nach oben

Erschienen in:

2022 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

12. Government and Market Reform Report Recommendations for Compensation or Remiuneration

verfasst von : Francesco de Zwart

Erschienen in: The Key Code and Advanced Handbook for the Governance and Supervision of Banks in Australia

Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Chapter 12 of the Key Code and Advanced Handbook examines government and market reform report recommendations for compensation or remuneration beginning with the recommendations of the Walker Review 2009 including the Compensation/Remuneration Committee and remuneration policy, executives and ‘high end’ employees, an overview of the Walker Review 2009 recommendations and ‘say-on-pay’ shareholder votes. We then examine the OECD Key Findings of 2009, the absence of pay for performance and Moody’s challenges for executive compensation as a forerunner to reviewing the existing compensation variables from Stage 1. These include a summary of the studies and relational effect paths for the [DirCEO$] (+/−), [EqOptIncent] (+), [EqOptEntrch] (−) and [CompCom] (+/−) variables.

There follows an examination of the Compensation/Remuneration Committee and high end employees to identify the risk ‘alignment’ effect and risk ‘failure’ effect of equity and options as well as the Compensation/Remuneration Committee variables for risk alignment with shareholders and risk-taking in excess of risk appetite. Here, there is emphasis on the significant [EqOptRiskAlignHighEnd] (+) and [EqOptRiskFailHighEnd] (−) variables.

Section 12.6 adds new governance variables for Compensation/Remuneration Committee composition, functions and policies in the ASX Principles and Recommendations, APRA’s Revised Draft CPS 511, the Walker Review 2009, APRA Final Report and the NAB Self-Assessment 2018. There follows the NAB Self-Assessment 2018 responsibilities for the Compensation/Remuneration Committee and governance variables for Compensation/Remuneration Committee functions and policies in the OECD Key Findings 2009 and the OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices.

We examine the IIF Risk-based incentive principles, long-term profitability adjusted for cost of capital, risk-taking and risk appetite, adjustments for the ‘risk time horizon’, adjustments for organization as a whole and firm-wide profit, severance pay and transparency and disclosure. Section 12.16 reviews the IIF examples of risk-adjusted compensation and incentives and Sect. 12.17 reviews the disclosure of bands and elements of compensation for executives and high end employees and anonymous disclosure of pay ‘bands’ for ‘high end’ employees.

The Chapter then moves to examine relevant restrictions, delay, lock-up, deferral and clawback of incentive payments with the associated relational effect paths. Relevant principles include that remuneration should not promote excessive risks and principles relating to ‘material risk takers’, deferral, ‘malus/forfeiture’ provisions and ‘clawback’ including the APRA Final Report findings for risk adjustments and variable remuneration. There follows variables for failure to adjust pay bonuses for risks incurred for low level employees, required minimum shareholdings of executive board members, executives and high end employees including vesting arrangements and ‘skin in the game’ shareholdings and ‘retention’ vesting arrangements.

We then examine formal codes of conduct for remuneration consultants including use of the code by the Compensation/Remuneration Committee to engage advisers. We conclude with significant variables for incentive payments and bonuses to be calculated by economic profit and not revenue, remuneration design adjustments for the firm’s risk appetite, cost of capital and liquidity risk, adjusting pay benchmarks for risk and remuneration consequences for breaches of company risk appetite limits, internal procedures and legal requirements.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Vorheriges Kapitel Approach and Structure of Part 4 Has a Risk-Taking Focus

Nächstes Kapitel FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (FSBP) and FSB Implementation Standards (FSBIS)

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Prudential Inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Final Report, 30 April 2018, (APRA Final Report), accessed 1 June 2018 at www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/.../CBA-Prudential-Inquiry_Final-Report_30042018.pdf, section 8, Remuneration, pp 65–79.

David Walker, A review of corporate governance in UK Banks and other financial industry entities, Final recommendations, 26 November 2009, The Walker Review secretariat, accessed 14 March 2017 at http://www.http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf (‘Walker Review 2009’), Para 7.7, p 108

Ibid, Recommendation 28, p 108.

The Bank for International Settlements, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Guidelines, Corporate Governance Principles for Banks, July 2015, accessed 21 March 2017 at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.htm, (‘BCBS Guidelines 2015’), Para 76, pp 17–18.

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Para 7.8, p 108.

Ibid, Para 7.10, p 109.

Ibid, Para 7.9, p 109 and Recommendation 29, p 110.

Ibid, Executive summary and recommendations, pp 20–22.

Ibid, Recommendation 28, p 20.

Ibid, Recommendation 29, p 20.

