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Über dieses Buch

The 9th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2005) was held in the Commonwealth of Dominica from February 28 to March 3, 2005. This conference, organized by the International Financial Cryptography Association (IFCA), continues to be the premier international forum for research, exploration, and debate regarding security in the context of finance and commerce. The conference title and scope was expanded this year to cover all aspects of securing transactions and systems. The goal is to build an interdisciplinary meeting, bringing together cryptographers, data-security specialists, business and economy researchers, as well as economists, IT professionals, implementers, and policy makers. We think that this goal was met this year. The conference received 90 submissions and 24 papers were accepted, 22 in the Research track and 2 in the Systems and Applications track. In addition, the conference featured two distinguished invited speakers, Bezalel Gavish and Lynne Coventry, and two interesting panel sessions, one on phishing and the other on economics and information security. Also, for the first time, some of the papers that were judged to be very strong but did not make the final program were selected for special invitation to our Works in Progress (Rump) Session that took place on Wednesday evening. Three papers were highlighted in this forum this year, and short versions of the papers are included here. As always, other conference attendees were also invited to make presentations during the rump session, and the evening lived up to its colorful reputation.



Threat and Attacks

Fraud Within Asymmetric Multi-hop Cellular Networks


Financial Cryptography 2003

, Jakobsson, Hubaux, and Buttyán suggested a lightweight micro-payment scheme aimed at encouraging routing collaboration in asymmetric multi-hop cellular networks. We will show in this paper that this scheme suffers from some weaknesses. Firstly, we will describe an attack which enables two adversaries in the same cell to communicate freely without being challenged by the operator center. We will put forward a solution to fix this protocol. Then we will describe another method that allows an attacker to determine the secret keys of the other users. This attack thwarts the micro-payment scheme’s purpose because an attacker can thus communicate without being charged. Finally we will suggest some solutions to counteract this attack.

Gildas Avoine

Protecting Secret Data from Insider Attacks

We consider defenses against confidentiality and integrity attacks on data following break-ins, or so-called intrusion resistant storage technologies. We investigate the problem of protecting secret data, assuming an attacker is inside a target network or has compromised a system.

We give a definition of the problem area, and propose a solution, VAST, that uses large, structured files to improve the secure storage of valuable or secret data. Each secret has its multiple shares randomly distributed in an extremely large file. Random decoy shares and the lack of usable identification information prevent selective copying or analysis of the file. No single part of the file yields useful information in isolation from the rest. The file’s size and structure therefore present an enormous additional hurdle to attackers attempting to transfer, steal or analyze the data. The system also has the remarkable property of healing itself after malicious corruption, thereby preserving both the confidentiality and integrity of the data.

David Dagon, Wenke Lee, Richard Lipton

Countering Identity Theft Through Digital Uniqueness, Location Cross-Checking, and Funneling

One of today’s fastest growing crimes is identity theft – the unauthorized use and exploitation of another individual’s identity-corroborating information. It is exacerbated by the availability of personal information on the Internet. Published research proposing technical solutions is sparse. In this paper, we identify some underlying problems facilitating identity theft. To address the problem of identity theft and the use of stolen or forged credentials, we propose an authentication architecture and system combining a physical location cross-check, a method for assuring uniqueness of location claims, and a centralized verification process. We suggest that this system merits consideration for practical use, and hope it serves to stimulate within the security research community, further discussion of technical solutions to the problem of identity theft.

Paul C. van Oorschot, S. Stubblebine

Invited Speaker

Trust and Swindling on the Internet

Fraud on the Internet is developing into a major issue of concern for consumers and businesses. Media outlets report that online fraud represents “an epidemic of huge and rapidly growing proportions”. One area that is particularly of interest is the area of swindling activities related to online auctions. Understanding fraud is especially important because of the “network externality” effect, in which a large number of satisfied users attracts other users to use the commercial services offered through the Internet, this effect is based on the knowledge that satisfied traders induce others to trade on the Internet increasing the trading system efficiency. Headlines that present swindling activities on the internet deter users from using the internet for commercial activities.

