4. Your Gender is a Battleground: Anti-Gender Issues in Serbia

Our title intentionally alludes to Barbara Kruger’s renowned work, the black and white photograph of a woman’s face split symmetrically along the vertical axis with the words ‘Your Body is a Battleground’ stamped over it. This work was created in support of the United States National March on Washington that took place on April 9, 1989, advocating for abortion rights and the protection of women’s bodily autonomy. The process of women’s empowerment and the emancipation of LGBT + people have been slow and fragile, with successful instances often encountering backlash. For this reason, 35 years later, this powerful slogan retains its relevance globally, and particularly in contexts like the Serbian one, where there is a rapid increase in anti-gender mobilization. This mobilization opposes post-essentialist conceptions of sexuality and gender issues, undermining their scientific basis by labelling them as ‘ideological’. Compared to earlier periods, attacks on reproductive rights, abortion access, sex education, LGBT + rights, and similar issues are now framed as a battle against ‘gender ideology’, ‘gender theory’, or ‘genderism’. These phenomena are regarded as contrary to human nature and the needs of ‘ordinary’ people and portrayed as being ‘externally’ imposed.

Anti-gender mobilization is recognized as a phenomenon spreading globally, and in recent years, it has manifested in Serbia, progressively expanding both in scope and effectiveness. The growing mobilization potential of the anti-gender discourse and the increasing number of its proponents have been identified and researched in Serbian feminist literature (Bobičić & Stojčić, 2023; Zaharijević, 2019; Zaharijević & Lončarević, 2020). The onset of significant mobilization is linked with a series of actions taken in 2017, focusing on the educational package¹ for teaching about sexual violence against children, which marked the beginning of anti-gender mobilization in Serbian (Zaharijević & Lončarević, 2020, 38). However, this mobilization was preceded by articles and books from the early 2010s authored by conservative intellectuals who aimed to critique what they termed as the ‘LGBT agenda’ and ‘gender feminism’. Notably, the sociologist Slobodan Antonić has played a crucial role by introducing the terms ‘gender feminism’ (used interchangeably with ‘radical feminism’) and ‘gay/LGBT agenda’ into Serbian sociology. These terms were employed to characterize a range of contemporary policies, discourses, and practices related to problems of gender and sexuality. Antonić argued that gender feminism represents a form of ‘social engineering’ that is bringing – against the will of ordinary people – a radical change to the very foundations of social interactions between women and men (Antonić, 2011, 2012). Similarly, the term ‘gay agenda’ is described as efforts of the ‘gay movement’ to go beyond just advocating for equal rights of LGBT and heterosexual populations, aiming instead for a broader revision of societal norms (Antonić, 2014). Originating from the academic circle, these ideas laid the ideological foundation for the subsequent development of anti-gender mobilization. Intellectuals have continued to play pivotal roles as key actors in various mobilizing events. In the case of Serbia, the influence of intellectuals in the inception of anti-gender discourse and the spread of anti-gender mobilization is substantial compared to other countries in the region.

Our chapter aims to reveal the central themes and key figures contributing to the articulation of cultures of rejection around the phenomenon of gender in Serbia. To effectively illustrate not only the scope and strategies of anti-gender mobilization but also its integration into the cultural system, the concept of cultures of rejection proves to be analytically valuable. Cultures of rejection can be described as a complex regime of attitudes, values, norms, affects, and practices that are interrelated and constituted through the rejection of a set of socio-cultural phenomena (Harder & Opratko, 2021, 5–6; Fiket et al., 2023). The cultures of rejection function as a ‘social imaginary’ or a ‘cultural map’ enabling individuals and social groups to envision the social world, its elements, and their place within it (Steger & James, 2013, 23; Bottici, 2019, 2). Rejection serves as an implicit basis for articulating various heterogeneous elements – such as signifiers, statements, texts, affects, and non-discursive practices – into a coherent whole. Cultures of rejection operate through othering and affective mobilization. Othering involves assigning negative characteristics to the rejected phenomenon which includes concurrently constructing a certain ‘in-group’ identity characterized oppositely to that of the rejected entity (Brons, 2015, 72; Balibar, 2005, 30). In other words, it refers to the power of the symbolic structures – such as codes, narratives, and stories – in shaping values and affects. These structures enable people to designate certain individuals or groups as different, inferior to the dominant social group, or even undesirable within a community. We claim that gender and those who support gender equality in Serbia have become the entities subjected to othering. This process of othering leads to affective mobilization, whereby gender is perceived as a source of danger, linked to negative emotions such as fear and anxiety (Wodak, 2015, 213; Isin, 2004, 231–232). It is ultimately tied to moralistic judgments that frame it with a narrative of moral antagonisms between ‘ = us’ and ‘them’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’, etc. (Bojanić et al., 2022, 329–330).

