Skip to main content
Erschienen in: Public Choice 1-2/2018

18.11.2017

Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 1-2/2018

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

We develop a simple spatial model suggesting that Members of Parliament strive for the inclusion of the head of state’s party in coalitions formed in mixed democratic polities, and that parliamentary parties try to assemble coalitions that minimize the ideological distance to the head of state. We identify the German local level of government as functionally equivalent to a parliamentary setting, such that the directly elected mayor has competencies similar to a president in a mixed national polity. Our findings show that the party affiliation of the head of state is a key factor considered by party members in the legislature when forming coalitions: coalitions in the legislature are more likely to form if they include the party of the head of the executive branch. Furthermore, the policy preferences of the head of the executive branch matter for the legislators’ behavior in the coalition formation process: the smaller the ideological distance between the position of a coalition and the position of the head of state, the more likely a coalition is to be formed.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
For instance, French presidential candidates formulate their policy positions in a separate platform in which they deviate from the position their parties adopted in their election manifestos (e.g., Laver et al. 2006).
 
2
Because of the preference order of the three legislative parties, a coalition between A and C would always include B.
 
3
In most cases, mayoral elections do not take place on the same day as local council elections.
 
4
Since one advantage of ‘scaling down’ (Snyder 2001) to the local level is fixing contextual features, we are not expecting unobserved heterogeneity in the estimated effects (see Glasgow et al. 2012) owing to our case selection. Nevertheless, we also applied mixed logit models to estimate the empirical models. The results substantially remain the same and likelihood ratio tests confirm that CL models are a better fit to our data than mixed logit models.
 
5
The size of the choice set is determined by the number of political groups that are elected to a local council. According to the literature on coalition formation, the number of potential coalitions within a parliament is calculated by 2 n  − 1, with n as the number of parliamentary represented parties. We exclude those potential outcomes of the coalition formation process in the local councils that include only one party because our definition of a coalition states that at least two parties have to sign a coalition agreement.
 
6
Note that our cases share a common feature with mixed regimes (Cheibub and Chernykh 2008, p. 277): the average seat share of the largest party is 0.40, i.e., most of the time no party controls a majority of seats in the local parliament.
 
7
This result does not change with variations in the size of local councils, i.e., the number of parliamentary parties. With the exception of the situations wherein 10 parties are represented in parliament and the head of executive branch’s party is included in two out of four formation opportunities, the head of the executive branch’s party is overwhelmingly more likely to be included in local government coalitions. For example, the predicted probabilities range from 81.3% in councils with six parties, over 94.1% in councils with 8 parties, to 100% in councils with 11 or 13 parties, respectively.
 
