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2022 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Evolving Regulatory Frameworks: Blockchain as a Form of Trust—Comparative Evidence

verfasst von : Alfio A. Puglisi

Erschienen in: Financial Technology and the Law

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Das Kapitel vertieft die sich entwickelnden regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen der Blockchain-Technologie und betont ihre Rolle als Vertrauensform und ihre Anwendung in rechtlichen und administrativen Zwecken. Er diskutiert die technologische Infrastruktur und Governance-Modelle prominenter Blockchain-Netzwerke wie Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple und R3. Der Autor untersucht, wie Blockchain als regulatorisches Instrument zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche (AML) und anderer staatlicher Dienste dienen kann, und untersucht die Herausforderungen und Chancen, die es bietet. Das Kapitel vergleicht auch globale Blockchain-Projekte und ihre Regulierungsansätze und betont die Bedeutung digitaler Souveränität und das Potenzial von Blockchain, traditionelle Regulierungsrahmen zu transformieren. Durch Anwendung eines länderübergreifenden Vergleichsansatzes liefert der Autor eine umfassende Analyse, wie die Blockchain-Technologie Gesetze in verschiedenen nationalen und internationalen Kontexten ergänzen, ergänzen und ersetzen kann.
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Vorheriges Kapitel Decentralized Blockchain Technology: Towards a Trusted and Transparent Beneficial Ownership Regime
Nächstes Kapitel Investigation of Cryptocurrency Enabled and Dependent Crimes
Fußnoten
1
Werbach (2018b).
 
2
Werbach (2018b).
 
3
Werbach (2018b).
 
4
For full list, please refer to Table 2.
 
5
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1965).
 
7
Auer (2019).
 
8
For a brief overview of the challenges of government in the area of decentralised financed and Blockchain please consult the latest article by FT https://​www.​ft.​com/​content/​e6e7d9d6-7778-4286-ba6f-e5831fcbc538.
 
10
Werbach (2018b) refers to Wright and De Filippi “Decentralised Blockchain Technology and the rise of Lex Cryptographia”, 40 in p.158.
 
11
Bitnation Panagea, para 2: “The world’ first virtual nation – a Blockchain jurisdiction”, Global Challenge Foundation https://​globalchallenges​.​org/​bitnation-pangea-the-worlds-first-virtual-nation-a-blockchain-jurisdiction/​.
 
12
North (1990), p. 12.
 
13
North (1990), p. 35.
 
15
Please refer to Uzoki (2019), Chiu and Koeppl (2017) and Auer (2019).
 
16
For an overview on the concept of trust please consult Fukuyama (1995).
 
17
Lizhi and Weingast (2018).
 
18
The Authority can be a government authority or a general authority exercising power or influence on the two companies. Collaboration across organisational boundaries allows the transfer of information or wealth.
 
19
Please refer to Fig. 1.
 
20
Horizontal layers of law are regulatory framework across jurisdiction who shares similar constitutions and legal principles. Vertical layers of law refer to the intersection of national and international law. Delegate layers of law refers to when government functions are delegated to third parties (i.e. private management of tax collection).
 
21
In this case coercive power is defined as the use of force to get an employee of an institution to follow an instruction. Moreover, in a Blockchains setting, the power to access a particular piece of information will be shared among several stakeholders and access to that information will be granted through the use of smart contracts. Little we know about those that have coercive power will be act according to “the rule of law” or not with the assumption that technology can limit their power and they can act as benevolent leaders.
 
22
In this context, institutions are defined as Blockchain firms, firms providing Blockchain services and products to consumers and or public and private clients.
 
23
Hofman et al. (2021).
 
24
Franks et al. (1997).
 
25
Werbach (2018a).
 
26
Please consult Werbach (2018a) and Black (2002).
 
27
Werbach (2018b).
 
28
Grief (2005), p. 1.
 
29
Hofman et al. (2021).
 
30
AML compliance protocols involve many firms and institutions.
 
31
Scholar Drezner has conducted extensive work on the governance and politics of Internet Regulation. Please consult Drezner (2007).
 
