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Human Studies
Erschienen in: Human Studies 3/2021

21.04.2021 | Theoretical / Philosophical Paper

Ethos and Eidos as Field Level Concepts for the Sociology of Morality and the Anthropology of Ethics: Towards a Social Theory of Applied Ethics

verfasst von: Nathan Emmerich

Erschienen in: Human Studies | Ausgabe 3/2021

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Abstract

This article presents the notions of ethos and eidos as field level concepts for the sociology of morality and the anthropology of ethics. This is accomplished in the context of Bourdieuan social theory and, therefore, from the broad standpoint of practice theory. In the first instance these terms are used to refer to the normative structures of social fields and are conceived so as to represent the way in which such structures fall between two planes, that of the implicit and the explicit. Subsequently, they are used to further understand a distinction between morality—roughly, the implicit moral order of a social field—and ethics—the more explicit and often codified elements of a social field’s normative structure. When presented in relation to academic philosophical inquiries into the ethical issues in healthcare and the life sciences—meaning the disciplines of applied ethics in general and applied (bio)ethics in particular—the analytic perspective these terms facilitate enables us to represent the fundamental conditions required for academic enquiry; taken together the ethos and eidos of an intellectual field constitute the requisite background of its normative epistemic and methodological commitments, thereby providing the structures of disciplined intellectual practices. Seen in this light it not only becomes possible to grasp applied (bio)ethics as a socially structured practice but to understand it in terms that can also be used to frame our everyday moral practices. In this way applied (bio)ethics can be acknowledged as a relatively unique part of our contemporary moral culture.
Vorheriger Artikel The Equivocity of Being: Heidegger, Multiplicity, and Fundamental Ontology
Nächster Artikel Freedom, Normativity and Finitude: Between Heidegger and Levinas

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Fußnoten
1
Further detail on this distinction between morality and ethics is offer in Sect. 3.
 
2
The fact that certain ethical commitments presently reflect the ethos in which they are deployed does not, of course, mean that their origins cannot be traced to more critical endeavors. Consider, for example, the principle of autonomy in contemporary medical practice and the fact that, at least in part, its origin can be traced to emergence of applied (bio)ethics in general and to Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1979) in particular.
 
3
On the sociology of intellectuals more generally see Kurzman and Owens (2002).
 
4
It is worth pointing out that whilst this paper is concerned with the disciplinary field of applied ethics, when Bourdieu speaks of ‘intellectual fields’ he has a broader notion in mind. His concern is with “the intellectual, as distinct from the scholar” (1969: 90); with those who make public contributions to broader civic and political life, and do so on the basis of the authority granted to them as academics, something that may or may not be related to their particular expertise (Bourdieu 1989; Medvetz 2018: 467). Bourdieu therefore offers an analysis of homo academicus (1990a), something broader than homo physicus, homo philosophicus, or homo applied ethicus. Nevertheless, his contributions are formative, particularly the comments presented in ‘The Corporatism of the Universal’ (Bourdieu 1989), ‘The Science of Science and Reflexivity’ (Bourdieu 2004) and elsewhere.
 
5
As a whole, bioethics is a multi- or inter-disciplinary form of enquiry. However, in this paper, my primary concern is with a core aspect of bioethics, namely the contributions of applied ethics. As I go onto suggest, both applied ethics and bioethics are uniquely modern phenomenon. That this is the case is a function of the central role played by applied ethics in the field, both at the present time and in terms of its historical emergence and development.
 
6
This perspective obviously contradicts the presumption of individualism shared by applied ethics, (analytic) moral philosophy and, one might add, contemporary moral psychology. In these (inter)related fields the view seems to be that ethics is primarily a matter of the reflective exertions of individual cognitive subjects. A moment’s reflection on the corpus of cases and thought experiments that are central to applied (bio)ethics demonstrates the centrality of this view. Similarly, it also lies at the heart of Sauer’s (2018) proposals for a third set of psychological processes which are meant to overcome certain theoretical problems for notions of ethical rationality generated by dual process moral psychology. Furthermore, despite Fedyk’s (2017) suggestion of a social turn in contemporary moral psychology, the field remains fundamentally individualist in its outlook and theoretical proposals. However, the account presented here is not offered in (full) contradistinction to those of Sauer, Fedyk or dual process moral psychology. Rather, we should accept the fact that a proper understanding of morality will require interdisciplinarity and, pace Fedyk, that it is preferable to pursue a form of theoretical consilience, this being the mutually informative integration or coordination of disciplinary perspectives, if not necessarily of the methodological and metaphysical variety that Fedyk himself pursues with regard to philosophy, moral psychology and evolutionary biology
(2017: 9 & 177).
 
