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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. Geopolitical Divisions Over Ukraine: The Impact on Iceland’s Arctic Policy

verfasst von : Valur Ingimundarson

Erschienen in: Iceland’s Arctic Policies and Shifting Geopolitics

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

Some scholars have defined contemporary Arctic geopolitics as an uneasy interaction between liberal institutionalism, emphasizing interstate cooperation and its ability to mitigate conflict, on the one hand, and neo-realism, with its preoccupation with the “anarchic” international system, power politics, and national security interests, on the other. Thus, the reopening of the Arctic from the military confines of the Cold War was interpreted during the last decade of the twentieth century as an opportunity to establish a new cooperative political order. In the twenty-first century, however, the Arctic was sometimes defined in terms of a resurgent neo-realism as states allegedly scrambled to reterritorialize a space to pursue national goals as part of resource competition. A case can be made for such a dualist reading, but with qualifications. The immediate post-Cold War period witnessed, as we have seen, a period of collaboration in the Arctic. Subsequently, the spate of media accounts on the “Scramble for the Arctic” and the potential for Great Power rivalry temporarily disturbed this narrative. It was, however, quickly dwarfed by a revival of government and scholarly discourses on neo-liberal cooperation schemes underscored by the commitment of the Arctic Five to the Law of the Sea and a peaceful settlement of potential territorial disputes.

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Fußnoten
1
See Jason Dittmer, Sami Moisio, Alan Ingram, and Klaus Dodds. “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics,” Political Geography 30, no. 4 (2011): 202–214.
 
2
On the neo-realist-liberal institutionalism debate, see, for example, Charles Kegley, Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (New York: Routledge, 2020); Keohane and Joseph J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd. ed. (London: Longman, 2000); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Filippo Andreatta and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Which Synthesis? Strategies of Theoretical Integration and the Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” International Political Science Review 31, no. 2 (2010): 207–227; John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 51–68; David A. Baldwin, ed. Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 42–63.
 
3
See, for example, “The Ilulissat Declaration.”
 
4
Interviews with Arctic Council officials, October 18, 2016.
 
5
See John Andreas Olsen, ed., NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalizing Collective Defence, Whitehall Papers, Vol. 87 (London: RUSI, 2016); Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy, Unified Effort (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2015), accessed November 15, 2023, https://​www.​regjeringen.​no/​globalassets/​departementene/​fd/​dokumenter/​unified-effort.​pdf.
 
6
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1932]).
 
7
See Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen, “The Ukrainian crisis moves north. Is Arctic conflict spill-over driven by material interests?” Polar Record 53, no. 1 (2017): 1–15.
 
8
James G. Foggo and Alarik Fritz, “NATO and the Challenge in the North Atlantic and the Arctic,” in Security in Northern Europe: Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue, ed. Johan Andreas Olsen (London: RUSI, 2018), 121–128.
 
9
See Jørgen Staun, “Russia’s strategy in the Arctic: cooperation, not confrontation,” Polar Record 53, no. 3 (2017): 314.
 
10
See Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office, report, The Economic Impact of the Russian Counter-Sanctions on Trade between Iceland and the Russian Federation.
 
11
Interview with a senior Icelandic foreign ministry official, November 3, 2015; see also an interview with Finance Minister Bjarni Benediktsson, the head of the Independence Party, “Bjarni hafði efasemdir frá upphafi” [Bjarni Benediktsson Harbored Doubts from the Start], Morgunblaðið, August 20, 2015, accessed June 10, 2023, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​frettir/​innlent/​2015/​08/​20/​bjarni_​hafdi_​efasemdir_​fra_​upphafi/​; see also Baldur Thorhallsson and Pétur Gunnarsson, “Iceland’s alignment with the EU-US sanctions on Russia: autonomy versus dependence,” Global Affairs 3, no. 3 (2017): 307–318.
 
12
“Bjarni hafði efasemdir frá upphafi”; “Sigmundur Davíð vill endurmeta EES-samninginn og ekki taka þátt í refsiaðgerðum ‘blindandi’” [Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson Wants to Reevaluate the EEA-Agreement and Is against ‘Blindingly’ Taking Part in Economic Sanctions], Kjarninn, January 6, 2016, accessed September 13, 2022, https://​kjarninn.​is/​frettir/​2016-01-06-sigmundur-david-vill-endurmeta-ees-samninginn-og-ekki-taka-thatt-i-refsiadgerdum-blindandi/​.
 
13
See “Sigmundur Davíð vill endurmeta EES-samninginn og ekki taka þátt í refsiaðgerðum ‘blindandi.’”
 
14
Nikolai Wammen, Carl Hagland, Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson, Ine Eriksen Søreide, and Peter Hultqvist, “Við aukum norrænt samstarf á sviði varnarmála” [We Will Increase Nordic Defense Cooperation], April 10, 2015, accessed November 17, 2023, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​efst-a-baugi/​frettir/​stok-frett/​2015/​04/​10/​Vid-aukum-norraent-samstarf-a-svidi-varnarmala/​.
 
15
See Skýrsla Gunnars Braga Sveinssonar utanríkisráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál, March 2016; see also Foreign Minister Lilja Alfreðsdóttir’s address—entitled “Brottför varnarliðsins—þróun varnarmála” [Icelandic National Security in the Post-IDF Era]—at a conference on the tenth anniversary of the departure of U.S. forces from Iceland, October 6, 2016, accessed September 30, 2023, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​library/​04-Raduneytin/​Utanrikisraduney​tid/​PDF-skjol/​Vardberg%2D%2D-raeda-utanri%CC%81kisra%CC%81dherra.​pdf.
 
16
Skýrsla Gunnars Braga Sveinssonar utanríkisráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál [Report by Foreign Minister Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson on Foreign and International Affairs], Þingtíðindi, March 2014, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​althingi.​is/​altext/​143/​s/​0757.​html; see also Skýrsla Gunnars Braga Sveinssonar utanríkisráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál [Report by Foreign Minister Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson on Foreign and International Affairs], Þingtíðindi, March 2015.
 
17
It concerned the leak of millions of files from the world’s fourth-largest offshore law firm, Mossack Fonseca. Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, who was mentioned in the files due to his co-ownership with his wife of an offshore company, resigned as Prime Minister following mass public protests and pressure within his own Progressive Party.
 
