2. Family, Corruption, and Family Corruption

A family is defined as a group of people bound by kinship ties (Ball, 1972). Members of this group can be related in various ways: by blood (consanguine), marriage (affinal), or through other legal or informal ceremonies. Some family ties are purposefully created, while others are inherent to the members. Family is a fundamental element of social structure, comprising clusters of statuses that significantly shape human behavior (Martin, 2009, p. 5). Family connects individuals to collectivities at the micro level within the social system by transcending individuality. Being part of a family and working for a family is often viewed as life’s true meaning (Campbell, 1964, p. 37). Although family is becoming a more fluid variable, encompassing a wide range of personal associations and identities, living arrangements, and gender roles, blood relations continue to hold significant legal, social, and symbolic relevance in the definition of family (Chambers & Gracia, 2022, pp. 1–3; Taylor, 2005). This is, for example, confirmed by the growing popularity of exploring the “self” through biological heritage with DNA testing (Chambers & Gracia, 2022, p. 21).

The literature distinguishes between multiple layers within family structures: immediate (or nuclear) family, extended family, kinship, lineage, clan, and tribe. This order also represents a scale of social distance between the members. The larger, more complex networks beyond the extended family have social structures that can be characterized as cohesive subgroups of a network. Connections within these subgroups are dense, and connections between subgroups are sparse (Fortes, 1953; Girvan & Newman, 2002; Levi-Strauss, 1969). Historically, societies have been organized around these larger groups, providing members with a complexly structured arrangement, information, intelligence, and informal norms, enabling but also limiting individual decisions (Campbell, 1964, p. 38; Ledeneva, 2018a, p. vii).

Immediate family typically consists of two parents and their children living together. Extended family includes relatives beyond this nuclear unit, such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins, often living together or maintaining close relationships. The subsequent collective, termed, kinship extends beyond the confines of immediate family. It encompasses the intricate network of relationships among individuals connected by blood (consanguinity), marriage (affinity), or adoption. The next category is lineage, a descent group that traces ancestry to a known common ancestor (usually through one line, patrilineal or matrilineal). A clan is an even larger group that asserts descent from a common ancestor, which may be unknown or even mythical (Fortes, 1953; Levi-Strauss, 1969). Historically, lineage or clan groups were of shared, reciprocal loyalty and obligations to each other, reinforced by the common practice of marrying within the clan, often to cousins (Akbari et al., 2019; Edlund, 2018).

The most expansive category in this classification is a tribe, which constitutes a political and social entity larger than clans and lineages. In many traditional societies, tribes are based on kinship, which means that the people within a tribe are often related by blood or marriage across extended generations, comprising multiple clans or lineages. Tribes are typically characterized by common ancestry, a shared language, territory, and cultural practices.

Another way to interpret the meaning of family is to classify family membership by the nature of their kin relations (Murphy, 2008; Sprecher et al., 2021). Primary kin, whether consanguineal or affinal, includes spouses, biological or adopted adult children, along with their parents and siblings. Primary kin members often live in the same household. Secondary kin, who are blood-related or adopted relatives, include grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, cousins, nephews, and nieces, and secondary affinal kin are those related through marriage, including parents- and siblings-in-law. Stepparents, stepsiblings, and other step-relatives might be included in this category as well. However, some individuals might consider stepparents or stepsiblings whom they have known for much of their lives as a form of close primary kin (Sanner et al., 2020). The fourth category is fictive, chosen, voluntary, pseudo or quasi kin: individuals not related by blood or law but considered kin or relatives (Ball, 1972; Braithwaite et al., 2010). Examples include “othermothers” who help to raise the children of friends or neighbors (Davis-Sowers, 2012), godparents, former step-relatives and in-laws (Schmeeckle et al., 2006), and the “rainbow kinship” networks of gay people (Stacey, 2004). Quasi-family ties are documented in many cultures, which suggest that family-relatedness can be socially constructed (Chambers & Gracia, 2022, pp. 5–7). Many of these alternative memberships, including spiritual kinship or godparenthood, are primarily instrumental arrangements that link family members to outside groups (Campbell, 1964, pp. 217–219; Lomnitz, 1997; Nelson, 2013).

Although the existence of some form of family structure is a universal phenomenon, families appear very different across various parts of the world. They have also been in flux. Historical forces such as industrialization, post-industrialization, urbanization, and rationalization have profoundly transformed family structures and functions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Kin ties are increasingly elective and must be cultivated to be maintained, but they can also be easier to cut than in the past (Furstenberg & Cherlin, 1991). Despite the nuclear family continuing to serve as an essential unit in contemporary societies, the historical transformations engendered by modernization have led to a pronounced decrease in the influence of large family networks, including kinship, lineage, and clans. Most of these traditional configurations have become obsolete in urban environments. However, the extended family still has an enduring impact; for example, it can provide resources and opportunities, such as the grandparents’ help in facilitating a grandchild’s educational and socioeconomic success (Barclay & Conley, 2024).

