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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. European Framework on Positive Action

verfasst von : Jozefien Van Caeneghem

Erschienen in: Legal Aspects of Ethnic Data Collection and Positive Action

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter reviews the European framework on positive action in order to uncover (1) whether the implementation of positive action is optional or mandatory, (2) which conditions must be fulfilled, and (3) which type(s) of measures can be adopted for equality and anti-discrimination purposes. This chapter first focuses on the Council of Europe. The analysis of the case law of the EctHR suggests a mixed approach towards the permissibility of this human rights instrument. A closer look at the work of the European Committee of Social Rights and the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities shows that these bodies appear to require the adoption of positive action under certain circumstances. The proportionality requirement is also considered and it is argued that it seems likely that the relevant supervisory bodies would accept strong measures providing preferential treatment in certain situations. Second, this chapter analyses the European Union framework. Given the sole focus on gender equality in employment until 1997, the most significant legislation and case law on gender-based positive action in employment is presented. The Court of Justice considers gender preferences as a derogation of the equal treatment principle and the focus appears to be on the pursuit of equality of opportunities rather than results. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the provisions on positive action based on racial and ethnic origin and other discrimination grounds and reflects on the possibilities presented by future case law for the CJEU to adopt a less restrictive approach.

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Vorheriges Kapitel International Framework on Positive Action
Nächstes Kapitel Positive Action for the Roma Minority in Europe
Fußnoten
1
See Chap. 7 on the international framework on positive action.
 
2
See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​1) on analysing the international and European framework on positive action.
 
3
The author uses the notion largely, because the CoE framework on positive action is also determined by the work of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC) and the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR). While the former is an independent expert committee that delivers opinions in the framework of its country-specific monitoring, the latter monitors States’ compliance through national reports and a collective complaints procedure that is open to social partners and non-governmental organisations. States must respect the decisions and conclusions of the ECSR insofar as they relate to binding legal provisions. In this sense, the ECSR exercises a quasi-judicial function.
 
4
Revised European Social Charter (3 May 1996). Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1 February 1995) (FCNM). European Social Charter (18 October 1961) (ESC). European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) (ECHR).
 
5
As will be explained in Sect. 8.2.2, the case law of the CJEU on positive action based on gender in employment must be analysed in order to understand the EU framework on positive action. Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (29 June 2000) (RED). Council Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (27 November 2000) (EED) will also be touched upon.
 
6
The three questions guiding the analysis were introduced in Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​1).
 
7
Positive action for Roma will be considered in Chaps. 9–11. The two main topics of the book were introduced in Chap. 1 (Sect. 1.​3).
 
8
See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2) on the context-dependency of the optional or mandatory nature of positive action at UN level.
 
9
See Sects. 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 on the CoE framework on positive action.
 
10
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), General Policy Recommendation No. 7: National legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination (13 December 2002), para. 5.
 
11
The importance of awareness-raising among and active participation of all stakeholders was stressed in Chap. 6 (Sects. 6.​3.​2 and 6.​5). Positive action for Roma will be considered in Chaps. 9–11. See, for example: ECRI, Third Report on Slovenia (30 June 2006), para. 34. ECRI, Third Report on Poland (17 December 2004), para. 119. ECRI, Third Report on Spain (24 June 2005), para. 107.
 
12
The ECHR covers the discrimination grounds covers “sex, race, colour, language, religion or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, birth or other status”. ECHR, art. 14. Protocol 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 2000) (Protocol 12 ECHR), art. 1. Protocol 12 entered into force on 1 April 2005. As of 9 May 2019, 20 States have ratified and 18 other States have signed but not ratified Protocol 12 ECHR. For an up-to-date overview of ratifications and signatures, see: https://​www.​coe.​int/​en/​web/​conventions/​full-list/​-/​conventions/​treaty/​177/​signatures?​p_​auth=​0EanQoP4 (Accessed 9 May 2019). Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 167–170. De Schutter (2007), p. 793. De Vos (2007a), p. 5.
 
13
This can be explained by the accessory or auxiliary character of art. 14 ECHR. Gerapetritis (2016), p. 167. De Schutter (2007), p. 794. De Vos (2007a), p. 51.
 
14
De Schutter (2011), pp. 6 and 48.
 
15
See Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.​3) on the distinction between formal and substantive equality. See also Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​4) on the limits of the formal equality approach. See, for instance: EctHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece, Judgment (6 April 2000, GC), para. 44. Gerapetritis (2016), p. 167. De Vos (2007a), p. 50.
 
16
The proportionality requirement will be discussed in Sect. 8.1.3. De Vos (2007a), p. 51.
 
17
De Schutter (2007), p. 793.
 
18
This case was discussed in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.​1) on equality and anti-discrimination, where it was explained that distinctions may not be made arbitrarily. EctHR, Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium (Belgian Linguistics case), Judgment (23 July 1968), para. 10 (“certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities”).
 
19
Harris et al. (2009), p. 611.
 
20
Thlimmenos refused to wear a military uniform for religious reasons. EctHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece, Judgment (6 April 2000, GC), para. 44. This case was previously briefly mentioned in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.) on the notions equality and anti-discrimination.
 
21
EctHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece, Judgment (6 April 2000, GC), para. 44.
 
22
The case concerned the quasi-automatic placement of Roma children in segregated schools on the basis of psychological tests that were not adapted to people of Roma origin while no safeguards were in place to take the special needs of the children as members of a disadvantaged group into account. The legislation therefore was found to have a disproportionate effect on Roma children. The EctHR ruled there was a violation of art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with art. 2 Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (20 March 1952) (right to education) because there was no objective and reasonable justification for the different treatment. EctHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, Judgment (13 November 2007), para. 175. D.H. and Others was previously discussed in Chap. 1 on the particular vulnerability of Roma in Europe (Sect. 1.​2.​1), Chap. 2 on the notions equality and anti-discrimination (Sect. 2.​1), pluralism (Sect. 2.​3.​3) and the right to education (Sect. 2.​7.​2), Chap. 4 on supporting indirect discrimination claims in legal proceedings as one of the main benefits of ethnic data collection (Sect. 4.​1.​5), and Chap. 5 on the importance of international and European monitoring and litigation as a data source on Roma (Sect. 5.​2.​4). See, similarly: EctHR, Stec v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (12 April 2006, GC), para. 51. See also on differences in the percentage of survivor’s pensions between widows and widowers: EctHR, Zeman v. Austria, Judgment (29 June 2006), para. 32.
 