18
Lilja Alfreðsdóttir, Brottför varnarliðsins—þróun varnarmála.
 
19
See Nataliya Marchenko, Odd Jarl Borch, Natalia Andreassen, Svetlana Kuznetsova, Valur Ingimundarson, and Uffe Jakobsen, “Navigation Safety and Risk Assessment Challenges in the High North,” in Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 275; see also Ingimundarson and Halla Gunnarsdóttir, “The Icelandic Sea Areas and Activity Level up to 2025.”
 
20
The member states are the following: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
 
21
See Arctic Coast Guard Forum, accessed February 22, 2024, https://​www.​arcticcoastguard​forum.​com/​about-acgf.
 
22
See Þjóðaröryggisstefna Íslands [Icelandic National Security Policy], Þingtíðindi, April 14, 2016, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​althingi.​is/​thingstorf/​thingmalalistar-eftir-thingum/​ferill/​?​ltg=​145&​mnr=​327; see also Page Wilson and Auður H. Ingólfsdóttir, “Small State, Big Impact? Iceland’s First National Security Policy.”
 
23
See “Joint Declaration between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland,” June 29, 2016, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​library/​04-Raduneytin/​Utanrikisraduney​tid/​PDF-skjol/​Joint-Declaration%2D%2DSigned-.​PDF.
 
24
“Agreement between the United States of America and Iceland. Effected by the Exchange of Notes at Reykjavik, October 13 and 17, 2017,” accessed September 30, 2023, https://​www.​state.​gov/​wp-content/​uploads/​2019/​02/​17-1017-Iceland-Defense-Coop-Notes.​pdf.
 
25
Icelandic Parliament, “Svar utanríkisráðherra við fyrirspurn frá Andrési Inga Jónssyni um viðveru herliðs á Keflavíkurflugvelli [The Foreign Minister’s [Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson] Response to a Question by Andrés Ingi Jónsson, on [Foreign] Military Presence at Keflavík Airport],” November 14, 2018, accessed January 13, 2024, https://​www.​althingi.​is/​altext/​149/​s/​0427.​htm; see also “Voru 153 daga við kafbátaeftirlit á Íslandi [Conducted Submarine Surveillance for 153 Days],” RUV, November 14, 2018, accessed February 3, 2024, https://​www.​ruv.​is/​frettir/​innlent/​voru-153-daga-vid-kafbataeftirlit-a-islandi.
 
26
This policy tension is still present in Norway’s 2020 Arctic policy. See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mennesker, muligheter og norske interesser i nord [People, Opportunities and Norwegian Interests in the North], November 27, 2020, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​regjeringen.​no/​no/​dokumenter/​meld.​-st.​-9-20202021/​id2787429/​; see also Andreas Østhagen, “What is the Point of Norway’s new Arctic Policy?” The Arctic Institute, December 2, 2020, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​thearcticinstitu​te.​org/​point-norway-new-arctic-policy/​.
 
27
Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, “Arctic: Territory of Dialogue,” address at the International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk, March 29, 2017, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​raduneyti/​utanrikisraduney​tid/​utanrikisradherr​a/​stok-raeda-utanrikisradherr​a/​2017/​03/​29/​Avarp-a-International-Arctic-Forum-i-Arkhangelsk/​.
 
28
James Stavrividis, “The U.S. Aim at Russia with a Resurrected Navy Fleet,” Bloomberg, May 16, 2018, accessed May 31, 2023, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​view/​articles/​2018-05-16/​u-s-navy-takes-aim-at-russia-with-a-new-fleet.
 
29
“The U.S. Aim at Russia With a Resurrected Navy Fleet.”
 
30
In his first annual report to the parliament on foreign and international affairs, Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson did not single out the Arctic but placed much emphasis on NATO and Nordic security cooperation. See Skýrsla Guðlaugs Þórs Þórðarsonar utanríkisráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál [Report by Foreign Minister Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarsonar on Foreign and International Affairs], Þingtíðindi, May 2017, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​althingi.​is/​altext/​146/​s/​0671.​html.
 
31
Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, “Back to the Future: The Geopolitical Centrality of the North Atlantic and the Arctic,” address delivered at the Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., May 16, 2018, accessed November 15, 2022, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​raduneyti/​utanrikisraduney​tid/​utanrikisradherr​a/​stok-raeda-utanrikisradherr​a/​2018/​05/​16/​Raeda-radherra-hja-hugveitunni-CSIS-i-Washington-DC/​.
 
32
U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military Competitive Edge (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018), accessed November 18, 2022, 3, https://​dod.​defense.​gov/​Portals/​1/​Documents/​pubs/​2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.​pdf.
 
33
See James G. Foggo and Alarik Fritz, “NATO and the Challenge in the North Atlantic and the Arctic,” 121–128.
 
34
See, for example, Vahid Nick Pay and Harry Gray Calvo, “Arctic Diplomacy: A Theoretical Evaluation of Russian Foreign Policy in the High North,” Russian Politics, 5, no. 1 (2020): 110–112.
 
35
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy, January 26, 2018, accessed September 30, 2021, https://​english.​www.​gov.​cn/​archive/​white_​paper/​2018/​01/​26/​content_​281476026660336.​htm.
 
36
This approach is reminiscent of the Cold War debate during the Carter Administration (1976–1980), over whether to tie Soviet actions on issues, such as human rights, with the future of détente in Soviet-American relations. See David Skidmore, “Carter and the Failure of Foreign Policy Reform,” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 4 (1993/1994): 699–729; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).
 
37
Congressional Research Service, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (updated February 1, 2021), 33, https://​crsreports.​congress.​gov/​product/​pdf/​R/​R41153/​177.
 
38
See Christopher R. Rossi, “Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome: Sovereignty ad Absurdum and the South China Sea Arbitration,” Cornell International Law Journal, 50, no. 2 (2017): 231–283; Oriana S. Mastro, “How China is bending the rules in the South China Sea”; Christine Elizabeth Macaraig and Adam James Fenton, “Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute,” The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, 8, no. 2 (2021): 42–58.
 
39
See Marc Lanteigne, “The Rise (and Fall?) of the Polar Silk Road,” The Diplomat, August 29, 2022, accessed June 2, 2023, https://​thediplomat.​com/​2022/​08/​the-rise-and-fall-of-the-polar-silk-road/​.
 
40
Oriana S. Mastro, “How China is bending the rules in the South China Sea,” The Interpreter, February 17, 2021, accessed May 21, 2023, https://​www.​lowyinstitute.​org/​the-interpreter/​how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea.
 
41
See “Pompeo—Russia is ‘aggressive’ in the Arctic, China’s work there also needs watching,” Reuters, May 6, 2019, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-finland-arctic-council/​pompeo-russia-is-aggressive-in-arctic-chinas-work-there-also-needs-watching-idUSKCN1SC1AY.
 
