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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Group Size and Gossip Strategies: An ABM Tool for Investigating Reputation-Based Cooperation

verfasst von : Francesca Giardini, Mario Paolucci, Diana Adamatti, Rosaria Conte

Erschienen in: Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XV

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain cooperation. There are two main paths through which social control can be applied: punishment and reputation. Using a Public Goods Game, we show that gossip, used for assortment under three different strategies, can be effective in large groups, whereas its efficacy is reduced in small groups, with no main effect of the gossiping strategy. We also test four different combinations of gossip and costly punishment, showing that a combination of punishment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation rates.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Partner Selection Delays Extinction in Cooperative and Coordination Dilemmas

Nächstes Kapitel Automatic Generation of Agent Behavior Models from Raw Observational Data

The model can be downloaded at http://labss.istc.cnr.it/code/punishment-and- reputation.

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Titel: Group Size and Gossip Strategies: An ABM Tool for Investigating Reputation-Based Cooperation
verfasst von: Francesca Giardini
Mario Paolucci
Diana Adamatti
Rosaria Conte
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XV
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-14626-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-14627-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14627-0_8

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