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Erschienen in: Empirical Economics 4/2018

01.07.2017

Guarding giants: resource commons quality and informal property rights in big-wave surfing

verfasst von: Franklin G. Mixon Jr., Steven B. Caudill

Erschienen in: Empirical Economics | Ausgabe 4/2018

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Abstract

This study extends prior empirical research on issues associated with the common-pool resource represented by surf breaks (i.e., surfing locations) by (1) creating an alternative, perhaps more objective metric, based on a logistic transformation of pairwise comparisons of the results of big-wave surfing competitions, of surf break quality, (2) applying the alternative surf break quality metric to “big-wave” surf breaks and (3) varying the test area by examining big-wave surf breaks worldwide. The results presented here are perhaps even more compelling than those from prior research—indicating that a marginal increase in surf break quality leads to a relatively large increase—in this case more than 30% points—in the probability of observing fierce localism at surf breaks. The finding here of a larger marginal effect of surf break quality on localism in big-wave surfing than in traditional surfing supports the idea that big-wave surfing and traditional surfing represent distinct markets, characterized by different technologies and inherent dangers, such that localism at big-wave surf breaks exceeds that at traditional surf breaks in terms of ferocity, ceteris paribus. Although this study focuses specifically on the relationship between surf break quality and localism, our research highlights the importance of informal property rights protection of common-pool resources.

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Fußnoten
1
For an example, Kaffine (2009) references the historical case of the creation of mineral rights across the Western states of the USA.
 
2
Kaffine (2009: 728) highlights this equivalence by questioning whether the observation of a high-quality common-pool resource accompanied by strong property rights is the result of the incentives created by strong property rights to invest in resource quality or instead the result of users’ recognition of the resources’ high quality and, given that recognition, users’ establishment of strong property rights.
 
3
As Kaffine (2009) indicates, informal “territorial” systems are found in lobster fisheries of coastal Maine (Acheson 1998) and with surf breaks (Rider 1998; Nazer 2004).
 
4
We are grateful to a referee for suggesting that we provide this type of discussion.
 
5
Given that big-wave surfing involves waves 20 or more feet tall, traditional surfing, as referred to here, is defined as surfing of smaller waves.
 
6
This introduction occurred at the famed Hawaiian surf break known informally as “Jaws,” and officially as Peahi (Struck 2013).
 
9
Additionally, the water pressure at a depth beyond 20 feet can be great enough to lead to eardrum rupture (http://​surf-stuff.​blogspot.​com/​2007/​12/​dangers-of-big-wave-surfing.​html).
 
10
This type of danger highlights why it is important to know how to swim out of these situations. Techniques for doing so have been developed, such as the Sloane weight drag/ free reef grab and pressure jet drag (Struck 2013).
 
13
Hamilton’s conclusion is supported by the plurality of big-wave fatalities, using the abbreviated list presented in this study, occurring at Mavericks.
 
14
Similarly, Laird points out that if the trade winds at Peahi are blowing 35 knots and wave faces are 70 feet high, there are essential pieces of equipment—the smallest board (complete with foot straps) one can ride and a jet ski.
 
15
Kaffine (2009: 729) adds that many local surfers feel that they own a surf break after surfing it for years, thus replicating patterns of behavior that have been observed in common-pool lobster fisheries (Acheson 1988). According to Mixon (2014), an extreme example of “local surfer ownership” is the famed Mavericks surf break near San Francisco/San Mateo County, where legendary big-wave surfer Jeff Clark surfed alone for 15 years after discovering the extraordinary break from above, on his school’s campus grounds. Clark eventually got lonely and introduced the break to other big-wave surfers (Peralta and George 2004; Surfline.​com).
 
16
Kaffine (2009: 731) points out that treating surf break quality as exogenous isolates the incentives locals have to close the surf break.
 
17
See Kaffine (2009) for comprehensive coverage of the formal analytics of localism at surf breaks. Also, Mixon (2014) summarizes, in greater detail than is done here, Kaffine’s formal analysis.
 
18
Founded in 1973, Billabong International Limited is an Australia-based retailer of sporting goods and apparel. These Billabong-sponsored awards are given in each of three categories—biggest paddle, best tube and biggest overall wave categories—in addition to ride of the year. In each case, a winner is chosen from a list of finalists (nominees).
 
19
For example, the 20 Billabong XXL awards from 2008 through 2012 were won by 15 different surfers, who performed on 10 different big-wave surf breaks. These two proportions are not statistically different at the usual significance levels.
 
20
As Mixon (2014) points out, surf breaks located near river mouths are typically dirtier (in terms of bacteria, etc.) than other surf breaks. A unique example of surf break dirtiness is a south Los Angeles-area surf break known as Shitpipe (Dirty = 8), which is located across from the Hyperion Sewage Treatment Plant. Paddling difficulty measures the difficulty that surfers face in getting from the shore to the lineup. An extreme example of paddling is that of Mavericks (Work = 10), for which Surfline.​com explains, in great detail, how to reach the lineup using multiple paddling routes.
 
21
Examples found in Mixon (2014) regarding access difficulty are provided with the questions: Is descending a cliff necessary in order to access the shoreline? Is the surf break accessible by way of watercraft only?
 
22
Mixon (2014) finds the expected negative result for the Dirty coefficient estimate, however that estimate is not significant at the usual levels.
 
23
Kaffine (2009: 739), on the other hand, finds that Work is both negatively and significantly related to Localism, supporting (1) the idea that, because informal property rights enforcement occurs during the paddle out to, and in, the lineup, policing the surf break is much easier when the ocean is calm during the paddle-out process and (2) the possibility that an elevated paddling difficulty, owing to the vigor of the ocean swells, may naturally cull the herd and reduce the need to enforce localism.
 
24
Kaffine (2009) and Mixon (2014) contend that surf break remoteness, as measured by larger values of Access, relates directly to the ability of locals to mete out punishment to nonlocals without incurring the wrath of local law enforcement, which also faces greater access costs to the shoreline and its associated surf break.
 
25
As Mixon (2014) points out, the OLS estimations reported in Table 3 assume, and perhaps erroneously so, that the measures of localism are equally spaced (i.e., that the difference between localism measures of 3 and 4 is the same as the difference between localism measures of 7 and 8).
 
26
Mixon (2014) again finds the expected negative result for the Dirty coefficient estimate, however that estimate remains statistically insignificant.
 
27
As stated earlier, the results in Kaffine (2009) and Mixon (2014) support the contention that surf break remoteness creates greater access costs to the shoreline and its associated surf break for local law enforcement, perhaps giving local surfers wider latitude in meting out punishment to nonlocals.
 
28
Replacing the index variables with four separate dummy variables series, as in Mixon (2014), would have been ideal. However, degrees of freedom limitations precluded such a substitution.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Guarding giants: resource commons quality and informal property rights in big-wave surfing
verfasst von
Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
Steven B. Caudill
Publikationsdatum
01.07.2017
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Empirical Economics / Ausgabe 4/2018
Print ISSN: 0377-7332
Elektronische ISSN: 1435-8921
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-017-1273-y

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