23
De Vos (2007a), p. 51. See, similarly: Akandji-Kombé (2007), p. 58.
 
24
EctHR, Chapman v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (18 January 2001, GC), paras. 93, 94, 98 and 116. Akandji-Kombé (2007), p. 58. Chapman was previously discussed in Chap. 2 when introducing the notions minority rights protection (Sect. 2.​4.​2), privacy (Sect. 2.​5.​2), and the right to housing (Sect. 2.​7.​3.​3).
 
25
The case concerned measures enforcing planning measures on Roma concerning the occupation of their own land in their caravans. The EctHR ruled there was no violation of art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with art. 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life and home) because the preservation of the environment is a legitimate aim, because no planning permissions was occupied for the caravans put on the land and because art. 8 ECHR does not give a right to be provided with a home.
 
26
EctHR, Connors v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (27 May 2004). European Network Against Racism (ENAR) (2008), pp. 5 and 6. ENAR (2007), p. 28. This case was previously discussed in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​7.​3.​3) when analysing the EctHR’s case law on housing.
 
27
EctHR, Connors v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (27 May 2004), para. 84.
 
28
EctHR, Connors v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (27 May 2004), para. 84. See also: EctHR, Chapman v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (18 January 2001, GC), para. 96. EctHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, Judgment (13 November 2007), para. 181. ENAR (2008), pp. 5 and 6.
 
29
The EctHR found a violation of art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with art. 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR (right to education). Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952, ETS 9. EctHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, Judgment (29 January 2013), paras. 127 to 129.
 
30
Interights (2011), p. 94.
 
31
McCrudden and Prechal (2009), p. 41. Equality mainstreaming was discussed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​3.​4).
 
32
This was a deliberate choice of the drafters. The Explanatory Report states that the prime objective of the general right to non-discrimination in art. 1 “is to embody a negative obligation for the Parties: the obligation not to discriminate against individuals”. See: Explanatory Report of Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 2000) (Explanatory Report Protocol 12 ECHR), para. 24.
 
33
Protocol 12 ECHR, third preamble.
 
34
See Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​5) for a discussion on the perception of positive action as a derogation or an aspect of equality. Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 167–170.
 
35
For an analysis of the proportionality principles, see Sect. 8.1.3. Explanatory Report Protocol 12 ECHR, para. 16. De Schutter (2007), p. 794.
 
36
Explanatory Report Protocol 12 ECHR, para. 16.
 
37
This is the indirect horizontal effect of the negative obligation not to discriminate imposed on public authorities. Explanatory Report Protocol 12 ECHR, paras. 24 and 26.
 
38
For example, access to medical care or access to water and electricity. Gerapetritis (2016), p. 180.
 
39
De Vos (2007a), p. 53.
 
40
Article 14 ECHR can only be relied on in conjunction with other substantive rights in the ECHR. Harris et al. (2009), p. 611.
 
41
See similarly: Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 169 and 170. Gerapetritis refers to the judgment of the EctHR in the case X and Y v. Netherlands, where it states that article 8 ECHR not merely compels the State to abstain from arbitrarily interfering with the private life of individuals but that might include positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family life. Such “obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves”. EctHR, X and Y v. the Netherlands, Judgment (26 March 1985), paras. 23 and next.
 
42
De Schutter (2007, p. 794) refers to individual opinions of Court members.
 
43
See: EctHR, Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, Judgment (12 October 2004), para. 43. The case concerned the overall discontinuance of the invalidity pension of a disability pensioner after 20 years after a change in legislation. De Schutter (2007), p. 794.
 
44
Positive action within the ECHR made up the focus of Sect. 8.1.1.
 
45
Art. E Revised ESC stipulates that “(t)he enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status”. Like art. 14 ECHR, art. E Revised ESC can only be invoked in combination with substantive provisions. De Schutter (2007), pp. 797 and 798. Art. E prohibits direct and indirect discrimination so as to ensure real and effective equality. See: De Vos (2007a), p. 53.
 
46
De Vos (2007a), p. 14. See Sect. 8.2.2 for the analysis of the CJEU case law on positive action based on gender in employment.
 
47
This implies the pursuit of a legitimate aim and a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. ECSR, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. France, Decision (19 October 2009), para. 82. Proportionality will be considered in Sect. 8.1.3.
 
48
See, for example: ECSR, ERRC v. France, Decision (19 October 2009), para. 81. ECSR, International Association Autism-Europe (IAAE) v. France, Decision (4 November 2003), para. 52. De Schutter (2007), p. 798.
 
49
ECSR, ERRC v. France, Decision (19 October 2009), para. 83. ECSR, IAAE v. France, Decision (4 November 2003), para. 52. De Vos (2007a), p. 53.
 
50
See, for example: ECSR, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v. Italy, Decision (25 June 2010), paras. 34 and 35. ECSR, ERRC v. France, Decision (19 October 2009), paras. 82 to 84. ECSR, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Decision (3 December 2008), para. 44. ECSR, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Decision (18 October 2006), para. 40. Suggested further reading: De Schutter (2011), pp. 46–50. This was highlighted previously in Chap. 2 on the rights to housing (Sect. 2.​7.​3) and health (Sect. 2.​7.​5).
 
51
De Schutter (2011), p. 6.
 
52
ECSR, ERRC v. Bulgaria, Decision (3 December 2008), para. 49.
 
53
Id. at par. 50.
 
54
ECSR, ERRC v. France, Decision (19 October 2009), paras. 84 and 85.
 
55
Id. at par. 84.
 
56
De Schutter (2011), p. 6. De Schutter (2007), pp. 797 and 798. Henrard (2007), p. 48. This was discussed previously in Sect. 8.1.1 on positive action within the framework of the ECHR.
 
57
FCNM, art. 4.3. This article was briefly mentioned in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​4.​2) on special measures to achieve full and effective equality for minorities. Henrard (2007, p. 53) mentions indirect discrimination.
 
58
See, for example: ACFC, First Opinion on Azerbaijan (22 May 2003), para. 28.
 
59
See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2) on the context-dependency of the optional or mandatory nature of positive action at UN level.
 
60
See, for example: ACFC, Second Opinion on Slovakia (26 May 2005), para. 38. ACFC, First Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro (27 November 2003), para. 38. De Schutter (2007), p. 798. Henrard (2007), pp. 51 and 53.
 
