Explaining Moral View Change: Second-Order Moral Reasoning
- Open Access
- 31.10.2025
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Abstract
1 Introduction
In contemporary studies of morality, philosophers identify from historical evidence the psychological and socio-structural conditions that cause individuals to adjust their moral views, which leads to the shift of moral norms and practices in society (see e.g., Appiah [1, 2] Hermann [3‐5]). These accounts reinforce the conception of moral agency as the function of pre-existing psychological and social structures.
In this paper, I propose the idea of second-order moral reasoning to highlight a currently underexplored conception of moral agency and introduce a new model for explaining individuals’ moral view change. Grounded in Bernard Williams’s notion of ethical freedom—which argues that no single moral system can fully determine individuals’ moralities—second-order moral reasoning is shaped by the moral values and concerns people endorse, which are often central to their lives. Hence, individuals do not always respond directly to their psychological feelings or external information; instead, they may engage in second-order moral reasoning and determine whether they should adjust their views based on their values and concerns. This new perspective leads to a new approach to moral intervention—one that grounds the elimination of harmful practices in a respect for individuals’ ethical freedom.
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In subsequent sections, I begin with an overview of accounts in which philosophers use psychological and socio-structural conditions to explain individuals’ change of moral views (Sect. 2). Next, I will show, through various empirical studies of moral view change and moral learning, that individuals do not always react directly to their psychological feelings or external information (Sect. 3). This challenges the conception of moral agency as the mere function of pre-existing psychological and social structures, which leads us to see that individuals’ moral development is sometimes contingent upon the moral values and concerns they acquire in their lives.
Built upon empirical observations, I draw on Bernard Williams’s notion of ethical freedom—which claims that no single set of moral views can fully determine one’s morality—and develop the idea of second-order moral reasoning to uphold a new model of moral view change (Sect. 4). Conceptually, second-order moral reasoning acknowledges that people have the freedom to determine what is morally good and significant to them, and it resists any attempt that seeks to establish the absolute authority of any value. Psychologically, while individuals process moral information and generate new sets of moral views through first-order moral reasoning, many of them engage in second-order moral reasoning and determine whether they should genuinely adjust their views based on their own values and concerns. Finally, I elaborate the moral significance of the idea of second-order moral reasoning by demonstrating how it can enrich our understanding of notable moral experiences, such as moral judgment, gut reactions, and moral insensitivity.
Lastly, I apply the new model of moral view change to address the practice of honour killing in Pakistan (Sect. 5). By proposing a new approach to moral intervention that focuses on Pakistanis’ second-order moral reasoning, I show how this new method can facilitate the elimination of harmful social practices and foster the development of a tolerant society.
2 Causes of Moral View Change
In contemporary moral philosophy, one rising trend is to view moral change as a subtype of social phenomena (see e.g., Pleasants [6, 7, 8]; MacDougall [9]).1 In some major discussions, philosophers adopt the cause-effect model in natural and social sciences and identify the conditions that lead individuals to change their moral views. These changes, in turn, drive the shift of moral “values, norms, practices” in society ([10], 354).2
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The causes philosophers identify generally fall into two major categories: psychological and socio-structural conditions. In The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen, Kwame Appiah [1] proposes honour-codes to be a particularly powerful mechanism of individuals’ moral view change. Honour here refers to people’s desire for the recognition of themselves and the groups they belong to. In one example, when China was invaded by western countries in the 19th century, Chinese intellectuals’ desire to restore national honour motivated their efforts to eradicate backward practices, such as women’s foot-binding.3 With the proposals made to the emperor, the ensuing national reform brought the practice to an end.
Another psychological condition is consistency reasoning. According to the model of reflective equilibrium, the inconsistency between individuals’ intuitive moral responses and the moral principles endorsed in society prompts individuals to adjust the principles to restore consistency [11, 12]. For instance, in Denmark, homosexuality remained a crime before liberal values gained prominence in Danish politics and society [13]. With more people endorsing liberal principles, they recognised the contradiction between their values and the criminalisation of homosexuals. The desire for consistency, then, drove individuals to abandon the hostility towards homosexuals and support the decriminalisation of homosexuality.
