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Enforcement outcomes against excessive pricing in Russia are controversial. Since many infringement decisions do not sustain judicial review, there is a recent shift from ex post intervention to ex ante price remedies by competition authorities. The objective of this chapter is to show that modest enforcement records are explained by the absence of convincing standards for price excessiveness but not by the weakness of theories of harm. The analysis of the Russian competition authority’s decisions involves three aspects, including enforcement targets, standards for establishing excessive margin, and reasons for court decisions. The competition authority develops guidelines to prove excessive pricing which do not convince the courts. Thus, the development of a reliable test is of high importance.
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- Enforcement Against Excessive Pricing in the Russian Federation
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