Skip to main content

2023 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Flexible Monetary Policy Rules from the Great Moderation to the New Normal Times (1993–2023): A Forward-Looking Review

verfasst von : Donato Masciandaro

Erschienen in: Monetary Policy Normalization

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The never-ending debate on the optimal money elasticity and predictability, coupled with the recent wishes of the major central banks to normalize monetary policy, motivate this analysis. Its aim is to offer a review of the evolution of the modern concept of flexible monetary policy rules, from the seminal contribution of (Taylor, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39:195–214, 1993) to nowadays. Four subsequent steps are implemented: after an excursus on the traditional rules versus discretion debate, the origin of the flexible rules is described, and then its evolution; finally, the opportunity to consider as a research perspective the role of the central bankers’ heterogeneity—in terms of personal preferences, including the behavioural biases—is highlighted. The more it is likely that psychology matters, the more a new motivation arises for a central bank to adopt a flexible rule.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
It is worth noting that the original Taylor Rule specification is still used; see Vinci and Licandro (2021).
 
2
However, endogeneity problems can be just minimized. In fact, central banks react to variables that are in turn endogenous to previous monetary policy shocks, both intended and unintended ones. In this case, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations, endogeneity implies a correlation between regressors and the error term—i.e. an asymptotic bias—that however can be addressed (Carvalho et al., 2021). Alternatively, estimations by Instrumental Variables (IV) or Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) can solve such as endogeneity problem (Clarida et al., 1999).
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Anderson, E., Malin, B. A., Nakamura, E., Simester, D., & Steinsson, J. (2017). Information rigidities and the sickness of temporary sales. Journal of Monetary Economics, 90, 64–83.CrossRef Anderson, E., Malin, B. A., Nakamura, E., Simester, D., & Steinsson, J. (2017). Information rigidities and the sickness of temporary sales. Journal of Monetary Economics, 90, 64–83.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Angeletos, G. M., & Lian, C. (2023). Determinacy without the Taylor Principle. Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming. Angeletos, G. M., & Lian, C. (2023). Determinacy without the Taylor Principle. Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
Zurück zum Zitat Avdjiev, S., Gambacorta, L., Goldberg, L. S., & Schiaffi, S. (2020). The shifting drivers of global liquidity. Journal of International Economics, 125, 103324.CrossRef Avdjiev, S., Gambacorta, L., Goldberg, L. S., & Schiaffi, S. (2020). The shifting drivers of global liquidity. Journal of International Economics, 125, 103324.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Barro, R. T., & Gordon, D. B. (1983). Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101–121.CrossRef Barro, R. T., & Gordon, D. B. (1983). Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 101–121.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Beck, G. W., & Wieland, V. (2008). Central bank misperceptions and the role of money in interest rate rules. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(1), 1–17.CrossRef Beck, G. W., & Wieland, V. (2008). Central bank misperceptions and the role of money in interest rate rules. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(1), 1–17.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bernanke, B. S., & Gertler, M. (1995). Inside the black box: The credit channel of monetary policy transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 27–48.CrossRef Bernanke, B. S., & Gertler, M. (1995). Inside the black box: The credit channel of monetary policy transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 27–48.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bhattarai, S., & Neely, C. J. (2022). An analysis of the literature on international unconventional monetary policy. Journal of Economic Literature, 60(2), 527–597.CrossRef Bhattarai, S., & Neely, C. J. (2022). An analysis of the literature on international unconventional monetary policy. Journal of Economic Literature, 60(2), 527–597.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bohm, T., & Sing, M. (2022). Evaluating the Reserve Bank’s forecasting performance. Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 85(4), 1–33. Bohm, T., & Sing, M. (2022). Evaluating the Reserve Bank’s forecasting performance. Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 85(4), 1–33.
Zurück zum Zitat Brunnermeier, M. K. (2023). Monetary policy in a changing world. Finance & Development, (March), 5–9. Brunnermeier, M. K. (2023). Monetary policy in a changing world. Finance & Development, (March), 5–9.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1962). Predictability: The criterion of monetary constitutions. Harvard University Press Buchanan, J. M. (1962). Predictability: The criterion of monetary constitutions. Harvard University Press
Zurück zum Zitat Bunzel, H., & Enders, W. (2010). The Taylor rule and the “opportunist” monetary policy Journal of Money. Credit and Banking, 42(5), 931–949.CrossRef Bunzel, H., & Enders, W. (2010). The Taylor rule and the “opportunist” monetary policy Journal of Money. Credit and Banking, 42(5), 931–949.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Calvo, G. A. (1978). On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy. Econometrica, 46(6), 1411–1428.CrossRef Calvo, G. A. (1978). On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy. Econometrica, 46(6), 1411–1428.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Campbell, J. R. (2013). Odyssean forward guidance in monetary policy: A primer. Economic Perspective, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 4Q, 130–152. Campbell, J. R. (2013). Odyssean forward guidance in monetary policy: A primer. Economic Perspective, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 4Q, 130–152.