61
Henrard (2007), p. 53.
 
62
See, for example: ACFC, First Opinion on Ireland (22 May 2003), paras. 34 to 37. ACFC, First Opinion on the Czech Republic (6 April 2001), para. 29. ACFC, First Opinion on Hungary (22 September 2000), para. 19. Chaps. 9–11 will focus on positive action for Roma.
 
63
See, for example: ACFC, First Opinion on Croatia (6 April 2001), para. 26. ACFC, First Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro (27 November 2003), para. 38. The need for adequate and long-term funding will be highlighted in Chap. 9 (Sect. 9.​2.​5) when discussing the challenges that limit positive action for Roma in Europe.
 
64
Such confusion and lack of awareness was highlighted throughout Chap. 6.
 
65
See, for example: ACFC, First Opinion on Azerbaijan (22 May 2003), para. 28. ACFC, First Opinion on Ukraine (1 March 2002), para. 27. This issue was addressed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​3.​2) on the importance of awareness raising among and active participation of all stakeholders in positive action.
 
66
See Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​3.​2) on awareness-raising among all relevant stakeholders as one of the prerequisites of positive action. This will be discussed further in Chap. 9 (Sect. 9.​2.​1) on the challenges that limit positive action for Roma in Europe. See also Chap. 12 (Sect. 12.​2.​1) on the need for awareness-raising on ethnic data collection and positive action as one of the key elements identified throughout this book.
 
67
See Chap. 7 on the context-dependency of the optional or mandatory nature of positive action at UN level (Sect. 7.​2) and in the conclusion (Sect. 7.​5).
 
68
See: De Schutter (2007), p. 800.
 
69
The particular vulnerability of Roma was covered in Chap. 1 (Sect. 1.​2.​1). Positive action for Roma will be considered in Chaps. 9–11.
 
70
This is the case for the collective complaints procedure of the ECSR (see reference 3). For the UN-treaty-monitoring bodies, it concerns the individual communications they may receive (see Chap. 7 reference 21). De Schutter (2007), p. 800.
 
71
See the differences in interpretation between the EctHR (Sect. 8.1.1) and the ECSR and the ACFC (Sect. 8.1.2).
 
72
See also: De Schutter (2007), p. 793.
 
73
See Sect. 8.1.1 on positive action within the framework of the ECHR.
 
74
Protocol 12 ECHR, third preamble. EctHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece, Judgment (6 April 2000, GC), para. 44. This was briefly addressed in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.​1) on the notions equality and anti-discrimination.
 
75
Henrard (2007), p. 48.
 
76
EctHR, Stec v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (12 April 2006, GC), paras. 51 and 61. This was confirmed in EctHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, Judgment (13 November 2007), para. 196. See also: EctHR, Belgian Linguistics case), Judgment (23 July 1968), para. 34.
 
77
EctHR, Stec v. the United Kingdom, Judgment (12 April 2006, GC), para. 51. Gerapetritis (2016, p. 168) states that the EctHR gives States a wider margin of appreciation when the nature of the issues is “closely linked to the interest of the State and the exercise of political powers by the constitutional organs”. See, for example: EctHR, Sommerfeld v. Germany, Judgment (8 July 2003, GC), paras. 63 and 92.
 
78
Case-by-case consideration of the proportionality principles by UN treaty-monitoring bodies was mentioned in Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2). See, similarly: Hollo (2006), p. 28.
 
79
See, for example, the case D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, where the EctHR stated that minorities have special needs and that States have an obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle to safeguard the interests of the minorities themselves and to preserve a cultural diversity of value to the whole community. For such reason, States must give special consideration to the needs and different lifestyle in regulations and when taking decisions in particular cases. EctHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, Judgment (13 November 2007), para. 181. De Schutter (2007), pp. 795 and 796. De Schutter (2011), p. 20. See, similarly: De Vos (2007a), pp. 51 and 53. Tsatsa-Nikolovska (2006), p. 31.
 
80
EctHR, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, Judgment (13 November 2007), para. 196. As explained in para. 176, however, there can be no objective justification of differences based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin, because the contemporary democratic society is “built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures”. The notion pluralism was analysed in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​3.​3). This judgment was also mentioned in Sect. 8.1.1 on the apparent permissive approach of the EctHR towards the adoption of positive action measures.
 
81
De Schutter (2011), p. 33. De Schutter (2007), p. 796. The temporary nature of positive action as a normative element of this human rights instrument was highlighted in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​2.​3).
 
82
For an overview of positive action within the ESCR framework, see Sect. 8.1.2.
 
83
Explanatory Report to the FCNM (1 February 1995) (Explanatory Report FCNM), para. 39. This was briefly discussed in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​4.​2) on special measures to achieve full and effective equality for minorities within the framework of minority rights protection.
 
84
Explanatory Report to the FCNM (1 February 1995), par. 39. The temporary nature distinguishes positive action (art. 4.2. FCNM) from specific minority measures promoting minority culture and identity and preventing forced assimilation (art. 5 FCNM). The latter can also have a more permanent or institutionalised nature, because they do not focus exclusively on redressing historical disadvantages. See, for example: ACFC, First Opinion on Bulgaria (27 May 2004), para. 45. De Schutter (2011), p. 58. Henrard (2007), p. 52.
 
85
Henrard (2007), pp. 52 and 53.
 
86
Id. at p. 53.
 
87
See, for example: ACFC, First Opinion on Ireland (22 May 2003), paras. 34 to 37. ACFC, First Opinion on Austria (16 May 2002), para. 82. ACFC, First Opinion on Germany (1 March 2002), para. 24. The importance of ethnic data for positive action was underlined in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​3.​4).
 
88
See Sect. 8.1.3 on proportionality as a limit to positive action in Europe.
 
89
See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​4.​2) where it was explained that, according to the UN treaty-monitoring bodies, the intensity of measures depends on the goals pursued and on the needs in the specific context where the measures will apply.
 
90
See similarly: Harris et al. (2009), p. 611. De Vos (2007a), p. 53.
 
91
ACFC, First Opinion on Ireland (22 May 2003), para. 37. Soft types of positive action were presented in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2.​3).
 
92
De Vos (2007a), p. 53. Henrard (2007), p. 48. States’ margin of appreciation in relation to the proportionality principle was highlighted in Sect. 8.1.3.
 
93
See the introduction to Sect. 8.1 on the CoE framework on positive action.
 
94
Resolution of the European Parliament on Non-Discrimination and Equal Opportunities for All—A Framework Strategy (14 June 2006), recital K and general consideration 8. Commission Green Paper, Equality and non-discrimination in an enlarged European Union (28 May 2004), p. 7. The five main aims of positive action were identified in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​4).
 