42
See Mikkel Runge Olesen, “The end of Arctic exceptionalism? A review of the academic debates and what the Arctic prospects mean for the Kingdom of Denmark,” Danish Foreign Policy Review 2020 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies), 103–127.
 
43
Interview with a Danish Arctic researcher, September 19, 2019.
 
44
Lon Strauss, “U.S. Marines and NATO’s Northern Flank,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13 (2022): 72–93, accessed November 23, 2024, https://​arcticreview.​no/​index.​php/​arctic/​article/​view/​3381/​6326.
 
45
Julienne Smith and Jerry Hendrix, Forgotten Waters: Minding the GIUK Gap.
 
46
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs Ingibjörg Solrun Gisladottir,” May 30, 2008, accessed February 3, 2024, https://​2001-2009.​state.​gov/​secretary/​rm/​2008/​05/​105447.​htm.
 
47
See Valur Ingimundarson, Uppgjör við umheiminn, 50–54.
 
48
See comments by Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir, Vísir, September 4, 2019, accessed November 23, 2023, https://​www.​visir.​is/​g/​2019190909439/​loftslagsvain-og-uppbygging-bandarikjahers-i-keflavik-storu-umraeduefnin-; see also the response from the non-committal response about Iceland’s participation in the BRI from the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the webzine Kjarninn, September 5, 2019, accessed November 18, 2022, https://​kjarninn.​is/​skyring/​2019-09-05-engin-endanlega-afstada-verid-tekin-til-thatttoku-i-belti-og-braut/​.
 
49
U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa Public Affairs, “U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bomber aircraft arrive in Iceland for ally, partner training,” August 24, 2021, accessed February 6, 2024, https://​www.​usafe.​af.​mil/​News/​Press-Releases/​Article/​2743096/​us-air-force-b-2-spirit-stealth-bomber-aircraft-arrive-in-iceland-for-ally-part/​.
 
50
See U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, “Statement of Intent on Defense Investments in Greenland,” September 17, 2018, accessed December 13, 2022, https://​twitter.​com/​usembdenmark/​status/​1041695240686632​960?​lang=​en.
 
51
See Valur Ingimundarson, “Framing the national interest: the political uses of the Arctic in Icelandic foreign and domestic policies.”
 
52
See “Obama and Nordic Nations Discuss Russia,” New York Times, May 13, 2016, accessed May 25, 2023, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​video/​us/​politics/​100000004405045/​obama-and-nordic-nations-discuss-russia.​html, May 13, 2016; “Obama Warms Up to Nordic Leaders,” New York Times, May 13, 2016, accessed May 25, 2023, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2016/​05/​14/​world/​europe/​obama-warms-to-nordic-heads-of-state.​html.
 
53
About the fading interest of the Nordic countries in cultivating relations with China, see, for example, Andreas Bøje Forsby, “Falling out of Favor: How China Lost the Nordic Countries,” The Diplomat, June 24, 2022, accessed May 25, 2023, https://​thediplomat.​com/​2022/​06/​falling-out-of-favor-how-china-lost-the-nordic-countries/​.
 
54
Interview with an Icelandic academic, February 3, 2024.
 
55
Ingi Freyr Vilhjálmsson, “Kínverska ríkið setur 700 til 800 milljónir í rannsóknarmiðstöð um norðurljósin” [China Invests 700–800 Million [Icelandic Kronor] in an Aurora Observatory], Heimildin, March 6, 2023, accessed April 10, 2023. https://​heimildin.​is/​grein/​16852/​.
 
56
Interview with an Icelandic science official, December 16, 2022.
 
57
Melody Schreiber, “A new China-Iceland Arctic science observatory is already expanding its focus,” Arctic Today, October 31, 2018, accessed July 1, 2023, https://​www.​arctictoday.​com/​new-china-iceland-arctic-science-observatory-already-expanding-focus/​.
 
58
See Þorsteinn Gunnarsson and Egill Þór Níelsson, “An Icelandic Perspective,” in Nordic-China Cooperation, 87–93.
 
59
“Kínverska ríkið setur 700 til 800 milljónir í rannsóknarmiðstöð um norðurljósin”; interview with a Icelandic science official December 16, 2022.
 
60
Email communications from Gunnlaugur Björnsson, a Research Scientist at the University of Iceland, to Valur Ingimundarson, February 8 and 10, 2023.
 
61
Interview with an Icelandic official, October 20, 2024.
 
62
See Ingi Freyr Vilhjálmsson, “Þingmaður spyr Katrínu um eftirlit með kínversku rannsóknarmiðstöðinni” [A Parliamentarian Asks Katrín [Jakobsdóttir] about how the Chinese Research Center Is Monitored], Heimildin, April 3, 2023, accessed April 10, 2023, https://​heimildin.​is/​grein/​17311/​; Ingi Freyr Vilhjálmsson, “Önnur ríki hafa áhyggjur af norðurljósamiðstöð Kína á Íslandi” [Other Countries Are Worried about the Aurora Observatory], Heimildin, April 1, 2023, accessed April 10, 2023, https://​heimildin.​is/​grein/​17281/​; Vilhjálmsson, “NATO hefur lýst áhyggjum af rannsóknamiðstöð Kína um norðurljósin” [NATO Has Expressed Worries about China’s Northern Lights Research Center], Heimildin, March 28, 2023, accessed April 10, 2023, https://​heimildin.​is/​grein/​17192/​.
 
63
See, for example, “China Begins to Revive Arctic Scientific Ground Projects After Setbacks,” Voice of America, December 5, 2022, accessed January 4, 2023, https://​www.​voanews.​com/​a/​china-begins-to-revive-arctic-scientific-ground-projects-after-setbacks/​.
 
64
See Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Norðurljós. Skýrsla starfshóps um efnahagstækifæri á norðurslóðum [Northern Lights, a Working Group Report about Economic Opportunities in the Arctic], May 2021, accessed July 5, 2023, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​library/​04Raduneytin/​Utanrikisraduney​tid/​PDF-skjol/​Nor%C3%B0urlj%C3%B3s%20​-%20​efnahagst%C3%A6kif%C3%A6ri%20​%C3%A1%20​nor%C3%B0ursl%C3%B3%C3%B0um_​WEB.​pdf.
 