Due to new dynamics such as “blended” families—partners living with children from previous relationships—the number of half-siblings and stepchildren in the same household has been increasing. The number of cohabitating couples—unmarried people living together—with children is also on the rise worldwide, with an average of 42% of births occurring outside marriage, and rates particularly high in Mexico (70%), Costa Rica (73%), and Chile (75%) (OECD, 2022).

Family can also be viewed as a form of social organization that encompasses many consciously organized and coordinated activities with different functions. Social organization is a form of social order that differentiates structured interactions from random occurrences. The latter are unscripted, unpredictable, and/or non-repeating behaviors that are not directed by a shared social framework. In the following section, I will explore the multiple dimensions of activities that help capture the complexity of the family. While there are overlaps among these dimensions, discussing them separately for analytical purposes is valuable. Family structures and functions vary due to cultural, economic, and political forces alongside historical patterns. Consequently, the following dimensions may represent more or less essential features of families in different countries.

My approach to understanding corruption is primarily sociological, focusing on local configurations of relations and relational patterns (Jancsics, 2024a). This sociology of corruption stands apart from both the previously mentioned utilitarian approach, mentioned earlier, and the constructivist approach. The utilitarian perspective generally employs rational choice theory—in most cases, the principal-agent dilemma—to interpret corruption, perceiving all corrupt transactions as a quid pro quo between two parties: an agent who illegally relinquishes her authority to make official decisions in exchange for payment from an external client (Banfield, 1975; Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). This predominant perspective, endorsed by many economists and political scientists, argues that corruption is disembedded from society and history (Garrido et al., 2024). Those involved in it are isolated or “undersocialized” actors, minimally influenced by social relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Jancsics, 2024a). Their primary motivation is self-interest. According to this viewpoint, corruption is not only ethically wrong but also severely detrimental to society, as it undermines the functionality of state institutions, squanders taxpayer money, curtails investment, hinders economic growth, degrades service quality, and diminishes trust in the public sector.

Family corruption is a relatively understudied and under-theorized concept, but it is worth exploring further and establishing it as a distinct analytical category. The primary explanations of the phenomenon suggest that family corruption occurs when the boundaries between private and public spheres are blurred (De Sousa, 2008; Fukuyama, 2018; Smith, 2001). The idea behind this theory is that the economic and personal spheres in contemporary societies should be clearly distinguished because they operate according to fundamentally opposing principles (Parsons, 1978, p. 15; Zelizer, 2005, p. 43). While most studies on family corruption do not explicitly reference this body of literature, they can be linked to a more abstract dichotomy identified by foundational scholars, which focuses on the distinction between modern and pre-modern societies (Giordano, 2018). They suggest that the family, as an organizing principle, has roots in pre-modern times, and its presence in contemporary impersonal bureaucracies is not normal and inevitably results in corruption. Suppose people are treated according to their family standards instead of receiving a uniform treatment that applies to everyone, regardless of the family to which they belong. In that case, the rule of law would not exist (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007). Several prominent sociologists, including Tönnies, Durkheim, and Weber, have emphasized such distinction between modern and pre-modern. Although the concepts formulated by these scholars differ slightly, notable similarities can be identified among them (Jenks, 1998).

Ferdinand Tönnies’ (1912) differentiation between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) elucidates two fundamentally contrasting forms of social organization. Gemeinschaft is characterized by close-knit, intimate relationships typically observed in traditional contexts such as families or rural communities. These interactions are rooted in strong emotional bonds, shared cultural values, and a profound sense of belonging. Conversely, Gesellschaft delineates the more impersonal, formal, and goal-oriented relationships prevalent in modern, urban, and industrial societies. In this latter framework, individuals engage primarily for personal gain, with interactions governed by contracts, institutional mechanisms, and rational calculations, rather than emotional connections.

Émile Durkheim (1893[1997]) presented another similar foundational sociological distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. He explains that mechanical solidarity emerges in environments of close proximity, where individuals form strong, personalized relationships within relatively small communities featuring minimal division of labor. As a result, mechanical solidarity is characterized by similarity and is generally found in small groups such as families, kinship networks, and tribes in pre-modern societies. In these close-knit groups, the collective identity often takes precedence over individual interests. On the other hand, organic solidarity develops in industrialized societies, often in urban settings characterized by significant social differentiation. This results in a complex division of labor that creates various social roles and a high level of specialization. Thus, organic solidarity is founded on the certainty of reciprocal dependence among individuals who hold specific functions or engage in particular activities. These societies rely on regulating relations between different groups and persons through the use of contracts and laws instead of uniform rules.

