters attempt to raise expenditures above the level preferred by the median voter. Although about half of all referenda fail, most projects eventually pass–as is predicted by the hypothesis of expenditure maximization.

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previous chapter Bad Economics, Good Law: The Concept of Externality

next chapter The Effect of Early Media Projections on Presidential Voting in the Florida Panhandle

Holcombe (1989) provides a compact and incisive survey of the literature.

Romer and Rosenthal (1983) discuss the relationship between the median voter model and the proportion voting for a proposal. It is surprising that this statistic is so widely ignored in the median voter literature.

DeBartolo G, Fortune P (1982) The demand for public services: inferences from municipal bond referenda. Natl Tax J 35:55–67

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McEachern WA (1978) Collective decision rules and local debt choice: a test of the median-voter hypothesis. Natl Tax J 31:129–136

Mikesell JL, Blair JP (1974) An economic theory of referendum voting: school construction and stock adjustment. Public Financ Rev 2(4):395–410CrossRef

Romer T, Rosenthal H (1978) Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice 33(4):27–43CrossRef

Romer T, Rosenthal H (1983) Voting and spending: some empirical relationships in the political economy of local public finance. Local provision of public services: the tiebout model after twenty-five years. Academic Press, New York, pp 165–182CrossRef

Title: Why Would Bond Referenda Ever Fail? Do They?
Author: William S. Peirce
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Explorations in Public Sector Economics
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47826-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-47828-9

Copyright Year: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47828-9_6