65
Interview with a high-ranking Icelandic Arctic official, March 12, 2021.
 
66
Letter, John Moloolenar and Raja Krishnamoorthi to Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin, October 16, 2024, accessed October 25, 2024, https://​selectcommitteeo​ntheccp.​house.​gov/​sites/​evo-subsites/​selectcommitteeo​ntheccp.​house.​gov/​files/​evo-media-document/​10.​16.​24_​PRC%20​dual%20​use%20​research%20​in%20​the%20​Arctic; see also “Áhyggjur af norðurljósarannsóknum ” [Worries about aurora reseach], Morgunblaðið, October 19, 2024, accessed October 25, 2024, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​greinasafn/​grein/​1873365/​?​item_​num=​2&​dags=​2024-10-19&​t=​515572980&​_​t=​1729857459.​4462316.
 
67
The biweekly newspaper Heimildin, accessed June 1, 2023, https://​heimildin.​is/​.
 
68
The name of the parliamentarian is Andrés Ingi Jónsson.
 
69
Björn Bjarnason, “The China Stigma Must Be Erased,” November 28, 2022, accessed June 12, 2023, https://​www.​bjorn.​is/​dagbok/​afma-verdur-kinastimpilinn.
 
70
See “Íslensk stjórnvöld hafa ekkert eftirlit eða aðkomu að rannsóknarmiðstöð Kína [The Icelandic Government Does Not Monitor and Has No Involvement in China’s Research Center],” Heimildin, June 9, 2023, accessed June 11, 2023, https://​heimildin.​is/​grein/​18033/​islensk-stjornvold-hafa-ekkert-eftirlit-eda-adkomu-ad-rannsoknarmistod​-kina/​.
 
71
Interview with a high-ranking Arctic official, February 6, 2024.
 
72
About Chinese investments in Iceland, see Egill Þór Níelsson and Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, “Kina, investeringer og sikkerhetspolitikk: Politikk og perspektiver i Norden—Island” [China, Investments and Security Policy: Politics and Perspectives in the Nordics—Iceland], Internasjonal Politikk 78, no. 1 (2020): 68–78; see also OECD, “OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment—Fourth Edition,” 2008, 17, accessed November 18, 2022, https://​www.​oecd.​org/​daf/​inv/​investmentstatis​ticsandanalysis/​40193734.​pdf.
 
73
See, for example, Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, “Iceland-China relations will continue to strengthen,” China Daily, September 6, 2018, accessed December 30, 2022, https://​www.​chinadaily.​com.​cn/​a/​201809/​06/​WS5b90702ba31033​b4f465477b.​html.
 
74
Þingsályktun um stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
75
A German engineering company, Bremenports, has invested in preliminary research on the possibility of building such a deep-water port. See “Bremenports to Develop New Deep-Water Port in Iceland,” World Maritime News, May 27, 2015, accessed November 30, 2022, https://​worldmaritimenew​s.​com/​archives/​275015/​bremenports-to-develop-new-deep-water-port-in-iceland/​; see also “Stærsta verkefni Íslandssögunnar. Hvað er að gerast í Finnafirði?” [The Greatest Project in the History of Iceland. What Is Happening in Finnafjörður?], Kjarninn, March 21, 2021, accessed July 10, 2023, https://​kjarninn.​is/​skyring/​staersta-verkefni-islandssogunnar-hvad-er-ad-gerast-i-finnafirdi/​.
 
76
“Drög að frumvarpi til laga um breytingu á varnarmálalögum nr. 34/2008 (á öryggissvæði o.fl.)” [A Draft of a Legislative Change in the Defense Law], February 26, 2021, accessed December 30, 2022, https://​samradsgatt.​island.​is/​oll-mal/​$Cases/​Details/​?​id=​2932.
 
77
“Katrín segir nýja herstöð ekki koma til greina” [PM Katrín Jakobsdóttir Says That a New Military Base Is out of the Question], Vísir, November 3, 2022, accessed January 22, 2022, https://​185.​21.​17.​249/​g/​20202032771d/​katrin-segir-nyja-herstod-ekki-koma-til-greina.
 
78
Interviews with a high-level Icelandic government official and defense official, February, 5, 2019.
 
79
Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, “New Geo-Political Reality in the West Nordic Area,” a conference speech at the Arctic Circle Assembly, Reykjavík, October 20, 2018, accessed December 30, 2022.
 
80
“New Geo-Political Reality in the West Nordic Area.”
 
81
Skýrsla utanríkisráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál [Report by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Foreign and International Affairs], April 2019, 10, 17, accessed November 30, 2022, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​efst-a-baugi/​frettir/​stok-frett/​2019/​04/​29/​Skyrsla-utanrikisradherr​a-um-utanrikis-og-althjodamal-logd-fyrir-Althingi/​.
 
82
Skýrsla utanríkis- og þróunarsamvinnuráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál [Report by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation] on Foreign and International Affairs, May 2020, 9, 79, accessed December 30, 2022, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​gogn/​rit-og-skyrslur/​stakt-rit/​2020/​05/​07/​Skyrsla-utanrikis-og-throunarsamvinnu​radherra-um-utanrikis-og-althjodamal-2020/​; Skýrsla utanríkis- og þróunarsamvinnuráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál [Report by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation on Foreign and International affairs], May 2021, 25, 81, accessed September 30, 2022, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​efst-a-baugi/​frettir/​stok-frett/​2021/​05/​05/​Skyrsla-utanrikis-og-throunarsamvinnu​radherra-um-utanrikis-og-althjodamal-2021/​.
 
83
“Skref í átt að enn betri samvinnu: Fyrsti sendimaður Grænlands á Íslandi tekinn til starfa” [A Step Towards Deeper Cooperation: The First Greenlandic Representative Has Assumed His Functions], Morgunblaðið, January 3, 2019, accessed November July 20, 2024, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​greinasafn/​grein/​1709573/​.
 
84
Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Samstarf Grænlands og Íslands á nýjum Norðurslóðum. Tillögur Grænlandsnefndar utanríkis- og þróunarsamvinnuráðherra [Cooperation between Greenland and Iceland in the New Arctic. Proposals by the Greenland Committee of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Development Cooperation], December 2020, accessed February 11, 2023, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​library/​02-Rit%2D%2Dskyrslur-og-skrar/​Samstarf%20​Gr%c3%a6nlands%20​og%20​%c3%8dslands%20​%c3%a1%20​n%c3%bdjum%20​Nor%c3%b0ursl%c3%b3%c3%b0um%20​-%20​Copy%20​(1).​pdf.
 