32
Drezner (2007).
 
33
The covid-19 crisis has increased the demand for digital services and products. Blockchain can facilitate these digital transactions. The covid-19 crisis has also highlighted rent-seeking behaviour of digital platforms. These arguments are beyond the scope of this chapter, but they are worthy to be mentioned.
 
34
De Filippi et al. (2020).
 
35
De Filippi et al. (2020).
 
36
De Filippi et al. (2020).
 
38
PWC (2018).
 
39
These projects were developed by national governments, central banks, leading Blockchain companies and have been fully tested and few of them implemented. The scale and size of these project is significant, attracting the attention of policy makers and regulators.
 
41
Pattberg (2017) and Rudder (2016).
 
42
Tansey (2007).
 
43
Emmel (2013).
 
44
Please refer to Pagliari and Young (2005) who offer an overview of traditional regulatory and governance frameworks and its underpinning mechanisms.
 
45
Chiu and Koeppl (2017).
 
46
Regulatory compliance for AML in KYC and digital identity.
 
47
Werbach (2018b).
 
48
Werbach (2018b).
 
49
Werbach (2018b).
 
50
De Filippi et al. (2020).
 
51
De Filippi et al. (2020).
 
52
R3 is a leading consortium of industry players enabled by industry-leading distributed ledger technology R3 (2016).
 
53
Hyperledger Foundation 2019, 2020, 2021 information available at: https://​www.​hyperledger.​org/​about.
 
54
Please refer to the document issued by the World Bank titled “BLOCKCHAIN Opportunities for Private Enterprises in Emerging Markets Second and Expanded Edition, January 2019. World Trade Organisation (2018) and World Bank (2019).
 
55
Zutshi et al. (2021).
 
56
Consensus consists of a polycentric order of actors who represent different views, objectives and are based in different jurisdictions.
 
57
In this case the governance structure is both delegated and/or technocratic.
 
62
Black (2008).
 
63
Höpner (2005).
 
64
Chamber of Digital Commerce (2020), description of the organisation available here https://​digitalchamber.​org/​about/​.
 
65
Cutler et al. (1999), p. 8.
 
66
This is very relevant for AML regulation and business compliance. Table 2 shows how governments and firms are conducting regulatory experiments in many business areas that involve auditing products and services.
 
Literatur
Auer R (2019) Embedded supervision: how to build regulation into blockchain finance. BIS Working Papers 811, Bank for International Settlements
Chiu J, Koeppl T (2017) The Economics of Cryptocurrencies. Working paper
Cutler DM, Glaeser EL, Vigdor JL (1999) The rise and decline of the American ghetto. J Polit Econ 107(3):455–506CrossRef
Drezner DW (2007) All politics is global: explaining international regulatory regimes
Fukuyama F (1995) Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity. The Free Press, New York
Grief A (2005) Commitment, Coercion and markets: the nature and dynamics of institutions supporting exchange. In: Menard C, Shirley MM (eds) Handbook of new institutional economics. Springer, Dordrecht
Höpner M (2005) What connects industrial relations and corporate governance? Explaining institutional complementarity. Soc Econ Rev 3(2):331–358CrossRef
North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRef
Pagliari S, Young K (2005) The interest ecology of financial regulation: interest group plurality in the design of financial regulatory policies. Socio Economic Review
PWC (2018) Accounting Requirements for Banks in Germany Similarities and Differences between German GAAP and IFRS Financial Statements in Germany Legal requirements and applicable GAAP
Rudder C (2016) How to assess private governance. Book chaper into Public Policy making by Private Organizations. Brooking Institution
Stringham EP (2015) How technologically advanced markets can work even when fraud is “legal.”. In: Private governance: creating order in economic and social life. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 1–13CrossRef
Uzoki (2019) The potential of digital infrastructure financing: Fintech and blockchain. OECD Publications
Wright and De Filippi “Decentralised Blockchain Technology and the rise of Lex Cryptographia”, 40
Metadaten
Titel
Evolving Regulatory Frameworks: Blockchain as a Form of Trust—Comparative Evidence
verfasst von
Alfio A. Puglisi
Copyright-Jahr
2022
Buch
Financial Technology and the Law

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-88035-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-88036-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2022

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88036-1_9