Bezalel Gavish

Digital Signing Methods

Identity-Based Partial Message Recovery Signatures (or How to Shorten ID-Based Signatures)

We propose a new notion of short identity-based signature scheme. We argue that the identity-based environment is essential in some scenarios. The notion of short identity-based signature schemes can be viewed as identity-based (partial) message recovery signatures. Signature schemes with message recovery has been extensively studied in the literature. This problem is somewhat related to the problem of signing short messages using a scheme that minimizes the total length of the original message and the appended signature. In this paper, firstly, we revisit this notion and propose an identity-based message recovery signature scheme. Our scheme can be regarded as the identity based version of Abe-Okamoto’s scheme [1]. Then, we extend our scheme to achieve an identity-based partial message recovery signature scheme. In this scheme, the signature is appended to a truncated message and the discarded bytes are recovered by the verification algorithm. This is to answer the limitation of signature schemes with message recovery that usually deal with messages of fixed length. This paper opens a new research area, namely how to shorten identity based signatures, in contrast to proposing a short signature scheme. We present this novel notion together with two concrete schemes based on bilinear pairings.

Fangguo Zhang, Willy Susilo, Yi Mu

Time Capsule Signature

We introduce a new cryptographic problem called

time capsule signature

. Time capsule signature is a ‘future signature’ that becomes valid from a specific future time


, when a trusted third party (called

Time Server

) publishes some trapdoor information associated with the time


. In addition, time capsule signature should satisfy the following properties:


If the signer wants, she can make her time capsule signature effective before the pre-defined time




The recipient of ‘future signature’ can verify right away that the signature will become valid no later than at time




Time Server need not contact any user at any time, and in fact does not need to know anything about the PKI employed by the users.


Signatures completed by the signer before time


are indistinguishable from the ones completed using the Time Server at time



We provide the rigorous definition of time capsule signature and the generic construction based on another new primitive of independent interest, which we call

identity-based trapdoor hard-to-invert relation



). We also show an efficient construction of


s (and, hence, time capsule signatures) in the random oracle model, and a less efficient construction in the standard model.

If the time


is replaced by a specific event, the concept of time capsule signature can be generalized to

event capsule signature


Yevgeniy Dodis, Dae Hyun Yum

Policy-Based Cryptography and Applications

In this paper, we introduce the concept of

policy-based cryptography

which makes it possible to perform policy enforcement in large-scale open environments like the Internet, while respecting the data minimization principle according to which only strictly necessary information should be collected for a given purpose. We propose concrete policy-based encryption and signature schemes, based on bilinear pairings, which allow performing relatively efficient encryption and signature operations with respect to credential-based policies formalized as boolean expressions written in generic conjunctive-disjunctive normal form. We illustrate the privacy properties of our policy-based cryptographic schemes through the description of three application scenarios.

Walid Bagga, Refik Molva


A Chat at the Old Phishin’ Hole

Phishing is an attack in which victims are lured by official looking email to a fraudulent web-site that appears to be that of a legitimate service provider. The email also provides victims with a convincing reason to log-on to the site. If users are fooled into logging-on, then the attacker is provided with the victims’ authentication information for the legitimate service provider, often along with personal information, such as their credit-card data, checking account information or social security data. Successful phishing attacks can result not only in identity and asset theft, but also in more subtle attacks that need not be directly directly harmful to the victim but which have negative consequences for society (for example: money laundering).

Richard Clayton, Drew Dean, Markus Jakobsson, Steven Myers, Stuart Stubblebine, Michael Szydlo

Modeling and Preventing Phishing Attacks


first contribution

of this paper is a theoretical yet practically applicable model covering a large set of phishing attacks, aimed towards developing an understanding of threats relating to phishing. We model an attack by a

phishing graph

in which nodes correspond to knowledge or access rights, and (directed) edges correspond to means of obtaining information or access rights from already possessed information or access rights – whether this involves interaction with the victim or not. Edges may also be associated with probabilities, costs, or other measures of the hardness of traversing the graph. This allows us to quantify the effort of traversing a graph from some starting node (corresponding to publicly available information) to a target node that corresponds to access to a resource of the attacker’s choice. We discuss how to perform economic analysis on the viability of attacks. A quantification of the economical viability of various attacks allows a pinpointing of weak links for which improved security mechanisms would improve overall system security.