The first significant anti-gender mobilization occurred in 2017, targeting the educational materials designed to teach children about gender-based violence and empowering them to respond appropriately. These materials were produced by the NGO Incest Trauma Center in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. Conservative intellectuals, supported by some teachers, and media outlets criticized the programme, accusing it of sexualizing children and introducing them ‘into the world of sexuality, into the world of adults, and even into the world of pathology’ (Antonić, 2017), while undermining parental rights (Bratić, 2017). They have successfully pressured the Ministry of Education to retract the initiative. The mobilization capitalized on concerns for children’s well-being and invoked the protection of Serbian values.

In rejecting the proposed educational package, two main argumentative strategies were employed. The first strategy downplayed the societal importance of learning about various forms of sexual violence and harassment, going as far as to portraying the content of the educational package as ‘mere ideology’ fundamentally opposed to Serbian values (Dimitrijević, 2017). It was described as the tools for the implementation of radical individualism, ‘radical feminism’, and – mentioned for the first time – ‘gender ideology’ (rodna ideologija). The second strategy involved ‘othering’ those who developed and supported this package, questioning their expertise, accusing them of pursuing financial gain, harbouring hidden agendas and having career backgrounds that were interpreted as work in ‘indoctrination’ (Antonić, 2017), including activities in ‘promoting and advocating lesbianism’ (Intermagazin, 2017). In far-right intellectual circles in Serbia, LGBT activists are perceived as emblematic of Western ideology due to the far-right’s reactionary stance against what they consider ‘Western liberal influences’ (Dević, 2019). Consequently, feminist researchers and activists, as well as LGBT activists, frequently encounter rejection based on narratives of national betrayal and serving the interests of Western powers. Based on these strategies of delegitimization and othering, the radical right party Dveri even called for the dismissal of the Minister of Education, but their demand was not met.

The success of these strategies is evidenced by the Ministry of Education’s swift retraction of the proposed educational package. A significant factor contributing to this was the mobilization’s focus on the topic of education and the well-being of children. The emotional well-being of children has been a highly charged issue in various political mobilizations (Rakusa-Suszczewski, 2021, 69), but within the anti-gender mobilization, the theme of ‘protecting our children’ emerged as the central strategy. The slogan ‘we must defend our children’ resonated strongly, mirroring sentiments found in anti-gender movements in countries like Poland (Rakusa-Suszczewski, 2021), Croatia (Hodžić et al., 2012), or Slovenia (Kuhar, 2017, 217, 225–226). Comparative studies show that these movements consistently invoke the image of the innocent child, positioning themselves as protectors from school-based indoctrination and champions of parental rights to impart moral and religious values to their offspring (Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017, 258). In Serbia, the narrative of ‘defending children’ predominantly employs a secular rhetoric, drawing upon the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This approach seeks to affirm parents’ rights to raise and educate their children according to their own beliefs (RTV, 2017).

Serbian anti-gender mobilization also articulated the demand to shield children from what they termed as the ‘ideology of homosexuality’ or ‘LGBT ideology’, with only occasional references to ‘gender ideology’. Critics associated the educational packages with ‘homosexualism’, condemning the authors of the packages for purportedly introducing children to pornography and normalizing same-sex displays of affection, such as two boys kissing. Homophobia has been a notable characteristic of the right-wing in Serbia, with stigmatizing and discriminatory attitudes toward the LGBT + community prevalent in public discourse (Bakić, 2007; Isaković & Žolt, 2017). Right-wing groups and parties have consistently criticized any proposal for the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships and the organization of LGBT + events, particularly the annual Pride parade. Moreover, discriminatory attitudes towards LGBT people are widespread in the general population. Research conducted on a representative sample of the population of Serbian citizens (older than 15 years) indicates high levels of social distance towards the LGBT community (with the highest scores being associated with LGBT individuals until 2016, after which higher scores have only been identified towards migrants, with LGBT now in the second position (Poverenik za zaštitu ravnopravnosti, 2019, 49). To illustrate, when asked whom they would not like as a neighbour, 23% of respondents marked LGBT people. LGBT individuals are the third least wanted neighbours in Serbia, following migrants (38%) and Albanians (27%) (Poverenik za zaštitu ravnopravnosti, 2019, 50).