95
The remedial aim of positive action was discussed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​4.​1). Commission Communication, Non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all—A framework strategy (1 June 2005), p. 6.
 
96
The European Commission mentions non-discrimination mainstreaming, data collection, awareness-raising and training activities, and promoting the benefits of diversity at the workplace as other stronger policy tools that are to be developed in addition to a sound legislative basis. Commission Communication, Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment (2 July 2008), pp. 7 and 8.
 
97
The UN treaty-monitoring bodies were considered in Chap. 7 on the international framework on positive action.
 
98
The Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted on 10 November 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999. Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice Consolidated version) (21 February 2001) (TEC). Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version) (TFEU). European Commission (2009), p. 22. De Schutter (2007), p. 801.
 
99
EU Treaties, the starting point of all EU action and law, are primary law. Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions are secondary law, because they come from the Treaties’ principles and objectives. Not all secondary law instruments are legally binding. Recommendations, for instance, allow the EU institutions to express their views and to suggest a certain course of action, but fall short of having binding force. Therefore, they are referred to as soft law. For more information on the different types of EU law, see: https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​info/​law/​law-making-process/​types-eu-law_​en (Accessed 28 April 2019).
 
100
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 117.
 
101
Council Directive 76/207/EEC on Equal Treatment for Men and Women as regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions (9 February 1976) (Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive). The Directive was amended throughout the years by Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (23 September 2002) (entry into force: 23 September 2002) and by Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (Gender Recast Directive) (5 July 2006) (entry into force: 15 August 2006) in order to reconcile its provisions with art. 141.4 TEC. De Schutter (2007), pp. 820 and 821. De Vos (2007a), p. 18. The remedial aim of positive action was discussed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​4.​1).
 
102
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 117. When discussion positive action for Roma, it will be suggested in Chap. 9 (Sect. 9.​2.​2.​2) that other population groups, including racial and ethnic minorities, would also benefit from such a positive duty to promote equal opportunities in order to achieve substantive equality.
 
103
Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC on the promotion of positive action for women (13 December 1984), third recital.
 
104
Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC on the promotion of positive action for women (13 December 1984), art. 1. The sectorial approach to positive action will be addressed further in Chap. 10 (Sect. 10.​1) on positive action for Roma in four key areas.
 
105
Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC on the promotion of positive action for women (13 December 1984), arts. 4 and 5. The importance of awareness-raising in relation to positive action was highlighted in Chap. 6 (Sects. 6.​3.​2 and 6.​5) and it will be stressed again in Chap. 9 (Sect. 9.​2.​1) on positive action for Roma in Europe. See also Chap. 12 (Sect. 12.​2.​1), where awareness-raising is identified as one of the key elements of this book.
 
106
Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC on the promotion of positive action for women (13 December 1984), art. 9. This was previously underlined in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​3.​4) on the importance of ethnic data to implement, monitor and evaluate positive action. Specifically in relation to positive action for Roma, the importance of ethnically disaggregated data will be discussed in Chap. 9 (Sect. 9.​2.​3.​2).
 
107
Council Recommendation 96/694 on the balanced participation of women and men in the decision-making process (2 December 1996), art. 1.
 
108
Council Recommendation 96/694 on the balanced participation of women and men in the decision-making process (2 December 1996), art. 3(a). Chap. 6 expanded on the link between positive action and ethnic data collection (Sect. 6.​3.​4) and clarified that specific data needs depend on the type and aim of positive action (Sect. 6.​3.​4.​2). See also Chap. 4 (Sect. 4.​1.​4) on the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies as one of the main benefits of ethnic data collection.
 
109
See, for example: Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and others v. Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA, Judgment (16 September 1999), para. 19. Council Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex (15 December 1997), art. 4 and recital 18. Suggested further reading: Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 210 and 211.
 
110
RED, art. 8. EED, art. 10. The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination and the link with statistics was explained in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.​2). Support of indirect discrimination claims in legal proceedings was identified as one of the benefits of ethnic data collection in Chap. 4 (Sect. 4.​1.​5). See also Chap. 5 (Sect. 5.​2.​4) on the significance of international and European monitoring and litigation as a data source on Roma in Europe.
 
111
Council Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services (13 December 2004).
 
112
Such reaffirmation was prompted after the Kalanke judgment, which will be analysed in Sect. 8.2.2.2. De Schutter (2007), p. 806. Veldman (1999), pp. 283 and 284.
 
113
TFEU, art. 157.1.
 
114
The wording of art. 157.4 TFEU is more general than the one used art. 2.4 Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive. Moreover, ‘under-represented sex”’ implies that women as well as men can benefit from positive action if they are under-represented within a particular working environment. Art. 2.4. Original Gender Treatment Directive was modified to ensure uniformity with the TFEU (former TEC). Gerapetritis (2016), p. 119.
 
115
Gender Recast Directive, art. 3. References to positive action are made in recitals 20 to 22.
 
116
Gender Recast Directive, art. 20. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 21.
 
117
Compare this to the Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive, where the wording “equal opportunities” was used. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 29. De Vos (2007a), p. 22. Henrard (2007), p. 31. The distinction between formal and substantive equality on the one hand, and equality of opportunity and equality of results on the other hand, was explained in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​4). See also Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.​3) on the notion equality. For further insight in the relevance of these distinctions for the different types of positive action measures, see Chap. 6 (Sects. 6.​2.​3 and 6.​2.​4).
 
118
De Vos (2007a), p. 22. The remedial aim was considered in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​4.​1).
 
119
See, for example: CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), par. 31. CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000), para. 55. De Vos (2007a), pp. 23 and 24. The CJEU case law on positive action will be analysed in Sect. 8.2.2.
 
120
The Advocates Generals advocate for a broader discretion for States in the adoption of positive action under art. 157 TFEU, which the CJEU has refused to do so far. See, for example: CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Opinion of Advocate General Saggio (10 June 1999), para. 26. CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Opinion Advocate General Maduro (29 June 2004), para. 48. De Schutter (2007), p. 807. De Vos (2007a), pp. 22 and 23. Bell (2007), p. 6. Waddington and Bell (2001), p. 601.
 
121
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (7 December 2000).
 
122
Ramos Martín (2013, pp. 20 and 29) argues that article 23 CFEU further strengthens the notion of substantive equality in the EU.
 
123
Ramos Martín (2013), pp. 20 and 29. This will be discussed further in Chap. 9 (Sect. 9.​2.​2.​2) when suggesting how the EU can do more to promote positive action for Roma.
 