Socio-structural conditions are another significant factor that leads people to acquire new sets of moral views. These conditions do not usually indicate directly what views we should adopt; rather, they shape our understanding of what actions are acceptable, and our responses to these actions give rise to the moral norms we implement in society.4 For example, in a recent paper on techno-moral change, Hopster et al. [5] highlight the “noteworthy” importance of technology in shaping moral views and norms. In one case, when the plough technology was introduced into farming in ancient times, the need for upper body strength led people to reward men for their economic contributions. As men’s superiority gained recognition, society enforced male-centred gender norms to sustain men’s privilege and incentivise their productivity (279–280).
In a different example, when contraceptive technologies, such as birth control pills, became more widely available in the 1960 s, they disrupted the prevailing sexual morality by decoupling sex from reproduction. As safe and protected sex became possible, individuals began to challenge the traditional values emphasising sexual chastity, purity, and modesty, and they advocated for greater individual freedom in sexual choices. Similar to the plough case, the pill did not directly increase people’s sexual freedom, but its availability prompted a reassessment of the past freedom-constraining sexual morality. This example, therefore, illustrates how the diffusion of new technology can lead individuals to adjust their moral views, which causes the change of moral norms in society.
Furthermore, in Julia Hermann’s [3] examination of the causes of moral progress, she highlights how the epistemic and economic conditions that emerged in the 18th century contributed to the abolition of slavery in the 19th century. For example, the development of new economic conditions, such as wage labour, showed to society that individuals were more productive when their self- interests were satisfied. Hence, compared to slavery, which denied the freedom of enslaved persons and inhibited their economic motivations and incentives to work, wage labour became a more desirable alternative to chattel slavery. This economic condition prompted individuals to favour a society without slavery, ultimately leading to its abolition.
In summary, the above accounts demonstrate how philosophers use psychological and socio-structural conditions to explain individuals’ change of moral views. Although it follows different pathways that the conditions trigger the changes, these conditions enable us to anticipate and potentially guide future changes of morality.
3 Reconceiving Moral Agency
Despite the valuable insights into individuals’ moral view change, the functionalist conception of moral agency assumed in the existing accounts of moral change— which sees individuals as the function of pre-existing psychological or social structures— should be re-examined. Empirical studies on moral learning and moral view change reveal another important type of moral agency that is currently underexplored. That is, individuals do not always respond directly to psychological or socio-structural conditions; instead, many of them determine based on their values and concerns what moral views to adopt.5 Therefore, individuals’ moral views are not merely the effects of certain psychological and socio-structural conditions. Next, I will discuss experiments from research on the psychological foundations of moral conviction, moral exemplars, and identity fusion and illustrate this alternative conception of moral agency.6
3.1 Psychological Foundations of Moral Conviction
The first type of empirical research that indicates the alternative conception of moral agency is studies on the psychological foundations of moral conviction. In a series of longitudinal experiments, psychologists investigate how individuals who are initially neutral about meat consumption come to perceive it as morally wrong [14]. These studies typically involve exposing participants to emotionally salient information about the cruelty of the meat industry, such as texts that highlight the harm caused to animals by meat consumption or evocative videos that depict the pain and suffering of animals.
While the original intent of the experiments is to test how mechanisms— such as the emotions of guilt and shame, the perception of animal suffering, and attitudes towards the naturalness of meat-eating— facilitate or hinder individuals’ moralisation (55), a closer examination of the experiments shows that the functionalist conception of moral agency is not sufficient. Based on participants’ post-experiment responses, they are categorised into four groups: Moralizers, Nonchangers, Decreasers, or Slight Changers. Moralizers are individuals who consistently support animal welfare. Nonchangers show no change in attitude, and Decreasers resist more actively the idea of animal welfare (58–59). Slight Changers are those who briefly support animal welfare but quickly abandon this stance (60).
