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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Going Beyond Dual Execution: MPC for Functions with Efficient Verification

verfasst von : Carmit Hazay, Abhi Shelat, Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam

Erschienen in: Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2020

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The dual execution paradigm of Mohassel and Franklin (PKC’06) and Huang, Katz and Evans (IEEE ’12) shows how to achieve the notion of 1-bit leakage security at roughly twice the cost of semi-honest security for the special case of two-party secure computation. To date, there are no multi-party computation (MPC) protocols that offer such a strong trade-off between security and semi-honest performance.

Our main result is to address this shortcoming by designing 1-bit leakage protocols for the multi-party setting, albeit for a special class of functions. We say that function f(x, y) is efficiently verifiable by g if the running time of g is always smaller than f and \(g(x,y,z)=1\) if and only if \(f(x,y)=z\).

In the two-party setting, we first improve dual execution by observing that the “second execution” can be an evaluation of g instead of f, and that by definition, the evaluation of g is asymptotically more efficient.

Our main MPC result is to construct a 1-bit leakage protocol for such functions from any passive protocol for f that is secure up to additive errors and any active protocol for g. An important result by Genkin et al. (STOC ’14) shows how the classic protocols by Goldreich et al. (STOC ’87) and Ben-Or et al. (STOC ’88) naturally support this property, which allows to instantiate our compiler with two-party and multi-party protocols.

A key technical result we prove is that the passive protocol for distributed garbling due to Beaver et al. (STOC ’90) is in fact secure up to additive errors against malicious adversaries, thereby, yielding another powerful instantiation of our paradigm in the constant-round multi-party setting.

As another concrete example of instantiating our approach, we present a novel protocol for computing perfect matching that is secure in the 1-bit leakage model and whose communication complexity is less than the honest-but-curious implementations of textbook algorithms for perfect matching.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Blazing Fast OT for Three-Round UC OT Extension

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One could instead use commitments for the translation table, but this would require the check circuit to implement the cryptographic verification procedure of the decommitments. In some circumstances AES-based commitments (or other methods) might be concretely better than decoding the VSS.

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Titel: Going Beyond Dual Execution: MPC for Functions with Efficient Verification
verfasst von: Carmit Hazay
Abhi Shelat
Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2020
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-45387-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-45388-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45388-6_12

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