8
We followed Martin and Stevenson (2001) to evaluate whether or not the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is violated by dropping a random set of alternatives from each coalition formation opportunity and applying a Hausman test. We used 50 replications, dropping a random set of 10% of the choices. The average p value is shown in Table 2. It is far greater than 0.05, so we conclude that the IIA assumption is not violated here (see also Chiba et al. 2015).
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Ade, F. (2014). Do constitutions matter? Evidence from a natural experiment at the municipality level. Public Choice, 160(3), 367–389.CrossRef Ade, F. (2014). Do constitutions matter? Evidence from a natural experiment at the municipality level. Public Choice, 160(3), 367–389.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Alemán, E., & Tsebelis, G. (2011). Political parties and government coalitions in the Americas. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3(1), 3–28. Alemán, E., & Tsebelis, G. (2011). Political parties and government coalitions in the Americas. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3(1), 3–28.
Zurück zum Zitat Altman, D. (2000). The politics of coalition formation and survival in multiparty presidential democracies: The case of Uruguay, 1989–1999. Party Politics, 6(3), 259–283.CrossRef Altman, D. (2000). The politics of coalition formation and survival in multiparty presidential democracies: The case of Uruguay, 1989–1999. Party Politics, 6(3), 259–283.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Amorim Neto, O. (2006). The presidential calculus: Executive policy making and cabinet formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies, 39(4), 415–440.CrossRef Amorim Neto, O. (2006). The presidential calculus: Executive policy making and cabinet formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies, 39(4), 415–440.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Amorim Neto, O., & Strøm, K. (2006). Breaking the parliamentary chain of delegation: presidents and non-partisan cabinet members in European democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 36(4), 619–643.CrossRef Amorim Neto, O., & Strøm, K. (2006). Breaking the parliamentary chain of delegation: presidents and non-partisan cabinet members in European democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 36(4), 619–643.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bäck, H. (2003). Explaining and predicting coalition outcomes: Conclusions from studying data on local coalitions. European Journal of Political Research, 42(4), 441–472.CrossRef Bäck, H. (2003). Explaining and predicting coalition outcomes: Conclusions from studying data on local coalitions. European Journal of Political Research, 42(4), 441–472.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bäck, H. (2005). The institutional setting of local political leadership and community involvement. In M. Haus, H. Heinelt, & M. Stewart (Eds.), Urban governance and democracy. Leadership and community involvement (pp. 65–101). New York: Routledge. Bäck, H. (2005). The institutional setting of local political leadership and community involvement. In M. Haus, H. Heinelt, & M. Stewart (Eds.), Urban governance and democracy. Leadership and community involvement (pp. 65–101). New York: Routledge.
Zurück zum Zitat Bäck, H., & Dumont, P. (2008). Making the first move. A two-stage analysis of the role of formateurs in parliamentary government formation. Public Choice, 135(3–4), 353–373.CrossRef Bäck, H., & Dumont, P. (2008). Making the first move. A two-stage analysis of the role of formateurs in parliamentary government formation. Public Choice, 135(3–4), 353–373.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Baylis, T. A. (1996). Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping executive authority in Eastern Europe. World Politics, 48(3), 297–323.CrossRef Baylis, T. A. (1996). Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping executive authority in Eastern Europe. World Politics, 48(3), 297–323.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Benz, A., & Zimmer, C. (2011). Germany: Varieties of democracy in a federal system. In J. Loughlin & A. Lidström (Eds.), The oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe (pp. 146–172). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benz, A., & Zimmer, C. (2011). Germany: Varieties of democracy in a federal system. In J. Loughlin & A. Lidström (Eds.), The oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe (pp. 146–172). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Bergman, T. (1993). Formation rules and minority governments. European Journal of Political Research, 23(1), 55–66.CrossRef Bergman, T. (1993). Formation rules and minority governments. European Journal of Political Research, 23(1), 55–66.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Beuman, L. M. (2015). Cohabitation in new post-conflict democracies: The case of Timor-Leste. Parliamentary Affairs, 68(3), 453–475.CrossRef Beuman, L. M. (2015). Cohabitation in new post-conflict democracies: The case of Timor-Leste. Parliamentary Affairs, 68(3), 453–475.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bogumil, J., & Holtkamp, L. (2013). Kommunalpolitik und Kommunalverwaltung: Eine praxisorientierte Einführung. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Bogumil, J., & Holtkamp, L. (2013). Kommunalpolitik und Kommunalverwaltung: Eine praxisorientierte Einführung. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
Zurück zum Zitat Bräuninger, T., & Debus, M. (2012). Parteienwettbewerb in den deutschen Bundesländern. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.CrossRef Bräuninger, T., & Debus, M. (2012). Parteienwettbewerb in den deutschen Bundesländern. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bräuninger, T., & König, T. (1999). The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature. European Journal of Political Research, 36(2), 207–234. Bräuninger, T., & König, T. (1999). The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature. European Journal of Political Research, 36(2), 207–234.