85
Samstarf Grænlands og Íslands á nýjum Norðurslóðum, 37.
 
86
As Page Wilson has pointed out, the legal and political complexities of the Greenlandic independence question have often been downplayed by politicians and scholars. But if the Greenlanders opt for independence—which would mean the end of the annual block grant from Denmark in the amount of more than half a billion U.S. dollars or about 20% of Greenland’s GDP and more than half of its budget—it is hard to see the Danes resisting such a decision given the contractual commitments they have already made; see Wilson, “An Arctic ‘cold rush’? Understanding Greenland’s (in)dependence question,” Polar Record 53, no. 5 (2017): 512–519.
 
87
Samstarf Grænlands og Íslands á nýjum Norðurslóðum, 27–28, 30–31, 33.
 
88
Samstarf Grænlands og Íslands á nýjum Norðurslóðum, 19.
 
89
Samstarf Grænlands og Íslands á nýjum Norðurslóðum, 33.
 
90
Samstarf Grænlands og Íslands á nýjum Norðurslóðum, 14.
 
91
Samstarf Grænlands og Íslands á nýjum Norðurslóðum, 33.
 
92
Þingsályktunartillaga um aukið samstarf Íslands og Grænlands [A Parliamentary Resolution on Increased Cooperation between Iceland and Greenland], May 31, 2021, accessed February 6, 2024, https://​www.​althingi.​is/​altext/​151/​s/​1560.​html.
 
93
Þingsályktunartillaga um aukið samstarf Íslands og Grænlands.
 
94
High-ranking Icelandic official, interview by author, April 12, 2023.
 
95
“Bæta í samstarf Grænlands og Íslands” [The Expansion of Greenlandic-Icelandic Relations], Morgunblaðið, September 23, 2023, accessed July 5, 2023, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​frettir/​innlent/​2021/​09/​23/​baeta_​i_​samstarf_​graenlands_​og_​islands/​.
 
96
Maria Ackrén and Rasmus Leander Nielsen, “The First Foreign- and Security Policy Opinion Poll in Greenland,” Ilisimatusarfik/University of Greenland and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2021, accessed February 11, 2023, https://​uni.​gl/​media/​6762444/​fp-survey-2021-ilisimatusarfik.​pdf.
 
97
See “Merkilegt skref í samstarfi Íslands og Grænlands” [A Noteworthy Step in Icelandic-Greenlandic Cooperation], Fréttablaðið, October 13, 2022, accessed February 11, 2023, https://​www.​frettabladid.​is/​frettir/​merkilegt-skref-i-samstarfi-islands-og-graenlands/​.
 
98
Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office, “Declaration of Cooperation between the Prime Minister of Greenland and the Prime Minister of Iceland on Future Cooperation between Greenland and Iceland,” October 13, 2022, accessed February 11, 2023, https://​www.​government.​is/​library/​01-Ministries/​Prime-Ministrers-Office/​Declaration%20​of%20​cooperation.​pdf.
 
99
“Declaration of Cooperation between the Prime Minister of Greenland and the Prime Minister of Iceland on Future Cooperation between Greenland and Iceland.”
 
100
Address by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi.
 
101
Address by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi.
 
102
Address by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi.
 
103
Address by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi.
 
104
Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, “Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland,” Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Rovaniemi, May 7, 2019, accessed January 25, 2024, https://​oaarchive.​arctic-council.​org/​handle/​11374/​2402?​show=​full.
 
105
Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, “Presentation of the [Arctic Council] Icelandic Chairmanship Program,” Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Rovaniemi, May 7, 2019, accessed January 25, 2024, https://​oaarchive.​arctic-council.​org/​handle/​11374/​2397; see also Þórðarson, “Opening Address at the seminar ‘Doing Business in the Arctic,’” American-Icelandic Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., May 23, 2019, accessed January 25, 2022, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​raduneyti/​utanrikisraduney​tid/​utanrikisradherr​a/​fyrri-radherrar/​stok-raeda-fyrrum-radherra/​2019/​05/​23/​Opnunaravarp-a-malthingi-Islensk-Ameriska-vidskiptaradsins​-Doing-Business-in-the-Arctic/​.
 
106
Arctic Economic Council, “Banks banning investments in the Arctic will hurt even more now,” May 5, 2022, accessed January 23, 2024, https://​arcticeconomicco​uncil.​com/​news/​banks-banning-investments-in-the-arctic-will-hurt-even-more-now/​.
 
107
See “Why the Arctic Economic Council is Needed: The People of the Arctic Deserve Our Full Attention and Opportunity to Develop,” High North News, May 31, 2023, accessed May 31, 2023, https://​www.​highnorthnews.​com/​en/​people-arctic-deserve-our-full-attention-and-opportunity-develop.
 
108
“First Joint Meeting between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council,” Arctic Council, October 19, 2019, accessed May 31, 2023, https://​arctic-council.​org/​news/​first-joint-meeting-between-the-arctic-economic-council/​.
 
109
See Margrét Cela and Pia Hansson, “A challenging chairmanship in turbulent times.”
 
110
Interview with a high-ranking Icelandic Arctic official, March 5, 2021.
 
111
Arctic Council, Arctic Council Strategic Plan 2021–2030, May 20, 2021, accessed January 25, 2024, https://​oaarchive.​arctic-council.​org/​handle/​11374/​2601.
 
112
“Reykjavík Declaration,” Arctic Council, May 20, 2021, accessed January 25, 2024, https://​oaarchive.​arctic-council.​org/​handle/​11374/​2600.
 
114
“Outlines of the Statement by Sergey Lavrov”; see also Kathryn C. Lavelle, “Regime, Climate, and Region in Transition: Russian Participation in the Arctic Council,” Problems of Post-Communism 69, no. 4–5 (2022): 345–357.
 
115
See Daniel McVicater, “How the Russia-Ukraine War Challenges Arctic Governance,” Council of Foreign Relations, May 10, 2022, accessed January 22, 2024, https://​www.​cfr.​org/​blog/​how-russia-ukraine-war-challenges-arctic-governance.
 
116
“Top US, Russia diplomats spar firmly but politely in Iceland,” AP, May 20, 2021, accessed January 22, 2024, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​donald-trump-iceland-europe-russia-middle-east-24e823ef46207bfb​e4c841e1b4a864f0​.
 
117
“Vill liðka fyrir bættum samskiptum” [Wants to Facilitate Improved Relations], Fréttablaðið, April 16, 2021, accessed January 22, 2024, https://​frettabladid.​overcastcdn.​com/​documents/​210416.​pdf.
 