As we can see from the experiments, after exposure to emotionally evocative materials, all participants acknowledge the cruelty of the meat industry and show sympathy for animals. However, their feelings do not produce uniform behavioural responses, and the variation in participants’ attitudes results largely from their background moral values and concerns. For example, many Moralizers express a deep concern for promoting care and avoiding harm in society, or they take being a moral person to be their central goals.7 Since abandoning meat consumption and protecting animals from harm are compatible with their values, they cease eating meat and engage actively in promoting animal welfare.
In contrast, despite their recognition of the pain of animals, many Nonchangers and Decreasers prioritise other concerns, such as the tastiness of meat and the fear of social ostracism if they act differently from their group members (15). Consequently, they show little to no change in their attitudes towards animal welfare. These findings challenge the functionalist conception of moral agency by suggesting that pre-existing psychological mechanisms—e.g., people’s moral emotions or cognition— do not always drive their moral view change. Instead, the experiments lend support to a new conception of moral agency—that is, many participants consider their values and concerns and determine their moral stances.
Applying one’s values to adjust one’s moral views indicates a psychological experience that differs substantially from the reactions to pre-existing psychological structures. These structures usually refer to hard-wired, genetically endowed psychology.8 For instance, the study of animal welfare draws on Jonanthan Haidt’s [15] social intuitionist theory to explain the source of individuals’ negative feelings when watching videos showing the suffering of animals. Such “affect-laden moral intuitions” ([14], 51), according to Haidt, are rooted in human evolutionary psychology, which are automatically activated whenever we encounter morally salient situations.9 Since these intuitive reactions are difficult to suppress or alter instantly, the functionalist view leaves little room for individuals’ reflexivity and choice in their moral development; people form moral views simply based on how they feel about a situation.
The new conception of moral agency, in comparison, is rooted in individuals’ reflexivity and choice. Rather than being entirely driven by genetically endowed psychological mechanisms, many people reflect on their life experiences and determine what moral values they should stick to. In this respect, while many may simply follow their intuitive reactions to develop their moral views, others exercise their freedom of choice and make moral decisions based on what they find morally important. Their conceptions of a good life and a moral person shape their moral views.
3.2 Moral Exemplars and Identity Fusion
In addition to studies on the psychological foundations of moral conviction, empirical research on moral exemplars and identity fusion further supports the new conception of moral agency. For instance, in an eight- week experiment on moral exemplars, experimenters divided middle school students into two groups. One of them received a moral education centred on peer exemplars engaging in voluntary service on a weekly basis, and the other received an education that highlighted historic moral figures such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Mother Teresa ([16], 7). The historical exemplars were intentionally designed to be more demanding than the peer exemplars. The researchers then compared students’ voluntary service twelve weeks after the intervention. This service—“as a form of moral behaviour” ([16], 1)—usually involves supporting and helping others. Since individuals are inspired by the morally praiseworthy actions of moral exemplars, their participation in the voluntary service measures their willingness to do what is morally good.
As the key finding of the experiment, all students felt elevated and recognised the moral excellence of the two types of exemplars. However, only those exposed to peer exemplars showed an increase in voluntary service, and the varied responses stemmed largely from participants’ perceived “attainability and relatability” of the actions of the exemplars ([17], 943).10 In other words, simply recognising the virtue of moral exemplars does not automatically motivate helping behaviours; individuals’ assessment of whether they are capable of performing the exemplars’ actions and whether such acts are meaningful determine whether they follow the exemplars.
Thus, individuals’ desires to become morally better persons and the moral standards they set for themselves are in fact more crucial than the virtues of moral exemplars in motivating their participation in moral activities ([16], 3).11 Since many individuals find it important to behave like their peers, this concern drives them to follow those peer exemplars and participate more actively in voluntary service. In contrast, because many of them do not aim to be the kind of moral persons embodied by Martin Luther King Jr. and Mother Teresa, they do not find it meaningful to emulate these historic moral figures. The self-understanding of individuals, therefore, results in their lack of change in moral activities. Moreover, since this experiment was conducted in a middle school setting, it suggests that from an early age, individuals tend to base their moral decisions on their moral values and concerns.