7
Indeed, for some, the morally objective and neutral standpoint of applied (bio)ethics is such that it, or the arguments and, in particular, conceptual analysis it presents, should be understood as setting the terms for subsequent political debate. Indeed, Radcliffe-Richards (2012, Chapter 3) presents such commitments as a precondition of ‘moral seriousness’. Thus, bioethics has long been criticized for presuming its standpoint is acultural (Bosk 1999; Fox and Swazey 1984, 2008; Kleinman 1995). Similar thoughts pertain to the universalist ambitions of applied ethics more generally. The parallel between what I am trying to initiate here, and the kinds of endeavours undertaken within the social studies of science should be obvious.
 
8
As is the case here, this essay tends to associate morality with the moral order of a society, culture, community or tradition. In contrast, ethics concerns the more explicit rules and principles that result from certain reflective practices. See Sect. 3 for further discussion.
 
9
Johnston rightly calls this “the only reasonable form of transcendence available to humans” (2014: xii).
 
10
For comments on the significance of ethos and eidos for habitus see Emmerich (2016).
 
11
In this context, one might also note the way Goodale presents values and ethical practices as co-instantiated, something that means not having to give up the distinction between “the internalized nature of individual morality identity and the social nature of morality” (Goodale 2009: 197) but nevertheless implies that some form of ontological relationship must obtain between them.
 
12
Consider, for example, Abend’s (2014) notion of the moral background.
 
13
Indeed, Bourdieu called the nation state an ‘unthinkable object’ albeit as he proceeded to think that very object (Bourdieu 2015: 3). Certainly, he recognises aspects of the state as fields, including the field of power (an ‘administrative field’ or ‘the field of public office’). Nevertheless, a nation is not itself a field, yet it grounds normative phenomena and as such one speaks of its ethos. The implication is that the term ethos (and, potentially, eidos) may have broader application than is being suggested here, i.e., as a property of fields. Equally, what is at play here may be the difference between the technical use of the term and its broader meaning à propos nations or culture. However, I will not seek to decide the point definitively. Suffice to say, all fields have a normative component and, therefore, an ethos. My thanks to a reviewer for pressing me on this point.
 
14
Of course, nothing is ever reproduced exactly, and every reproduction is also a unique production. That this is the case may lead some to abandon broad notions like culture or ethos, particularly when applied to macro phenomena like nation states. However, to do so is, I would suggest, to cut sociological and anthropological enquiry off at its knees. Rather than abandoning ‘the macro’ what is required is an acknowledgement of the indeterminist nature of such concepts, and their fluidity, plasticity or malleability. Equally, one must also acknowledge the similarities one finds across particular social institutions (state schools, say) and well as when we focus our attention at different levels. The best way to understand such relationship is in terms of family resemblances and the fractal model implied by forms of life or modes of social life (Collins 2019: 8; Collins and Kusch 1999: 16f.).
 
15
Recent work that makes a notable contribution to this idea include Herzog (2018), Miller (2009) and Jaeggi (2019).
 
16
Philosophical inattention to the term ethos results from something that tends to go unremarked: it is an axiographical, as opposed to axiological, notion and cannot, therefore, by deployed in the service of the kinds of normative analysis offered by moral and political philosophers. A similar kind of misapprehension may be related to the fact it has not been directly attended to by scholars working in the new SoM and AoE. See below for further comment.
 
17
On the face of it, this point contradicts a recent analysis of ‘implicit normativity’ offered by Cribb who suggests that “[i]n principle any instance of implicit normativity could become an explicit concern within organizational or professional ethics” (2020: 21). Cribb’s conception of a social field’s implicit normativity has much in common with my notion of a social field’s ethos. Whilst Cribb’s exact position is not clear, it seems that just as ‘knowing how’ cannot be completely rendered into ‘knowing that,’ what is implicitly normative in a social field can only be imperfectly expressed in explicitly normative terms.
 
18
Pellandini-Simányi argues that morality and ethics qua ethics (normative commitments, evaluations and judgements that are made for their own sake, as opposed to being a matter of broader interests or influences vis capital) should be located within social fields rather than “abstract notions of ‘values’ that float somewhere outside of society” (2014: 670). Her assessment is correct although the response should be to locate the relevant values, norms and principles within fields, the strategy adopted here.
 