Zurück zum Zitat Canova, F. (2009). What explains the great moderation in the US? A structural analysis. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(4), 697–721.CrossRef Canova, F. (2009). What explains the great moderation in the US? A structural analysis. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(4), 697–721.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Castro, V. (2011). Can central bank monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented) Tylor rule or by a nonlinear rule? Journal of Financial Stability, 7, 228–246.CrossRef Castro, V. (2011). Can central bank monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented) Tylor rule or by a nonlinear rule? Journal of Financial Stability, 7, 228–246.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chappell, H. W. M., Jr., Havrilesky, T., & McGregor, R. R. (1997). Monetary policy preferences of Individual FOMC members: A content analysis of the memoranda of discussion. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(3), 454–460.CrossRef Chappell, H. W. M., Jr., Havrilesky, T., & McGregor, R. R. (1997). Monetary policy preferences of Individual FOMC members: A content analysis of the memoranda of discussion. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(3), 454–460.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chappell, H. W. M., Jr., & McGregor, R. R. (1993). Partisan monetary policies: Presidential influence through the power of appointment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), 185–218.CrossRef Chappell, H. W. M., Jr., & McGregor, R. R. (1993). Partisan monetary policies: Presidential influence through the power of appointment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), 185–218.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Clarida, R., Galì, J., & Gertler, M. (1998). Monetary policy rules in practice. European Economic Review, 42(6), 1033–1067.CrossRef Clarida, R., Galì, J., & Gertler, M. (1998). Monetary policy rules in practice. European Economic Review, 42(6), 1033–1067.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Clarida, R., Galì, J., & Gertler, M. (1999). The science of monetary policy: A new Keynesian perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1661–1707.CrossRef Clarida, R., Galì, J., & Gertler, M. (1999). The science of monetary policy: A new Keynesian perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1661–1707.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Clerc, P., & Boianovsky, M. (2023). Michael Woodford’s Interest & Prices after twenty years, Mimeograph. Clerc, P., & Boianovsky, M. (2023). Michael Woodfords Interest & Prices after twenty years, Mimeograph.
Zurück zum Zitat Coibion, O., & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2015). Is the Phillips curve alive and well after all? Inflation expectations and the missing disinflation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1), 197–232. Coibion, O., & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2015). Is the Phillips curve alive and well after all? Inflation expectations and the missing disinflation. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1), 197–232.
Zurück zum Zitat Cukierman, A., Web, S. B., & Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes. World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), 353–398.CrossRef Cukierman, A., Web, S. B., & Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes. World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), 353–398.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Curdia, V., & Woodford, M. (2011). The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58, 54–79.CrossRef Curdia, V., & Woodford, M. (2011). The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58, 54–79.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Dellas, H., & Tavlas, G. S. (2016). Friedman, Chicago and monetary rules. In R. A. Cord & J. D. Hammond (Eds.), Milton Friedman (pp. 198–216). Oxford University Press. Dellas, H., & Tavlas, G. S. (2016). Friedman, Chicago and monetary rules. In R. A. Cord & J. D. Hammond (Eds.), Milton Friedman (pp. 198–216). Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Eijffinger, S. C., & Masciandaro, D. (Eds.). (2018). Hawks and doves: Deeds and words. CEPR Press. Eijffinger, S. C., & Masciandaro, D. (Eds.). (2018). Hawks and doves: Deeds and words. CEPR Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Favara, G., & Giordani, P. (2009). Reconsidering the role of money for output, prices and interest rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(3), 419–430.CrossRef Favara, G., & Giordani, P. (2009). Reconsidering the role of money for output, prices and interest rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(3), 419–430.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Fourcans, A., & Vranceanu, R. (2004). The ECB interest rate rule under the Duisenberg presidency. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 579–595.CrossRef Fourcans, A., & Vranceanu, R. (2004). The ECB interest rate rule under the Duisenberg presidency. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 579–595.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Friedman, M. (1962). Should there be an independent monetary authority? In L. B. Yeager (Ed.), Search of a monetary constitution (pp. 114–118). Harvard University Press. Friedman, M. (1962). Should there be an independent monetary authority? In L. B. Yeager (Ed.), Search of a monetary constitution (pp. 114–118). Harvard University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Gali, J., & Monacelli, T. (2005). Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy. Review of Economic Studies, 72(3), 707–734.CrossRef Gali, J., & Monacelli, T. (2005). Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy. Review of Economic Studies, 72(3), 707–734.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Gerlach-Kristen, P. (2009). Outsiders at the Bank of England’s MPC. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(6), 1099–1115.CrossRef Gerlach-Kristen, P. (2009). Outsiders at the Bank of England’s MPC. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(6), 1099–1115.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Hasui, K., Kobayashi, T., & Sugo, T. (2021). Optimal irreversible monetary policy. European Economic Review, forthcoming. Hasui, K., Kobayashi, T., & Sugo, T. (2021). Optimal irreversible monetary policy. European Economic Review, forthcoming.