Zurück zum Zitat Chang, C. H. (2014). Cohabitation in semi-presidential countries. Social Sciences, 3(2), 31–43. Chang, C. H. (2014). Cohabitation in semi-presidential countries. Social Sciences, 3(2), 31–43.
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A. (2007). Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cheibub, J. A. (2007). Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A., & Chernykh, S. (2008). Constitutions and democratic performance in semi-presidential democracies. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 9(2), 269–303.CrossRef Cheibub, J. A., & Chernykh, S. (2008). Constitutions and democratic performance in semi-presidential democracies. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 9(2), 269–303.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A., & Chernykh, S. (2009). Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance? Constitutional Political Economy, 20(3–4), 202–229.CrossRef Cheibub, J. A., & Chernykh, S. (2009). Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance? Constitutional Political Economy, 20(3–4), 202–229.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z., & Ginsburg, T. (2014). Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 515–544.CrossRef Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z., & Ginsburg, T. (2014). Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 515–544.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143(1–2), 67–101.CrossRef Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143(1–2), 67–101.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2002). Democratic institutions and regime survival: parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered. Annual Review of Political Science, 5(1), 151–179.CrossRef Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2002). Democratic institutions and regime survival: parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered. Annual Review of Political Science, 5(1), 151–179.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2010). From conflict to coordination: Perspectives on the study of executive-legislative relations. Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos, 1(1), 38–53.CrossRef Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2010). From conflict to coordination: Perspectives on the study of executive-legislative relations. Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos, 1(1), 38–53.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cheibub, J. A., Przeworski, A., & Saiegh, S. M. (2004). Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science, 34(4), 565–587.CrossRef Cheibub, J. A., Przeworski, A., & Saiegh, S. M. (2004). Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science, 34(4), 565–587.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chiba, D., Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2015). A copula approach to the problem of selection bias in models of government survival. Political Analysis, 23(1), 42–58.CrossRef Chiba, D., Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2015). A copula approach to the problem of selection bias in models of government survival. Political Analysis, 23(1), 42–58.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Chiou, F. Y., & Rothenberg, L. S. (2003). When pivotal politics meets partisan politics. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 503–522.CrossRef Chiou, F. Y., & Rothenberg, L. S. (2003). When pivotal politics meets partisan politics. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 503–522.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Clark, W., Golder, M., & Golder, S. N. (2013). Principles of comparative politics. Washington: CQ Press. Clark, W., Golder, M., & Golder, S. N. (2013). Principles of comparative politics. Washington: CQ Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Crombez, C., & Hix, S. (2015). Legislative activity and gridlock in the European Union. British Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 477–499.CrossRef Crombez, C., & Hix, S. (2015). Legislative activity and gridlock in the European Union. British Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 477–499.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Dassonneville, R., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (2013). Economic policy voting and incumbency: Unemployment in Western Europe. Political Science Research and Methods, 1(1), 53–66.CrossRef Dassonneville, R., & Lewis-Beck, M. S. (2013). Economic policy voting and incumbency: Unemployment in Western Europe. Political Science Research and Methods, 1(1), 53–66.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Däubler, T., & Debus, M. (2009). Government formation and policy formulation in the German States. Regional and Federal Studies, 19(1), 73–95.CrossRef Däubler, T., & Debus, M. (2009). Government formation and policy formulation in the German States. Regional and Federal Studies, 19(1), 73–95.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Debus, M. (2009). Pre-electoral commitments and government formation. Public Choice, 138(1), 45–64.CrossRef Debus, M. (2009). Pre-electoral commitments and government formation. Public Choice, 138(1), 45–64.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Debus, M., & Gross, M. (2016). Coalition formation at the local level: Institutional constraints, party policy conflict, and office-seeking political parties. Party Politics, 22(6), 835–846.CrossRef Debus, M., & Gross, M. (2016). Coalition formation at the local level: Institutional constraints, party policy conflict, and office-seeking political parties. Party Politics, 22(6), 835–846.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Duverger, M. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. European Journal of Political Research, 8(2), 165–187.CrossRef Duverger, M. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. European Journal of Political Research, 8(2), 165–187.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Egner, B. (2015). Parliaments in disguise? How German councillors perceive local councils. Local Government Studies, 41(2), 183–201.CrossRef Egner, B. (2015). Parliaments in disguise? How German councillors perceive local councils. Local Government Studies, 41(2), 183–201.