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Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

31.05.2017 | Original Paper

Epsilon-stability in school choice

verfasst von: Chao Huang, Qianfeng Tang, Ziwei Wang

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 2/2017

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Abstract

In many school choice practices, scores, instead of ordinal rankings, are used to indicate students’ qualification. We study school choice problems where students have ordinal preference over schools while their priorities at schools are in the form of cardinal scores. The cardinality of scores allows us to measure the intensity of priority violations and hence relax stability by proposing epsilon-stability. We also propose the epsilon-EADA mechanism to select the constrained efficient matching under epsilon-stability.

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Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) first suggested to use alternative mechanisms to replace the Boston mechanism. See Pathak (2016) for detailed survey on school choice reforms.

For more details on the connection between SIC and the simplified EADAM, see Tang and Yu (2014), Sect. 4.2.

See Afacan et al. (2016), Proposition 3, for an example which illustrates of why a SIC stage is needed after applying Kesten’s EADAM. The same example can also be used to illustrate why constrained efficiency can be achieved by using the simplified EADAM alone.

Bando (2014) independently proposes another simplification of Kesten (2010), which is embedded in Tang and Yu (2014).

Kesten (2010) shows that under a limited information setting, truth-telling is an ordinal Bayes Nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game under EADAM.

Abdulkadiroğlu A, Sönmez T (2003) School choice: A mechanism design approach. Am Econ Rev 93:729–747CrossRef

Abdulkadiroğlu A, Pathak P, Roth A (2009) Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the NYC high-school match. Am Econ Rev 99:1954–1978CrossRef

Afacan MO, Aliog̃ulları ZH, Barlo M (2016) Sticky matching in school choice. Econ Theory. doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0995-y

Bando K (2014) On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm. Games Econ Behav 87:269–287CrossRef

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Kesten O, Kurino M (2016) Do outside options matter in matching? A new perspective on the trade-offs in student assignment, (working paper)

Lien JW, Zheng J, Zhong X (2016) Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission. Games Econ Behav (accepted)

Pathak PA (2016) What really matters in designing school choice mechanisms? (working paper)

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Tang Q, Yu J (2014) A new perspective on Kesten’s school choice with consent idea. J Econ Theory 154:543–561CrossRef

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Titel: Epsilon-stability in school choice
verfasst von: Chao Huang
Qianfeng Tang
Ziwei Wang
Publikationsdatum: 31.05.2017
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 2/2017
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1060-x

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