Markus Jakobsson

Helping the Phish Detect the Lure

When a client attempts to interact with an online service provider that performs any form of financial transaction, the service provider requires the client to authenticate itself. This is normally done by having the client provide a user-name and password that were previously agreed upon, through some procedure, the first time the client attempted to use the services provided by the provider. Asymmetrically, the client does not ask the provider for the same form of authentication. That is, the customer of the bank does not ask the web-page to somehow prove that it is really the bank’s web-page. This asymmetry seems to come mostly from an attempt to port security models from the physical to the digital world: I would never expect a physical bank branch to authenticate itself to me through any form other than its branding. However, that is not to say customers don’t implicitly authenticate their bank-branches, they do! However, it is a rather implicit authentication that is based on the use of branding and law-enforcement by the banks. Unfortunately, many of the security assumptions that hold in the physical world do not hold in the digital world: the costs of setting up an authentic looking but fraudulent web-page are low; the pay-off for successful phishing attacks is high; and digital law enforcement is weak to non-existent in the digital realm and so the risks are minimal. This makes phishing an attractive type of fraud, and has led to its growing popularity.

Steven Myers

Who’d Phish from the Summit of Kilimanjaro?

Phishing emails are now so convincing that even experts cannot tell what is or is not genuine; though one of my own quiz answering errors resulted from failing to believe that genuine marketeers could possibly be so clueless! Thus I believe that education of end users will be almost entirely ineffective and education of marketing departments – to remove “click on this” (and HTML generally) from the genuine material – is going to take some time.

Richard Clayton


A Privacy-Protecting Coupon System

A coupon represents the right to claim some service which is typically offered by vendors. In practice, issuing bundled multi-coupons is more efficient than issuing single coupons separately. The diversity of interests of the parties involved in a coupon system demands additional security properties beyond the common requirements (e.g., unforgeability). Customers wish to preserve their privacy when using the multi-coupon bundle and to prevent vendors from profiling. Vendors are interested in establishing a long-term customer relationship and not to subsidise one-time customers, since coupons are cheaper than the regular price. We propose a secure multi-coupon system that allows users to redeem a predefined number of single coupons from the same multi-coupon. The system provides unlinkability and also hides the number of remaining coupons of a multi-coupon from the vendor. A method used in the coupon system might be of independent interest. It proves knowledge of a signature on a message tuple of which a single message can be revealed while the remaining elements of the tuple, the index of the revealed message, as well as the signature remain hidden.

Liqun Chen, Matthias Enzmann, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Markus Schneider, Michael Steiner

Testing Disjointness of Private Datasets

Two parties, say Alice and Bob, possess two sets of elements that belong to a universe of possible values and wish to test whether these sets are disjoint or not. In this paper we consider the above problem in the setting where Alice and Bob wish to disclose no information to each other about their sets beyond the single bit: “whether the intersection is empty or not.” This problem has many applications in commercial settings where two mutually distrustful parties wish to decide with minimum possible disclosure whether there is any overlap between their private datasets. We present three protocols that solve the above problem that meet different efficiency and security objectives and data representation scenarios. Our protocols are based on Homomorphic encryption and in our security analysis, we consider the semi-honest setting as well as the malicious setting. Our most efficient construction for a large universe in terms of overall communication complexity uses a new encryption primitive that we introduce called “superposed encryption.” We formalize this notion and provide a construction that may be of independent interest. For dealing with the malicious adversarial setting we take advantage of recent efficient constructions of Universally-Composable commitments based on verifiable encryption as well as zero-knowledge proofs of language membership.