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Elgie, R. (1999). The politics of semi-presidentialism. In R. Elgie (Ed.), Semi-presidentialism in Europe (pp. 1–21). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Elgie, R. (1999). The politics of semi-presidentialism. In R. Elgie (Ed.), Semi-presidentialism in Europe (pp. 1–21). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Elgie, R. (2011). Semi-presidentialism in Western Europe. In R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, & Y. S. Wu (Eds.), Semi-Presidentialism and democracy (pp. 81–97). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef Elgie, R. (2011). Semi-presidentialism in Western Europe. In R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, & Y. S. Wu (Eds.), Semi-Presidentialism and democracy (pp. 81–97). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Elgie, R., & McMenamin, I. (2011). Explaining the onset of cohabitation under semi-presidentialism. Political Studies, 59(3), 616–635.CrossRef Elgie, R., & McMenamin, I. (2011). Explaining the onset of cohabitation under semi-presidentialism. Political Studies, 59(3), 616–635.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2014). The politics of patronage and coalition: How parties allocate managerial positions in state-owned enterprises. Political Studies, 62(2), 398–417.CrossRef Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2014). The politics of patronage and coalition: How parties allocate managerial positions in state-owned enterprises. Political Studies, 62(2), 398–417.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Fernandes, J. M., & Magalhães, P. C. (2016). Government survival in semi-presidential regimes. European Journal of Political Research, 55(1), 61–80.CrossRef Fernandes, J. M., & Magalhães, P. C. (2016). Government survival in semi-presidential regimes. European Journal of Political Research, 55(1), 61–80.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Glasgow, G., & Golder, S. N. (2015). A new approach to the study of parties entering government. British Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 739–754.CrossRef Glasgow, G., & Golder, S. N. (2015). A new approach to the study of parties entering government. British Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 739–754.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Glasgow, G., Golder, M., & Golder, S. N. (2012). New empirical strategies for the study of parliamentary government formation. Political Analysis, 20(2), 248–270.CrossRef Glasgow, G., Golder, M., & Golder, S. N. (2012). New empirical strategies for the study of parliamentary government formation. Political Analysis, 20(2), 248–270.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Gross, D. A., & Sigelman, L. (1984). Comparing party systems: A multidimensional approach. Comparative Politics, 16(4), 463–479.CrossRef Gross, D. A., & Sigelman, L. (1984). Comparing party systems: A multidimensional approach. Comparative Politics, 16(4), 463–479.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kang, S. G. (2009). The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence. European Journal of Political Research, 48(4), 543–572.CrossRef Kang, S. G. (2009). The influence of presidential heads of state on government formation in European democracies: Empirical evidence. European Journal of Political Research, 48(4), 543–572.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kirschke, L. (2007). Semipresidentialism and the perils of power-sharing in neopatrimonial states. Comparative Political Studies, 40(11), 1372–1394.CrossRef Kirschke, L. (2007). Semipresidentialism and the perils of power-sharing in neopatrimonial states. Comparative Political Studies, 40(11), 1372–1394.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Krehbiel, K. (1996). Institutional and partisan sources of gridlock. A theory of divided and unified government. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 8(1), 7–40.CrossRef Krehbiel, K. (1996). Institutional and partisan sources of gridlock. A theory of divided and unified government. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 8(1), 7–40.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Krehbiel, K. (1998). Pivotal politics. A theory of U.S. law making. Chicago: Chicago University Press.CrossRef Krehbiel, K. (1998). Pivotal politics. A theory of U.S. law making. Chicago: Chicago University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data. American Political Science Review, 92(2), 311–331. Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data. American Political Science Review, 92(2), 311–331.
Zurück zum Zitat Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Sauger, N. (2006). Policy competition in the 2002 French legislative and presidential elections. European Journal of Political Research, 45(4), 667–697.CrossRef Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Sauger, N. (2006). Policy competition in the 2002 French legislative and presidential elections. European Journal of Political Research, 45(4), 667–697.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Laver, M., & Schofield, N. (1998). Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRef Laver, M., & Schofield, N. (1998). Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lewis-Beck, M., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183–219.CrossRef Lewis-Beck, M., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183–219.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Linz, J. J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, 1(1), 51–69. Linz, J. J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, 1(1), 51–69.
