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Über dieses Buch

This book constitutes revised selected papers from the 4th International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security, GraMSec 2017, held in Santa Barbara, CA, USA, in August 2017. The 5 full and 4 short papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 19 submissions. The book also contains one invited paper from the WISER project. The contributions deal with the latest research and developments on graphical models for security.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Graphical Modeling of Security Arguments: Current State and Future Directions

Abstract
Identifying threats and risks to complex systems often requires some form of brainstorming. In addition, eliciting security requirements involves making traceable decisions about which risks to mitigate and how. The complexity and dynamics of modern socio-technical systems mean that their security cannot be formally proven. Instead, some researchers have turned to modeling the claims underpinning a risk assessment and the arguments which support security decisions. As a result, several argumentation-based risk analysis and security requirements elicitation frameworks have been proposed. These draw upon existing research in decision making and requirements engineering. Some provide tools to graphically model the underlying argumentation structures, with varying degrees of granularity and formalism. In this paper, we compare these approaches, discuss their applicability and suggest avenues for future research. We find that the core of existing security argumentation frameworks are the links between threats, risks, mitigations and system components. Graphs - a natural representation for these links - are used by many graphical security argumentation tools. But, in order to be human-readable, the graphical models of these graphs need to be both scalable and easy to understand. Therefore, in order to facilitate adoption, both the creation and exploration of these graphs need to be streamlined.
Dan Ionita, Margaret Ford, Alexandr Vasenev, Roel Wieringa

Evil Twins: Handling Repetitions in Attack–Defense Trees

A Survival Guide
Abstract
Attack–defense trees are a simple but potent and efficient way to represent and evaluate security scenarios involving a malicious attacker and a defender – their adversary. The nodes of attack–defense trees are labeled with goals of the two actors, and actions that they need to execute to achieve these goals. The objective of this paper is to provide formal guidelines on how to deal with attack–defense trees where several nodes have the same label. After discussing typical issues related to such trees, we define the notion of well-formed attack–defense trees and adapt existing semantics to correctly capture the presence of repeated labels.
Angèle Bossuat, Barbara Kordy

Visualizing Cyber Security Risks with Bow-Tie Diagrams

Abstract
Safety and security risks are usually analyzed independently, by different people using different tools. Consequently, the system analyst may fail to realize cyber attacks as a contributing factor to safety impacts or, on the contrary, design overly secure systems that will compromise the performance of critical operations. This paper presents a methodology for visualizing and assessing security risks by means of bow-tie diagrams, which are commonly used within safety assessments. We outline how malicious activities, random failures, security countermeasures and safety barriers can be visualized using a common graphical notation and propose a method for quantifying risks based on threat likelihood and consequence severity. The methodology is demonstrated using a case study from maritime communication. Our main conclusion is that adding security concepts to the bow-ties is a promising approach, since this is a notation that high-risk industries are already familiar with. However, their advantage as easy-to-grasp visual models should be maintained, hence complexity needs to be kept low.
Karin Bernsmed, Christian Frøystad, Per Håkon Meland, Dag Atle Nesheim, Ørnulf Jan Rødseth

CSIRA: A Method for Analysing the Risk of Cybersecurity Incidents

Abstract
Analysing risk is critical for dealing with cybersecurity incidents. However, there is no explicit method for analysing risk during cybersecurity incidents, since existing methods focus on identifying the risks that a system might face throughout its life. This paper presents a method for analysing the risk of cybersecurity incidents based on an incident risk analysis model, a method for eliciting likelihoods based on the oddness of events and a method for categorising the potential ramifications of cybersecurity incidents.
Aitor Couce-Vieira, Siv Hilde Houmb, David Ríos-Insua

Quantitative Evaluation of Attack Defense Trees Using Stochastic Timed Automata

Abstract
Security analysis is without doubt one of the most important issues in a society relying heavily on computer infrastructure. Unfortunately security analysis is also very difficult due to the complexity of systems. This is bad enough when dealing with ones own computer systems - but nowadays organisations rely on third-party services - cloud services - along with their own in-house systems. Combined this makes it overwhelming difficult to obtain an overview of possible attack scenarios. Luckily, some formalisms such as attack trees exist that can help security analysts. However, temporal behaviour of the attacker is rarely considered by these formalisms.
In this paper we build upon previous work on attack-defence trees to build a proper temporal semantics. We consider the attack-defence tree a reachability objective for an attacker and thereby separate the attacker logic from the attack-defence tree. We give a temporal stochastic semantics for arbitrary attackers (adhering to certain requirements to make the attacker “sane”) and we allow annotating attacker actions with time-dependent costs. Furthermore, we define what we call a cost-preserving attacker profile and we define a parameterised attacker profile. The defined semantics is implemented via a translation to uppaal SMC. Using uppaal SMC we answer various questions such as the expected cost of an attack, we find the probability of a successful attack and we even show how an attacker can find an optimal parameter setting using ANOVA and Tukeys test.
René Rydhof Hansen, Peter Gjøl Jensen, Kim Guldstrand Larsen, Axel Legay, Danny Bøgsted Poulsen