Aggelos Kiayias, Antonina Mitrofanova

Hardware Oriented Mechanisms

RFID Traceability: A Multilayer Problem

RFID tags have very promising applications in many domains (retail, rental, surveillance, medicine to name a few). Unfortunately the use of these tags can have serious implications on the privacy of people carrying tagged items. Serious opposition from consumers has already thwarted several trials of this technology. The main fears associated with the tags is that they may allow other parties to covertly collect information about people or to trace them wherever they go. As long as these privacy issues remain unresolved, it will be impossible to reap the benefits of these new applications. Current solutions to privacy problems are typically limited to the application layer. RFID system have three layers, application, communication and physical. We demonstrate that privacy issues cannot be solved without looking at each layer separately. We also show that current solutions fail to address the multilayer aspect of privacy and as a result fail to protect it. For each layer we describe the main threats and give tentative solutions.

Gildas Avoine, Philippe Oechslin

Information-Theoretic Security Analysis of Physical Uncloneable Functions

We propose a general theoretical framework to analyze the security of Physical Uncloneable Functions (PUFs). We apply the framework to optical PUFs. In particular we present a derivation, based on the physics governing multiple scattering processes, of the number of independent challenge-response pairs supported by a PUF. We find that the number of independent challenge-response pairs is proportional to the square of the thickness of the PUF and inversely proportional to the scattering length and the wavelength of the laser light. We compare our results to those of Pappu and show that they coincide in the case where the density of scatterers becomes very high.Finally, we discuss some attacks on PUFs, and introduce the Slow PUF as a way to thwart brute force attacks.

P. Tuyls, B. Škorić, S. Stallinga, A. H. M. Akkermans, W. Ophey

Supporting Financial Transactions

Risk Assurance for Hedge Funds Using Zero Knowledge Proofs

This work introduces a new tool for a fund manager to verifiably communicate portfolio risk characteristics to an investor. We address the classic dilemma:

How can an investor and fund manager build trust when the two party’s interests are not aligned?

In addition to high returns, a savvy investor would like a fund’s composition to reflect his own risk preferences. Hedge funds, on the other hand, seek high returns (and commissions) by exploiting arbitrage opportunities and keeping them secret. The nature and amount of risk present in these highly secretive portfolios and hedging strategies are certainly not transparent to the investor.

This work describes how to apply standard tools of cryptographic



zero-knowledge proofs

, to financial engineering. The idea is to have the fund manager describe the portfolio contents indirectly by specifying the asset quantities with cryptographic commitments. Without de-committing the portfolio composition, the manager can use zero knowledge proofs to reveal chosen features to investors – such as the portfolio’s approximate sector allocation, risk factor sensitivities, or its future value under a hypothetical scenario.

The investor can verify that the revealed portfolio features are consistent with the committed portfolio, thus obtaining strong assurance of their correctness – any dishonest portfolio commitment would later serve as clear-cut evidence of fraud. The result is a closer alignment of the manager’s and investor’s interests: the investor can monitor the fund’s risk characteristics, and the fund manager can proceed without leaking the exact security composition to competitors.

Michael Szydlo

Probabilistic Escrow of Financial Transactions with Cumulative Threshold Disclosure

We propose a scheme for privacy-preserving escrow of financial transactions. The objective of the scheme is to preserve privacy and anonymity of the individual user engaging in financial transactions until the cumulative amount of all transactions in a certain category, for example all transactions with a particular counterparty in any single month, reaches a pre-specified threshold. When the threshold is reached, the escrow agency automatically gains the ability to decrypt the escrows of all transactions in that category (and only that category).

Our scheme employs the

probabilistic polling

idea of Jarecki and Odlyzko [JO97], amended by a novel robustness mechanism which makes such scheme secure for malicious parties. When submitting the escrow of a transaction, with probability that is proportional to the amount of the transaction, the user reveals a share of the key under which all his transactions are encrypted. Therefore, the fraction of shares that are known to the escrow agency is an accurate approximation of the fraction of the threshold amount that has been transacted so far. When the threshold is reached, with high probability the escrow agency possesses all the shares that it needs to reconstruct the key and open the escrows. Our main technical contribution is a novel tool of

robust probabilistic information transfer

, which we implement using techniques of optimistic fair 2-party computation.

