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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. Facing Crises: Economy, Democracy, and Political Transaction Costs

verfasst von : Claude Ménard

Erschienen in: Democracy and an Open-Economy World Order

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The groveling crisis that plagues Greece and that is deeply embedded in the European crisis, which is itself rooted in a more global setting of economic and political crises, reveals the complexity of the relationship between economy and democracy. It also shows how fragile both are and how deeply entrenched in politics are the questions raised and the solutions proposed.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The German Concept of Market Economy: Social Market Economy. Its Roots and Its Contribution to Liberal Economic Orders in Germany, Europe and Beyond

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Titel: Facing Crises: Economy, Democracy, and Political Transaction Costs
verfasst von: Claude Ménard
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Democracy and an Open-Economy World Order
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-52167-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-52168-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52168-8_8