Zurück zum Zitat Ilbas, P. (2012). Revealing the preferences of the US Federal Reserve. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 27(3), 440–473.CrossRef Ilbas, P. (2012). Revealing the preferences of the US Federal Reserve. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 27(3), 440–473.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ireland, P. N. (2004). Money’s role in the monetary business cycle. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36, 969–983.CrossRef Ireland, P. N. (2004). Money’s role in the monetary business cycle. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36, 969–983.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jung, A. (2013). Policy makers interest rates preferences: Recent evidence on for three monetary policy committees. International Journal of Central Banking, 9(3), 45–192. Jung, A. (2013). Policy makers interest rates preferences: Recent evidence on for three monetary policy committees. International Journal of Central Banking, 9(3), 45–192.
Zurück zum Zitat Levin, A., Wieland, V., & Williams, J. C. (2003). The performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules under model uncertainty. American Economic Review, 93(3), 622–645.CrossRef Levin, A., Wieland, V., & Williams, J. C. (2003). The performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules under model uncertainty. American Economic Review, 93(3), 622–645.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lubik, T., & Schorfheide, F. (2007). Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? A structural investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 1069–1087.CrossRef Lubik, T., & Schorfheide, F. (2007). Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? A structural investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 1069–1087.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Malmendier, U., Nagel, S., & Zhen, Y. (2021). The making of hawks and doves. Journal of Monetary Economics, 117, 19–42.CrossRef Malmendier, U., Nagel, S., & Zhen, Y. (2021). The making of hawks and doves. Journal of Monetary Economics, 117, 19–42.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Martin, C., & Milas, C. (2004). Modelling monetary policy: Inflation targeting in practice. Economica, 71, 209–221.CrossRef Martin, C., & Milas, C. (2004). Modelling monetary policy: Inflation targeting in practice. Economica, 71, 209–221.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Masciandaro, D., Peia, O., & Romelli, D. (2023). Central bank communication and social media: From silence to twitter. Journal of Economic Surveys, forthcoming. Masciandaro, D., Peia, O., & Romelli, D. (2023). Central bank communication and social media: From silence to twitter. Journal of Economic Surveys, forthcoming.
Zurück zum Zitat McCallum, B. T. (1993). Specification and analysis of a monetary policy rule for Japan. Bank of Japan, Monetary and Economic Studies, 11, 1–45. McCallum, B. T. (1993). Specification and analysis of a monetary policy rule for Japan. Bank of Japan, Monetary and Economic Studies, 11, 1–45.
Zurück zum Zitat McCallum, B. T. (1999). Issues in the design of monetary policy rules. In J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1(C), 1483–1530. McCallum, B. T. (1999). Issues in the design of monetary policy rules. In J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, 1(C), 1483–1530.
Zurück zum Zitat Nelson, E. (2005). Why money growth determines inflation in the long run: Answering the Woodford critique. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40, 1791–1814.CrossRef Nelson, E. (2005). Why money growth determines inflation in the long run: Answering the Woodford critique. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40, 1791–1814.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Nelson, E. (2007). Friedman and Taylor on monetary policy rules. Review Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 90, 95–116. Nelson, E. (2007). Friedman and Taylor on monetary policy rules. Review Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 90, 95–116.
Zurück zum Zitat Orphanides, A. (2003). Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(5), 983–1022.CrossRef Orphanides, A. (2003). Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(5), 983–1022.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Orphanides, A. (2015). Fear of lift-off: Uncertainty, rules, and discretion in monetary policy normalization. Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 97(3), 173–196. Orphanides, A. (2015). Fear of lift-off: Uncertainty, rules, and discretion in monetary policy normalization. Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 97(3), 173–196.
Zurück zum Zitat Orphanides, A., & Wieland, V. (2013). Complexity and monetary policy. International Journal of Central Banking, 9(1), 167–204. Orphanides, A., & Wieland, V. (2013). Complexity and monetary policy. International Journal of Central Banking, 9(1), 167–204.
Zurück zum Zitat Ozlale, U. (2003). Price stability versus output stability: Tales of Federal Reserve administrations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27(9), 1595–1610.CrossRef Ozlale, U. (2003). Price stability versus output stability: Tales of Federal Reserve administrations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27(9), 1595–1610.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1993). Designing institutions for monetary stability. Carnegie—Rochester Series on Public Policy, 39, 53–84. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1993). Designing institutions for monetary stability. Carnegie—Rochester Series on Public Policy, 39, 53–84.