Stanisław Jarecki, Vitaly Shmatikov

Systems, Applications, and Experiences

Views, Reactions and Impact of Digitally-Signed Mail in e-Commerce

We surveyed 470 merchants regarding their experience, knowledge and perceptions of digitally-signed email. Some of these merchants (93) had been receiving digitally-signed VAT invoices from Amazon for more than a year. Respondents attitudes were measured as to the role of signed and/or sealed mail in e-commerce. Among our findings: 25.2% of merchants thought that receipts sent by online merchants should be digitally-signed, 13.2% thought they should be sealed with encryption, and 33.6% thought that they should be both signed and sealed. Statistically-significant differences between merchants who had received the signed mail and those who had not are noted. We conclude that Internet-based merchants should send digitally-signed email as a “best practice,” even if they think that their customers will not understand the signatures, on the grounds that today’s email systems handle such signatures automatically and the passive exposure to signatures appears to increase acceptance and trust.

Simson L. Garfinkel, Jeffrey I. Schiller, Erik Nordlander, David Margrave, Robert C. Miller

Securing Sensitive Data with the Ingrian DataSecure Platform

Recent high profile data thefts have shown that perimeter defenses are not sufficient to secure important customer data. The damage caused by these thefts can be disastrous, and today an enterprise with poor data security may also find itself violating privacy legislation and be liable to civil lawsuits. The Ingrian DataSecure Platform presents an approach for protecting data inside the enterprise – and so to help eliminate many of the threats of data theft.

This paper demonstrates how an enterprise can prevent unauthorized data exposure by implementing column encryption in commercially available databases. Adding security at the database layer allows an enterprise to protect sensitive data without rewriting associated applications. Furthermore, large enterprises require scalable and easily administrable solutions. In order to satisfy this demand this paper introduces the concept of a Network-Attached Encryption Server, a central device with secure storage and extensive user access permissions for protecting persistent security credentials.

Andrew Koyfman

Ciphire Mail Email Encryption and Authentication

Ciphire Mail is cryptographic software that provides email encryption and digital signatures. The Ciphire Mail client resides on the user’s computer between the email client and the email server, intercepting, encrypting, decrypting, signing, and authenticating email communication. During normal operation, all operations are performed in the background, making it very easy to use even for non-technical users. Ciphire Mail provides automated secure public-key exchange using an automated fingerprinting system. It uses cryptographic hash values to identify and validate certificates, thus enabling clients to detect malicious modification of certificates. This data is automatically circulated among clients, making it impossible to execute fraud without alerting users. The Ciphire system is a novel concept for making public-key cryptography and key exchange usable for email communication. It is the first transparent email encryption system that allows everyone to secure their communications without a steep learning curve.

Lars Eilebrecht

Message Authentication

A User-Friendly Approach to Human Authentication of Messages

Users are often forced to trust potentially malicious terminals when trying to interact with a remote secure system. This paper presents an approach for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of messages sent through an untrusted terminal by a user to a remote trusted computing base and vice versa. The approach is both secure and easy to use. It leverages the difficulty computers have in addressing some artificial intelligence problems and therefore requires no complex computation on the part of the user. This paper describes the general form of the approach, analyzes its security and user-friendliness, and describes an example implementation based on rendering a 3-D scene.

Jeff King, Andre dos Santos

Approximate Message Authentication and Biometric Entity Authentication

Approximate Message Authentication Code (AMAC) is a recently introduced cryptographic primitive with several applications in the areas of cryptography and coding theory. Briefly speaking, AMACs represent a way to provide data authentication that is tolerant to acceptable modifications of the original message. Although constructs had been proposed for this primitive, no security analysis or even modeling had been done.

In this paper we propose a rigorous model for the design and security analysis of AMACs. We then present two AMAC constructions with desirable efficiency and security properties.

AMAC is a useful primitive with several applications of different nature. A major one, that we study in this paper, is that of entity authentication via biometric techniques or passwords over noisy channels. We present a formal model for the design and analysis of biometric entity authentication schemes and show simple and natural constructions of such schemes starting from any AMAC.

