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Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

1. Industrial Organisation in a European Perspective

Abstract
It has become traditional to criticise the perfect-competition model, from the point of view of both its normative implications and its explanatory value. However, the model remains a useful starting-point. It provides us with a standard of comparison which permits us to examine some of the most prominent characteristics of our modern industrial economy.
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

2. Industrial Concentration

Abstract
Traditionally, market structure has been characterised by the following factors:
(i)
the degree of concentration of firms;
 
(ii)
the level and types of barriers to entry;
 
(iii)
the degree of product differentiation; and
 
(iv)
the nature of industry demand, its evolution and elasticity.
 
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

3. Over-all Concentration, Conglomerate Bigness and the Largest European Corporations

Abstract
It has often been stated that the absolute size of a firm is irrelevant to the question of competition and that there is no or little connection between the aggregate level of concentration and the level of concentration in individual markets; and while concentration ratios within particular industries are accepted as conventional indicators of market power, the use of measures of over-all concentration has been viewed with suspicion. Over-all (or aggregate) concentration is defined as being the proportion of some aggregate of economic activity accounted for by a relatively small number of the largest firms taken together.
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

4. Barriers to Entry, Product Differentiation and Price Elasticity of Market Demand

Abstract
Although concentration has been accorded an important (and probably excessive) role in industrial-organisation studies, there are other aspects of market structure which must be given adequate attention as explanatory variables for industry conduct and performance. We shall now examine barriers to entry, product differentiation and the price elasticity of market demand.
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

5. Effects of Market Structure and Size on Performance

Abstract
Within the field of industrial economics, a growing role is played by quantitative studies relying on regression analysis, which tests the impact of market structure upon various aspects of performance. But while in the United States there exists an impressive body of econometric work,1 similar European research is scarcer and less well known, at least on the Continent. One explanation is the often insuperable difficulty of obtaining the relevant data: on the one hand, the European business world keeps its secrets very efficiently, so that even data like firm’s sales are sometimes hard to obtain; on the other hand, there is little co-ordination between or within national administrations, so that there is a lack of standardised information. Furthermore, the few European economists concerned with industrial economics often show scepticism towards quantitative studies which assume a direct link between market structure and performance; they prefer to undertake case studies, analysis of business policies and institutions. Despite these reservations, the purpose of this chapter is to present, after a discussion of the concept of ‘performance’, recent European econometric studies from which the foundations of statistical knowledge of European industrial economics could be built.
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

6. Objectives and Strategies of the Firm: Static and Dynamic Aspects

Abstract
In contrast with the traditional profit-maximising economic theory of the firm where managerial discretion is unimportant, there is an impressive and growing body of literature which suggests that the firm is a complex organisation made up of a coalition of agents pursuing various goals, and co-ordinating and controlling economic activities by non-market as well as market allocative mechanisms.
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

7. European Competition Policy: Goals and Means

Abstract
When deciding what sorts of policy to adopt to ensure that the industrial economy functions efficiently the European authorities chose competition policy. But the choice of the most impersonal means of social control of the economy must be justified by showing that competition policy is a more efficient way of achieving given economic goals than the other types of policy. As the Economic Council of Canada has said: ‘where competition is such as to promote the efficient use of manpower, capital and natural resources, it obviates or lessens the need for other forms of control such as more or less detailed public regulation or public ownership of industry’.1 An analysis of the goals and methods of this way of controlling the working of the European market is the subject of this chapter.
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

8. Roles of Industrial Policy

Abstract
Many firms will, as we have seen, try to replace the uncertainties of the competitive process by co-operation or concerted conduct. The large firm is inclined to control its environment by means of some kind of private planning, assuring it more predictable market structure and performance. The public authorities, confronted with these tendencies, adopt two types of policies: on the one hand, they use anti-trust policy to maintain market uncertainty and competitive pressure; on the other hand, they have recourse to industrial policy inspired by sectoral or regional considerations which often results in some form of planning agreement between industry and the state. It is the object of the present chapter to examine the contents of such a policy, its relationship with anti-trust policy and implications for the Community as a whole.
Alexis P. Jacquemin, Henry W. De Jong

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