Ibid, Recommendation 30, p 21.

Ibid, Recommendation 31, p 21.

Ibid, Recommendation 32, p 21.

Ibid, Recommendation 33, p 21.

Ibid, Recommendation 34, p 22.

Ibid, Recommendation 35, p 22.

Ibid, Recommendation 36, p 22.

Ibid, Recommendation 37, p 22.

Ibid, Recommendation 38/39, p 22.

OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages, June 2009, approved for publication 29 May 2009, accessed 12 April 2017 at www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.pdf, (‘OECD Key Findings 2009’), p 22.

Ibid, p 24 citing S. Davis, 2007, “Does “say on pay” work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable”, The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance Policy Briefing Paper, 1.

See discussion in section 10.2.3.1 in Francesco de Zwart, Enhancing Firm Sustainability Through Governance, The Relational Corporate Governance Approach, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Corporations, Globalisation and the Law Series, July 2015, (‘Stage 1’), chapter 10, pp 299–304.

For Stage 1, see also, Francesco de Zwart, “Enhancing firm sustainability through governance – Part 1: The challenge of corporate governance” (2018) 33(2) Aust Jnl of Corp Law 144 and Francesco de Zwart, “Enhancing firm sustainability through governance – Part 2: The framework of the relational corporate governance approach” (2019) 34(1) Aust Jnl of Corp Law 27.

OECD Key Findings 2009, above n 20, Governance of the remuneration process, pp 7-8.

Ibid, p 16.

Ibid, p 30.

OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis, Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles, 24 February 2010, accessed 11 May 2017 at www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/44679170.pdf, (‘OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices’), pp 8-9.

Ibid, Para 22, p 9.

Ibid, Para 23, p 9.

Lutgart A A Van Den Berghe, “To What Extent is the Financial Crisis a Governance Crisis? From Diagnosis to Possible Remedies”, (27 May 2009), accessed 4 April 2017 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410455, 11.

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 69. See discussion in Sect. 12.6 below.

Christian Plath, Corporate Governance in the Credit Crisis: Key Considerations for Investors, Moody’s Global Corporate Governance, November 2008, (20 November 2008), accessed 10 April 2017 at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1309707, (‘Moody’s Challenges 2008’), 4.

Ibid.

APRA Final Report, above n 1, section 8, Remuneration, pp 65–79.

Director/CEO Compensation Levels.

Equity/Option Plans and Holdings of Directors/Executives – Incentive/‘Alignment’ Effect (excludes short-term options).

Equity/Option Plans and Holdings of Directors/Executives – ‘Entrenchment’ Effect (excludes short-term options).

Martijn Cremers, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, and Urs C Peyer, ‘CEO Centrality’, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No 601 (December 2007, Revised May 2008), accessed 5 March 2015 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030107, 1.

See discussion in sections 8.5–8.5.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 246–251.

The terms ‘incentive alignment’ effect and ‘entrenchment’ effect are taken from O Fuerst and S Kang, ‘Corporate Governance, Expected Operating Performance, and Pricing’, accessed 5 March 2015 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=141357, 6–7. See discussion in section 10.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 295–296.

See discussion in section 7.3.1.3.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 203–205.

See the construction of the eight governance factors in sections 2.6.1–2.6.8 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 36–59.

Equity/Option Plans and Holdings of Directors/Executives – Incentive/‘Alignment’ Effect (excludes short-term options).

See discussion in section 2.6.3 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 41–46.

Ibid.

See discussion in section 2.6.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 41–43.

See Figure 2.6 and discussion in sections 2.7–2.7.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 62–65.

Board – Director Skills ‘Mix’. See discussion in section 7.3.1.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 198–201.

Board Independent Director: Executive Director Proportion – Monitoring Effect. See discussion in sections 7.3.2.1.1–7.3.2.1.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 208–212.

See discussion in section 7.3.1.3.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 203–205.

Equity/Option Plans and Holdings of Directors/Executives – ‘Entrenchment’ Effect (excludes short-term options).

Fuerst and Kang, above n 39, 6–7. See discussion in section 10.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 295–296.

OECD Key Findings 2009, above n 20, Governance of the remuneration process, pp 7–8.

See discussion in section 5.2.2.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 112–114.

See discussion in section 10.2.4.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 309.

Fuerst and Kang, above n 39, 6–7. See discussion in section 10.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 295–296.

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 29, p 20.

Ibid, Recommendation 30, p 21.

Ibid, Recommendation 35, p 22.

OECD Key Findings 2009, above n 20, Governance of the remuneration process, pp 7–8.

Ibid.