118
“Ísland fest sig í sessi sem miðstöð norðurslóða” [The Consolidation of Iceland as a Central Arctic Hub], Fréttablaðið, May 21, 2021, accessed January 22, 2024, https://​www.​frettabladid.​is/​frettir/​olafur-island-fest-sig-i-sessi-sem-midstod-nordursloda/​.
 
119
“Ísland fest sig í sessi sem miðstöð norðurslóða.”
 
120
“Ísland fest sig í sessi sem miðstöð norðurslóða.”
 
121
See, for example, David Edmonds and John Eidinow, Bobby Fischer Goes to War (New York: Harper Publishers, 2004); Harold C. Schonberg, “Cold War in the World of Chess,” New York Times, September 27, 1981, accessed February 6, 2024, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​1981/​09/​27/​magazine/​cold-war-in-the-world-of-chess.​html; “Kissinger Phone Call to Fischer Disclosed,” New York Times, July 18, 1972, accessed February 10, 2024, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​1972/​07/​18/​archives/​kissinger-phone-call-to-fischer-disclosed.​html.
 
122
Þingsályktun um stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
123
Þingsályktun um stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
124
Arctic Council, “New Observer: West Nordic Council,” September 11, 2017, https://​arctic-council.​org/​news/​new-observer-west-nordic-council/​.
 
125
Þingsályktun um stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
126
Þingsályktun um stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
127
Interview with an Icelandic official, February 23, 2024. See also Joji Morshita, “The Arctic Five-plus-Five process on central Arctic Ocean fisheries negotiations: Reflecting the interests of Arctic and non-Arctic actors,” in Emerging Legal Orders in the Arctic: The Role of Non-Arctic Actors, ed. Akiho Shibata, Leilei Zou, Nikolas Sellheim, and Marzia Scopelliti, 109–131.
 
128
See Jóhann Sigurjónsson, “Icelandic Perspectives on the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,” The Yearbook of Polar Law Online 12, no. 1 (2020): 268–284; see also Arnór Snæbjörnsson, “Nýr samningur um að koma í veg fyrir stjórnlausar úthafsveiðar í miðhluta Norður-Íshafsins” [New Agreement on the Prevention of Irregular Fishing on the High Seas in the Central Arctic Ocean], Úlfljótur, January 23, 2019, accessed February 20, 2024, https://​ulfljotur.​com/​2019/​01/​23/​nyr-samningur-um-ad-koma-i-veg-fyrir-stjornlausar-uthafsveidar-i-midhluta-nordur-ishafsins/​; Sigurveig Þórhallsdóttir, “Norður-Íshafssamningurinn” [The Central Arctic Ocean Agreement] (MA thesis, University of Iceland, 2020).
 
129
Interview with a Canadian official, December 3, 2014.
 
130
“Iceland protests five-nation fishing deal in Arctic,” News24, July 24, 2015, accessed January 15. 2024, https://​www.​news24.​com/​news24/​green/​news/​iceland-protests-five-nation-fishing-deal-in-arctic-20150724.
 
131
Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Vegna ‘5-ríkja samráðs’ um fiskveiðar í Norður-Íshafi” [On “Five-State Consultation” on Fishing in the Arctic Ocean], July 23, 2015, accessed February 18, 2024, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​efst-a-baugi/​frettir/​stok-frett/​2015/​07/​23/​Vegna-5-rikja-samrads-um-fiskveidar-i-Nordur-Ishafi-nbsp/​; see also “Iceland protests five-nation fishing deal in Arctic.”
 
132
The Foreign Minister stressed that since Iceland was one of the largest fishing states in the world—and more dependent on fishing than any of the other Arctic states—it had a say over future regulation of fishing in international waters. Claiming that Iceland had always supported science-based regional cooperation, he made the point that it was a member of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NAFO), and the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES). Finally, he argued that the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement on the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and migratory stocks covered the Arctic Ocean as well as other parts of the world. See “Vegna ‘5-ríkja samráðs’ um fiskveiðar í Norður-Íshafi.”
 
133
See Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen and Gry Thomasen, “How has Arctic coastal state cooperation affected the Arctic Council?” 6; see also Erik J. Molenaar, “International Regulation of Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries,” in Challenges of the Changing Arctic: Continental Shelf, Navigation, and Fisheries, ed. Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and Ronán Long (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), 429–463; Erik J. Molenaar, “The CAOF Agreement: Key Issues of International Fisheries Law.” In New Knowledge and Changing Circumstances in the Law of the Sea, ed. Tomas Heidar, (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2020), 446–476.
 
134
See Jóhann Sigurjónsson, “Icelandic Perspectives on the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean,” 270.
 
135
“How has Arctic coastal state cooperation affected the Arctic Council?” 6.
 
136
“How has Arctic coastal state cooperation affected the Arctic Council?” 5.
 
137
Yet, when it comes to the management of migratory and transboundary fish stock in the Arctic region, Iceland had been keen on fighting any attempts to establish an international fishery management organization, which could limit its own influence as a major fishing state. Iceland has stated its opposition to any regional fishing management organizations (RFMOs), which excludes states with vested regional interests, with a say over the management of migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks. On the other hand, it has been not opposed to regulatory measures designed to promote sustainability—in general terms—in the Arctic. Interview with a high-ranking Arctic official, January 20, 2017.
 
138
See Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Auglýsing um samning um að koma í veg fyrir stjórnlausar úthafsveiðar í miðhluta Norður-Íshafsins” [Announcement on the Agreement on the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean], June 22, 2021, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​library/​03-Verkefni/​Utanrikismal/​Lagamal/​C-deildar-atak/​16_​2021_​Augl%C3%BDsing%20​um%20​samning%20​um%20​a%C3%B0%20​koma%20​%C3%AD%20​veg%20​fyrir%20​stj%C3%B3rnlausar%20​%C3%BAthafsvei%C3%B0ar%20​%C3%AD%20​mi%C3%B0hluta%20​Nor%C3%B0ur-%C3%8Dshafsins.​.​pdf
 
139
Tillögur nefndar um endurskoðun á stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
140
Tillögur nefndar um endurskoðun á stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
141
See, for example, Rauna Kuokkanen, “‘To See What State We Are In’: First Years of the Greenland Self-Government Act and the Pursuit of Inuit Sovereignty,” Ethnopolitics 16, no. 2 (2017): 184; see also Dorothée Céline Cambo, “Disentangling the conundrum of self-determination and its implications in Greenland,” Polar Record 56 (e3): 1–10. https://​doi.​org/​10.​1017/​S003224742000016​9.
 
