1994 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Fairness judgements in an asymmetric public goods dilemma
verfasst von : Jeffrey A. Joireman, D. Michael Kuhlman, Hidetaka Okuda
Erschienen in: Social Dilemmas and Cooperation
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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Dawes (1980) and Marwell and Ames (1979) have suggested that decision making in social dilemmas is importantly influenced by considerations of fairness. The present study examined subjects’ fairness judgements in an asymmetric public goods dilemma. Subjects stated the fairest possible contribution each of six persons could make to provide a public good. These six persons differed in terms of individual wealth (resource asymmetry). The subjects’ attributions for resource asymmetries were manipulated so that for some, attributions were Internal (people are rich or poor due to their own efforts/abilities) and for others, External (people are rich or poor due to task difficulty/luck). This manipulation was the major independent variable. As expected, subjects making internal attributions stated that poor persons should contribute a larger proportion of their wealth than rich ones. The subjects making external attributions judged equal proportional contributions to be most fair. Fairness judgements appeared to influence subjects’ own contributions and their expectations of others’ contributions. The subject’s Social Orientation (Cooperative, Noncooperative) was also measured. Cooperators judged equal proportional contributions as fair, whereas Non-cooperators felt the poor should contribute a higher proportion of their wealth than the rich. Cooperators and Non-cooperators contributed equal proportions, in contrast to the hypothesis.