1987 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Games in Normal Form
verfasst von : Prof. Dr. Eric van Damme
Erschienen in: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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For normal form games the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined since a Nash equilibrium of such a game need not be robust, i.e. it may be unstable against small perturbations in the data of the game. In this chapter, we will consider various refinements of the Nash concept for this class of games, all of which require an equilibrium to satisfy some particular robustness condition.