Finally, studies of identity fusion buttress a similar conception of moral agency.12 The view change in these studies refer to individuals’ shift to a group-centred moral framework from an individualistic one. To put this alternatively, people prioritise actions that guarantee the interests of groups after the change. In one experiment, participants recalled a day when they felt most positively about their families or countries, compared to an ordinary day, and rated their sense of affinity to their groups ([18], 562). The purpose of the experiment is to explore the causal relation between negative collective events, such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters, individuals’ feelings of elevation and gratitude when receiving help from other group members, and their sense of oneness with one’s group (564). Participants’ reports nevertheless reveal an understanding of their psychological experiences that upholds the new conception of moral agency.
Specifically, feelings of gratitude do not cause directly individuals’ identity fusion with their groups. Instead, during many adverse events, individuals endorse the crucial importance of social groups after receiving support from fellow members. Based on their loyalty to their groups, they reevaluate their moral perspectives and switch to a framework that prioritises group well-being. As a result of this adjustment, they experience a “visceral sense of oneness” with their groups and promote interpersonal care among group members (568). The autobiographical method employed in identity fusion studies, thus, enables us to see how individuals acquire their core values from social experiences and apply the values to adjust their moralities.
Together, the three types of empirical studies illuminate an important but currently underexplored conception of moral agency. Instead of being merely driven by their intuitive psychological reactions or external information, many people adjust their moral views based on the moral values and concerns they acquire from their life experiences. This new conception of moral agency points to a new model of moral view change—one that I will develop in the next section.
4 A New Explanatory Model: Second-Order Moral Reasoning
The alternative conception of moral agency casts a new light upon individuals’ moral view change: through each instance of change—each adjustment of one’s moral beliefs and behaviours in accordance with their core values and concerns—individuals come to live the life they desire and become the persons they aspire to be. By giving up meat-eating and promoting animal welfare, individuals foster a life rooted in a care for all species. Likewise, through increasing voluntary service, many students become the morally praiseworthy persons they desire to be.
I propose the idea of second-order moral reasoning to develop a new model of moral view change that reflects this new conception of moral agency. Conceptually, this idea recognises individuals’ ethical freedom to determine and live by their own values. Hence, we should continually explore individuals’ values to understand their second-order moral reasoning. Psychologically, while individuals process moral information at the stage of first-order moral reasoning, it is through second-order moral reasoning that they determine—in light of their values and concerns—whether they should adjust their views. Next, I start from Bernard Williams’s idea of ethical freedom to develop the idea of second-order moral reasoning and elaborate the new model.
4.1 Ethical Freedom and Second-Order Moral Reasoning
The idea that individuals determine their values and align their actions accordingly is not new. In Harry Frankfurt’s [19, 20] discussions of ideal, freedom, and necessity, we attain genuine freedom through determining from our self-chosen ideals the course of action we should pursue. Similarly, building upon Kantian notion of rationality, Christine Korsgaard [21] contends that our human agency is constituted in the very process of acting on our practical identities. These identities stand for descriptions under which we value ourselves, find our lives “worth living,” and recognise our actions as “worth undertaking” ([22], 101); also see Bambauer ([23, 63)]. By acting consistently with these identities, we become the persons we aspire to be.13
Despite their recognition of individuals’ capacity to determine their values and align their actions, Frankfurt and Korsgaard’ focus is primarily on normative questions: how should we think and act in order to be genuinely free and to deserve human dignity? In other words, rather than describing a basic human condition that can help us understand everyday moral life, the two philosophers outline the conditions we must fulfil in order to be treated with respect, rather than being merely used as instruments for achieving certain goals. Consequently, the process of determining one’s values and acting consistently applies only to those who strive for genuine freedom and human dignity (see Gibbard [24]).