Despite these attitudes, Ana Brnabić became the first openly lesbian prime minister in Serbia in 2017 (and the second in the world, following Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir in Iceland (2009–2013)), just a few months after the retraction of the educational packages. While Ana Brnabić cannot be directly linked to LGBT activism, her appointment was perceived by European Union officials as a progressive milestone and by some local LGBT organizations as an act that provides visibility to the community, potentially having a positive impact. However, despite having an openly lesbian prime minister, significant progress regarding LGBT rights in Serbia has been limited. The appointment of Brnabić as the prime minister sent a message to the Western public that Serbia is progressive and not homophobic, while domestically she has been criticized for leading a government that does not actively recognize or advance LGBT rights (Zaharijević & Antonijević, 2024, 96).

The second key instance of anti-gender mobilization specifically targeted the attempt to pass the Law on Same-sex Partnerships in 2021. Anti-gender actors reframed their earlier homophobic attitudes, expanding their critique from strictly ‘Western’, ‘European’, and/or ‘American’ agendas to include ‘gender ideology’ as the major obstacle hindering Serbia’s moral and biological renewal (Begenišić, 2021a). Despite the country being led by the openly lesbian prime minister, whose partner gave birth during her term and who comes from the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), conservative intellectuals and politicians – including those from smaller radical right parties as well as representatives of the SNS – consistently opposed the draft law. They argued that it was ‘undemocratic’ and ‘unconstitutional’, claiming it opposed the will of the majority and challenged the definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, as stated in the Constitution of Serbia (Kuprijanović, 2021). The Serbian Orthodox Church played a significant role in the opposition, submitting official comments against the draft law to the Government of the Republic of Serbia. Unlike conservative intellectuals and right-wing politicians who framed their opposition in secular terms, church representatives relied on religious rhetoric, labelling the proposed document as ‘the propagation and advertising of sin’ (Stanje stvari, 2021). Both secular and religious discourses in Serbia, converging on the notion of the foreign ‘gender agenda’ from the West which supposedly aimed to fundamentally change Serbian society or even threaten the existence of the nation (Malenica, 2021), worked in a complementary manner to prevent the adoption of the law.

Pride parades in Serbia represent the third focal point mobilizing anti-gender actors. Since 2013, Prides in Belgrade have been organized without major disruptions. Although small groups of right-wing activists, occasionally accompanied by a few priests, have organized so-called ‘family walks’ before or after Pride events as protests or ‘purifying actions’, Pride events themselves have proceeded without extreme public disapproval. President Vučić has utilized Pride parades, along with the appointment of Ana Brnabić as the Prime Minister, for ‘tactical Europeanization’ to enhance his international image, yet Pride remained relatively invisible to the wider local public (Slootmaeckers, 2023, 167). In this context, it is noteworthy that Ana Brnabić has attended the Pride march several times but has not leveraged Pride as an opportunity to articulate the demands that would improve the position of the LGBT community in Serbia.

The dynamics shifted in 2022 when the support for protests against Pride increased, leading to a significantly more pronounced opposition to the event in the media. The fact that it was the EuroPride, an international event, which was scheduled to take place in 2022 in Belgrade, was used to mobilize more people against Pride than in previous years. The mobilization was based on the argument that EuroPride was a foreign event imposed on Serbian society by the West. The narrative gained traction in 2022, the year when anti-Western sentiments were strengthened and extensively utilized in the political discourse of both the ruling parties and the right-wing opposition, emerging as a reaction to the war in Ukraine (Jović et al., 2022). Riding the wave of increasing pro-Russian sentiments by combining anti-Western and homophobic rhetoric, the West, primarily the US, was portrayed as an empire forcing Serbia to organize events like Pride parades, which allegedly contradict the will of the people and their cultural identity. In such narratives, Serbia was depicted as a ‘colony’ that needs to be obedient to Western directives, especially concerning LGBT + rights (Mitić, 2022).

EuroPride was perceived as an external threat supported by a minority of local ‘traitors’ who were seen as deviating from traditional gender roles and the patriarchal family structure, the elements considered foundational to the nation. The phrase ‘rape of the state’ (Rodić, 2022) was used to emphasize the claim that foreign forces, in collaboration with local minorities, were demanding changes opposed to the will of the people, potentially endangering the nation’s survival. This narrative depicted EuroPride as a form of ‘tyranny of the minority over the majority’, thus overshadowing discussions about sexual consent and rights. Right-wing organizations, political parties, and the Serbian Orthodox Church organized counter-manifestations called litanies (litije) across Serbia to protest against EuroPride, receiving significant media attention (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2022). In church traditions, a litany is a religious procession led by a priest, featuring a series of petitions. In this case, it referred to the organized marches of citizens accompanied by representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who prayed for the preservation of traditional marriage and family. People moved beyond the realm of online activism, taking to the streets² to protest against what they perceived as the greatest threat to contemporary Serbian society: gender ideology. Paradoxically, during this period of organized protests and claims in the media that gender ideology, introduced through EuroPride, would have destructive effects, Ana Brnabić was appointed prime minister for the third time.

