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The crisis engulfed the banking systems of many of the advanced economies, exposing common flaws in the global regulatory framework. The policy response to the crisis was correspondingly global. In this section, we shall discuss the two key elements of the global policy response: the reforms to the international prudential standards and the attempts to solve TBTF.
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Acharya, V., Anginer, D., & Warburton, A. (2015). The end of market discipline? Investor expectations of implicit state guarantees. mimeo.
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- Global Reform
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