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Published in: Journal of Chinese Political Science 4/2021

27-04-2021 | Book Review

Xiang Gao, Delegation and Development: Local Government in China’s Market Transition

(Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2020), 212p, $6.89 paperback

Author: Xiao Ma

Published in: Journal of Chinese Political Science | Issue 4/2021

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Excerpt

Scholars often turn to local governments, and their relationships with the central government, to uncover the institutional underpinnings of China’s economic growth. These attempts have produced some of the most influential work in comparative political economy. Concepts and notions such as “local state corporatism” [1], “market-preserving federalism” [2], “bureaucratic integration” [3], “M-form government” [4], “promotion tournament” [5], and “regionally decentralized authoritarianism” [6, 7] are foundational in offering different explanations of the incentive structures that have propelled China’s development. Gao’s latest book, Delegation and Development, marks a novel contribution to this seminal line of research. …

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Metadata
Title
Xiang Gao, Delegation and Development: Local Government in China’s Market Transition
(Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2020), 212p, $6.89 paperback
Author
Xiao Ma
Publication date
27-04-2021
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Journal of Chinese Political Science / Issue 4/2021
Print ISSN: 1080-6954
Electronic ISSN: 1874-6357
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09743-6

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