124
For the historical reasons explained in Sect. 8.2.1, this kind of positive action is most frequently discussed by the CJEU. EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2011), p. 39.
 
125
The most significant cases will be considered in Sects. 8.2.2.2–8.2.2.4.
 
126
CJEU, Commission v. France, Judgment (25 October 1988). Chap. 6 expanded on the difference between formal and substantive equality (Sect. 6.​1.​4) and the controversy as to whether positive action constitutes a derogation or an aspect of equality (Sect. 6.​1.​5). The notions formal and substantive equality were first introduced in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.​3) when discussing the notion equality.
 
127
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 122.
 
128
European Network of Equality Bodies (Equinet) (2014), p. 13. Ramos Martín (2013), pp. 19 and 29. De Schutter (2007), p. 802. De Vos (2007a), pp. 10 and 29. Kostadinova (2006), p. 5. It was discussed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​5) whether positive action constitutes a derogation or an aspect of equality.
 
129
Equinet (2014), pp. 5 and 48. De Vos (2007a), pp. 24 and 31. Szyszczak (2006). Mulder (1999), p. 69. The application of the proportionality principle by the CJEU will be discussed further in Sect. 8.2.2.5.
 
130
TFEU, art. 157.4. Gender Recast Directive, art. 4. Council Directive 2004/113/EC, art. 6. See, for example: Schiek (2002), p. 299. For an overview of the different types of measures covered by the notion positive action, see Chap. 6 (Sects. 6.​2.​2–6.​2.​4).
 
131
The CJEU’s focus appears to be on the pursuit of equality of opportunities rather than equality of results. Equinet (2014), p. 13. De Vos (2007a), p. 29.
 
132
This will be discussed further in Sect. 8.2.2.5 on the CJEU’s derogatory approach to positive action and in Sect. 8.2.4 on the opportunities future case law on positive action on other grounds and in other fields create. See also: Ramos Martín (2013), pp. 29 and 30.
 
133
ENAR (2007), p. 10. For more on the different types of positive action, see Chap. 6 (Sects. 6.​2.​2–6.​2.​4).
 
134
See, similarly: De Vos (2007a), p. 24.
 
135
De Vos (2007a), p. 24.
 
136
The broad spectrum of positive action measures was highlighted in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2).
 
137
See Chap. 6 on the varying understandings of positive action (Sect. 6.​1.​1), the different types of positive action (Sects. 6.​2.​2–6.​2.​4), the need for awareness-raising among and active participation of all relevant stakeholders (Sect. 6.​3.​2), and on perceptions of non-targeted groups (Sect. 6.​5.​2).
 
138
Measures merely aiming at compensating for inequalities are not covered by art. 2.4 Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive. In Lommers, the CJEU added in para. 41 that such measures “might nevertheless also help to perpetuate a traditional division of roles between men and women”. CJEU, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Judgment (19 March 2002), para. 32. See also: CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), para. 22. In Marschall, the CJEU stated that “the mere fact that a male candidate and a female candidate are equally qualified does not mean that they have the same chances”. CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), para. 26. In Commission v. France, the CJEU stated that art. 2.4 Original Equal Treatment Directive only permits measures “intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life”. Commission v. France, Judgment (25 October 1988), para. 15. De Vos (2007b), pp. 7 and 8. Fredman (2002), p. 151.
 
139
Farkas (2011), p. 42. De Schutter (2010), pp. 30 and 31. De Vos (2007a), p. 18.
 
140
European Commission (2009), p. 22.
 
141
Mulder (1999), p. 69.
 
142
Kostadinova (2006), p. 5.
 
143
Art. 3.3 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version) stipulates that the Union “shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child”. Art. 8 TFEU states that “(i)n all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women”. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 30.
 
144
For the UN framework, see Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2). For the CoE framework, see Sects. 8.1.1 and 8.1.2. See also: McCrudden and Prechal (2009), p. 41.
 
145
Henrard (2007), p. 31. Holtmaat and Tobler (2005), p. 414. This will be discussed in Sects. 8.2.3 and 8.2.4 on positive action based on other discrimination grounds than gender.
 
146
CJEU, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Judgment (17 October 1995).
 
147
According to the regional law, there was under-representation if less than half of the staff in a specific job class were women.
 
148
Advocate General Tesauro states in its Opinion in Kalanke that “in taking the group as such into consideration, positive action moreover marks a transition from the individual vision to the collective vision of equality”. See: CJEU, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro (6 April 1995), par. 8. Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Judgment (17 October 1995), paras. 18 and 21. Fredman (2002), pp. 136–138. The group-focus was identified as descriptive element of positive action in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​2.​1). The Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive was discussed in Sect. 8.2.1 on EU instruments on gender-based positive action.
 
149
CJEU, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Judgment (19 March 2002), para. 39. Lommers will be analysed in Sect. 8.2.2.4 and the proportionality principle in Sect. 8.2.2.5.
 
150
CJEU, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Judgment (17 October 1995), para. 19.
 
151
CJEU, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Judgment (17 October 1995), paras. 16 and 22 to 24. This was confirmed in later case law. See, for example: CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), para. 27. Fredman (2002), pp. 136–143.
 
152
Kalanke was criticised for lacking solid legal clarity on how the opportunities of members of the under-represented sex could be promoted if they could not even be given preference in situations where there are two equally qualified candidates of different sex. De Schutter (2007), p. 805. De Vos (2007a), p. 20. Suggested further reading on Kalanke: Veldman (1999), pp. 281–283. Zuleeg (1998/9), pp. 319–328. Brems (1996), pp. 172–179. Fredman (1996), pp. 575–600. Moore (1996), pp. 156–161. Prechal (1996), pp. 1245–1259. Senden (1996), pp. 146–164.
 
153
The CJEU characterises quota as representation equality. The European Commission recommended amending the Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive to clarify that preferences would still be possible provided that the particular circumstances of each individual case are assessed. See: Commission Communication, The interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen (27 March 1996), pp. 1, 3, 6 and 8 to 10. Strict quota were defined in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2.​4.​2) on strong types of positive action.
 
154
Ramos Martín (2013), p. 9. European Commission (2009), pp. 22 and 23.
 
155
This debate eventually resulted in the amendment of art. 157 TFEU (art. 119 TEC at the time). Veldman (1999), p. 291.
 