The most influential dichotomy was developed by Weber (1968[1922]), who distinguished between patrimonial and modern bureaucratic organizations. According to this theory, societies were previously organized around patrimonial households, where authority was deeply rooted in tradition and personal loyalty to the family’s patriarch. Economic production occurred within the household or on property controlled by it. This organizational form was characterized by a lack of formal rules, where administrative roles were filled based on kinship, loyalty, or favoritism rather than merit or competence. Weber contrasted the patrimonial system with the ideal type of rational-legal bureaucracy, usually defined as involving a written set of regulations, nonhereditary positions, a clear chain of command, and impersonal rules.

The shift from patrimonialism to bureaucracy was an organizational transformation that profoundly shaped the transition from medieval to modern societies (Collins, 2011). Such changes also contributed to the emergence of non-corrupt modern states (Rothstein & Teorell, 2015). Modern bureaucracies operate on the basis of clearly defined rules and hierarchical structures, where authority is derived from the office, not the individual. Positions are filled through technical qualifications and merit, promoting impersonality, consistency, and objectivity in decision-making. The Weberian perspective also emphasizes the separation of households from workplaces by creating special-purpose buildings—such as offices, factories, stores, and barracks—where office incumbents are separated from their families. However, many scholars believe that this shift has never been completely successful, and aspects of patrimonialism have endured, even in the most industrialized nations (Lachmann, 2011). This phenomenon is also called neopatrimonialism. The presence of familial and personal networks within contemporary rational-legal systems is often considered a form of corruption (Charrad & Adams, 2011; Collins, 2011).

Another foundational dichotomy distinguishes the family from the economic system and capital, reflecting intellectual traditions of managerialism—inspired by Weberian rational-bureaucratic thought—and modernization theory advanced by Talcott Parsons. As Beckert and Stamm (2025) explain, mid-twentieth-century theories portrayed capitalism as a domain governed by rational, impersonal market forces, while the family was cast as a private sphere of emotional intimacy and personal relationships. Managerialism advanced the notion that modern corporations had separated ownership from control—making salaried managers, rather than family owners, the key actors of capitalism. Likewise, influential mid-twentieth-century sociologists reinforced a strict division between the family and the economy, conceptualizing them as distinct social systems with fundamentally different functions: the economy oriented toward profit, and the “modern” nuclear family relegated to emotional support and socialization (Burgess & Locke, 1945; Parsons & Smelser, 1956).

Parsons (1951) also focused on a broader normative shift in modernity—a significant change in societal values from particularism, rooted in local personal ties, to universalism. In traditional societies, particularism reflected value orientations grounded in personal relationships, loyalties, and in-group solidarity within family, kinship, and community networks. In contrast, universalism focuses on evaluating individuals and situations through general, impersonal, and objective criteria such as laws, merit, or qualifications that apply impartially, regardless of specific connections or characteristics. Parsons asserted that industrial societies move from particularistic to universalistic values as an essential adaptation to the complexities of the social system. As societies evolve, they necessitate more abstract, consistent, and codified regulations to guarantee fair treatment and effective functioning amid increasingly diverse and mobile populations.

According to this line of thought, religion may also explain such variations between societies. Scholars differentiate between corporation-based societies in Western Europe and clan-based societies, which are common in regions such as China and the Middle East. This differentiation is linked to enduring religious doctrines affecting family and marriage. In Europe, the influence of Christianity fostered ethical obligations towards non-kin, emphasizing individualism over familial ties. Consequently, as kinship-based structures diminished, a nuclear family model alongside an individualistic culture emerged during the late medieval period, thereby underpinning the ascendance of corporations (Goody, 1983; Greif, 2006). Conversely, societies in China and the Middle East have historically been characterized by clan structures. Within China, Confucianism and post-Song Chinese Buddhism highlighted moral responsibilities towards kin. In addition, clan-based entities, such as extended families and tribes, as well as a notable preference for cousin marriages, continue to significantly influence familial structures in Middle Eastern societies to this day (Bittles, 2012; Courbage & Todd, 2014; Greif, 2006). It is important to recognize that, even though China and much of the Middle East modernized later than Europe, they are now industrialized capitalist societies, partly because Western powers influenced this process.