Moody’s Challenges 2008, above n 31, 4.

Ibid.

See discussion in section 2.6.3 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 41–46.

See discussion in section 2.6.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 41–43.

Australian Securities Exchange, ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, Fourth Edition, February 2019, accessed 10 April 2020, available at https://www.asx.com.au/documents/regulation/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-fourth-edn.pdf (‘2019ASX’).

Ibid, Rec 8.1, p 29.

Ibid, Rec 8.1(a)(1), p 29.

Ibid.

Ibid, Rec 8.1(a)(2), p 29.

Ibid, Rec 8.1(a)(3), p 29.

Ibid, Rec 8.1(a)(4),p 29.

Ibid, Rec 8.1(1)(5), p 29.

Ibid.

Ibid, Commentary to Rec 8.1, p 29.

Ibid.

Ibid, Commentary to Rec 8.1, p 29.

Ibid.

Ibid, Rec 8.2, p 30.

Ibid, Commentary to Rec 8.2, pp 30–31.

Ibid, Box 8.2, p 31.

Ibid.

Ibid

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, Commentary to Rec 8.2, p 30.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, Rec 8.3(a), p 30.

109

Ibid, Rec 8.3(b), p 30.

110

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Revised Draft Prudential Standard CPS 511 Remuneration, November 2020, accessed 19 November 2020, available at: https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/%5Bdate%3Acustom%3AY%5D-%5Bdate%3Acustom%3Am%5D/Revised Draft Prudential Standard CPS 511 Remuneration - Clean - November 2020.pdf (“CPS 511”).

For earlier versions of CPS 511, see Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Draft Prudential Standard CPS 511 Remuneration, July 2019, accessed 30 September 2019, available at:

https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/draft_prudential_standard_cps_511_remuneration_v2.pdf. See also:

Consultation on Remuneration Requirements for all APRA-regulated entities, accessed 22 September 2019, available at https://www.apra.gov.au/consultation-remuneration-requirements-all-apra-regulated-entities; and
Discussion paper: Strengthening prudential requirements for remuneration July 2019, accessed 22 September 2019, available at https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/discussion_paper_strengthening_prudential_requirements_for_remuneration_july_2019_v1.pdf.

Recent pronouncements from APRA in January 2020 state that this draft will be finalised in the first half of 2020 with an expected effective date of July 2021. See:

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Information Paper, APRA’s Policy Priorities, January 2020, accessed 17 February 2020, available at https://www.apra.gov.au/apras-policy-priorities, section 2.1.2 Remuneration and Attachment B: Timelines; and
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Information Paper, APRA’s Supervision Priorities, January 2020, accessed 17 February 2020, available at https://www.apra.gov.au/apras-supervision-priorities, section 2.3.3 Remuneration.

In addition to finalisation of APRA’s Draft Prudential Standard 511 Remuneration, APRA has announced that it intends to consult on revised versions of Prudential Standard CPS 510 Governance, Prudential Standard CPS 220 Risk Management and Prudential Standard 520 Fit and Proper in the second half of 2020 with expected effective dates of 2022. See the above Information Paper, APRA’s Policy Priorities, section 2.1.1 Governance and risk management, section 2.1.3 Accountability and Attachment B: Timelines.

111

Ibid, CPS 511, section 4, pp 3–4.

112

Ibid, section 9(a), p 4.

113

Ibid, section 18(s)(i) and (ii), p 8.

114

Ibid, section 24, p 10.

115

Ibid, section 25, p 10.

116

Ibid, section 26, p 10.

117

Ibid, section 27, p 10.

118

Ibid, section 28, p 10.

119

Ibid, section 18(t), p 8.

120

Ibid, section 29, p 10. For the CPS511 Remuneration Framework, see Sect. 21.1 of Chap. 21 of this Stage 2.

121

Ibid, section 30, pp 10–11.

122

Ibid.

123

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 28, p 20.

124

Ibid, Recommendation 29, p 20.

125

Ibid, Recommendation 30, p 21.

126

Ibid, Recommendation 31, p 21.

127

Ibid, Recommendation 33, p 21.

128

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 66.

129

Ibid.

130

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 34, p 22.

131

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 of this Chap. 12 above.

132

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 34, p 22.

133

Ibid, Recommendation 35, p 22.

134

Ibid, Recommendation 37, p 22.

135

Compensation Committee – Disclosure of Enhanced Benefits and Conditions of Operation – Enhancement in Risk Management and Internal and External Monitoring - relational effect path. See discussion in Sect. 17.3 of Chap. 17 below.

136

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 38/39, p 22.