Due to criticisms against the organization of EuroPride from various quarters – including representatives of the ruling party SNS (for example, the Mayor of Belgrade, a member of the SNS, stated that ‘because of the way it is organized, it [Europride] runs counter to our traditional values’ (Šapić, 2022)), right-wing parties, the Serbian Orthodox Church, informal citizen groups, and participants in litanies – EuroPride was initially banned. Eventually, under pressure from EU officials, the government allowed EuroPride gathering to take place at Tašmajdan Park. However, the participants were not allowed to march through the streets where the initial route was planned.

The protests organized against EuroPride also brought attention to the content of biology textbooks in Serbia regarding the concept of gender. Similar to the criticism levelled against EuroPride, it was claimed that biology textbooks were influenced by ‘LGBT ideology’ or ‘gender ideology’ whose first victims are ‘our children’ due to the textbooks mentioning a distinction between sex and gender. The debate over the status of biology textbooks became highly polarizing among the general public, with some aiming to prevent the spread of ‘gender ideology’ in schools, while others advocating for the inclusion of scientifically relevant information about gender in education. Following a plea from the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was made during the prayer for the preservation of marriage and family delivered at litanies, the Ministry of Education quickly reacted. Within days, the Minister requested a review of the eighth-grade biology curriculum. An ad hoc working group was then established by the Council for the Advancement of Education, consisting of scientists known for their right-wing political views, whose identities were initially concealed from the public and who were selected in opposition to the Serbian Biological Society.³ Through this process, the representatives of anti-gender mobilizations gained institutional authority to influence the inclusion of gender-related content in educational curricula. Despite substantial objections from biology professionals and a portion of the public, the textbooks were removed from circulation. The mobilization principles mirrored those seen in previous cases – conservative intellectuals and right-wing politicians publicly expressed their concerns, receiving crucial support from the church, especially from its highest authority, the patriarch.

The concept of gender was portrayed as a threat to children’s development, highlighting the risk to this particularly vulnerable group if norms originating from the West are adopted and applied to Serbian society (Stajić, 2021). Secular and religious discourses became closely intertwined, critiquing the textbooks for their supposed conflict with faith, tradition, and science.⁴ Anti-gender actors emphasized that almost all members of society were against the textbooks (Avramović, 2022), labelling those who criticized their removal as representatives of the ‘culture of nonsense’, lacking reason and knowledge, or even branding them as ‘crazy’ and ‘fanatics’ (Podkast Kod Brane, 2022, 43:07–43:43). Through this rhetoric, an effort was made to legitimize the rejection as a way to align the majority against what was framed as an unreasonable or even extremist and delusional minority.

Last but certainly not least, gender-sensitive language has emerged as a crucial issue within anti-gender mobilization. The debate on gender and language has unprecedentedly grown in the public sphere following media commentary on a draft of the Bill on gender equality in 2017, which emphasized the need to specify the feminine forms for nouns that denote professions and social roles (Bogetić, 2022, 6). Initially, criticism of gender-sensitive language appeared in the works of conservative intellectuals (Antonić, 2011), and the circle of critics expanded following the adoption of the bill in 2021. After its adoption, gender-sensitive language has taken centre stage in anti-gender mobilization. Conservative intellectuals, right-wing politicians, and representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church, including the patriarch, have been particularly vocal in their opposition, especially regarding the use of feminine noun forms for women’s professions and titles.

Echoing previous instances of mobilization, opponents of gender-sensitive language have framed it as an externally imposed project orchestrated by foreign entities and enforced in a top-down manner, alleging that it contradicts the ‘essence of the Serbian language’, tradition, and linguistic structure (Vreme, 2022). Additionally, they invoked the metaphor of ‘rape’, describing gender-sensitive language as a violation or mutilation of the language (Janjetović, 2023).

A Belgrade-based law office has been contesting the constitutional validity of gender-sensitive language for several years. An initiative was submitted to the Constitutional Court of Serbia in 2021, claiming that the Bill on gender equality was not in line with the Constitution, which recognizes only the category of sex, not gender. Furthermore, the lawsuit claims that the act introduces legal uncertainty by suspending the application of several thousand regulations that use terms not aligned with the law’s mandate for the obligatory use of gender-sensitive language (Begenišić, 2021b). The Serbian Orthodox Church and its patriarch vehemently advocate against this law and gender-sensitive language. Representatives of the church, as in the case of some other debates of public interest, combined tropes from the civil, religious, and nationalist discourses (Resanović, 2021) to convey a broader message. They argue that gender-sensitive language infringes the right to ‘personal freedom’, contradicts the church norm that views ‘marriage a Sacred Mystery’, and ultimately threatens to dismantle the ‘spiritual and cultural code of the nation’ along with its ‘collective unconscious’ (Bulović, 2021).

