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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Forced Trades in a Free Market

verfasst von : Marc Fleurbaey

Erschienen in: Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

A free trade is always Pareto-improving. But some “free trades” are actually forced in the sense that they reflect the trader’s poverty rather than his or her preferences. We propose a rigorous concept of forced trade, and apply it to the ethical evaluation of Walrasian equilibria.

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Titel: Forced Trades in a Free Market
verfasst von: Marc Fleurbaey
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-46438-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-46439-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_14