137

Compensation/Remuneration Committee – Outside Advisers See discussion in Sect. 12.21 of this Chap. 12 below.

138

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 68.

Ibid, 69.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, p 70.

Ibid, p 71.

National Australia Bank, NAB Self-Assessment on Governance, Accountability and Culture, November 2018, accessed 15 March 2019, available at https://www.nab.com.au/content/dam/nabrwd/documents/reports/corporate/nab-self-assessment-2018.pdf (‘NAB Self-Assessment 2018’).

Ibid, p 12.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

OECD Key Findings 2009, above n 20, Governance of the remuneration process, pp 7–8 and 30.

153

Ibid.

154

Compensation/Remuneration Committee - Incentives Tied to Short-Term Share Price for Executives and High End Employees - Risk-Taking in Excess of Risk Appetite – Likelihood of Bank Failure. See discussion in Sect. 16.1 of Chap. 16 below.

155

Transparency and Timing of Reporting – Monitoring Effect. See discussion in section 9.1.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 262–263.

156

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 66.

157

Banks – Compensation/Remuneration Committee – Long-Term Focus for All “High End” Employees – Long-Term Variable Remuneration for All “High End” Employees – Enhancement of Level of Risk-Taking in Alignment with Shareholders (Walker Review 2009 and APRA).

158

Banks - Compensation Committee – Capping the Ratio of Variable to Fixed Compensation for High End Employees - Enhancement of Level of Risk-Taking in Alignment with Shareholders. See discussion in Sect. 16.6 of Chap. 16 below.

159

Compensation/Remuneration Committee – Outside Advisers. See discussion in Sect. 12.21 below.

160

Compensation Committee – Presence, Operation and Frequency. See discussion in section 10.2.4.1 of Stage 1, above n 22.

161

162

Banks – Compensation/Remuneration Committee – Long-Term Variable Remuneration for Performance Actually Realised – Enhancement of Level of Risk-Taking in Alignment with Shareholders.

163

Compensation/Remuneration Committee – Outside Advisers. See discussion in Sect. 12.21 below.

164

OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices, above n 26, pp 8–9.

165

166

Banks – Compensation/Remuneration Committee – Long-Term Variable Remuneration for Performance Actually Realised – Enhancement of Level of Risk-Taking in Alignment with Shareholders.

167

168

Institute of International Finance, Final Report of the IIF Committee on Market Best Practices: Principles of Conduct and Best Practice Recommendations, Financial Services Industry Response to the Market Turmoil of 2007–2008, Washington, DC, July 2008, accessed 24 March 2017 at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/11_CON_GFC/IIF_Final_Report_of_the_Committee_on_Market_Best_Practices.pdf (‘IIF Final Report 2008’), Principle II., Compensation Policies, p 49.

169

Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Report of the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, 11 February 2009, Financial Market Trends, Vol 2009/1, ISSN 1995–2864, accessed 27 March 2017 at http://search.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42229620.pdf, (‘OECD Kirkpatrick Report 2009’), 15.

170

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, Principle II.i, p 49.

171

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 66.

172

Ibid.

173

For a discussion of the bank’s risk appetite, see Chap. 40 below.

174

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, Principle II.ii, p 49.

175

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

176

Ibid.

177

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, Principle II.iii, p 49. See also OECD Kirkpatrick Report 2009, above n 165, 15.

178

Fuerst and Kang, above n 39, 6–7. See discussion in section 10.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 295–296.

179

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, Principle II.iv, p 49.

180

Ibid, Principle II.v, p 49.

181

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 of this Chap. 12 above.

182

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, Principle II.vii, p 49.

183

Ibid, Discussion of Principles of Conduct II.i – II.vii, p 50.

184

Ibid, 50.

185

Ibid.

186

Ibid. The OECD Kirkpatrick Report 2009, above n 171, 16 further explained this issue:

These issues were picked up in the UBS report, which noted that the compensation and incentive structure did not effectively differentiate between the creation of alpha (i.e. return in excess of defined expectation) versus return from a low cost of funding. In the case of UBS, the internal cost of funds did not take account of risk so that the traders involved in sub-prime could obtain finance at a low cost. This made sub-prime an attractive asset to carry long. Super senior tranches carried low margins so that the incentive was to expand positions to achieve a given level of bonus…Essentially, bonuses were measured against gross revenue after personal costs, with no formal account taken of the quality or sustainability of those earnings. Senior management, on the other hand, received a greater proportion of deferred equity.

187

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 of this Chap. 12 above.

188

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, p 50.

Ibid, p 51.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

194

Ibid.

195

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, p 51.