The patriarch frequently urges state authorities to take action against non-governmental organizations that ‘consistently and systematically promote gender ideology, politics, and practice’ in preschool and school education (N1, 2023). Dragan Stanić, the president of the Matica Srpska, a key cultural authority for Serbian language and culture, shares similar views. He perceives the actions envisaged by the Bill on gender equality as ‘violence perpetrated by a certain group of people with a particular ideological orientation’ (RTV, 2024).

In this segment, we aim to map the discourse used by anti-gender actors in Serbia, specifically focusing on how the notion of gender is articulated with other ideas, signifiers, and terms.⁵ We will refer to various sets of these articulations as ‘discursive strategies’ and define them as intentional plans of discursive practices adopted in order to achieve a particular goal. By researching these discursive strategies, we aim to shed light on how linguistic tactics are employed by anti-gender actors to ‘demonstrate’, ‘validate’, or ‘highlight’ specific points or issues related to the concept of gender (Wodak, 2009, 38–40) in order to mobilize affects and facilitate the process of ‘othering’.

In the early stages of anti-gender mobilization, which focused on educational packages, the term ‘homosexual ideology’ was predominantly used, even as the term ‘gender ideology’ began to surface (Srbin info, 2017). Serbian academics were among the first to discuss these issues in articles aimed at the general public. For example, Miša Đurković, a political philosopher and at the time the director of the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, stated:

The authors [of the educational package] are keen to completely separate sex, as a physical entity, from gender, which is supposedly a pure social construct. This means that every child is encouraged to ‘choose their gender’ or, in other words, experiment with their sexuality (Đurković, 2017).

In the anti-gender discourse, the difference between gender and sex is not seen as the outcome of scientific research but rather as a purely ideological distinction. In other words, gender is perceived as a political construct, which is seen as foreign, fundamentally incompatible with Serbian culture and tradition, and ‘in conflict with our core values’ (Zaharijević & Lončarević, 2020, 31). The slippery slope argument is also employed, suggesting that accepting the distinction between sex as a biological category and gender as a social construct will inevitably lead to encouraging all members of our society – and especially children – to ‘experiment’ with their sexuality (note the sudden switch from gender identity to sexuality), or actually move away from the heterosexual orientation.

Based on such interpretation, the very concept of gender became a key category in subsequent stages of mobilization, and ‘gender ideology’ was identified as the root cause of the reforms anti-gender actors want to combat (see also Kováts, 2017; Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017). The shift from critiquing ‘homosexual ideology’ to targeting gender was strategized to attract new supporters. Anti-gender actors reframed widely held homophobic sentiments, which are not limited to right-wing politicians and activists; rather, they are also widespread among the general population, particularly those with traditional and patriarchal value orientations (Mršević, 2013; Petrović & Radoman, 2019).

In order to emphasize the foreignness of ‘gender ideology’, the term ‘gender’ is often left untranslated and phonetically transcribed as ‘džender’ in Serbian. Anti-gender actors deliberately use ‘džender’ to distinguish it sharply from ‘rod’, the Serbian translation of gender (see also Zaharijević, 2019, 33–34). By doing so, right-wing actors assert that ‘rod’ is a natural category, suggesting that there is no distinction between biological sex and gender. As a result, sex/gender roles are considered to be primarily biologically determined, in stark contrast to ‘džender’, which is portrayed as an ideological construct challenging the natural/normal order. The individuals and groups who are involved in generating knowledge about the complex interplay of biological and social factors in shaping gender identity, and/or those advocating for a more gender-equal society, are often labelled as ‘džender’ ideologists.

I tried to explain, clarify, but in a scientific manner, using methods that entail support, referencing research, insights, and various perspectives. I endeavoured to address many contentious questions, especially those taken for granted […] A big part of this theory, gender theory, gender ideology, is based on theories, terms, things which are not clear enough and are more of an ideology than proper science (Podkast Kod Brane, 2021, 02:22–02:47; 18:38–18:59).⁶

While legitimate and recognized knowledge about ‘gender’, ‘gender identities’, and ‘gender roles’ is being delegitimized and stripped off of its scientific status, the proponents of anti-gender mobilizations, especially those who are intellectuals, often portray their own stance as scientifically valid. The main arguments used by anti-gender intellectuals suggest that they represent a minority scientific viewpoint on a global scale, for which securing grants is nearly impossible. Furthermore, from this self-victimizing stance, they argue that producing knowledge from within research institutions is almost impossible due to the dominance of ‘gender ideology’ (Podkast Kod Brane, 2022, 47:16–51:00).

