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This book provides practical solutions for addressing energy efficiency as a clause term within a charter party contract. For this, upon a reflection of the regulatory craft, it analyzes key concepts of case law, and discusses them together with commercial and economic principles. In this way, the book aims at offering a comprehensive, interdisciplinary view of the chartering process, together with a new approach for safeguarding energy efficiency investments. A special emphasis is given to the maritime industry. Here, the newly developed framework, based on game theory, has been successfully applied to demonstrate the importance of including a clause term in contract negotiation to achieve protection against both an uncertain market and an even more challenging shipping environment. The book not only fills a gap in the literature, covering a topic that has been largely neglected to date, yet it offers researchers and practitioners extensive information to change the chartering process radically.





Chapter 1. Introduction

In addition to regulatory compliance and to irradiate environmental stewardship across the maritime industry, appropriate mechanisms need to be in place so that the ocean freight service is delivered in an energy efficient manner. This chapter is aimed at explaining the book’s motivation, the adopted research approach which is distinguished between qualitative as well as quantitative, and it offers an outline of the embodied content.
George Adamantios Psarros

Qualitative Part


Chapter 2. Literature Review

In the book’s second chapter, a background related to design energy efficiency improvements and their connection to the maritime regulatory framework is presented. Consequently, a subsection is devoted to the types of charter party agreements that are commonly used within shipping and a brief on the parties’ duties is provided. Then, a short discussion on the barriers that could inhibit the introduction of the design energy efficiency improvements is given.
George Adamantios Psarros

Chapter 3. Methodology

This chapter is aimed at presenting the framework of the conducted qualitative research. Essential element is the observation of commercial contracts for the use of the vessel (charter party ) as well as legal instruments for the carriage of goods by sea with the result being a theory generalization. This entails that a qualitative inductive and exploratory approach is adopted in a sense that there is a gap in the logic argument between the conclusion and the observations being made. The coherence for this reasoning is achieved through the grounded theory method, a formalized strategy to collect and analyze data (observed premises) which enables to answer the particular research objectives and meet the book’s aim.
George Adamantios Psarros

Chapter 4. Analysis and Findings

This chapter is concerned with reporting the results grounded on the methodology outlined in the previous chapter. In this respect, firstly the initial coding of legal instrument interpretations on the carriage of goods by sea investigates if it is permitted to regulate the rights and responsibilities of design energy efficiency improvements. Furthermore, it seeks to identify any wedge for incorporating such term in the charter party contract through the relevant law literature. Secondly, since the research is concentrated around voyage and time charters, the focused coding is supported by sufficient sampling of the standard agreement forms. To this end, content analysis is employed for uncovering themes within the clauses by objectively and systematically searching for certain subjects within the text (i.e. energy efficiency specification). Moreover, it is determined which themes are associated with vessel design parameters. This process continues until additional data collation does not contribute to the coding of the topic under investigation and any new theoretical lines of enquiry are not possible to be offered.
George Adamantios Psarros

Quantitative Part


Chapter 5. Chartering Negotiations for Energy Efficiency

The fifth chapter introduces the reader to the quantitative part, which is devoted to answering the fundamental question how to design the energy efficiency sharing scheme mechanism and its connection to the chartering procedure. In this respect, game theory offers a wide range of models that can be adjusted to appropriately represent the incentive mixture for energy efficiency. Firstly, the principal -agent problem is utilized for determining the difference between the two players’ reservation prices (hire for time and freight for voyage charter ) as well as their information asymmetry related to energy efficiency. This forms the basis where the negotiations can begin. Secondly, the two players are given the opportunity to split the difference between them with alternating offers which resembles a bargaining game and results to the contracted price . Then, for the given vessel revenue performance, discounted cash flow analysis is performed to investigate whether the EEISS is profitable and the expense can be justified.
George Adamantios Psarros

Chapter 6. Application—Ocean Grain Transportation

Having outlined the principal -agent and bargaining games as foundation tools for modeling the chartering negotiations inclusive of the EEISS appraisal, we are now in position to appreciate the capabilities of this approach. The forthcoming developments in the text indicate how informed decision making can be realized when these models are entertained with data. By necessity, this chapter is concentrated on demonstrating the practical viability of the suggested techniques through an illustrative case study, where the material is presented in a gradual quest for problem solving. The working example is focused on seaborne grain transport since it is acknowledged that grain is one of the most important commodities around the world.
George Adamantios Psarros



Chapter 7. Conclusions, Limitations and Recommendations

The research objectives posed the necessity to adapt a qualitative approach using exploratory document search from which a theory is developed to examine if it is appropriate to include design energy efficiency improvement clause in charter party contracts. Subsequently, the book’s work proceeded with the quantitative research objectives , where game theory is employed to suggest a suitable incentive mechanism design that may support the pricing aspects of the clause. The developed conceptual framework is demonstrated through a case study within seaborne grain transport. In this respect, the book’s current and final chapter is aimed at concluding the performed research by outlining the results of the analysis as well as the contribution to the body of knowledge on charter party contracts. In confidence that academic and industry interest may be generated, this chapter has also the purpose to address the book’s limitations and to make recommendations drawn upon the book’s second chapter’s literature review.
George Adamantios Psarros


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