Zurück zum Zitat Linz, J. J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In J. J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), The failure of presidential democracy: Comparative perspectives (pp. 3–87). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Linz, J. J. (1994). Presidential or parliamentary democracy: Does it make a difference? In J. J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), The failure of presidential democracy: Comparative perspectives (pp. 3–87). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2001). Government formation in parliamentary democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 33–50.CrossRef Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2001). Government formation in parliamentary democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 33–50.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2010). The conditional impact of incumbency on government formation. American Political Science Review, 104(3), 503–518.CrossRef Martin, L. W., & Stevenson, R. T. (2010). The conditional impact of incumbency on government formation. American Political Science Review, 104(3), 503–518.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2011). Parliaments and coalitions: The role of legislative institutions in multiparty governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2011). Parliaments and coalitions: The role of legislative institutions in multiparty governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Martínez-Gallardo, C. (2012). Out of the cabinet: What drives defections from the government in presidential systems? Comparative Political Studies, 45(1), 62–90.CrossRef Martínez-Gallardo, C. (2012). Out of the cabinet: What drives defections from the government in presidential systems? Comparative Political Studies, 45(1), 62–90.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Martínez-Gallardo, C. (2014). Designing cabinets: presidential politics and ministerial instability. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6(2), 3–38. Martínez-Gallardo, C. (2014). Designing cabinets: presidential politics and ministerial instability. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6(2), 3–38.
Zurück zum Zitat Martínez-Gallardo, C., & Schleiter, P. (2015). Choosing whom to trust: Agency risks and cabinet partisanship in presidential democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 48(2), 231–264.CrossRef Martínez-Gallardo, C., & Schleiter, P. (2015). Choosing whom to trust: Agency risks and cabinet partisanship in presidential democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 48(2), 231–264.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In P. Zarembka (Ed.), Frontiers in econometrics (pp. 105–142). New York: Academic Press. McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In P. Zarembka (Ed.), Frontiers in econometrics (pp. 105–142). New York: Academic Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Mellors, C., & Brearey, P. (1986). Multi-dimensional approaches to the study of local coalitions: some cross-national comparisons. In G. Pridham (Ed.), Coalitional behaviour in theory and practice: an inductive model for Western Europe (pp. 278–295). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Mellors, C., & Brearey, P. (1986). Multi-dimensional approaches to the study of local coalitions: some cross-national comparisons. In G. Pridham (Ed.), Coalitional behaviour in theory and practice: an inductive model for Western Europe (pp. 278–295). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Nikolova, P. (2011). Bulgaria: The dawn of a new era of inclusive subnational democracy? In J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks, & A. Lidström (Eds.), The oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe (pp. 665–684). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nikolova, P. (2011). Bulgaria: The dawn of a new era of inclusive subnational democracy? In J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks, & A. Lidström (Eds.), The oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe (pp. 665–684). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Olislagers, E., & Steyvers, K. (2015). Choosing coalition partners in Belgian local government. Local Government Studies, 41(2), 202–219.CrossRef Olislagers, E., & Steyvers, K. (2015). Choosing coalition partners in Belgian local government. Local Government Studies, 41(2), 202–219.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Pasquino, G. (1997). Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work. European Journal of Political Research, 31(1–2), 128–137. Pasquino, G. (1997). Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work. European Journal of Political Research, 31(1–2), 128–137.
Zurück zum Zitat Protsyk, O. (2005). Politics of intraexecutive conflict in semipresidential regimes in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 19(2), 135–160.CrossRef Protsyk, O. (2005). Politics of intraexecutive conflict in semipresidential regimes in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 19(2), 135–160.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Protsyk, O. (2006). Intra-executive competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of institutional conflict and cooperation under semi-presidentialism. Political Studies, 54(2), 219–244.CrossRef Protsyk, O. (2006). Intra-executive competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of institutional conflict and cooperation under semi-presidentialism. Political Studies, 54(2), 219–244.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Roper, S. D. (2002). Are all semipresidential regimes the same? A comparison of premier-presidential regimes. Comparative Politics, 34(3), 253–272.CrossRef Roper, S. D. (2002). Are all semipresidential regimes the same? A comparison of premier-presidential regimes. Comparative Politics, 34(3), 253–272.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Samuels, D. J., & Shugart, M. S. (2010). Presidents, parties, and prime ministers. How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Samuels, D. J., & Shugart, M. S. (2010). Presidents, parties, and prime ministers. How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009a). Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared. European Journal of Political Research, 48(5), 665–693.CrossRef Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009a). Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared. European Journal of Political Research, 48(5), 665–693.