The notion that ‘external forces’ are imposing various policies, measures, and instruments related to gender equality is a central theme for Serbian anti-gender actors.

Living under the ‘soft occupation’ of the Washington-Brussels Empire, in 2021, we witnessed the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, while dealing with ‘gender equality’, also attacked the Serbian language, demanding the implementation of the ideas of the crazy old crone, Judith Butler, who is an honorary doctorate recipient from the University of Belgrade (Dimitrijević, 2022).⁷

This discursive strategy adopts what can be described as a quasi ‘colonial analysis’, viewing gender and policies related to gender and sexuality as a form of imperial oppression and imposition. Initially, non-governmental anti-gender actors depicted the government as being ‘captured’ by foreign interests through the actions of a treacherous minority that had gained power within the government and served the interests of the West as a ‘comprador elite’. By attributing the imposition of ‘gender ideology’ and various related policies to these ‘comprador elites’ (HelmCast⁸ 2017a, 30:00–32:00), these actors link gender issues with current state representatives, specifically pointing to the responsibility of the prime minister and the president for spreading ideological indoctrination.

In response to this criticism, representatives of the ruling party have increasingly started to reference ‘gender’ as a tool of ideological subjugation employed by the West, distinguishing their position by highlighting the success of their political efforts to resist such pressures. A notable example of this stance was demonstrated in a speech by the former Belgrade mayor, Aleksandar Šapić, at a large election rally of the ruling party in December 2023, just a few months after he had initiated the event ‘Belgrade Family Days’. He underscored that, under the ruling party’s continued governance, society would not adopt notions that ‘brother and sister’ could be referred to as ‘child 1 and 2’, or that mom and dad could be replaced with ‘parent 1 and 2’. Instead, he affirmed that the people would ‘remain honourable, humane, and honest’ and that ‘brother and sister, mom and dad will forever remain what they have always been’ (Novosti, 2023).⁹

Framing gender as an instrument of oppression imposed by Western globalized capitalism is a widespread discursive strategy that draws heavily on a nationalist narrative of harassment and abuse against ‘domestic traitors’ and ‘foreign mercenaries’ from the 1990s. This approach has remained relevant, albeit in a modified form, with a focus on gender. When utilized by anti-gender actors, this strategy aims to undermine the feminist activists, scholars, and political opponents who advocate for the importance of gender issues. The key difference lies in whether those employing this strategy are anti-gender actors in positions of power or representatives of radical right-wing parties and conservative intellectuals who critique the government. In the latter case, even government representatives are portrayed as part of a network of foreign collaborators, leading to their subsequent rejection.

For example, relying on the work of the Italian philosopher Diego Fusaro, Antonić claims:

Contemporary ‘turbo-capitalism’ [...] promotes those ideas, theories and behaviours that make individuals weaker, less connected, and therefore more exposed to manipulation and exploitation. A component of this ideology is the so called sexual liberation […] with the promotion of the model of easily changeable partners – just like it is expected of workers to accept short-term job contracts and their quick succession […] The goal is to leave, in front of the powerful, global Master, only a weak, atomized and non-social individual that in the morning sees the other as an adversary in a competition to see who will work for less and in the afternoon as an object for sexual pleasure (Antonić 2021a, b).

Anti-gender actors employ this discursive strategy as a critical justification for their opposition to the concept of ‘gender’, presenting it as a critical analysis that ostensibly reveals power structures allegedly manipulating the notion of gender for malevolent purposes. It is the mechanism of othering that is hidden in the guise of a supposed critical analysis through which the notion of ‘gender’ is articulated with various signifiers related to what is perceived as ‘the West’. In this way, ‘gender’ is being presented as a foreign imposition and a tool of oppression endangering the Serbian nation, but it is also articulated within a larger discursive whole, a specific culture of rejection that is aimed at ‘the West’ as a discursive construct.

This discursive strategy consists of arguments that present the notion of gender as a central category of a new totalitarian ideology. Consequently, it is argued that the proponents of gender ideology seek to establish control over both private and public spheres, while aggressively opposing all dissenting viewpoints.