19
It is worth pointing out that despite certain philosophers and applied ethicists presuming otherwise, there is no reason to think that sociological research done in this vein is merely descriptive; an axiographical standpoint does not come at the cost of the kind of critical engagement and socio-analysis central to sociological, anthropological and historical research.
 
20
As an anonymous reviewer rightly points out, in exception to this claim can be found in the work of Husserl and those who have continued it. In this literature eidos refers to the essence of a phenomena, a very different meaning to what is presented here.
 
21
One might also point out that ethos provides an essential component for the social conditions of reception and understanding. Take this essay, its production is predicated upon (but, of course, not determined by) the intellectual ethos embodied in its author’s habitus. Equally, its reception is predicated on the ethos embodied in the habitus of its readers. There will, presumably, be no small degree of overlap, not least insofar as both author and reader have an ‘interest in disinterestedness’ (Bourdieu 2004: 52), an essential and widely shared component of the scholastic point of view that is constitutive of the modern intellectual ethos (Bourdieu 1990b).
 
22
Empirical researchers have drawn similar conclusions. Gill (2009: 8) points out that formal rules are inevitable modulated by an encompassing ethos. Citing Gill, Herzog (2018: 147) makes comparable points.
 
23
On the notion of a space of reasons, presented in the philosophical, but nevertheless pertinent, context of moral particularism see: Smith (2010).
 
24
As will be discussed further, this is not something that is restricted to intellectual disciplines per se. Prescriptions for public reason can be similarly understood, at least insofar as they require us to move past the particulars of our own social and cultural context and adopt the standpoint of ethical universalism and moral objectivity (or neutrality). Such thinking can be applied to: reflective equilibrium and the Rawlsian veil of ignorance; discourse ethics and the Habermasian ideal speech situation; as well as to cosmopolitanism more generally (Anderson 2005: 15).
 
25
To reiterate, given the fact that any eidos is necessarily predicated upon an ethos, the explicit is always embedded in the implicit. Thus, in the final analysis, the same is true of both ethics and morality as well as disciplined intellectual enquires and their underlying or implicit moral orders (Lederman 2004: 66), at least as presented here.
 
26
One could just as easily adopt the reverse and associate ethics with ethos and morality with logical schemes and codifications. My decision has been largely dictated by the fact that the field of applied ethics concerns logical schemes and codifications.
 
27
See Franklin (2019) for a recent contribution to this perennial issue and Fox and Swazey (1984) for an early critique of the mismatch between applied (bio)ethics and ‘medical morality’.
 
28
It seems to me that there would be distinct rewards to be found were we to reconceive or reimagine both moral philosophy and applied ethics as human sciences. The same thought can be applied to the interdisciplinary enterprise of bioethics where, arguably, it carries even more significance. However, I will not press the point here.
 
29
Without wishing to be repetitive, we might reiterate a point that was previously made, and to do so in the same terms. This ‘interest in disinterestedness’ grants that intellectuals have “the ability to move beyond our current habits of thought and action to creatively remake some aspect of ourselves and our world” such that they can achieve “the only reasonable form of transcendence available to humans” (Johnson 2014: xii).
 
30
As this suggests, one can envision the Ideal Speech Situation (ISS) or ‘the presuppositions of argument’ that structure Discourse Ethics in terms of the normative structures of a particular social field, i.e., the public square or sphere (Habermas 1990). Although they are not identical, its underlying values, norms and principles or ethos of discourse ethics has much in common with the way applied ethics is configured vis an interest in disinterestedness, the rules and procedures of argument, impartiality, objectivity, universalism, and so forth.
 
31
Given the nature of jurisprudence engagement between applied ethics and medical law may meet the barest of criteria for multi- or inter- disciplinarity. Nevertheless, it does meet such criteria.
 
32
One might draw attention to Mol’s (2008) analysis of the logic of care and the logic of choice in healthcare. This work would suggest that the dominant logic (ethos-eidos) of healthcare primarily reflects autonomy as understood by mainstream bioethics. The feminist notion of relational autonomy can be associated with the logic of care.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Ethos and Eidos as Field Level Concepts for the Sociology of Morality and the Anthropology of Ethics: Towards a Social Theory of Applied Ethics
verfasst von
Nathan Emmerich
Publikationsdatum
21.04.2021
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Human Studies / Ausgabe 3/2021
Print ISSN: 0163-8548
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-851X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09579-2

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