Rather than emphasising a normative ideal, the idea of second-order moral reasoning recognises that ethical freedom is a fundamental aspect of human existence.14 Based on Miranda Fricker’s [25] interpretation of the “fundamental presupposition” and “root conviction” of Bernard Williams’s moral philosophy, individuals are ethically free in the sense that no single conception of morality can fully determine how one ought to live (919).15 More importantly, we do not attain the freedom through thinking and acting in particular ways. It is rather a basic condition and fact of human life: we “set our own ends,” “generate our own values and correlative practical reasons,” and make decisions about the actions we should take (921).16
Because individuals are ethically free, they can choose whether to exercise this freedom. Therefore, while many people adjust their moralities in response to psychological reactions and external information, others exercise their inherent freedom, determine their values, and align their lives through engaging in second-order moral reasoning. Moreover, because of its recognition of the varied values of individuals, second-order moral reasoning differs from the accounts of Frankfurt and Korsgaard in a further sense. From the perspectives of the two philosophers, determining what we love or commit to gives us a unified identity that can rationally guide our actions. Contrarily, since individuals are ethically free, they can value what is typically viewed as disordered, chaotic, or self-contradictory on the idea of second-order moral reasoning. Many may hold a clear and stable identity, whereas others navigate their lives with divided and conflicting identities.
4.2 Why Ethical Freedom?
Developing second-order moral reasoning from the notion of ethical freedom may raise the concern that it simply accommodates all human choices. Hence, it is either trivial for stressing what most people would not deny—i.e., human morality is diverse—or it legitimises many harm-perpetuating actions in the name of ethical freedom. Why is ethical freedom so crucial to second-order moral reasoning?
The emphasis on ethical freedom stems from studies of moral and social change, in which philosophers seek to establish the authority of some limited values. Building upon his thoughts of ethical freedom, Williams [26] criticises the moralistic tendencies of utilitarianism and Kantianism, which portray themselves as universal moral frameworks to which everyone must adhere. Similarly, philosophers often identify the key values we can deploy to achieve desired changes in society. However, their accounts tend to obscure individuals’ freedom to pursue their preferred moral lives.
For example, Agnes Tam [27] introduces “We-reason” as the key mode of thinking that drives the abolition of slave trade and slavery in British oversea colonies (75). The trade was previously sustained by British’s joint commitment to the “economic value of slave labor” (89), but it was resisted when the commitment shifted to repairing the damage of Britain’s national honour by the trade (90). Reflecting “the value grounded in social relationships” (90), the “We-reason” points to a second-order moral reasoning shaped by individuals’ conformity to the majority opinions of their groups. In other words, individuals value their groups and slavery become illegitimate when group commitments reject it. Similarly, Cristina Bicchieri [28] and her colleagues conducted a series of behavioural interventions aimed at ending female genital cutting (FGC) in African communities. When the majority of a community— including many celebrities and community leaders— change to view uncut girls as Saleema, a word connoting “whole, intact, healthy, and perfect,” others follow suit and shift to see being uncut as “the natural, pristine state” (139).17 Hence, Bicchieri also emphasises the compliance with the majority as the key driving factor of belief change.
Both Tam and Bicchieri promote the “We-reason” as the mode of thinking for bringing about progressive social changes. In other words, because “We-reason” appears plausible in multiple cases of belief change,18 philosophers infer that conformity to group opinions is a fundamental value shaping individuals’ views across many societies. Therefore, activating this value can be an effective means of encouraging desired changes. In this regard, similar to how adherents of utilitarianism and deontology seek to enforce the universal acceptance of values such as utility and duty, philosophers studying norm change impose the value of conformity to group opinions on individuals, rather than attending to the fact that they have the freedom to determine and live by their own values.