156
CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997).
 
157
The CJEU states that “it appears that, even where male and female candidates are equally qualified, male candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates particularly because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in working life and the fear, for example, that women will interrupt careers more frequently, that owing to household and family duties they will be less flexible in their working hours, or that they will be absent from work more frequently because of pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding”. CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), para. 29. Van Gerven (2005), pp. 180 and 181. De Schutter (2007), p. 811.
 
158
CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), para. 30.
 
159
The focus shifts from the individual to the group. Barnard and Hervey (1998), pp. 340 and 349 (1998). Suggested further reading on Marschall: Cabral (1998), pp. 481–487.
 
160
This contrary to the American tradition, where preferential treatment was originally justified to compensate for past discrimination. This was briefly discussed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​4.​1) on the remedial aim of positive action. Veldman (1999), p. 287.
 
161
Ramos Martín (2013), p. 9. O’Cinneide (2012), p. 17. Gill (2010), p. 4. Barnard and Hervey (1998). Suggested further reading on Marschall: Fredman (2002), pp. 138–140. More (1999), pp. 443–452. Brems (1998), pp. 668–674. Cabral (1998), pp. 481–487. Veldman (1998), pp. 403–414.
 
162
CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), paras. 24, 33 and 35. This was confirmed in later case law. See, for example: CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), para. 23. CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000), paras. 23, 37 and 38.
 
163
CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), paras. 32 and 33.
 
164
Henrard (2007), p. 30.
 
165
CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), paras. 33 and 35.
 
166
Advocate-General Jacobs states in his Opinion in Marschall that the saving clause in the German legislation “appears to envisage that precisely those criteria may none the less be used where it is invoked, with the result that the post will be offered to the male candidate on the basis of criteria which it is accepted are discriminatory” and therefore should be considered unlawful. The CJEU did not follow this point of view. CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), para. 4. CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs (15 May 1997), paras. 7 and 37. Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 125 and 126. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 23. Suggested further reading: Charpertier (1998), pp. 167–195.
 
167
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 126. The difference between equality of opportunity and equality of result was explained in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​4).
 
168
Veldman (1999), pp. 287 and 288.
 
169
CJEU, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment (11 November 1997), paras. 31 and 32. Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 204 and 205. The link between positive action and ethnic data was emphasised in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​3.​4).
 
170
De Schutter (2010), pp. 30 and 31. European Commission (2009), p. 23.
 
171
Strict quota were cited as a strong type of positive action involving preferential treatment in Chap. 6 (Sect. 2.​4.​2).
 
172
De Vos (2007a), p. 20.
 
173
Henrard (2007), p. 30.
 
174
CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000). Van Gerven (2005), pp. 180 and 181. Marschall was discussed in Sect. 8.2.2.2.
 
175
It concerned the Hessen Act on Women’s Equality. CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000), para. 55. Suggested further reading on Badeck: Küchhold (2001), pp. 116–120. Berthou (2000), pp. 901–908. The Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive was discussed in Sect. 8.2.1 when reviewing the EU instruments dealing with gender-based positive action.
 
176
CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000), paras. 53 to 55. Ramos Martín (2013, p. 24) adds that such measures may however not produce absolute rigidity. Strict quote were cited as a strong type of positive action providing preferential treatment in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2.​4.​2).
 
177
CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000), para. 53.
 
178
Id. at para. 54.
 
179
Henrard (2007), p. 30.
 
180
Gill (2010), p. 8. European Commission (2009), p. 23. Henrard (2007), p. 30. Suggested further reading: Fredman (2002), pp. 136–143. Individual outreach was cited as a strong type of positive action involving preferential treatment in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2.​4.​1).
 
181
CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000), para. 51.
 
182
Because men can still get training in the private sector or take up the places reserved for women if there are not enough female applicants, the right of individuals to be treated on the basis of their personal situation is not to be sacrificed in the name of automatic and absolute preferences given to members of a group on the basis of their membership of that group. The Advocate-General focused on the need for proportionality in Badeck. De Schutter (2007), p. 820.
 
183
Therefore, an actual fact was used as the quantitative criterion for giving preference to women. CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000), paras. 12, 39 and 42 to 44.
 
184
CJEU, Georg Badeck and Others, Judgment (28 March 2000), para. 42. De Schutter (2007), p. 814.
 
185
De Schutter (2007), p. 777.
 
186
These instrument were discussed in Sect. 8.2.1 on gender-based positive action in EU law.
 
187
Abrahamsson was the first case where the CJEU interpreted the scope and meaning of art. 141.4 TEC. CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000). Ramos Martín (2013), p. 24. European Commission (2009), p. 23.
 
188
CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000), para. 62.
 
189
The contested legislation concerned the introduction of positive action measures to fill the position of professors and research assistants in academia. CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000), paras. 25, 49 and 53.
 
190
Gerapetritis (2016, p. 230) cites criteria such as seniority, age, date of last promotion, family status or income of the partner.
 
191
CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000), paras. 25, 49, 50 and 53.
 
192
It concerned art. 141.4 TEC and art. 2.4 Original Gender Equal Treatment Directive. Henrard (2007), pp. 29 and 30.
 
193
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 126.
 
194
CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000), para. 48. This was confirmed in later case law. See: CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), para. 25.
 
195
CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000), para. 55. De Vos (2007b), p. 8. Fredman (2002), pp. 136–143. The lack of clarify of the proportionality principle will be addressed further in Sect. 8.2.2.5. The difference between formal and substantive equality was first mentioned in Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.​1.​3) and further explained in Chap. 6 (Sects. 6.​1.​4, 6.​2.​3 and 6.​2.​4).
 
196
See: CJEU, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist, Judgment (6 July 2000), paras. 4 and 7. De Vos (2007a), p. 18.
 
197
Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004).
 
198
CJEU, Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen, Judgment (7 December 2000).
 
199
CJEU, Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen, Judgment (7 December 2000), paras. 38, 39 and 44.
 
200
Henrard (2007), p. 30.
 
201
The delay men suffer on account of the compulsory military or civilian services referred to is at least equal to that period. CJEU, Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen, Judgment (7 December 2000), paras. 44 to 47.
 
202
Equinet (2014), p. 21.
 
203
Henrard (2007), p. 30.
 
204
CJEU, Joseph Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie and Ministre de la Fonction publique, de la Réforme de l’Etat et de la Décentralisation, Judgment (29 November 2001).
 
205
CJEU, Joseph Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie and Ministre de la Fonction publique, de la Réforme de l’Etat et de la Décentralisation, Judgment (29 November 2001), paras. 41, 46, 50, 52 and 77. De Vos (2007a), p. 19.
 
