Gangster States

This book is the product of an odd confluence of events: a secret predilection for lurid crime fiction that unexpectedly collided with readings from a graduate seminar in evolutionary biology many years ago. In a rational world, these divergent realms would not intersect. The reason I started reading lowbrow crime novels in the first place was to escape the highbrow tedium that characterized my anthropology graduate seminars. (There are only so many long-winded discussions of Gramsci and Bourdieu one can endure.) Late-night infusions of lean, minimalist crime fiction offered a compelling antidote to the rhetorical excesses of postmodern theory. But evolutionary biology turned out to be anything but tedious. It was quite enthralling, and over time the class readings began to compete with my stash of pulp fiction until I became equally immersed in both genres. At some point, cognitive wires crossed, and evolutionary theory suddenly sparked a whole new way of thinking about organized crime.

Concise definitions of organized crime are surprisingly elusive. There is little consensus within or between the disciplines of criminology, anthropology, political science, economics or sociology as to the exact meaning of the term (Armao, 2003; Caiden and Alexander, 1985; Kenney and Fickenauer, 1995; Reuter, 1985a, 1985b; Van Duyne, 2003). In many cases, the phrase “organized crime” is used interchangeably with words like “mafia,” “gangsterism” and “racketeering.” These terms, however, all have different connotations and imprecise meanings.

The use of behavioral ecology to model the evolution of racketeering and organized crime in unregulated systems of exchange does have some points of overlap with the emerging field of behavioral economics. Behavioral economists maintain that psychological variables have measurable impacts on individual economic decision making and behavior (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). Much research in this area is conducted in laboratory settings so that subjects can be rigorously studied under controlled conditions. This approach also allows psychologically oriented economists to explore neurological substrates of economic behavior, such as reciprocity and altruism (Fehr and Schmidt, 2004). Behavioral economics also has implications for research with non-human primates, whose behavioral systems have also been shown to include notions of fairness as well as systems of reciprocity and exchange (see de Waal, 2010).

Gangster-states are defined here as chimeric, transitional political economies that temporarily formalize the extractive economic monopolies of racketeering over marked geographic territory. Once territorial boundaries become established, the racket resembles a rudimentary kleptocratic state, with the security forces repurposed beyond monopoly enforcement into activities more typically associated with government. These may include the organization of economic production, conflict resolution and territorial defense. Gangster-state territories are not fixed or static, as kleptocratic elites will seek to colonize surrounding territory if conditions are favorable. On the other hand, the extractive core of racketeering creates an impetus for conflict with neighboring groups as well as exhaustive depletion of resources that may ultimately lead to political-economic decline or collapse.

This work began back in the 1990s, when a seedy crime novel collided with a graduate seminar in evolutionary biology to generate an unusual set of research questions: Is racketeering an evolutionary stable strategy? Is the geographic inscription of protection rackets a phase of primary and secondary state formation? How do conflicts between rival racketeers shape longitudinal patterns of inequality, political stability, state formation and state failure?