The gender revolution brings an ideologized equality of man and woman; the deconstruction of male and female sex identity; the fight against normative heterosexual behaviour, along with a complete legal and social equality, as well as the privileging of all non-heterosexual lifestyles; abortion as the so-called reproductive right of women; the forced sexualization of children and youth; systematic efforts to impoverish families, with the aim of taking children away from their father and mother and handing them over to a neo-totalitarian state (Dimitrijević 2022).

In Serbia, this form of argumentation strongly relies on the widespread anti-socialist sentiment that is closely aligned with nationalist value orientations. Following the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, a new hegemonic narrative emerged based on anti-socialism and achieved through the demonization of the entire Yugoslav historical experience. This narrative depicts socialist Yugoslavia as a deviation for Serbia, portraying it as a state that was born from the sacrifice of its own national interests (Kuljić, 2005). As a result, within this context, advocating the idea that ‘gender ideology’ represents a new form of communism proves to be a highly potent strategy for mobilization (Hodžić et al., 2012; Korolczuk & Graff, 2017; Graff & Korolczuk, 2018; Kuhar, 2017; Rakusa-Suszczewski, 2021).

People like me will have either to remain silent and cease their professional activities, just as during the communist era, or move out of this country, or consciously opt to go to prison (Đurković 2021).

By portraying ‘gender ideology’ as synonymous with widespread repression and the suppression of freedom, anti-gender actors amplify the perceived significance of their own engagement by ascribing greater courage and a more liberal spirit to their own viewpoints and activities.

Thus, they suggest that political pluralism is on the verge of complete erosion, primarily due to the activities of leftist feminist activists and scholars who are labelled as ‘gender ideologists’ or sometimes, more pointedly, as ‘gender commissars’ (džender komesarke) or ‘gender Stakhanovites’¹⁰ (džender stahanovke) (Antonić, 2021c). The use of vocabulary reminiscent of the actual socialist era serves to further discredit these individuals. With these terms, they aim to evoke (more fabricated than real) memories of the former socialist political order, thereby emphasizing the threat posed by something that may initially appear to belong to the past.

The last discursive strategy can be seen as a derivative of the previous ones, specifically focusing on how anti-gender actors envision the possible consequences of what they call ‘gender ideology’. This framing is also deeply intertwined with nationalist sentiments.

Everything depends on our children, the future Serbian tribe. In them lies the key to the survival of the Serbian people, and we must pass on to them the keys to Kosovo. God will not allow a Serbian existence in any form or gender. We know what it means to be a Serb. There will either be such a Serb, or there will be none at all. In today's defiant world, could it be enough for us to love only our wives and with them bring forth new, sacred, and heroic offspring?¹¹ (Jovanović 2021).

Professor Petrović reminds us that the new US president Biden announced that they are going to force ‘LGBT ideology as the very core of democracy’ onto the world. The followers of these theories rushed to establish that it should say in these textbooks how ‘sex and gender don't match in each person’, that children can ‘choose’ whether they are going to be male of female - professor Petrović claims, and concludes that: These ideas arrived into our textbooks and they want to destroy the highest natural order, the Serbian Orthodox ethos and the Serbian language!¹² (Novi Standard, 2021).

Gender, perceived as unscientific and labelled a ‘totalitarian ideology’ imposed by the neoliberal West to create more obedient and productive workers, is viewed as a threat to the ‘normal’ ontological relationship between individuals and the nation. This relationship conceptualizes the nation as an organism comprised of individual bodies, a fusion that creates a singular ontological entity (Isin, 2004). Consequently, ‘gender’ is framed as jeopardizing this harmonious coexistence. Traditional sex roles and heterosexuality are celebrated as essential for the nation’s future, while ‘gender’ is constructed as a source of fear and anxiety, seen as undermining this vision (Wodak, 2015, 181). There is a strong advocacy for preserving traditional values, including the patriarchal gender regimes that lead to differentiated sex roles and opportunities. Russia often serves as an influential model for the conservation of these values, with its existing legal regulations as a reference point (Nova srpska politička misao, 2024). This stance capitalizes on the pro-Russian sentiment among the segments of society that align with nationalist values, stemming from the belief that culturally, Serbs share more with Russia than with the West, and considering Russia as a political ally due to its non-recognition of Kosovo.