196

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 of this Chap. 12 above.

197

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

198

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 34, p 22.

199

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

200

IIF Final Report 2008, above n 170, p 51.

201

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

202

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 31, p 21.

203

Ibid, Recommendation 32, p 21.

204

Ibid, Recommendation 37, p 22.

205

OECD Key Findings 2009, above n 20, Governance of the remuneration process, pp 7–8.

206

BCBS Guidelines 2015, above n 4, Para 153, p 36.

207

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, 2004, OECD Publications Service, Paris ‘(OECD Principles 2004’). See http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_37439,00.html (accessed 6 March 2015). See now G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 30 November 2015, accessed 29 July 2015 at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/g20-oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance-2015_9789264236882-en (‘G20/OECD 2015 Principles’).

208

BCBS Guidelines 2015, above n 4, Para 154, p 36.

209

Transparency and timing of Reporting – Monitoring Effect. See discussion in section 9.1.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 262–263.

210

See discussion in section 2.6.5 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 47–51.

211

See discussion in section 2.6.7 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 51–58.

212

Board – Director Skills ‘Mix’ - see Figure 7.2 and discussion in section 7.3.1.2.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 198–201.

213

Board Independent Director: Executive Director Proportion – Monitoring Effect – see discussion in sections 7.3.2.1.1–7.3.2.1.2 of Stage 1, above 22, pp 208–212.

214

See discussion in section 2.6.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 41–43.

215

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Para 7.11, p 110.

216

Ibid.

217

Ibid, Recommendation 30, p 110.

218

Ibid, Para 7.13, p 111.

219

Ibid, Para 7.15, pp 111–112.

220

Ibid, Recommendation 31, p 113.

221

OECD Key Findings 2009, above n 20, p 21.

222

BCBS Guidelines 2015, above n 4, Para 148, p 148.

223

Ibid, Para 150, pp 34–35.

224

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 33, Para 7.34, p 117 (format altered and bullet-points added).

225

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 66.

226

Bernard S Sharfman, Steven J Toll and Alan Szydlowski, “Wall Street’s Corporate Governance Crisis” (2009) 17(1) Corporate Governance Advisor 5–8, Jan/Feb 2009, (2 March 2009) accessed 10 April 2017 at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1299879, 6.

227

Ibid.

228

Ibid.

229

Van Den Berghe, above n 29, 12 (footnote omitted).

230

Ibid.

231

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 67.

232

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

233

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 72.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, p 73.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. APRA cites Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Prudential Practice Guide PPG 511 Remuneration, November 2009.

247

APRA Final Report, above n 1, p 73.

248

Ibid, pp 73–74.

249

Ibid, p 74.

250

Ibid. See also the more general recommendations in Recommendations 23 and 24, ibid, pp 74–75.

Ibid, p 75.

Ibid.

Ibid, p 76.

Ibid, Recommendation 25, p 78 (emphasis in original).

Ibid, p 78.

Ibid, p 78.

Ibid, p 69

Ibid, p 78.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, Recommendation 26, p 79.

264

OECD Key Findings 2009, above n 20, p 17.

265

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

266

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Para 7.35, p 118.

267

Ibid, Recommendation 34, p 118.

268

See discussion in section 10.2.5.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 311–312.

269

See discussion in section 10.2.4 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 303–309.

270

Ibid.

271

See discussion in section 10.2.5.1 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 311–312.

272

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Recommendation 38/39, p 22.

273

OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices, above n 26, Para 26, p 10.

274

Ibid, Para 27, p 10.

275

Ibid, Para 30, p 11.

276

[OutBrdAdv] (+) variable – Outside/External Board Advisers. See discussion in section 7.3.2.1.2 of Stage 1, above n 22, pp 211–212.

277

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

278

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Para 7.24, pp 114–115.

279

BCBS Guidelines 2015, above n 4, Para 149, p 34.

280

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

281

Walker Review 2009, above n 2, Para 7.36, p 118.

282

Ibid, Para 7.37, p 118.

283

Ibid.

284

Ibid, Recommendation 35, p 119.

285

Ibid, Recommendation 35, p 22.

286

BCBS Guidelines 2015, above n 4, Para 149, p 150.

287

See discussion in Sect. 12.5 above.

Titel: Government and Market Reform Report Recommendations for Compensation or Remiuneration
verfasst von: Francesco de Zwart
Verlag: Springer Nature Singapore
Buch: The Key Code and Advanced Handbook for the Governance and Supervision of Banks in Australia
Print ISBN: 978-981-16-1709-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-16-1710-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1710-2_12

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"