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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

From Authoritarian Constitutionalism to Populist De-Constitutionalisation. Transformation of the Turkish State Under Erdoğan

verfasst von : Ilker Gökhan Sen

Erschienen in: The People’s Constitution

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

Turkey has been passing from one type of authoritarian regime to another. While the former regime has been relatively stable, based on an authoritarian conception of constitutionalism, the new one displays a picture of a blatantly illegal order. Authoritarian populism is the hallmark of this new regime. This contribution will first emphasize the differences between the old (statist) and new (populist) authoritarianism in Turkey under Erdoğan. After briefly explaining his populism, certain aspects of the current populist de-constitutionalisation are highlighted. The following sections are structured to shed light on the anti-pluralism and anti-institutionalism of populism under the AKP. The third section describes the AKP’s populist understanding of democracy and human rights and its difference from “statist” values of old authoritarianism, while in the fourth section, a snapshot of Erdoğan’s colonization of anti-majoritarian institutions and civil society is created (Sect. 4).

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Vorheriges Kapitel An Analysis of Illiberal Democracies. Towards the End of Law?

Nächstes Kapitel Populist Transformation of Constitutional Law: North Macedonia

Gözler (2016) extensively defined the concept. This term is increasingly used in the Turkish doctrine Acar (2016); Kaboğlu (2019) and Sağlam (2019), p. 224.

I will use the concept of populism/populist in its authoritarian and anti-constitutional sense (Müller 2016, 2017; Sadurski 2019, p. 23). Of course, for some scholars, not all populists are authoritarian; and populism ‘by definition is (not) antithetical to constitutionalism’, Tushnet and Bugarič (2021, p. 36).

Müller (2016), p. 61; Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), pp. 2–21.

See mutatis mutandis: Sadurski (2019), p. 5.

Isiksel (2013), p. 704.

Gargarella (2019), p. 118.

Özbudun (2011), pp. 19–23.

Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009), pp. 31–71.

The people should be unified and have only one true representative (Müller 2016, p. 20). Also cf. Bugarič (2019), p. 603; Huq (2018), p. 1132.

Aytaç and Elçi (2019), p. 89.

Aytaç and Elçi (2019), pp. 91–93.

See mutatis mutandis Howse (2019), p. 643.

See generally Kaltwasser (2013); Schepelle (2019), p. 316.

Oder (2017). See infra Sect. 4.

Isiksel (2013), p. 704.

I argue that a formal and thin conception of rule of law is the prerequisite for its material and thick conception. The former refers to the compliance of procedures and forms when creating a legal rule. The latter refers to liberal values such as human rights, limited government, and freedom. See Krygier (2014), p. 51; See generally Sellers (2014).

TCC Decision, Register no. 2016/166; Decision no. 2016/159. Date 12 October 2016. Published in the Official Gazette of November 4, 2016, No. 29878; TCC Decision, Register no. 2016/172, Decision no. 2016/165. Date 2 November 2016. Published in the Official Gazette of November 4, 2016, No. 29878.

For a detailed analysis of the earlier case law of the TCC and references to the relevant TCC decisions see Göztepe (2018).

Haimerl (2017) and Göztepe (2018).

For a detailed report see OHCHR (2018).

See generally Göztepe (2018).

Gözler (2017) I translated the verbatim, the original is in Turkish. Later, in 2018 the parliament adopted these KHKs as a law, creating a further anomaly in the legal system. On this see Altıparmak et al. (2018).

Isiksel (2013), p. 705 and Esen and Gümüscü (2016), p. 6.

According to the V-DEM Electoral Democracy Index, for example, Turkey’s electoral integrity score has been declining since 2005, and in 2014 it fell below the threshold for being considered a democracy. See Castaldo (2018), p. 467. The worsening has continued since. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/ (Choose Turkey in the “Region”, and “Electoral democracy” in the indicators). In 2018, the Freedom House downgraded Turkey from “partly free” to “not free” referring, among others, to the worsening of the electoral democracy. Freedom House (2018).

See generally Kox (2015) and OSCE/ODIHR (2018).

For details see OSCE/ODIHR (2017).

See for example Arikan (2019).

Yilmaz and Turner (2019), p. 692.

For old regime actors’ tendency to obey court decisions see Isiksel (2013), p. 705 For Erdoğan’s defiance against court decisions see generally Gözler (2016), p. 26.

For the timeline see: https://www.osmankavala.org/en/judicial-process.

DW (2022).

Reuters (2021).

Erdoğan’s several statements may be found on the official website of the Presidency: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/.

See generally Sajo (2021), p. 141. See also Eissenstat (2022), p. 368.