In conclusion, the nation is seen as an ontological entity to which individuals and families are not only integrated but also obligated to contribute, primarily through procreation. The fulfilment of these obligations is also closely tied to adherence to traditional values. As such, an individual’s sexual practices are understood as being directly tied to the existence of the nation, implying that any factors seen as disturbing heteronormativity and questioning traditional gender norms pose a direct threat to the very existence of the Serbian nation. Gender is presented as one of those threats, and thus, even the mere mention of the term gender evokes feelings of fear and anxiety. This makes the mechanism of othering more effective, reinforcing the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, making it stronger, more hierarchical, and more impermeable. Mentioning Kosovo further exacerbates the invocation of anxieties, positioning gender as an equal threat to the ‘ontological security’ of the nation as the possible future independence of Kosovo (Ejdus, 2020).¹³

In the Serbian context, as in many others, ‘gender’ serves as an empty signifier. It does not denote a specific social phenomenon or policies but is articulated through heteronormative, patriarchal, and nationalist ideological elements. It embodies a vague, emotionally charged rejection of issues as diverse as family policies, gender equality, gender studies, sexuality policies, sex education, and, specifically in Serbia, the recognition of the independence of Kosovo (Mayer & Sauer, 2017). Therefore, the focus on gender allows right-wing actors in Serbia to amalgamate different discourses into one overarching threat that different actors can unite against, as it is construed as an attack on at least one of the three ‘Ns’ defended by these actors: nature, nation, and normality (Paternotte & Kuhar, 2017, 259–260). The portrayal of gender as a threat has relied on the self-victimization position, a theme that has been prominently featured in nationalist discourses in previous decades. This has fostered paranoid and self-destructive mindsets that readily identify an enemy in others.

In Serbia, anti-gender actors use the mechanisms of the cultures of rejection to frame their mobilizations and discursive strategies by constructing gender as an ‘othered’ concept or a foreign phenomenon that must be rejected to safeguard the purity of the national identity. Signifiers like the US, the EU, Brussels, ‘neoliberalism’, or ‘globalization’ are equated with the ‘West’ and superimposed on the notion of gender, portraying it as a Western imposition on the Serbian nation. Therefore, the struggle against gender and related policies is framed as a battle for the ‘national future’ and against the erosion of the ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ state of the Serbian nation.

We can observe two distinct characteristics of anti-gender actors and discourses in Serbia. First, anti-gender actors form a heterogeneous coalition consisting of the conservative members of the ruling party, right-wing opposition politicians and intellectuals. Members of the ruling party perceive NGO activists and feminist theorists as the ‘elite’ collaborating with the West to spread ‘gender ideology’. In contrast, radical right anti-gender actors maintain an ambivalent stance towards the government. They often depict it as part of the ‘elite’, but also see it as a potential ally in their anti-gender struggles (such as is the case of the textbooks ‘working group’). Therefore, the collaboration between non-governmental anti-gender actors (right-wing opposition and right-wing intellectuals who are moderately critical towards the ruling party) and the diffused and malleable conservative fraction of the ruling party is presented to the public as an endeavour to ‘free’ the government from ‘foreign influences’, pressuring it to promote ‘gender ideology’ (Obradović, 2022).

Second, anti-gender actors have recently strived not to appear as proponents of a culture of rejection. They present themselves as adopting an inclusive stance. This suggests that gay men and lesbians could be acknowledged as a legitimate minority within the Serbian nation, while the focus of rejection is the ‘LGBT agenda’ and the activists and NGOs accused of aggressively promoting ‘gender ideology’. Additionally, there has been a notable increase in transphobia, indicating that transgender individuals have become the latest group to be included in the repertoire of rejected phenomena around which new anti-gender mobilizations and discourses are being formulated (Radoman, 2023, 146). At their core, anti-gender actors in Serbia distinguish between what they consider ‘legitimate homosexuality’ as a tolerable minority and a form of homosexuality they perceive as being imposed from the West. The latter form is seen as a political agenda threatening the ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ order of the Serbian nation (HelmCast,¹⁴ 2017b, 45:08–49:59; Đurković, 2023, 27:24–28:10). Through this distinction, anti-gender actors aim to legitimize their actions and encourage exclusionary attitudes towards certain groups. By adopting a stance of a ‘conditional tolerance’, they often mask their rejection of sexual minorities with a ‘but’ (e.g., ‘I’m not against homosexuals, but …’).

Despite the outward appearance of growing inclusivity, everyday life reveals a starkly contrasting trend: the erosion of gender equality and an uncertain future for the visibility and recognition of gender-related issues and topics. The anti-gender discourse, initially limited to a small group of conservative intellectuals and representatives of radical right parties primarily active in niche right-wing publications, has significantly broadened its reach. This shift is evident in the increased presence of anti-gender rhetoric in the speeches of representatives from the dominant catch-all political party in power, church authorities, and various public figures across Serbia’s most popular and widely consumed media outlets – national TV channels and newspapers with the largest circulation. In this environment, gender-related issues become deeply divisive, exacerbating polarization and reducing the potential for dialogue and solidarity among citizens.