Contra Tam and Bicchieri, by emphasising the idea of ethical freedom, we avoid generalising from limited examples and experiments the values that shape individuals’ second-order moral reasoning. Though we aim to develop a new model that can be used to explain the change of moral views of a population of people, the notion of ethical freedom encourages us to recognise the varied ways individuals think about what is morally good and significant, thus avoiding the absolute authority of any value. This cultivates our sensitivity towards different moral perspectives and equips us with the capacity to comprehend individuals’ distinctive second-order moral reasoning and empathise with them.
4.3 A New Explanatory Model
Built upon the idea of second-order moral reasoning, a continuous anthropological investigation is crucial to the new model of moral view change. Instead of identifying the psychological and socio-structural conditions that cause people to alter their moral views, we explore individuals’ lived experiences, acknowledge the diverse values and concerns that are vital to their lives, and understand their particular second-order moral reasoning.
At the psychological level, individuals adjust their moral views through first- and second- order moral reasoning. The distinction between the two is akin to elaboration and validation. In social psychology, elaboration and validation describe two routes of attitude formation following exposure to media discussions on topics such as charitable causes. Elaboration, considered “primary or first-order cognition,” tracks how people think carefully or cursorily about certain sets of information ([29], 273). However, elaboration alone does not determine how they think, feel, or judge about that information. Instead, many of them enter the stage of validation and develop “confidence or doubt in the validity of” their thoughts and attitudes (273). These “metacognitive reactions” then determine to what extent the attitudes people form about their thoughts rationally guide their behaviours (273).
Analogously, individuals engage in first-order moral reasoning when their psychological reactions or external information prompts them to consider some new sets of moral views. Nonetheless, this process does not always alter their beliefs. Instead, many of them proceed to second-order moral reasoning, and they evaluate—based on their core values and concerns— whether they should genuinely endorse those views. In this regard, the key difference between this new model and the cause-effect model discussed in Sect. 2 is as follows: while we identify the key factors that trigger individuals to adjust their moral views according to the cause-effect model, the new model recognises the importance of both first- and second-order moral reasoning. However, compared to the mere processing of moral information, second-order moral reasoning—which is shaped by individuals’ core values and concerns— is the more major determinant of individuals’ moral views.
4.4 Moral Significance of Second-Order Moral Reasoning
The idea of second-order moral reasoning offers fresh perspectives on various significant moral experiences, including moral judgment, gut reactions, and moral insensitivity. In response to her notion of banality of evil— the idea that the atrocities committed by Nazis during World War II stemmed largely from individuals’ lack of independent moral thinking— Hannah Arendt [30, 31] revisits Kantian moral philosophy, stressing the importance of exercising moral judgment to resisting dictatorship. Arendt’s thoughts, however, are ambivalent over two interpretations— a “total absence of thinking” ([32], 8) or a failure to think properly.19 Recent discussions tend to support the latter interpretation: Adolf Eichmann, one of the Nazi officials executed in Jerusalem in 1962, was capable of moral thought. Nonetheless, he made judgments based on his duty to obey Hitler, rather than a respect for human life (see Krishnan & Queloz 2023, 39, 231).
This new interpretation suggests that the “banality of evil” does not arise from an absence of moral thinking but the lack of an independent second-order moral reasoning. Many Nazi soldiers, educated to be loyal and patriotic, endorsed the obedience to Hitler’s rules as their core value. Despite witnessing atrocities, their second-order moral reasoning—their loyalty to the Nazi regime—led them to carry out the orders for mass killings. Conversely, a small number of Nazi soldiers, such as Captain Wilhelm Hosenfeld who saved the Polish- Jewish pianist Władysław Szpilman, acted on their compassion and righteousness and saved many Jews in their capacities.20 Hence, the mere act of thinking and judging is not enough for individuals’ resistance to dictatorship. A critical examination of the values shaping one’s second-order moral reasoning is crucial.
Moving beyond Kantian rationalism, which emphasises reasoning as the foundation of moral judgment, many philosophers and psychologists now believe that moral judgments often stem from gut reactions—the immediate, automatic feelings of repulsion or pleasure. For example, Jonathan Haidt’s [15] experiments reveal that many individuals intuitively judged incestuous behaviours to be wrong, and most of them were unable to provide principled arguments to support their responses. Gut reactions, then, offer a more plausible explanation of their judgments compared to logical, rule- based moral reasoning.