206
Id.
 
207
CJEU, Joseph Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie and Ministre de la Fonction publique, de la Réforme de l’Etat et de la Décentralisation, Judgment (29 November 2001), paras. 39, 40, 46, 56-58, 65, 67 and 68. Equinet (2014), p. 22.
 
208
CJEU, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Judgment (19 March 2002), para. 39. This was confirmed in later case law. See, for example: CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), para. 24.
 
209
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 127.
 
210
CJEU, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Judgment (19 March 2002), paras. 43 to 48 and 50.
 
211
See, for example: CJEU, Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start España ETT SA, Judgment (30 September 2010). CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), para. 32. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 26.
 
212
Ramos Martín (2013), p. 26.
 
213
See, for example: CJEU, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Judgment (17 October 1995), paras. 21 and 22. Gerapetritis (2016), p. 250. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 29. De Vos (2007a), pp. 5 and 24. This was mentioned briefly in the introduction to the analysis of the CJEU’s case law on gender-based positive action in Sect. 8.2.2.1. See also the discussion in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​4) as to whether positive action is an aspect or a derogation of equality.
 
214
As explained in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2.​4.​2), strict quota are strong positive action measures involving preferential treatment.
 
215
Bell (2007), p. 6.
 
216
De Schutter (2007), pp. 818 and 819.
 
217
Id. at p. 819.
 
218
These measures were discussed under the notion individual outreach among the strong types of positive action involving preferential treatment in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2.​4).
 
219
De Schutter (2007), p. 819.
 
220
Ramos Martín (2013), p. 16. For Harbo (2010, pp. 158 and 159), the essence of the proportionality principle “is that it makes it possible to combine a liberal rights-based constitutional rationality with a strong commitment to a welfare state”. The CJEU case law on positive action was analysed in Sects. 8.2.2.2–8.2.2.4. See also Chap. 6 on positive action as an aspect or a derogation of equality (Sect. 6.​1.​5), on soft types of positive action (Sect. 6.​2.​3), and on the need for an analytical, legal and regulatory framework for positive action (Sect. 6.​3.​1).
 
221
Legal certainty is also a general principle of EU law. Harbo (2010), pp. 158, 158, 160, 162 and 184.
 
222
Henrard (2007), p. 29.
 
223
ENAR (2008), p. 7. Proportionality was identified as a normative element of positive action in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​2.​2). See Sect. 8.1.3 for a brief overview of the proportionality principle at CoE level. See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​3.​2) for proportionality as applied by the UN treaty-monitoring bodies.
 
224
Equinet (2014), p. 5. Harbo (2010), pp. 161 and 165. De Vos (2007b), pp. 7 and 8. De Vos (2007a), pp. 5 and 24.
 
225
Men can get training in the private sector or take up the places reserved for women if there are not enough applicants from women. De Schutter (2007), p. 820.
 
226
Harbo (2010), p. 160. De Vos (2007a), p. 8.
 
227
Suggested further reading on the different interpretations given to the proportionality principle: Harbo (2010), pp. 158–185. For a comparison between the proportionality test in the EU and the strict scrutiny test in the USA, see: Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 223 and 234.
 
228
It was explained in Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​3.​2) that the UN treaty-monitoring bodies adopt a case-by-case consideration of the proportionality requirement.
 
229
Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 41 and 42. De Vos (2007a), p. 5.
 
230
De Vos (2007a), p. 24.
 
231
See, for example: CJEU, Commission v. France, Judgment (25 October 1988), para. 15 (“eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life”). Equinet (2014), p. 26. Ramos Martín (2013), paras. 16 and 17. ENAR (2008), p. 7. Henrard (2007), p. 29.
 
232
De Vos (2007a), p. 24.
 
233
ENAR (2008), p. 7. The importance of ethnically disaggregated data for positive action based on racial or ethnic origin was highlighted in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​3.​4).
 
234
ENAR (2008), p. 7.
 
235
See, for example: CJEU, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Judgment (19 March 2002), para. 39. CJEU, Commission v. France, Judgment (25 October 1988), para. 15. CJEU, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, Judgment (30 September 2004), para. 24. Gerapetritis (2016), p. 250. Harbo (2010), p. 161. De Vos (2007a), pp. 5 and 20. Henrard (2007), p. 29.
 
236
Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 41 and 42.
 
237
Harbo (2010), p. 165.
 
238
Id. at p. 161.
 
239
Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 231 and 250. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 17. Harbo (2010), pp. 65 and 172.
 
240
ENAR (2007), p. 10.
 
241
Harbo (2010), p. 161.
 
242
ENAR (2007), p. 10.
 
243
ENAR (2008), p. 7.
 
244
See also: Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 62, 63 and 232.
 
245
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 63.
 
246
Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 230 and 250.
 
247
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 232. Equinet (2014), p. 26. Ramos Martín (2013), p. 17. The temporary nature of positive action as a normative element thereof was stressed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​2.​3). Chap. 7 also emphasised that the UN bodies prohibit the maintenance of permanent, separate standards (Sect. 7.​3.​3). See also Sect. 8.1.3 on the limits to positive action at CoE level.
 
248
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 232. For more on the importance of statistics for positive action, see Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​3.​4).
 
249
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 232. The temporary nature of positive action was identified as a normative principle in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​1.​2.​3). See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​3.​3) for the UN framework. Proportionality in the CoE framework was addressed in Sect. 8.1.3.
 
250
Ramos Martín (2013), p. 29. Gill (2010), p. 15. Marschall was analysed in Sect. 8.2.2.2.
 
251
O’Cinneide (2012), p. 18. Gill (2010), p. 15.
 
252
States may withhold altogether from implementing preferential treatment for disadvantaged groups in order to avoid a possible negative ruling from the CJEU. O’Cinneide (2012), p. 18. Strong types of positive action measures were discussed in Chap. 6 (Sect. 6.​2.​4).
 
253
See similarly: De Vos (2007a), p. 25.
 
254
Sect. 8.2.4 on the opportunities of future CJEU case law on positive action.
 
255
Art. 19.1 TFEU covers “sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”.
 
256
Because the EED does not cover the discrimination ground racial or ethnic origin, it will only be marginally touched upon in this chapter. Farkas (2011), p. 42.
 