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009b). Review article: Citizens, presidents and assemblies: The study of semi-presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz. British Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 871–892.CrossRef Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009b). Review article: Citizens, presidents and assemblies: The study of semi-presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz. British Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 871–892.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2010). Who’s in charge? Presidents, assemblies, and the political control of semipresidential cabinets. Comparative Political Studies, 43(11), 1415–1441.CrossRef Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2010). Who’s in charge? Presidents, assemblies, and the political control of semipresidential cabinets. Comparative Political Studies, 43(11), 1415–1441.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Sedelius, T., & Mashtaler, O. (2013). Two decades of semi-presidentialism: issues of intra-executive conflict in Central and Eastern Europe 1991–2011. East European Politics, 29(2), 109–134.CrossRef Sedelius, T., & Mashtaler, O. (2013). Two decades of semi-presidentialism: issues of intra-executive conflict in Central and Eastern Europe 1991–2011. East European Politics, 29(2), 109–134.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Shugart, M. S. (2005). Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns. French Politics, 3(3), 323–351.CrossRef Shugart, M. S. (2005). Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns. French Politics, 3(3), 323–351.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). Presidents and assemblies. Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). Presidents and assemblies. Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. European Journal of Political Research, 42(3), 287–312.CrossRef Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. European Journal of Political Research, 42(3), 287–312.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Skjæveland, A., Serritzlew, S., & Blom-Hansen, J. (2007). Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Denmark. European Journal of Political Research, 46(5), 721–745.CrossRef Skjæveland, A., Serritzlew, S., & Blom-Hansen, J. (2007). Theories of coalition formation: An empirical test using data from Denmark. European Journal of Political Research, 46(5), 721–745.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Snyder, R. (2001). Scaling down: The subnational comparative method. Studies in Comparative International Development, 36(1), 93–110.CrossRef Snyder, R. (2001). Scaling down: The subnational comparative method. Studies in Comparative International Development, 36(1), 93–110.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ştefuriuc, I. (2013). Government formation in multi-level settings. Party strategy and institutional constraints. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef Ştefuriuc, I. (2013). Government formation in multi-level settings. Party strategy and institutional constraints. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Strøm, K., Müller, W. C., & Bergman, T. (Eds.). (2010). Cabinets and coalition bargaining: The democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strøm, K., Müller, W. C., & Bergman, T. (Eds.). (2010). Cabinets and coalition bargaining: The democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Swianiewicz, P. (2011). Poland: Europeanization of Subnational Governments. In J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks, & A. Lidström (Eds.), The oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe (pp. 480–504). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Swianiewicz, P. (2011). Poland: Europeanization of Subnational Governments. In J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks, & A. Lidström (Eds.), The oxford handbook of local and regional democracy in Europe (pp. 480–504). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Tavits, M. (2008). Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do direct elections matter?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Tavits, M. (2008). Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do direct elections matter?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Thomson, R. (2011). Citizens’ evaluations of the fulfillment of election pledges: Evidence from Ireland. The Journal of Politics, 73(1), 187–201.CrossRef Thomson, R. (2011). Citizens’ evaluations of the fulfillment of election pledges: Evidence from Ireland. The Journal of Politics, 73(1), 187–201.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tsai, J. H. (2008). Sub-types of semi-presidentialism and political deadlock. French Politics, 6(1), 63–84.CrossRef Tsai, J. H. (2008). Sub-types of semi-presidentialism and political deadlock. French Politics, 6(1), 63–84.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRef Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Turgeon, M., & Bélanger, É. (2017). Institutions and attribution of responsibility outside the electoral context: a look at French semi-presidentialism. European Political Science Review, 9(2), 209–231.CrossRef Turgeon, M., & Bélanger, É. (2017). Institutions and attribution of responsibility outside the electoral context: a look at French semi-presidentialism. European Political Science Review, 9(2), 209–231.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Wu, Y. S. (2011). Clustering of semi-presidentialism: A first cut. In R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, & Y. S. Wu (Eds.), Semi-presidentialism and democracy (pp. 21–41). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wu, Y. S. (2011). Clustering of semi-presidentialism: A first cut. In R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, & Y. S. Wu (Eds.), Semi-presidentialism and democracy (pp. 21–41). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Metadaten
Titel
Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities
Publikationsdatum
18.11.2017
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 1-2/2018
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0489-x

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 1-2/2018

Public Choice 1-2/2018 Zur Ausgabe