The modern versus premodern or universal versus particularistic approach to family corruption stems from the idea that contemporary societies are founded on formal, universal, and legally established norms and that widespread informal or particularistic behavior undermines these principles (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007). According to this approach, when individuals or groups bypass formal rules in favor of family relationships and selective treatment, generalized trust in society is eroded, the rule of law is weakened, and inequality is fostered. When people observe that opportunities and decisions are influenced by personal connections rather than fair, transparent, and merit-based processes, they begin to doubt that others will act honestly or that institutions will treat everyone equally. This perspective claims such antagonism is even more relevant in a formal organizational context, since organizations are consciously built on standardized procedures, formal rules, and policies to ensure consistency and effectiveness and reduce conflicts in decision-making and goal-achievement processes. These structures should provide clear, impersonal guidelines for behavior, roles, and responsibilities, helping coordinate efforts and minimize ambiguity and deviation, all going against the very idea of the informality of family.

This book argues that although the universalism-particularism contrast has some merit, it is an ideal type that cannot fully capture the complexity and nuance of corrupt cases involving family members. The simplified and abstract binary model suggests that when family stays in its own territory, the private sphere, it has a positive role; it functions as the essential fabric, the building block of society. However, when it enters the public sphere or formal organizations, it undermines the rule of law and is essentially equivalent to corruption. I believe relying on such a strict dichotomy as a primary explanation for family corruption limits our understanding of the phenomenon. Real-life situations are highly dynamic and embedded in multiple layers of social structure. Private and public spheres are intertwined in many ways. As mentioned earlier, family is a crucial site for economic transactions—activities that many scholars overlook or simplify because they do not fit into the realm of “pure” market transactions. Furthermore, the concept of completely isolating families from formal organizations, such as government and business entities, due to their reliance on informal rules, emotional connections, and non-market objectives, which are inherently incompatible with the organizations’ contractual and impersonal framework, is unfeasible. The reality that approximately two-thirds of companies globally are family-owned or controlled challenges the very notion of such a rigid separation (European Commission, 2008; Song et al., 2021). It is not unusual for world political leaders to appoint family members to government positions. In the United States, President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 appointment of his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, as Attorney General sparked controversy. Despite this, President Donald Trump appointed his daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner as senior advisors (Waxman, 2016). In the United Kingdom, former Prime Minister Boris Johnson faced criticism for appointing his brother, Jo Johnson, to ministerial roles and later to the House of Lords (Landler, 2020). Similarly, in France, President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 23-year-old son, Jean Sarkozy, was poised to lead a central public agency despite lacking relevant experience, leading to public outcry (Gauthier-Villars, 2009). The phenomenon of children, spouses, or other close relatives of influential politicians being elected to significant positions is also common, even in so-called Western democracies. As of June 2024, eleven democracies worldwide had leaders whose fathers or husbands previously occupied similar roles (Loxton, 2024). The list spans the globe and includes Canada, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius, Nauru, the Philippines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Uruguay.

Family is a complex and multifaceted form of social organization that operates simultaneously as a private emotional domain and a unit that provides key social functions. Through an interdisciplinary approach grounded in sociology, this chapter emphasized that family is far more than a domestic or sentimental entity—it is a foundational arrangement that shapes norms, power relations, status transmission, and resource flows within and across generations. Families reproduce social class, mediate access to opportunities, and organize economic activities through informal mechanisms that are both complementary to and in tension with formal institutions. These informal dynamics become particularly significant when considering the relationship between family and corruption.

Corruption, like family, is rarely an isolated act but an organized social activity embedded in situations, local networks, formal hierarchies, and larger social structures. In contrast to the predominant utilitarian approach and constructivist views, corruption here is defined as a socially organized form of resource transfer—often shaped by kinship ties—where at least one party is a member of a formal organization from which resources are extracted. The chapter introduced the concept of family corruption as an underexplored but pervasive phenomenon that emerges when family and corruption overlap. Traditional sociological dichotomies—such as Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft (Tönnies), mechanical vs. organic solidarity (Durkheim), and patrimonialism vs. bureaucracy (Weber)—suggest that the incursion of family into modern, rational-legal systems inevitably results in dysfunction. However, this chapter challenged such binary thinking by showing that the boundaries between private and public, family and organization, informal and formal are often fluid and overlapping. Rather than assuming that family involvement in public or bureaucratic settings is inherently corrupt, a more nuanced, empirical analysis is required to understand the conditions under which such interactions either reinforce or undermine institutional integrity.

As the examples mentioned in this chapter suggest, the informal realm of family and the formal spheres of business and politics intersect more frequently than we might expect. Although potentially ethically questionable, not all of these instances imply family corruption. So, when does family corruption actually happen? What are the potential configurations of the overlaps between the two forms of social organization, family and corruption? What interests and benefits do corrupt actors gain from including their family members in such transactions? What is it for a family to get involved in corruption? I answer these questions in the following chapters of the book.