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First presented on the plenary panel on the Bloomington School at the 50th Anniversary Public Choice Society Annual Meetings in New Orleans, March 2013.
Elinor (Lin) and Vincent Ostrom spent their lives creating a school of institutional analysis that focused on the power of human creativity to solve collective human dilemmas. The Ostroms used the abstract methods and language of public choice theory, but their appreciation of human capability and self-governing kept them solidly grounded in real world decision-making. This belief led to their rich analytic approach to understanding human institutional design, which combined theoretical analysis, laboratory experiments, and empirical fieldwork. This essay identifies the major themes that formed the Bloomington School—the importance of constitutional design and self-governance, federalism and polycentric orders, the challenge of institutional design to solve social dilemmas, the importance of using multiple approaches (analytic, laboratory experiments, and careful field work) to understand important social problems., and a personal examination of the Ostrom’s lasting impact for public choice and public policy. Lin’s and Vincent’s lives and their academic careers came together to create their significant contributions. Observing how they collaborated and inspired students and colleagues provides a model for generations of scholars.
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- Governing their commons: Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and the Bloomington School
Roberta Q. Herzberg
- Springer US
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