See on the pattern of Erdoğan’s alliance formation Cagaptay (2021), pp. 35–37.

Approximately 53% of the voters in the 2018 presidential elections voted for Erdoğan (BBC 2018). Interestingly, this support doesn’t melt away so quickly even in the harshest economic conditions. The latest polls show that the AKP has a roughly 28% of electoral support (Ahval 2022).

Konda (2018).

AKP (2018).

See Karaömerlioğlu (2022), pp. 83–87.

O’Connell (2020), p. 101.

O’Connell (2020), pp. 114–115.

Quoted in Yağcı (2009).

Mukhtar is head of village or neighborhood See Demir(2020), p. 75 and Çinar and Soyarik-Sentürk (2019), p. 109.

Demir (2020), p. 78.

Oruç (2014).

Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2015).

O’Connell (2020), p. 104.

For more on the concept see Liwanga (2020), p. 70. For the Turkish context see Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (2019).

O’Connell (2020), p. 122 and Akdeniz and Altıparmak (2018), pp. 23–24.

As a “foreign” and expensive spirit “whisky” is used for insulting the liberal and left-wing intellectuals, by implying them being self-indulgent, drunk and even alcoholic, and being aliens to the realities of the Turkish people (Milas 2018).

Akgönül and Oran (2019), p. 15.

In a similar context, Cagaptay highlights Erdoğan’s “survival instinct” See Cagaptay (2021), p. 89.

BBC Turkish (2015).

Columbia Global Freedom of Expression (2016).

For relevant background and legal information see Hypotheses (2020).

Canan Kaftancıoğlu is the Istanbul chairwoman of the main opposition party CHP’. Ms. Kaftancıoğlu faces several criminal and legal charges as a form of Erdoğan’s ‘revenge’ following the electoral defeat in Istanbul’s local elections (DW 2020).

Selahattin Demirtaş is the co-leader of the pro-Kurdish left-wing political party HDP (for Halkların Demokratik Partisi-People’s Democratic Party). Judicial harassment started against Demirtaş soon after Erdoğan said he would “pay the price” (Columbia Global Freedom of Expression 2020).

See for example Gal (2020).

Unal (2017). Aydın Ünal is a former politician who started his political career with the advent of the AKP in 2002. Since then, he has served under several capacities for AKP including the member of the parliament, minister and advisor to the president. See his bio in ibid.

Kathimerini (2021).

Arato (2019), p. 318 and Hailbronner and Landau (2017).

See for example Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009), p. 98.

Oder (2017).

Turkut (2019).

See above Sect. 2.

Haimerl (2017).

Tecimer (2019).

For details see Sen (2021).

Tecimer (2019).

For details see Sen (2021).

See generally Doğan and Selenica (2021), pp. 5–6.

See generally Yildiz (2019).

For the concept in the Turkish context and its relevance to populism see Yaren et al. (2022).

Hürriyet (2017).

This is a commentary on the American far right (2018, p. 108). But for all intents and purposes, this assumption fits perfectly with Erdoğan and his entourage.

See Bianet (2016) and Cumhuriyet (2016).

Assuming a voluntary role in this fury, a pro-government academic said: “the educated section of Turkey, is the most dangerous group for society.” This statement was indeed endorsed by the government, which immediately promoted the speaker to a higher position in the academic bureaucracy.

TCC Decision, Register no. 2018/105 Decision no. 2019/71. Date 19 September 2019. Published in the Official Gazette of November 13, 2019, No. 30947.

Amnesty International (2021).

Mijatović (2020), para 141–148.

The Law No. 7262 on Preventing Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, entry into force 31 December 2020 (Venice Commission 2021).

Such as the Law on Associations (no. 5253) and Law on Aid Collection (no. 2860).

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2021).

Ahval (2020).

See Venice Commission (2020).

Law no. 7249 of 11 July 2020 Amending the Attorneyship Law (no. 1136 of 19 March 1969) For the full text and explanatory note see Venice Commission (2020).

There are already some allegations that became a matter for debate in the Turkish parliament (Cumhuriyet 2021).

Oder (2021).

This was made by means of the abstract norm control as per the article 150 of the Constitution.

TCC decision, Register no:2020/60 Decision no. 2020/54 Date. October 1, 2020, Published in Official Gazette of December 10, 2020, No. 31330.

Müller (2017), Epub version.

Sajo (2021), pp. 247–260.

Hardt (2020), p. 12.

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Titel: From Authoritarian Constitutionalism to Populist De-Constitutionalisation. Transformation of the Turkish State Under Erdoğan
verfasst von: Ilker Gökhan Sen
Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland
Buch: The People’s Constitution
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-71888-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-71889-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71889-2_5