2000 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Evolutionary Selection of Correlation Mechanisms for Coordination Games
verfasst von : Angelo Antoci, Marcello Galeotti, Pier Luigi Sacco
Erschienen in: Interaction and Market Structure
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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One of the main problems with the notion of correlated equilibrium is the lack of an explicit rationale for the correlation mechanism that is adopted. This paper investigates the conditions under which a specific correlation mechanism may be selected through a social learning process in a population of boundedly rational players that are randomly matched to play a coordination game. The selection process among correlation mechanisms is defined by replicator equations and the qualitative features of the dynamics are analyzed for the general case with n correlation devices. It is found that the dynamics generically select one specific mechanism among the alternative ones, thus bringing about a social standard of choice, i.e. a conventional way of correlating players‘ actions in anonymous interactions. This result then provides a strong evolutionary rationale for correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for coordination games.