142
Tillögur nefndar um endurskoðun á stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
143
Tillögur nefndar um endurskoðun á stefnu Íslands í málefnum norðurslóða.
 
144
“Agreement on the Platform for the Coalition Government of the Independence Party, the Left Green Movement and the Progressive Party,” November 28, 2021, accessed February 11, 2024, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​rikisstjorn/​stjornarsattmali​/​.
 
145
Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Ísland fordæmir innrás Rússa í Úkraínu” [Iceland Condemns the Invasion of Russia into Ukraine], February 24, 2022, accessed February 11, 2024, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​efst-a-baugi/​frettir/​stok-frett/​2022/​02/​24/​Island-fordaemir-innras-Russa-i-Ukrainu/​; “Innrás Rússlands í Úkraínu—viðbrögð íslenskra stjórnvalda: íslensk stjórnvöld fordæma ólögmæta innrás Rússlands og lýsa yfir algjörum stuðningi við Úkraínu” [Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine—Iceland’s Reaction: The Icelandic Government Condemns Russia’s Illegal Invasion and Declares Full Support for Ukraine], the Icelandic Government, October 6, 2022, accessed February 9, 2024, https://​www.​stjornarradid.​is/​verkefni/​utanrikismal/​strid-i-ukrainu-vidbrogd-islenskra-stjornvalda/​.
 
146
“Ræða utanríkisráðherra [Þórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörð Gylfadóttir] á Helsinki Security Forum á þingi Hringborðs norðurslóða.”
 
147
“Ræða utanríkisráðherra [Þórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörð Gylfadóttir] á Helsinki Security Forum á þingi Hringborðs norðurslóða.”
 
148
“Ræða utanríkisráðherra [Þórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörð Gylfadóttir] á Helsinki Security Forum á þingi Hringborðs norðurslóða.”
 
149
“Ræða utanríkisráðherra [Þórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörð Gylfadóttir] á Helsinki Security Forum á þingi Hringborðs norðurslóða.”
 
150
“Mikil umsvif og náin samvinna” [Extensive [military] Activities and Close Cooperation], Morgunblaðið, April 13, 2023, accessed April 19, 2023, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​mogginn/​bladid/​grein/​1833634/​?​t=​380088780&​_​t=​1681913551.​4705353.
 
151
See, for example, “Föst viðvera herliðs á Íslandi hafi fælingarmátt” [A Permanent Military Presence in Iceland Serves a Deterrence Function], Morgunblaðið, March 6, 2023, accessed April 19, 2022, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​frettir/​innlent/​2022/​03/​06/​fost_​vidvera_​herlids_​a_​islandi_​hafi_​faelingarmatt/​; “Skoða ætti endurkomu hersins” [The Return of the [U.S.] Military Should Be Explored], Morgunblaðið, April 7, 2023, accessed April 19, 2023, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​mogginn/​bladid/​netgreinar/​2023/​04TT/​07/​skoda_​aetti_​endurkomu_​hersins/​.
 
152
See Arnór Sigurjónsson, Íslenskur her. Breyttur heimur, nýr veruleiki [An Icelandic Military: New Challenges in a Changed World] (Reykjavík: Arnór Sigurjónsson, 2023).
 
153
And the Defense Agreement with the United States as the cornerstone of its defense policy.
 
154
See “Ekki mistök að loka varnarstöðinni” [Not a Mistake to Close the Defense Base], Morgunblaðið, April 20, 2023, accessed April 20, 2023, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​frettir/​innlent/​2023/​04/​14/​ekki_​mistok_​ad_​loka_​varnarstodinni/​; see also “Íslenskur her ekki tímabær” [An Icelandic Military Not Timely], Morgunblaðið, March 7, 2023, accessed April 20, 2023, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​frettir/​innlent/​2023/​03/​07/​islenskur_​her_​ekki_​timabaer/​.
 
155
Interview with a U.S. Department of Defense official, April 10, 2018.
 
157
See “Fyrirhugað að hafa herskip í Helguvík” [The Docking of Warships Planned in Helguvík], Morgunblaðið, June 9, 2023, accessed June 11, 2023, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​mogginn/​bladid/​grein/​1837704/​.
 
158
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Arctic Council Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” [The United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland], March 3, 2022, accessed January 24, 2023, https://​www.​state.​gov/​joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/​.
 
159
See Daniel McVicater, “How the Russia-Ukraine War Challenges Arctic Governance,” Council of Foreign Relations, May 10, 2022, accessed January 22, 2023, https://​www.​cfr.​org/​blog/​how-russia-ukraine-war-challenges-arctic-governance.
 
160
Interview with high-ranking Icelandic official, interview by author, April 12, 2023.
 
161
U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Limited Resumption of Arctic Council Cooperation [The United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland],” June 8, 2022, accessed January 24, 2023, https://​www.​state.​gov/​joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation/​.
 
162
See Timo Koivurova, “The Arctic Council can continue without Russia,” Arctic Today, March 10, 2022, accessed January 24, 2023, https://​www.​arctictoday.​com/​the-arctic-council-can-continue-without-russia/​.
 
163
See “Russia’s future in Arctic Council depends on whether its activity meets Russian interests—Russian Foreign Ministry,” Interfax, February 5, 2024, accessed February 7, 2024, https://​interfax.​com/​newsroom/​top-stories/​99094/​; see also Timo Koivurova and Ahio Shibata, “After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Can we still cooperate with Russia in the Arctic?” Polar Record 59, e12 (2023): 1–9, https://​doi.​org/​10.​1017/​S003224742300004​9.
 
164
Interview with a high-ranking Icelandic official, April 12, 2023; interview with a high-ranking Arctic official, interview by author, February 6, 2024.
 
165
“Lavrov: ‘The Arctic Council’s Future Depends on Whether a Civilized Dialogue Can Continue,” High North News, May 15, 2023, accessed June 11, 2023, https://​www.​highnorthnews.​com/​en/​lavrov-arctic-councils-future-depends-whether-civilized-dialogue-can-continue.
 
166
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s video address to the participants in the 13th session of the Arctic Council, May 11, 2023,” accessed June 11, 2023, https://​mid.​ru/​en/​foreign_​policy/​rso/​1869388/​.
 
167
“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s video address to the participants in the 13th session of the Arctic Council, May 11, 2023.”
 
168
Interview with a high-ranking official, February 6, 2024.
 
169
“Russia’s future in Arctic Council depends on whether its activity meets Russian interests—Russian Foreign Ministry,” Interfax, February 5, 2024, accessed February 11, 2024, https://​interfax.​com/​newsroom/​top-stories/​99094/​.
 