257
Art. 5 RED can be directly enforced before national courts and the CJEU. Art. 3.1 RED states that the “Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to: (a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion; access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience; (c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay; (d) membership of and involvement in an organisation of workers or employers, or any organisation whose members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such organisations; (e) social protection, including social security and healthcare; (f) social advantages; (g) education; (h) access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the public, including housing.”
 
258
RED, recital 17.
 
259
De Vos (2007a), p. 28. Henrard (2007), p. 31. McInerney (2000), p. 320.
 
260
According to Boccadoro (2009, p. 30), many authorities regretted the choice for optional positive action upon adoption of the RED. ENAR (2008), p. 6. De Vos (2007a), p. 28. Like positive action, ethnic data collection is also optional in the RED. This was explained in Chap. 3 (Sect. 3.​1.​1) on the lack of an explicit legal obligation to collect such data.
 
261
Commission Communication, Report on the implementation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies (2 April 2014), p. 9. Chopin et al. (2014), p. 33. Ahmed (2011), p. 71. Ringelheim (2008/9), pp. 52 and 53. Positive action within the framework of ICERD was discussed in Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2.​1).
 
262
De Vos (2007a), p. 38.
 
263
The European Commission (2009, p. 31) cites Bulgaria (race, ethnicity and Roma in education, healthcare, housing and employment), Croatia (ethnicity in the judiciary and State administration), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Republic of North Macedonia since February 2019; ethnicity including Roma in employment and education), Hungary (ethnic origin/social status in education), Poland (ethnic origin in education, employment, healthcare, living conditions), Slovenia (ethnicity including Roma in political representation, education), UK (race in education, training and welfare, under-representation in employment, membership among under-represented racial groups). In some countries, such as France, anti-discrimination legislation does include a provision on positive action and the introduction of such measures that are overtly based on racial or ethnic origin would be unlawful.
 
264
European Commission (2009), pp. 56 and 58.
 
265
Mulder (1999), p. 69. This will be picked up again in relation the lack of political will to adopt positive action for Roma in Chap. 9 (Sect. 9.​2.​2).
 
266
ENAR (2007), p. 23.
 
267
Id. at p. 23.
 
268
See Sects. 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 for the CoE framework. See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2) for the UN framework.
 
269
De Schutter (2010), p. 27. De Schutter (2007), pp. 238 and 239.
 
270
Chapters 9–11 zoom in on positive action for Roma.
 
271
De Vos (2007a), p. 38. The CJEU case law on gender-based positive action in employment was analysed in Sect. 8.2.2.
 
272
Farkas (2011), p. 43. European Commission (2009), p. 22. Henrard (2007), p. 29.
 
273
Equinet (2013), p. 18.
 
274
See, for example: Caruso (2003), p. 332.
 
275
Gerapetritis (2016), p. 204. Suggested further reading: Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 202–205.
 
276
Gerapetritis (2016), pp. 204 and 205.
 
277
De Vos (2007a), pp. 29 and 30. Shaw (2004), p. 13.
 
278
The only small difference is found in art. 157.4 TFEU that includes the wording “specific advantages” for the under-represented sex. The RED and the EED use the wording “special measures”.
 
279
Equinet (2014), p. 24.
 
280
See, for example: Schiek (2002), p. 299.
 
281
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (21 April 2004), pp. 15, 22 and 23. In its proposal for the EED, the European Commission stated that “as positive measures are a derogation from the principle of equality, they should be interpreted strictly, in the light of the current case-law on sex discrimination”. See: Commission Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (25 November 1999), p. 11.
 
282
Interights (2011), p. 96.
 
283
De Vos (2007a), p. 31.
 
284
RED, retical 12 and art. 3.1.
 
285
De Schutter (2007), p. 821.
 
286
De Vos (2007a), p. 31.
 
287
See also: De Vos (2007a), p. 31. Lynch (2007), p. 17. Waddington and Bell (2001), p. 603.
 
288
European Commission (2009), p. 23.
 
289
This would mean that the CJEU could step away from establishing limits that apply in all circumstances and in all Member States. European Commission (2009), pp. 23, 24, 26 and 32.
 
290
See Sect. 8.1.4 for the CoE framework and Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​4.​2) for the UN framework.
 
291
The particular vulnerability of Roma in Europe was mentioned in Chap. 1 (Sect. 1.​2.​1). Chapters 9–11 will focus on positive action for Roma.
 
292
Bell (2007), p. 6.
 
293
While such measures have yet to be considered before the CJEU, art. 7.2 EED appears to leave the door open for such preferential treatment to safeguard or promote the integration of people with disabilities into the working environment. See also the use of quota to increase the proportion of Catholics in the police service in Northern Ireland, for which a specific exception was granted in art. 15 EED. European Commission (2009), pp. 24 and 25. De Vos (2007a), pp. 31, 32, 46 and 47. Waddington and Bell (2001), p. 603.
 
294
De Vos (2007a), pp. 31 and 32. Hollo (2006), p. 29.
 
295
This was discussed in Sect. 8.2.2.5 on the evaluation of the proportionality principle and other notions used by the CJEU in its case law on gender-based positive action.
 
296
The lack of clear delineation of these criteria in the current CJEU case law on gender-based positive action was addressed in Sect. 8.2.2.5. See also: De Vos (2007a), pp. 5 and 32.
 
297
See Chap. 7 on the international framework on positive action.
 
298
This chapter also included some references to the country monitoring of the ACFC and the quasi-judicial functions of the ECSR through the collective complaints procedure, it mainly focused on the case law of the EctHR and the CJEU.
 
299
Regrettable, art. 23 CFEU disregards positive action based on other discrimination grounds than gender.
 
300
The UN framework on positive action was analysed in Chap. 7.
 
301
In Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2.​1) it was explained that article 2.2 ICERD makes the adoption of such measures mandatory when the circumstances warrant it.
 
302
See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​2) for the UN framework.
 
303
The role of proportionality the UN framework on positive action was considered in Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​3.​2).
 
304
The ACFC requires differences in treatment promoting substantive equality to be adequate to achieve such a legitimate goal and so they may not extend in time or in scope beyond what is necessary.
 
305
See Chap. 7 (Sect. 7.​4).
 
306
See Chap. 9 on positive action for the Roma minority in Europe, Chap. 10 on positive action for Roma in four key areas, and Chap. 11 on inter-cultural mediation to enhance Roma inclusion.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
European Framework on Positive Action
verfasst von
Jozefien Van Caeneghem
Copyright-Jahr
2019
Buch
Legal Aspects of Ethnic Data Collection and Positive Action

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-23667-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-23668-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23668-7_8