The quick and intuitive reactions, however, can also be understood through the lens of second-order moral reasoning. As we discussed in Sect. 3, individuals— from children to adults—develop moral values early in life. For example, many people value their communities and families through socialisation, and they may take any act their communities and families resist to be moral wrongs and develop a repulsive feeling from an early age. Since individuals may never re-examine their values and contest their second-order moral reasoning, they may never rethink about the moral import of incest and experience discomfort whenever they encounter scenarios of incest.
Furthermore, moral insensitivity is often regarded as a form of ignorance, which thwarts marginalised groups from challenging social discrimination and injustice [33, 34]. While philosophers argue for individuals’ responsibilities in cultivating their moral sensitivities ([34], 187), the key aspect of the responsibility lies indeed in scrutinising one’s core values and second-order moral reasoning. Many individuals—who appear insensitive—are capable of understanding the sufferings of disadvantaged groups, but they may not prioritise the urgency of responding to those sufferings in a justice-oriented manner. Instead, they tend to focus on issues more closely related to their values, such as a career that brings them personal success. Without a second-order moral reasoning that prioritises the support of disadvantaged groups, individuals offer limited responses to their struggles and remain apathetic to the prevalence of injustice.
In conclusion, highlighting a new conception of moral agency that differs from the functionalist view, the idea of second-order moral reasoning offers novel insights into individual moral deliberation and judgment. It encourages us to reflect on our experiences— what values we endorse and why we endorse them— and recognise how the values may have been shaping our moral experiences in a way we did not realise. The idea of second-order moral reasoning, then, not only indicates a new avenue to moral view change, it also enriches our understanding of human moral life.
5 A New Approach to Moral Intervention
Finally, the new model of moral view change inspires a new approach to moral intervention that focuses particularly on individuals’ second-order moral reasoning. Back to Appiah’s [1] discussions, based on his elaboration of how honour-codes led people to end aristocratic duelling in England and the foot-binding practice in China, he takes the practice of honour killing in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey to be another case for which a moral revolution is urgent but has not yet been achieved. As a type of violence against women, people perform honour killings to restore the honour of families and communities damaged by women’s extra-marital sexual behaviours (144–146; 152). During the movement of “collective shaming,” human rights activists pressured the Pakistani government to reform laws and stop the violence (159). Although women no longer need four male witnesses to testify in rape cases, whenever honour is mentioned, many murder cases remain ignored, and people in more remote areas continue to kill women in the name of honour (159).
The collective shaming movement reflects the functionalist conception of moral agency—that is, the humiliation experienced by the Pakistani government triggers their desire for national honour, which can prompt policymakers to take actions and ban the practice of honour killing. Given the limited impact of this approach, we can try a new method that grounds intervention in the second-order moral reasoning of Pakistanis. Not only is this a new approach to eliminating harmful social practices, it also facilitates the development of a tolerant society. Building upon the discussions in Sect. 4, recognising Pakistanis’ diverse values and concerns is vital for understanding the second-order moral reasoning that shapes their moral views. While we seek to end the practice of honour killing, we nurture a tolerant society through acknowledging the ethical freedom and capacity of Pakistanis to determine their core values.
The new approach to intervention begins with an understanding of why many Pakistanis refuse to change their minds. For many people in western societies, their pursuits of a liberal life give rise to a second-order moral reasoning shaped by the values of individual freedom and harm prevention, which enable them to see immediately the wrongness of honour killings. As a result, they blame many Pakistanis for not accepting the same set of moral principles, but overlook that they engage in a very different sort of second- order moral reasoning.21 As a country experiencing the clash of western influences and their own culture and history, many Pakistanis do not prioritise Western liberal ideals but seek to preserve their country’s historical continuity and cultural distinctiveness.22 Therefore, their second-order moral reasoning differs substantially from the reasoning of individuals from the liberal world.