Zurück zum Zitat Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(4), 1169–1189. Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(4), 1169–1189.
Zurück zum Zitat Rossi, B. (2021). Identifying and estimating the effects of unconventional monetary policy: How to do and what have learned? Econometric Journal, 24(1), 1–32.CrossRef Rossi, B. (2021). Identifying and estimating the effects of unconventional monetary policy: How to do and what have learned? Econometric Journal, 24(1), 1–32.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rudebush, G. D., & Svensson, L. E. O. (1999). Policy rules for inflation targeting. In J. B. Taylor (Ed.), Monetary policy rules (pp. 203–262). University of Chicago Press. Rudebush, G. D., & Svensson, L. E. O. (1999). Policy rules for inflation targeting. In J. B. Taylor (Ed.), Monetary policy rules (pp. 203–262). University of Chicago Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Sargent, T. J., & Wallace, N. (1981). Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 5(3), 1–17. Sargent, T. J., & Wallace, N. (1981). Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 5(3), 1–17.
Zurück zum Zitat Sauer, S., & Sturm, J. E. (2007). Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy. German Economic Review, 8(3), 375–398.CrossRef Sauer, S., & Sturm, J. E. (2007). Using Taylor rules to understand ECB monetary policy. German Economic Review, 8(3), 375–398.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Smets, F., & Wouters, R. (2003). An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5), 1123–1175.CrossRef Smets, F., & Wouters, R. (2003). An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5), 1123–1175.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Svensson, L. E. O. (1995). Optimal inflation targets, “conservative” central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic Review, 87, 98–114. Svensson, L. E. O. (1995). Optimal inflation targets, “conservative” central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic Review, 87, 98–114.
Zurück zum Zitat Svensson, L. E. O. (1997). Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets. European Economic Review, 41, 1111–1146.CrossRef Svensson, L. E. O. (1997). Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets. European Economic Review, 41, 1111–1146.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Svensson, L. E. O. (2000). Open-economy inflation targeting. Journal of International Economics, 50(1), 155–183.CrossRef Svensson, L. E. O. (2000). Open-economy inflation targeting. Journal of International Economics, 50(1), 155–183.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Svensson, L. E. O. (2003a). What is wrong with Taylor rules? Using judgment in monetary policy through targeting rules. Journal of Economic Literature, 41(2), 426–477.CrossRef Svensson, L. E. O. (2003a). What is wrong with Taylor rules? Using judgment in monetary policy through targeting rules. Journal of Economic Literature, 41(2), 426–477.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tavlas, G. S. (2021). A reconsideration of the doctrinal foundations of monetary policy rules: Fisher versus Chicago. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 43(1), 55–82.CrossRef Tavlas, G. S. (2021). A reconsideration of the doctrinal foundations of monetary policy rules: Fisher versus Chicago. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 43(1), 55–82.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rule in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195–214.CrossRef Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rule in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195–214.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Taylor, J. B. (1999). A historical analysis of monetary policy rules. In J. B. Taylor (Ed.), Monetary policy rules (pp. 319–348). Chicago University Press.CrossRef Taylor, J. B. (1999). A historical analysis of monetary policy rules. In J. B. Taylor (Ed.), Monetary policy rules (pp. 319–348). Chicago University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Taylor, J. B. (2000). Using monetary policy in emerging market economies. In Stabilization and monetary policy: The international experience (pp. 441–457). Bank of Mexico. Taylor, J. B. (2000). Using monetary policy in emerging market economies. In Stabilization and monetary policy: The international experience (pp. 441–457). Bank of Mexico.
Zurück zum Zitat Taylor, J. B. (2011). The cycle of rules and discretion in economic policy. National Affairs, 55(1), 55–65. Taylor, J. B. (2011). The cycle of rules and discretion in economic policy. National Affairs, 55(1), 55–65.
Zurück zum Zitat Walsh, C. E. (1995). Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic Review, 85, 150–176. Walsh, C. E. (1995). Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic Review, 85, 150–176.
Zurück zum Zitat Woodford, M. (2003a). Interests and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy. Princeton University Press. Woodford, M. (2003a). Interests and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy. Princeton University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Woodford, M. (2003b). Optimal interest rate smoothing. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 861–886.CrossRef Woodford, M. (2003b). Optimal interest rate smoothing. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 861–886.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Flexible Monetary Policy Rules from the Great Moderation to the New Normal Times (1993–2023): A Forward-Looking Review
verfasst von
Donato Masciandaro
Copyright-Jahr
2023
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38708-1_4