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Erschienen in:
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2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Global Development and Climate Change: A Game Theory Approach

verfasst von : António Bento Caleiro, Miguel Rocha de Sousa, Ingo Andrade de Oliveira

Erschienen in: Climate Change and Global Development

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The increasing concern with climate change is one of the main issues of our time, and thus we aim to theoretically and mathematically analyse its causes. However our approach follows a different stream of thought, presenting the reasoning and decision-making processes between technical and moral solutions. We have resorted to game theory models in order to demonstrate cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, ranging from the traditional to the evolutionary within game theory. In doing so we are able to glimpse the development of modern society and a paradigm shift regarding human control over nature and to what extent it is harmful to the sustainability of our environment and the survival of future generations. Merging different fields of knowledge, we present a theoretical-philosophical approach, combined with empirical-mathematical solutions taking into account the agent-based behaviour guided blindly by instrumental rationality.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Introduction
Nächstes Kapitel On the Edge of Climate Change: In a Search of an Adequate Agent-Based Methodology to Model Environmental Dynamics
Fußnoten
1
As recognized in Buchholz and Sandler (2017), this effect can be reinforced if followers are sufficiently risk-averse and/or climate change damage to be uncertain (Auerswald et al. 2011).
 
2
As noted by Hedley Bull (2002: 13), and bringing up his definition according to the issue of CC we perceive, it is worthy to discuss whether our shared beliefs frame the states nowadays as a society of states, a system of states or rather as an international anarchy.
 
3
The idea of the greatest good to the greatest number is essential in welfare functions and crucial in all economics decision-making. Our Nash equilibria and evolutionary approach assume this kind of instrumental rationality.
 
4
Also, again we are framing global universal concepts, such that in our global economic model, the implications are that we are dealing with universal laws; thus, we are dealing with homogeneous agents in economic terms.
 
5
Once it considers “loving ends justify any means”, it is framed here as realist tradition.
 
6
The diplomatic process of making treaties is the primary source of international law, and it goes through different stages before becoming binding/an international law: (1) negotiation (two or more countries design the treaty according to their interests), (2) ratification (the approval of the treaty by their domestic policy institutions), (3) renegotiation (after domestic discussions/parley, treaties may suffer some alterations) and (4) implementation (the approval of a treaty by international institutions).
 
8
Where Von Neumann was a cooperative group leader and discussant, Nash had an individualistic approach (Nasar 1998); thus the different approaches both men dealt with led to quite different conclusions, and both men were playing rivals and not coalitions.
 
9
Nash, a bright young genius in his early 20s, would entry into a spiral of mental illness for 30 years to recover quite miraculously and win the 1994 Nobel prize in economics for his solution general bargaining non-cooperative game and, even later, won the prestigious Niels Henrik Abel’s Prize in Mathematics in 2015 for his contributions for partial differential equations (related to an embeddedness theorem in topology which joined topology with algebra) (http://​www.​abelprize.​no/​nyheter/​vis.​html?​tid=​63589). The prize was awarded to Nash in 2015, and he was killed in a taxi car crash on the New Jersey Turnpike, just 2 days after coming back from Norway.
 
10
As recognized in Buchholz and Sandler (2017), this effect can be reinforced if followers are sufficiently risk-averse and/or climate change damage to be uncertain (Auerswald et al. 2011).
 
11
It is interesting to note that, usually, the singular is used to designate this type of game, i.e. the prisoner’s dilemma. This may be due to the fact that the preferences of one prisoner are representative of the preferences of all prisoners. In our case, because payment levels may be different, we prefer to consider the plural, i.e. prisoners’ dilemma.
 
12
In this regard, it is illuminating to quote The Economist (2007): “After all, all countries will enjoy the benefits of a stable climate whether they have helped to bring it about or not. So a government that can persuade others to cut their greenhouse-gas emissions without doing so itself gets the best of both worlds: it avoids all the expense and self-denial involved, and yet still escapes catastrophe. […] The problem, of course, is that if everyone is counting on others to act, no one will, and the consequences could be much worse than if everyone had simply done their bit to begin with. Game theorists call a simplified version of this scenario the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’”.
 
13
We will assume infinite retaliation.
 
14
From an empirical point of view, there is some support for the idea that, in the short run, the countries that pollute less are those more vulnerable to the malefic consequences of the climate change. See, for instance, the ND-GAIN Country Index (http://​index.​gain.​org/​; accessed on August 11, 2017).
 
15
NetLogo is a multi-agent programmable modeling environment, freely available at http://​ccl.​northwestern.​edu/​netlogo/​ with a very wide range of applications, as evidenced by the wide range of models available to users.
 
16
We are assuming that this point in time occurs before the point of, say, no return.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Global Development and Climate Change: A Game Theory Approach
verfasst von
António Bento Caleiro
Miguel Rocha de Sousa
Ingo Andrade de Oliveira
Copyright-Jahr
2019
Verlag
Springer International Publishing
Buch
Climate Change and Global Development

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-02661-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-02662-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02662-2_2