Recognising the distinctiveness of Pakistanis’ second-order moral reasoning, we can address the practice of honour killing by exposing Pakistanis to alternative interpretations of their values. First, given many Pakistanis’ emphasis on the continuity of their history, we can deploy historical resources creatively and inspire new kinds of historical understanding of their country.23 Partition, as a significant part of Pakistan’s history, is often remembered with violence, bloodshed, and interreligious hostility (see e.g., Fahad et al., [35]). A group of Indian and Pakistani thinkers counter this narrative by uncovering the humane aspects of the Partition—that is, the love, compassion, and care shown by people from different religions is also a substantial part of Partition. Rather than the exclusion of non-Muslin minorities, the “deep sense of love and faith for the soil” is widespread among different religious groups ([36], 146). Hence, running through the history of Pakistan is not violence and harm, but the love and kindness of humanity. In light of this understanding of Pakistan’s history, honour killings are not consistent with the country’s history; it is instead a disunity that deviates from the central spirit of the country.24 Preserving Pakistan’s history requires Pakistanis to choose actions that show love and kindness, rather than violence.
Another concern of many Pakistanis is the erosion of their cultural autonomy by external influences; they adopt the practice of honour killing to maintain a distinctive cultural identity. One solution is to cultivate new cultural symbols. Iran, for instance, has been Islamised for many centuries, but it was never Arabised and the majority of the Iranian population preserved their Persian identity. An important cultural bond, as many Iranian scholars and people believe, is the epic poem Shahnameh composed by the Iranian poet Abolqasem Ferdowsi over 10 centuries ago. As a national epic, it is repeated and remembered by every generation, which preserves Iranians’ Persian identity through good and difficult times of the country (see e.g., Boroujerdi [37, 38]).
This example may sound controversial, since Iran is another country where honour killings and other forms of persecution of women are prevalent. What I find particularly important is the construction of cultural symbols, which recognises that being culturally autonomous involves more than the freedom from any external interference. Instead, Pakistanis need real cultural symbols they can attach to, through which they can recognise their distinctiveness and distinguish themselves from others. By constructing new symbols aligned with Pakistan’s culture and history, we encourage Pakistanis to appreciate from their concern for cultural autonomy the value of new symbols. When they affirm their autonomous cultural identity through the new symbols, their psychological attachment to the practice of honour killing is severed, which wears down their need to sustain their history and cultural autonomy through the violence against women.
In sum, the new prescription for addressing the practice of honour killing in Pakistan bolsters the importance of second-order moral reasoning as a new model of moral view change. Recognising individuals’ ethical freedom to determine and live by their own values, we ground our efforts to eliminate harmful practices in a respect for individuals’ ethical freedom. While we stress the wrongness of honour killings, we show a sympathetic understanding of the values and concerns crucial to many Pakistanis. Our attempt to end the practice of honour killing is then part of the process of building a tolerant society.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper aims to introduce the idea of second-order moral reasoning and develop a new model of moral view change. Although psychological and socio-structural conditions can sometimes lead individuals to adjust their moral views, empirical studies on moral learning and moral view change suggest that we are not always the function of pre-existing psychological and social structures. Instead, we determine our own values and concerns and create our unique moral lives through aligning our moral views with the values.
Hence, drawing on Bernard Williams’s notion of ethical freedom, I propose the idea of second-order moral reasoning to establish a new process underlying individuals’ moral view change. Acknowledging people’s ethical freedom, the idea of second-order moral reasoning prompts us to explore continuously individuals’ diverse values. Finally, through the case of honour killings in Pakistan, I show how a moral intervention that targets second-order moral reasoning can contribute to the elimination of harmful practices and the building of a tolerant society.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank especially Amit Chaturvedi, Ron Mallon, Alexandra Plakias, Justin Tiwald, and Brian Wong for their critical feedback on the earlier versions of the paper. I also want to thank the reviewers and editors for their valuable comments.
Declarations
Competing Interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
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