170
“Russia Wants to Cooperate With BRICS Countries on Research on Svalbard,” High North News, April 14, 2023, accessed February 10, 2024, https://​www.​highnorthnews.​com/​en/​russia-wants-cooperate-brics-countries-research-svalbard.
 
171
“Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation: Joint Statement of the European Union, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden on suspending activities with Russia,” March 9, 2022, accessed May 29, 2023, https://​www.​eeas.​europa.​eu/​eeas/​barents-euro-arctic-cooperation-joint-statement-european-union-finland-denmark-iceland-norway_​en.
 
172
“Northern Dimension Policy: Joint Statement by the European Union, Iceland and Norway on suspending activities with Russia and Belarus,” March 8, 2022, accessed May 29, 2023, https://​ndpculture.​org/​news/​northern-dimension-policy-joint-statement-by-the-european-union-iceland-and-norway-on-suspending-activities-with-russia-and-belarus/​.
 
173
“Statement published by the Norwegian MFA: Russia Suspended from the Council of the Baltic Sea States,” March 3, 2022, accessed May 29, 2023, https://​www.​regjeringen.​no/​en/​aktuelt/​russland-suspenderes-fra-ostersjoradet/​id2903009/​. Norway held the presidency of the Council when Russia invaded Ukraine.
 
174
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“Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the situation around the Northern Dimension and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC),” March 11, 2022, accessed May 29, 2023, https://​mid.​ru/​ru/​foreign_​policy/​news/​1803807/​?​lang=​en.
 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Ministry Statement on the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Council of the Baltic Sea States,” May 17, 2022, accessed May 29, 2023, https://​www.​mid.​ru/​en/​foreign_​policy/​news/​1813674/​.
 
177
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Ministry Statement on Russia’s withdrawal from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council,” September 18, 2023, accessed February 2, 2024, https://​mid.​ru/​en/​foreign_​policy/​rso/​1904899/​.
 
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“AEC appoints a new chair from the North Norwegian Company,” Arctic Economic Council, May 30, 2023, accessed, May 31, 2023, https://​arcticeconomicco​uncil.​com/​news/​aec-appoints-a-new-chair-from-the-north-norwegian-company/​.
 
179
Interview with a high-level Icelandic official, April 12, 2023; see also Timo Koivurova and Akiho Shibata, “After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Can we still cooperate with Russia in the Arctic,” Polar Record, 59 (2023) (e12), March 17, 2023, accessed May 29, 2023, 1–9, https://​doi.​org/​10.​1017/​S003224742300004​9.
 
180
Interview with a high-ranking Icelandic official, April 12, 2023.
 
181
Interview with a high-ranking Icelandic official, April 12, 2023.
 
184
Oran Young, “Can the Arctic Council Survive the Impact of the Ukraine Crisis?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, December 30, 2022, accessed January 24, 2023, https://​gjia.​georgetown.​edu/​2022/​12/​30/​can-the-arctic-council-survive-the-impact-of-the-ukraine-crisis/​.
 
185
Natalia Drozdiak and Danielle Bochove, “The Arctic Is the New Spot for NATO and Russia to Flex Their Military Muscle,” Bloomberg, March 13, 2023, accessed February 11, 2024, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​features/​2023-03-13/​nato-russia-are-flexing-their-military-power-in-the-arctic.
 
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NATO, “Pre-ministerial press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers,” October 11, 2022, accessed December 10, 2023, https://​www.​nato.​int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​opinions_​208037.​htm.
 
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Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Iceland suspends embassy operations in Moscow,” June 9, 2023, accessed June 11, 2023, https://​www.​government.​is/​diplomatic-missions/​embassy-article/​2023/​06/​09/​Iceland-suspends-embassy-operations-in-Moscow/​.
 
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“Iceland suspends embassy operations in Moscow.”
 
190
“Iceland suspends embassy operations in Moscow.”
 
191
“Russia says Iceland will ‘destroy’ ties by suspending embassy operations,” Reuters, June 10, 2023, accessed June 11, 2023, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​world/​europe/​russia-says-iceland-destroys-ties-by-suspending-embassy-operations-2023-06-10/​.
 
192
“Russia says Iceland will ‘destroy’ ties by suspending embassy operations.”
 
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“Russia will react to Iceland’s unfriendly steps,” Prensa, June 10, 2023, accessed June 11, 2023, https://​www.​plenglish.​com/​news/​2023/​06/​10/​russia-will-react-to-icelands-unfriendly-steps/​.
 
194
“Russia will react to Iceland’s unfriendly steps.”
 
195
On Iceland’s trade relations with the Soviet Union and the East bloc, see, for example, Jón Ólafsson, Kæru félagar. Íslenskir sósíalistar og Sovétríkin 1920–1960 [Dear Comrades: Icelandic Socialists and the Soviet Union, 1920–1969] (Reykjavík: Mál og menning, 1999); Valur Ingimundarson, Í eldlínu kalda stríðsins. Samskipti Íslands og Bandaríkjanna 1945–1960; Skafti Ingimarsson, “Íslenskir kommúnistar og sósíalistar: Flokksstarf, félagsgerð og stjórnmálabarátta 1918–1968” [Icelandic Communists and Socialists: Party Activism, Social Structure, and Political Struggle], Ph.D. diss. (University of Iceland, 2018); Þór Whitehead, “Austurviðskipti Íslendinga” [Iceland’s Trade with the East Bloc], Frelsið 3, no. 3 (1982): 198–211.
 
196
Interview with a high-level governmental official, June 22, 2023.
 
197
“Sendiráðið í Moskvu verður áfram lokað” [The Embassy in Moscow will Remain Closed], Morgunblaðið, October 19, 2023, accessed February 10, 2024, https://​www.​mbl.​is/​frettir/​innlent/​2023/​10/​19/​sendiradid_​i_​russlandi_​verdur_​afram_​lokad/​. Benediktsson repeated practical rationale for the decision: the low level of embassy activities, the idle state of the bilateral relationship, and the need for an ambassadorial rotation. Yet, he stressed Iceland was not severing diplomatic ties with Russia, even if it did not maintain normal embassy functions.
 
198
Interview with a high-level governmental official, June 22, 2023; “Sendiráðið í Moskvu verður áfram lokað.”
 
Metadaten
Titel
Geopolitical Divisions Over Ukraine: The Impact on Iceland’s Arctic Policy
verfasst von
Valur Ingimundarson
Copyright-Jahr
2024
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40761-1_4

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