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Erschienen in:
Introduction Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Fundamentals of Mechanism Design

verfasst von : Changyan Yi, Jun Cai

Erschienen in: Market-Driven Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Mechanism design is a subfield of microeconomics and game theory. It considers how to implement good system-wide solutions to problems that involve multiple self-interested agents [1]. In 2007, the Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson “for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory.” This indicates the importance and popularity of mechanism design in various areas of applied economics as well as market-driven applications. For instance, mechanism design has been extensively studied in practical engineering problems, such as electronic market design, distributed scheduling, and radio resource allocation.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Introduction
Nächstes Kapitel Recall-Based Spectrum Auction Mechanism
Fußnoten
1
This refers to win-or-lose scenarios where each user is only interested in getting all it demands or nothing.
 
2
“Feasible” means that for any two winners i ≠ j, we have \(\mathcal{T}_{i} \cap \mathcal{T}_{j} =\emptyset\).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Fundamentals of Mechanism Design
verfasst von
Changyan Yi
Jun Cai
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Buch
Market-Driven Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-29690-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-29691-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29691-3_2

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