G. Di Crescenzo, R. Graveman, R. Ge, G. Arce

Exchanges and Contracts

Analysis of a Multi-party Fair Exchange Protocol and Formal Proof of Correctness in the Strand Space Model

A multi-party fair exchange protocol is a cryptographic protocol allowing several parties to exchange commodities in such a way that everyone gives an item away if and only if it receives an item in return. In this paper we discuss a multi-party fair exchange protocol originally proposed by Franklin and Tsudik, and subsequently shown to have flaws and fixed by González and Markowitch. We identify flaws in the fixed version of the protocol, propose a corrected version, and give a formal proof of correctness in the strand space model.

Aybek Mukhamedov, Steve Kremer, Eike Ritter

Achieving Fairness in Private Contract Negotiation

Suppose Alice and Bob are two entities (e.g. agents, organizations, etc.) that wish to negotiate a contract. A contract consists of several clauses, and each party has certain constraints on the acceptability and desirability (i.e., a private “utility” function) of each clause. If Bob were to reveal his constraints to Alice in order to find an agreement, then she would learn an unacceptable amount of information about his business operations or strategy. To alleviate this problem we propose the use of Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) to find an agreement between the two parties. There are two parts to this: i) determining whether an agreement is possible (if not then no other information should be revealed), and ii) in case an agreement is possible, coming up with a contract that is


(acceptable to both parties),


(when many valid and good outcomes are possible one of them is selected randomly with a uniform distribution, without either party being able to control the outcome), and


(no clause is replaceable by another that is better for both parties). It is the fairness constraint in (ii) that is the centerpiece of this paper as it requires novel techniques that produce a solution that is more efficient than general SFE techniques. We give protocols for all of the above in the semi-honest model, and we do not assume the Random Oracle Model.

Keith Frikken, Mikhail Atallah

Auctions and Voting

Small Coalitions Cannot Manipulate Voting

We demonstrate how to make voting protocols resistant against manipulation by computationally bounded malicious voters, by extending the previous results of Conitzer and Sandholm in several important directions: we use one-way functions to close a security loophole that allowed voting officials to exert disproportionate influence on the outcome and show that our hardness results hold against a large fraction of manipulating voters (rather than a single voter). These improvements address important concerns in the field of secure voting systems. We also discuss the limitations of the current approach, showing that it cannot be used to achieve certain very desirable hardness criteria.

Edith Elkind, Helger Lipmaa

Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions

The purpose of multi-unit auctions is to allocate identical units of a single type of good to multiple agents. Besides well-known applications like the selling of treasury bills, electrical power, or spectrum licenses, multi-unit auctions are also well-suited for allocating CPU time slots or network bandwidth in computational multiagent systems. A crucial problem in sealed-bid auctions is the lack of trust bidders might have in the auctioneer. For one, bidders might doubt the correctness of the auction outcome. Secondly, they are reluctant to reveal their private valuations to the auctioneer since these valuations are often based on sensitive information. We propose privacy-preserving protocols that allow bidders to jointly compute the auction outcome without the help of third parties. All three common types of multi-unit auctions (uniform-price, discriminatory, and generalized Vickrey auctions) are considered for the case of marginal decreasing valuation functions. Our protocols are based on distributed homomorphic encryption and can be executed in a small constant number of rounds in the random oracle model. Security merely relies on computational intractability (the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption). In particular, no subset of (computationally bounded) colluding participants is capable of uncovering private information.

Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm

Event Driven Private Counters

We define and instantiate a cryptographic scheme called “private counters”, which can be used in applications such as preferential voting to express and update preferences (or any secret) privately and non-interactively. A private counter consists of an encrypted value together with rules for updating that value if certain events occur. Updates are private: the rules do not reveal how the value of the counter is updated, nor even whether it is updated for a certain event. Updates are non-interactive: a counter can be updated without communicating with its creator. A private counter also contains an encrypted bit indicating if the current value in the counter is within a pre-specified range.