Probabilistic Modeling of Insider Threat Detection Systems

Abstract
Due to the high consequences of poorly performing automated insider threat detection systems (ITDSs), it is advantageous for Government and commercial organizations to understand the performance and limitations of potential systems before their deployment. We propose to capture the uncertainties and dynamics of organizations deploying ITDSs to create an accurate and effective probabilistic graphical model that forecasts the operational performance of an ITDS throughout its deployment. Ultimately, we believe this modeling methodology will result in the deployment of more effective ITDSs.
Brian Ruttenberg, Dave Blumstein, Jeff Druce, Michael Howard, Fred Reed, Leslie Wilfong, Crystal Lister, Steve Gaskin, Meaghan Foley, Dan Scofield

Security Modeling for Embedded System Design

Abstract
Among the many recent cyber attacks, the Mirai botnet DDOS attacks were carried out using infected IoTs. To prevent our connected devices from being thus compromised, their security vulnerabilities should be detected and mitigated early. This paper presents how the SysML-Sec Methodology has been enhanced for the evolving graphical modeling of security through the three stages of our embedded system design methodology: Analysis, HW/SW Partitioning, and Software Analysis. The security requirements and attack graphs generated during the Analysis phase determine the sensitive data and attacker model during the HW/SW Partitioning phase. We then accordingly generate a secured model with communication protection modeled using abstract security representations, which can then be translated into a Software/System Design Model. The Software Model is intended as the final detailed model of the system. Throughout the design process, formal verification and simulation evaluate safety, security, and performance of the system.
Letitia W. Li, Florian Lugou, Ludovic Apvrille

Circle of Health Based Access Control for Personal Health Information Systems

Abstract
Patients can track, manage, and share their personal health information (PHI). There are security concerns with the ownership and custodianship of PHI. Traditional provider-facing access control (AC) policies have been applied to many patient-facing applications without consideration as to whether these controls are comprehensible and sufficient. We have conducted a scoping literature review of on AC and patient privacy (n = 31) to identify the state of knowledge and to understand what is being done to address this gap. Synthesizing the results we propose Circle of Health Based AC, a graphical patient-centric AC model. The model has been validated with a panel of user experience, healthcare, and security experts. This work will discuss the scoping literature review and describe the proposed model and justification for it’s applications for user-defined access policy.
Ryan Habibi, Jens Weber, Morgan Price

New Directions in Attack Tree Research: Catching up with Industrial Needs

Abstract
Attack trees provide a systematic way of characterizing diverse system threats. Their strengths arise from the combination of an intuitive representation of possible attacks and availability of formal mathematical frameworks for analyzing them in a qualitative or a quantitative manner. Indeed, the mathematical frameworks have become a large focus of attack tree research. However, practical applications of attack trees in industry largely remain a tedious and error-prone exercise.
Recent research directions in attack trees, such as attack tree generation, attempt to close this gap and to improve the attack tree state-of-the-practice. In this position paper we outline the recurrent challenges in manual tree design within industry, and we overview the recent research results in attack trees that help the practitioners. For the challenges that have not yet been addressed by the community, we propose new promising research directions.
Olga Gadyatskaya, Rolando Trujillo-Rasua

Employing Graphical Risk Models to Facilitate Cyber-Risk Monitoring - the WISER Approach

Abstract
We present a method for developing machine-readable cyber-risk assessment algorithms based on graphical risk models, along with a framework that can automatically collect the input, execute the algorithms, and present the assessment results to a decision maker. This facilitates continuous monitoring of cyber-risk. The intended users of the method are professionals and practitioners interested in developing new algorithms for a specific organization, system or attack type, such as consultants or dedicated cyber-risk experts in larger organizations. For the assessment results, the intended users are decision makers in charge of countermeasure selection from an overall business perspective.
Aleš Černivec, Gencer Erdogan, Alejandra Gonzalez, Atle Refsdal, Antonio Alvarez Romero

Backmatter

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