We also define a privacy model for private counters and prove that our construction satisfies this notion of privacy. As an application of private counters, we present an efficient protocol for preferential voting that hides the order in which voters rank candidates, and thus offers greater privacy guarantees than any other preferential voting scheme.

Eu-Jin Goh, Philippe Golle

Works in Progress

Secure Distributed Human Computation

We suggest a general paradigm of using large-scale distributed computation to solve difficult problems, but where humans can act as agents and provide candidate solutions. We are especially motivated by problem classes that appear to be difficult for computers to solve effectively, but are easier for humans; e.g., image analysis, speech recognition, and natural language processing. This paradigm already seems to be employed in several real-world scenarios, but we are unaware of any formal and unified attempt to study it. Nonetheless, this concept spawns interesting research questions in cryptography, algorithm design, human computer interfaces, and programming language / API design, among other fields. There are also interesting implications for Internet commerce and the B24b model. We describe this general research area at a high level and touch upon some preliminary work; a more extensive treatment can be found in [6].

Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart Stubblebine

Secure Multi-attribute Procurement Auction

In this paper, we develop a secure multi-attribute procurement auction, in which a sales item is defined by several attributes called qualities, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. We first present a Vickrey-type protocol that can be used for multi-attribute procurement auctions.Next, we show how this protocol can be executed securely.

Koutarou Suzuki, Makoto Yokoo

Audit File Reduction Using N-Gram Models

While some accurate, current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS’s) get rapidly overwhelmed with contemporary information workload [1,2]. This problem partly dwells in the number of repetitive spurious information that IDS’s unnecessarily analyse. Using this observation, we propose a methodology which can be used to significantly remove such spurious information and thus alleviate intrusion detection.

Fernando Godínez, Dieter Hutter, Raúl Monroy

User Authentication

Interactive Diffie-Hellman Assumptions with Applications to Password-Based Authentication

Password-based authenticated key exchange are protocols that are designed to provide strong authentication for client-server applications, such as online banking, even when the users’ secret keys are considered weak (e.g., a four-digit pin). In this paper, we address this problem in the three-party setting, in which the parties trying to authenticate each other and to establish a session key only share a password with a trusted server and not directly among themselves. This is the same setting used in the popular


network authentication system. More precisely, we introduce a new three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol. Our protocol is reasonably efficient and has a per-user computational cost that is comparable to that of the underlying two-party authenticated key exchange protocol. The proof of security is in the random oracle model and is based on new and apparently stronger variants of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem which are of independent interest.

Michel Abdalla, David Pointcheval

Secure Biometric Authentication for Weak Computational Devices

This paper presents computationally “lightweight” schemes for performing biometric authentication that carry out the comparison stage without revealing any information that can later be used to impersonate the user (or reveal personal biometric information). Unlike some previous computationally expensive schemes — which make use of slower cryptographic primitives — this paper presents methods that are particularly suited to financial institutions that authenticate users with biometric smartcards, sensors, and other computationally limited devices. In our schemes, the client and server need only perform cryptographic hash computations on the feature vectors, and do not perform any expensive digital signatures or public-key encryption operations. In fact, the schemes we present have properties that make them appealing even in a framework of powerful devices capable of public-key signatures and encryptions. Our schemes make it computationally infeasible for an attacker to impersonate a user even if the attacker completely compromises the information stored at the server, including all the server’s secret keys. Likewise, our schemes make it computationally infeasible for an attacker to impersonate a user even if the attacker completely compromises the information stored at the client device (but not the biometric itself, which is assumed to remain attached to the user and is not stored on the client device in any form).

Mikhail J. Atallah, Keith B. Frikken, Michael T. Goodrich, Roberto Tamassia

Panel Summary: Incentives, Markets and Information Security

Economics and information security should be naturally related: the former deals with the value and distribution of scarce resources, while the latter focuses on protecting and controlling valued resources. Indeed, the observation that information security should be informed by economic theory is not new. Anderson [1] and others have explicitly highlighted the relationship, which can be seen as a natural progression from the economics of crime literature that dates back to the 1960s [2].

Allan Friedman


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